c8b6b4fe4a
We'd previously been assuming we'd want to predict P-256 and X25519 but, on reflection, that's nonsense. Although, today, P-256 is widespread and X25519 is less so, that's not the right question to ask. Those servers are all 1.2. The right question is whether we believe enough servers will get to TLS 1.3 before X25519 to justify wasting 64 bytes on all other connections. Given that OpenSSL has already shipped X25519 and Microsoft was doing interop testing on X25519 around when we were shipping it, I think the answer is no. Moreover, if we are wrong, it will be easier to go from predicting one group to two rather than the inverse (provided we send a fake one with GREASE). I anticipate prediction-miss HelloRetryRequest logic across the TLS/TCP ecosystem will be largely untested (no one wants to pay an RTT), so taking a group out of the predicted set will likely be a risky operation. Only predicting one group also makes things a bit simpler. I haven't done this here, but we'll be able to fold the 1.2 and 1.3 ecdh_ctx's together, even. Change-Id: Ie7e42d3105aca48eb9d97e2e05a16c5379aa66a3 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/10960 Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> |
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| .github | ||
| crypto | ||
| decrepit | ||
| fuzz | ||
| include/openssl | ||
| infra/config | ||
| ssl | ||
| third_party/android-cmake | ||
| tool | ||
| util | ||
| .clang-format | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| API-CONVENTIONS.md | ||
| BUILDING.md | ||
| CMakeLists.txt | ||
| codereview.settings | ||
| CONTRIBUTING.md | ||
| FUZZING.md | ||
| INCORPORATING.md | ||
| LICENSE | ||
| PORTING.md | ||
| README.md | ||
| STYLE.md | ||
BoringSSL
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful:
- PORTING.md: how to port OpenSSL-using code to BoringSSL.
- BUILDING.md: how to build BoringSSL
- INCORPORATING.md: how to incorporate BoringSSL into a project.
- API-CONVENTIONS.md: general API conventions for BoringSSL consumers and developers.
- STYLE.md: rules and guidelines for coding style.
- include/openssl: public headers with API documentation in comments. Also available online.
- FUZZING.md: information about fuzzing BoringSSL.
- CONTRIBUTING.md: how to contribute to BoringSSL.