63c79122e0
This partitions the session ID space of the internal cache by version, which is nominally something we want, but we must check the version externally anyway for both tickets and external session cache. That makes this measure redundant. (Servers generate session IDs and 2^256 is huge, so there would never accidentally be a collision.) This cuts down on the "key" in the internal session cache, which will simplify adding something like an lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve_key function. (LHASH is currently lax about keys because it can freely stack-allocate partially-initialized structs. C++ is a bit more finicky about this.) Change-Id: I656fd9dbf023dccb163d2e8049eff8f1f9a0e21b Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29585 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> |
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| .. | ||
| curve25519 | ||
| ed25519 | ||
| poly1305 | ||
| alert.go | ||
| cert.pem | ||
| chacha20_poly1305_test.go | ||
| chacha20_poly1305.go | ||
| channel_id_key.pem | ||
| cipher_suites.go | ||
| common.go | ||
| conn.go | ||
| deterministic.go | ||
| dtls.go | ||
| ecdsa_p224_cert.pem | ||
| ecdsa_p224_key.pem | ||
| ecdsa_p256_cert.pem | ||
| ecdsa_p256_key.pem | ||
| ecdsa_p384_cert.pem | ||
| ecdsa_p384_key.pem | ||
| ecdsa_p521_cert.pem | ||
| ecdsa_p521_key.pem | ||
| ed25519_cert.pem | ||
| ed25519_key.pem | ||
| fuzzer_mode.json | ||
| handshake_client.go | ||
| handshake_messages.go | ||
| handshake_server.go | ||
| hkdf_test.go | ||
| hkdf.go | ||
| key_agreement.go | ||
| key.pem | ||
| packet_adapter.go | ||
| prf.go | ||
| recordingconn.go | ||
| rsa_1024_cert.pem | ||
| rsa_1024_key.pem | ||
| rsa_chain_cert.pem | ||
| rsa_chain_key.pem | ||
| runner_test.go | ||
| runner.go | ||
| shim_ticket.go | ||
| sign.go | ||
| test_output.go | ||
| ticket.go | ||
| tls.go | ||