|
- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <assert.h>
-
- #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/hmac.h>
- #include <openssl/mem.h>
- #include <openssl/obj.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-
- #include "ssl_locl.h"
- static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
- SSL_SESSION **psess);
- static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
- static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
-
- SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
- tls1_export_keying_material,
- 0,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
- ssl3_set_handshake_header,
- ssl3_handshake_write,
- ssl3_add_to_finished_hash,
- };
-
- SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
- tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
- ssl3_set_handshake_header,
- ssl3_handshake_write,
- ssl3_add_to_finished_hash,
- };
-
- SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
- tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
- |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
- ssl3_set_handshake_header,
- ssl3_handshake_write,
- ssl3_add_to_finished_hash,
- };
-
- static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2)
- {
- uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t*)p1);
- uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t*)p2);
- if (u1 < u2)
- {
- return -1;
- }
- else if (u1 > u2)
- {
- return 1;
- }
- else
- {
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be more
- * than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. This
- * function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
- * out. */
- static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs)
- {
- CBS extensions = *cbs;
- size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
- uint16_t *extension_types = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
-
- /* First pass: count the extensions. */
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0)
- {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
- {
- goto done;
- }
-
- num_extensions++;
- }
-
- if (num_extensions == 0)
- {
- return 1;
- }
-
- extension_types = (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions);
- if (extension_types == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_check_duplicate_extensions, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
- extensions = *cbs;
- for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++)
- {
- CBS extension;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
- {
- /* This should not happen. */
- goto done;
- }
- }
- assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0);
-
- /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
- qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t);
- for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++)
- {
- if (extension_types[i-1] == extension_types[i])
- {
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 1;
- done:
- if (extension_types)
- OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
- return ret;
- }
-
- char ssl_early_callback_init(struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx)
- {
- CBS client_hello, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods, extensions;
-
- CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len);
-
- /* Skip client version. */
- if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2))
- return 0;
-
- /* Skip client nonce. */
- if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 32))
- return 0;
-
- /* Extract session_id. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id))
- return 0;
- ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id);
- ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id);
-
- /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ctx->ssl))
- {
- CBS cookie;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie))
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Extract cipher_suites. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
- CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 ||
- (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0)
- return 0;
- ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites);
- ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites);
-
- /* Extract compression_methods. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
- CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1)
- return 0;
- ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods);
- ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods);
-
- /* If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any
- * extensions. (E.g. SSLv3.) */
- if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0)
- {
- ctx->extensions = NULL;
- ctx->extensions_len = 0;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) ||
- !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) ||
- CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0)
- return 0;
- ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions);
- ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions);
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- char
- SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
- uint16_t extension_type,
- const unsigned char **out_data,
- size_t *out_len)
- {
- CBS extensions;
-
- CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len);
-
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
- {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
-
- /* Decode the next extension. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
- return 0;
-
- if (type == extension_type)
- {
- *out_data = CBS_data(&extension);
- *out_len = CBS_len(&extension);
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
-
-
- static const int nid_list[] =
- {
- NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
- NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
- NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
- NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
- NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
- NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
- NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
- NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- };
-
- static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] =
- {
- TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
- };
-
- static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] =
- {
- 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- };
-
- int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id)
- {
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
- if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))
- return OBJ_undef;
- return nid_list[curve_id-1];
- }
-
- uint16_t tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
- {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
- {
- /* nid_list[i] stores the NID corresponding to curve ID i+1. */
- if (nid == nid_list[i])
- return i + 1;
- }
- /* Use 0 for non-existent curve ID. Note: this assumes that curve ID 0
- * will never be allocated. */
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len|
- * to the list of allowed curve IDs. If |get_peer_curves| is non-zero,
- * return the peer's curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred
- * list. */
- static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int get_peer_curves,
- const uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len)
- {
- if (get_peer_curves)
- {
- *out_curve_ids = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist;
- *out_curve_ids_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- return;
- }
-
- *out_curve_ids = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
- *out_curve_ids_len = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- if (!*out_curve_ids)
- {
- *out_curve_ids = eccurves_default;
- *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(eccurves_default) / sizeof(eccurves_default[0]);
- }
- }
-
- int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id)
- {
- uint8_t curve_type;
- uint16_t curve_id;
- const uint16_t *curves;
- size_t curves_len, i;
-
- /* Only support named curves. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) ||
- curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
- !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id))
- return 0;
-
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
- for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
- {
- if (curve_id == curves[i])
- {
- *out_curve_id = curve_id;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s)
- {
- const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
- size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
-
- /* Can't do anything on client side */
- if (s->server == 0)
- return NID_undef;
-
- /* Return first preference shared curve */
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
- &supp, &supplen);
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
- &pref, &preflen);
- for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++)
- {
- for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++)
- {
- if (pref[i] == supp[j])
- return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i]);
- }
- }
- return NID_undef;
- }
-
- /* NOTE: tls1_ec_curve_id2nid and tls1_set_curves assume that
- *
- * (a) 0 is not a valid curve ID.
- *
- * (b) The largest curve ID is 31.
- *
- * Those implementations must be revised before adding support for curve IDs
- * that break these assumptions. */
- OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(
- (sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])) < 32, small_curve_ids);
-
- int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len,
- const int *curves, size_t ncurves)
- {
- uint16_t *curve_ids;
- size_t i;
- /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
- * while curve ids < 32
- */
- uint32_t dup_list = 0;
- curve_ids = (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t));
- if (!curve_ids)
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++)
- {
- uint32_t idmask;
- uint16_t id;
- id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
- idmask = ((uint32_t)1) << id;
- if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
- {
- OPENSSL_free(curve_ids);
- return 0;
- }
- dup_list |= idmask;
- curve_ids[i] = id;
- }
- if (*out_curve_ids)
- OPENSSL_free(*out_curve_ids);
- *out_curve_ids = curve_ids;
- *out_curve_ids_len = ncurves;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_curve_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the
- * TLS curve ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on
- * success and zero on failure. */
- static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id, uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec)
- {
- int nid;
- uint16_t id;
- const EC_GROUP *grp;
- if (!ec)
- return 0;
-
- grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
- if (!grp)
- return 0;
-
- /* Determine curve ID */
- nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
- id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
- if (!id)
- return 0;
-
- /* Set the named curve ID. Arbitrary explicit curves are not
- * supported. */
- *out_curve_id = id;
-
- if (out_comp_id)
- {
- if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
- *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
- else
- *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* tls1_check_point_format returns one if |comp_id| is consistent with the
- * peer's point format preferences. */
- static int tls1_check_point_format(SSL *s, uint8_t comp_id)
- {
- uint8_t *p = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist;
- size_t plen = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length;
- size_t i;
-
- /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
- * is supported (see RFC4492). */
- if (p == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < plen; i++)
- {
- if (comp_id == p[i])
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* tls1_check_curve_id returns one if |curve_id| is consistent with both our and
- * the peer's curve preferences. Note: if called as the client, only our
- * preferences are checked; the peer (the server) does not send preferences. */
- static int tls1_check_curve_id(SSL *s, uint16_t curve_id)
- {
- const uint16_t *curves;
- size_t curves_len, i, j;
-
- /* Check against our list, then the peer's list. */
- for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
- {
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &curves, &curves_len);
- for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
- {
- if (curves[i] == curve_id)
- break;
- }
- if (i == curves_len)
- return 0;
- /* Servers do not present a preference list so, if we are a
- * client, only check our list. */
- if (!s->server)
- return 1;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
- size_t *pformatslen)
- {
- /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
- * use default */
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
- {
- *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- }
- else
- {
- *pformats = ecformats_default;
- *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
- }
- }
-
- /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
- * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
- */
- static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
- {
- uint8_t comp_id;
- uint16_t curve_id;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- int rv;
- pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- if (!pkey)
- return 0;
- /* If not EC nothing to do */
- if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
- {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return 1;
- }
- rv = tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (!rv)
- return 0;
- /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
- * supported curves extension. */
- if (s->server && !tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id))
- return 0;
- return tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id);
- }
-
- /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
- int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
- {
- uint16_t curve_id;
- EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
- {
- /* Need a shared curve */
- return tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef;
- }
- if (!ec)
- {
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
- }
- return tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, NULL, ec) &&
- tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id);
- }
-
-
-
- /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
- * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
- */
-
- #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
-
- #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
-
- #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
-
- static const uint8_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
- };
- size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
- {
- /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
- if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
- {
- *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
- return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
- }
- else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
- {
- *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
- return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
- }
- else
- {
- *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
- return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
- }
- }
-
- /* tls12_check_peer_sigalg parses a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm out of
- * |cbs|. It checks it is consistent with |s|'s sent supported
- * signature algorithms and, if so, writes the relevant digest into
- * |*out_md| and returns 1. Otherwise it returns 0 and writes an alert
- * into |*out_alert|.
- */
- int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert,
- SSL *s, CBS *cbs, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
- size_t sent_sigslen, i;
- int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
- uint8_t hash, signature;
- /* Should never happen */
- if (sigalg == -1)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &hash) ||
- !CBS_get_u8(cbs, &signature))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
- if (sigalg != signature)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- {
- uint16_t curve_id;
- uint8_t comp_id;
- /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
- if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->server)
- {
- if (!tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) ||
- !tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
- sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
- for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
- {
- if (hash == sent_sigs[0] && signature == sent_sigs[1])
- break;
- }
- /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
- if (i == sent_sigslen && (hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- *out_md = tls12_get_hash(hash);
- if (*out_md == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
- * wish.
- */
- if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *out_md;
- return 1;
- }
- /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
- * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
- * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
- * session and not global settings.
- *
- */
- void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
- {
- CERT *c = s->cert;
- const unsigned char *sigalgs;
- size_t i, sigalgslen;
- int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
- c->mask_a = 0;
- c->mask_k = 0;
- /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
- if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
- c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
- else
- c->mask_ssl = 0;
- /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
- * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
- * TLS 1.2.
- */
- sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
- for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
- {
- switch(sigalgs[1])
- {
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- have_rsa = 1;
- break;
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- have_ecdsa = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- /* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature
- * algorithms.
- */
- if (!have_rsa)
- {
- c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
- }
- if (!have_ecdsa)
- {
- c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
- }
- /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
- if (!s->psk_client_callback)
- {
- c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
- c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
- }
- c->valid = 1;
- }
-
- /* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to
- * compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding
- * is to be done. */
- unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, size_t header_len)
- {
- int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
- int using_ecc = 0;
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- {
- size_t i;
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
- {
- const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
-
- alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
- {
- using_ecc = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
- if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
- && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return orig;
-
- ret+=2;
-
- if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
- if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
- {
- /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
- unsigned long size_str;
- long lenmax;
-
- /* check for enough space.
- 4 for the servername type and entension length
- 2 for servernamelist length
- 1 for the hostname type
- 2 for hostname length
- + hostname length
- */
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
- || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
- return NULL;
-
- /* extension type and length */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
- s2n(size_str+5,ret);
-
- /* length of servername list */
- s2n(size_str+3,ret);
-
- /* hostname type, length and hostname */
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- s2n(size_str,ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
- ret+=size_str;
- }
-
- /* Add RI if renegotiating */
- if (s->renegotiate)
- {
- int el;
-
- if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
-
- if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret += el;
- }
-
- /* Add extended master secret. */
- if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
- {
- int ticklen;
- if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
- ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
- else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
- {
- s->session->tlsext_tick = BUF_memdup(
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->length);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
- return NULL;
- ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
- s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
- }
- else
- ticklen = 0;
- if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
- goto skip_ext;
- /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
- * rest for ticket
- */
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
- s2n(ticklen,ret);
- if (ticklen)
- {
- memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
- ret += ticklen;
- }
- }
- skip_ext:
-
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- {
- size_t salglen;
- const unsigned char *salg;
- salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
- s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
- s2n(salglen, ret);
- memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
- ret += salglen;
- }
-
- if (s->ocsp_stapling_enabled)
- {
- /* The status_request extension is excessively extensible at
- * every layer. On the client, only support requesting OCSP
- * responses with an empty responder_id_list and no
- * extensions. */
- if (limit - ret - 4 - 1 - 2 - 2 < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
- s2n(1 + 2 + 2, ret);
- /* status_type */
- *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
- /* responder_id_list - empty */
- s2n(0, ret);
- /* request_extensions - empty */
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
- {
- /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
- * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
- if (s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
- {
- /* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support for
- * certificate timestamps. */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
- {
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
- s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
- s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
- s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
- ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
- {
- /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
- * support for Channel ID. */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new)
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
- else
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
- if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
- {
- int el;
-
- ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
-
- if(!ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret += el;
- }
-
- if (using_ecc)
- {
- /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
- long lenmax;
- const uint8_t *formats;
- const uint16_t *curves;
- size_t formats_len, curves_len, i;
-
- tls1_get_formatlist(s, &formats, &formats_len);
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
- if (formats_len > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
- if (formats_len > 255)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
- s2n(formats_len + 1,ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char)formats_len;
- memcpy(ret, formats, formats_len);
- ret+=formats_len;
-
- /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
- if ((curves_len * 2) > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
- if ((curves_len * 2) > 65532)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
- s2n((curves_len * 2) + 2, ret);
-
- /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
- * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
- * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
- * resolves this to two bytes.
- */
- s2n(curves_len * 2, ret);
- for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
- {
- s2n(curves[i], ret);
- }
- }
-
- #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
- /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
- * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
- *
- * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
- * extensions it MUST always appear last. */
- if (header_len > 0)
- {
- header_len += ret - orig;
- if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200)
- {
- size_t padding_len = 0x200 - header_len;
- /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always
- * include least one byte of data if including the
- * extension. WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is
- * intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */
- if (padding_len >= 4 + 1)
- padding_len -= 4;
- else
- padding_len = 1;
- if (limit - ret - 4 - (long)padding_len < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
- s2n(padding_len, ret);
- memset(ret, 0, padding_len);
- ret += padding_len;
- }
- }
- #endif
-
- if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
- return orig;
-
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
- }
-
- unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
- {
- int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
- int next_proto_neg_seen;
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return orig;
-
- ret+=2;
- if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
- if (!s->hit && s->should_ack_sni && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
- if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- {
- int el;
-
- if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
-
- if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret += el;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret)
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
- if (using_ecc)
- {
- const unsigned char *plist;
- size_t plistlen;
- /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
- long lenmax;
-
- tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
- if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
- if (plistlen > 255)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
- s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
- memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
- ret+=plistlen;
-
- }
- /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
-
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
- && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected)
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
- if(s->srtp_profile)
- {
- int el;
-
- ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
-
- if(!ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret+=el;
- }
-
- next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
- {
- const unsigned char *npa;
- unsigned int npalen;
- int r;
-
- r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
- s2n(npalen,ret);
- memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
- ret += npalen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
- {
- const uint8_t *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
- size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
-
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
- s2n(3 + len,ret);
- s2n(1 + len,ret);
- *ret++ = len;
- memcpy(ret, selected, len);
- ret += len;
- }
-
- /* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
- * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
- {
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
- else
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
-
- if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2) == 0)
- return orig;
-
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
- * ClientHello.
- * cbs: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
- * out_alert: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a zero
- * return.
- *
- * returns: 1 on success. */
- static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
- {
- CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name_list_copy;
- const unsigned char *selected;
- unsigned char selected_len;
- int r;
-
- if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &protocol_name_list) ||
- CBS_len(cbs) != 0 ||
- CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2)
- goto parse_error;
-
- /* Validate the protocol list. */
- protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list;
- while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0)
- {
- CBS protocol_name;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name))
- goto parse_error;
- }
-
- r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- CBS_data(&protocol_name_list), CBS_len(&protocol_name_list),
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
- }
- return 1;
-
- parse_error:
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
- {
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- CBS extensions;
- size_t i;
-
- s->should_ack_sni = 0;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
-
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
- }
-
- /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
- if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
- s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
- }
- /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
- if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
- s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
- }
- /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
- s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
- }
- /* Clear ECC extensions */
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- }
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist != 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- }
-
- /* There may be no extensions. */
- if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0)
- {
- goto ri_check;
- }
-
- /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
- !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
- {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
-
- /* Decode the next extension. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- {
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, (unsigned char*)CBS_data(&extension),
- CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg);
- }
-
- /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
-
- - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
- in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
- to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
- it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
- Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
- set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
- case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
- a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
- presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
- the value of the Host: field.
- - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
- i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
- - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
-
- */
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- {
- CBS server_name_list;
- char have_seen_host_name = 0;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &server_name_list) ||
- CBS_len(&server_name_list) < 1 ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */
- while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0)
- {
- uint8_t name_type;
- CBS host_name;
-
- /* Decode the NameType. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Only host_name is supported. */
- if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
- continue;
-
- if (have_seen_host_name)
- {
- /* The ServerNameList MUST NOT contain
- * more than one name of the same
- * name_type. */
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- have_seen_host_name = 1;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) ||
- CBS_len(&host_name) < 1)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
- CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit)
- {
- assert(s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
- {
- /* This should be impossible. */
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Copy the hostname as a string. */
- if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &s->session->tlsext_hostname))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->should_ack_sni = 1;
- }
- }
- }
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
- {
- CBS ec_point_format_list;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
- {
- CBS elliptic_curve_list;
- size_t i, num_curves;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) ||
- CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 ||
- (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist =
- (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list));
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2;
- for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++)
- {
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist[i]))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
- {
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension), s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
- {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
- {
- CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Ensure the signature algorithms are non-empty. It
- * contains a list of SignatureAndHashAlgorithms
- * which are two bytes each. */
- if (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
- (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) % 2) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
- * error.
- */
- if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
- s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
- {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
- * renegotiation.
- *
- * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
- * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
- * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
- * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
- * anything like that, but this might change).
-
- * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
- * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
- * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
- * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
- * Finished message could have been computed.) */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
- {
- if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, out_alert))
- return 0;
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- }
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id &&
- s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
- {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- }
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new &&
- s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
- {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
- }
-
-
- /* session ticket processed earlier */
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
- {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
- return 0;
- }
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
- s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
- }
- }
-
- ri_check:
-
- /* Need RI if renegotiating */
-
- if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
- /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
- if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
- ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
- {
- int alert = -1;
- if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0)
- {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
- * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
- * the length of the block. */
- static char ssl_next_proto_validate(const CBS *cbs)
- {
- CBS copy = *cbs;
-
- while (CBS_len(©) != 0)
- {
- CBS proto;
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(©, &proto) ||
- CBS_len(&proto) == 0)
- {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
- {
- int tlsext_servername = 0;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- CBS extensions;
-
- /* TODO(davidben): Move all of these to some per-handshake state that
- * gets systematically reset on a new handshake; perhaps allocate it
- * fresh each time so it's not even kept around post-handshake. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
-
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
- }
-
- /* Clear ECC extensions */
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- }
-
- /* There may be no extensions. */
- if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0)
- {
- goto ri_check;
- }
-
- /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
- !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
- {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
-
- /* Decode the next extension. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- {
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, (unsigned char*)CBS_data(&extension),
- CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg);
- }
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- /* We must have sent it in ClientHello. */
- if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- tlsext_servername = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
- {
- CBS ec_point_format_list;
-
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
- {
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension),
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || CBS_len(&extension) > 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
- {
- /* The extension MUST be empty and may only sent if
- * we've requested a status request message. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!s->ocsp_stapling_enabled)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Set a flag to expect a CertificateStatus message */
- s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- unsigned char *selected;
- unsigned char selected_len;
-
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* The data must be valid. */
- if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&extension))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension),
- s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
- {
- CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name;
-
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList
- * which must have exactly one ProtocolName. Each of
- * these is length-prefixed. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &protocol_name_list) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0 ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) ||
- CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name,
- &s->s3->alpn_selected,
- &s->s3->alpn_selected_len))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id)
- {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new)
- {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp)
- {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) == 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Session resumption uses the original session information. */
- if (!s->hit)
- {
- if (!CBS_stow(&extension,
- &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
- &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
- {
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
- {
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
- return 0;
- }
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
- {
- if (/* It is invalid for the server to select EMS and
- SSLv3. */
- s->version == SSL3_VERSION ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
- {
- if (s->tlsext_hostname)
- {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
- {
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- ri_check:
-
- /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
- * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
- * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
- * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
- * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
- * absence on initial connect only.
- */
- if (!renegotiate_seen
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
-
- int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
- {
- return 1;
- }
-
- int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
- {
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
- {
- int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
- /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
- * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
- /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
- * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
- switch (ret)
- {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->should_ack_sni = 0;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
- {
- int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
- /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
- * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
- * it must contain uncompressed.
- */
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if (((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) &&
- !tls1_check_point_format(s, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
- return -1;
- }
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
- switch (ret)
- {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
- {
- int alert = -1;
- if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
- return 1;
-
- if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0)
- {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
- * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
- * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
- *
- * ctx: contains the early callback context, which is the result of a
- * shallow parse of the ClientHello.
- * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- * point to the resulting session.
- *
- * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
- * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
- * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
- *
- * Returns:
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
- * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
- * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
- * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
- * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
- *
- * Side effects:
- * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
- * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
- * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
- * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
- * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
- * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
- */
- int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
- SSL_SESSION **ret)
- {
- *ret = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- const unsigned char *data;
- size_t len;
- int r;
-
- /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
- * to permit stateful resumption.
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
- return 0;
- if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) && !ctx->extensions)
- return 0;
- if (!SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
- ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, &data, &len))
- {
- return 0;
- }
- if (len == 0)
- {
- /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
- * currently have one. */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 1;
- }
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
- {
- /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
- * decrypted rather than generating the session
- * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
- * handshake based on external mechanism to
- * calculate the master secret later. */
- return 2;
- }
- r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, data, len, ctx->session_id,
- ctx->session_id_len, ret);
- switch (r)
- {
- case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 2;
- case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
- return r;
- case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 3;
- default: /* fatal error */
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
- *
- * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
- * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
- * sess_id: points at the session ID.
- * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
- * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- * point to the resulting session.
- *
- * Returns:
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
- * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
- */
- static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
- SSL_SESSION **psess)
- {
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned char *sdec;
- const unsigned char *p;
- int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
- unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
- if (eticklen < 48)
- return 2;
- /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
- {
- unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
- int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
- &ctx, &hctx, 0);
- if (rv < 0)
- return -1;
- if (rv == 0)
- return 2;
- if (rv == 2)
- renew_ticket = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Check key name matches */
- if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
- return 2;
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
- }
- /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
- * integrity checks on ticket.
- */
- mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
- if (mlen < 0)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- eticklen -= mlen;
- /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return 2;
- }
- /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
- /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
- p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (!sdec)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
- if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- return 2;
- }
- slen += mlen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- p = sdec;
-
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
- OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- if (sess)
- {
- /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
- * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
- * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
- * as required by standard.
- */
- if (sesslen)
- memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
- sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
- *psess = sess;
- if (renew_ticket)
- return 4;
- else
- return 3;
- }
- ERR_clear_error();
- /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
- * ticket. */
- return 2;
- }
-
- /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
-
- typedef struct
- {
- int nid;
- int id;
- } tls12_lookup;
-
- static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
- {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
- {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
- {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
- {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
- {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
- };
-
- static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
- {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
- {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
- };
-
- static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
- {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
- {
- if (table[i].nid == nid)
- return table[i].id;
- }
- return -1;
- }
-
- static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
- {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
- {
- if ((table[i].id) == id)
- return table[i].nid;
- }
- return NID_undef;
- }
-
- int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
- {
- int sig_id, md_id;
- if (!md)
- return 0;
- md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
- sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- if (md_id == -1)
- return 0;
- sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
- if (sig_id == -1)
- return 0;
- p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
- p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
- return 1;
- }
-
- int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
- {
- return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
- sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- }
-
- const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
- {
- switch(hash_alg)
- {
- case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
- return EVP_md5();
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
- return EVP_sha1();
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
- return EVP_sha224();
-
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
- return EVP_sha256();
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
- return EVP_sha384();
-
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
- return EVP_sha512();
- default:
- return NULL;
-
- }
- }
-
- static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
- {
- switch(sig_alg)
- {
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- }
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
- static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
- int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
- {
- int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
- if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
- return;
- if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
- {
- hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
- sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- if (phash_nid)
- *phash_nid = hash_nid;
- }
- if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
- {
- sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
- sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- if (psign_nid)
- *psign_nid = sign_nid;
- }
- if (psignhash_nid)
- {
- if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
- OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
- hash_nid, sign_nid);
- else
- *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
- }
- }
- /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
- static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
- const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
- const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
- {
- const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
- size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
- for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
- {
- /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
- if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
- continue;
- if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
- continue;
- for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
- {
- if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
- {
- nmatch++;
- if (shsig)
- {
- shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
- shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
- tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
- &shsig->sign_nid,
- &shsig->signandhash_nid,
- ptmp);
- shsig++;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- return nmatch;
- }
-
- /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
- static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
- {
- const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
- size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
- size_t nmatch;
- TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
- CERT *c = s->cert;
- if (c->shared_sigalgs)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
- c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
- }
- /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
- if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs)
- {
- conf = c->client_sigalgs;
- conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
- }
- else if (c->conf_sigalgs)
- {
- conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
- conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
- }
- else
- conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
- if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
- {
- pref = conf;
- preflen = conflen;
- allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
- allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
- }
- else
- {
- allow = conf;
- allowlen = conflen;
- pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
- preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
- }
- nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
- if (!nmatch)
- return 1;
- salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
- if (!salgs)
- return 0;
- nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
- c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
- c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
- return 1;
- }
-
-
- /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
-
- int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const CBS *sigalgs)
- {
- int idx;
- size_t i;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- CERT *c = s->cert;
- TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
-
- /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
- if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- return 1;
- /* Length must be even */
- if (CBS_len(sigalgs) % 2 != 0)
- return 0;
- /* Should never happen */
- if (!c)
- return 0;
-
- if (!CBS_stow(sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgslen))
- return 0;
-
- tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
-
- for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
- i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
- {
- idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
- if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
- {
- md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
- c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
- c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
- {
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
- }
- }
-
- }
- /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
- * use the certificate for signing.
- */
- if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
- {
- /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
- * not supported it stays as NULL.
- */
- if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
- {
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
- }
- if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
- c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
-
- int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
- int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
- unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
- {
- const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
- if (psig == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (idx >= 0)
- {
- idx <<= 1;
- if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
- return 0;
- psig += idx;
- if (rhash)
- *rhash = psig[0];
- if (rsig)
- *rsig = psig[1];
- tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
- }
- return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
- }
-
- int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
- int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
- unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
- {
- TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
- if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
- return 0;
- shsigalgs += idx;
- if (phash)
- *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
- if (psign)
- *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
- if (psignhash)
- *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
- if (rsig)
- *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
- if (rhash)
- *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
- return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
- }
-
- /* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given
- * SSL connection and writes it to |md|. */
- int
- tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s)
- {
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned temp_digest_len;
- int i;
- static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
- return 0;
-
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
-
- if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
- {
- static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic,
- sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
- if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
- return 0;
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
- s->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++)
- {
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL)
- continue;
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
- * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */
- int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s)
- {
- int digest_len;
- /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because
- * the handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original,
- * full handshake. */
- if (s->hit)
- return -1;
- /* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been
- * negotiated. */
- if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
- return -1;
-
- digest_len = tls1_handshake_digest(
- s, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
- sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash));
- if (digest_len < 0)
- return -1;
-
- s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
- {
- unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
- int rhash, rsign;
- size_t i;
- if (salglen & 1)
- return 0;
- sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
- if (sigalgs == NULL)
- return 0;
- for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
- {
- rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
- sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
- sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-
- if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
- goto err;
- *sptr++ = rhash;
- *sptr++ = rsign;
- }
-
- if (client)
- {
- if (c->client_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
- c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
- c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
- }
- else
- {
- if (c->conf_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
- c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
- c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
- }
-
- return 1;
-
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
- return 0;
- }
-
- static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
- {
- int sig_nid;
- size_t i;
- if (default_nid == -1)
- return 1;
- sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
- if (default_nid)
- return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
- for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
- if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
- return 1;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
- static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
- {
- X509_NAME *nm;
- size_t i;
- nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
- {
- if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
- * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
- * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
- * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
- */
-
- /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
-
- #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
- (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
- /* Strict mode flags */
- #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
- (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
- | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
-
- int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
- int idx)
- {
- size_t i;
- int rv = 0;
- int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
- CERT *c = s->cert;
- /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
- if (idx != -1)
- {
- /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
- if (idx == -2)
- {
- cpk = c->key;
- idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
- }
- else
- cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
- x = cpk->x509;
- pk = cpk->privatekey;
- chain = cpk->chain;
- strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
- /* If no cert or key, forget it */
- if (!x || !pk)
- goto end;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!x || !pk)
- goto end;
- idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
- if (idx == -1)
- goto end;
- cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
- if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
- check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
- else
- check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
- strict_mode = 1;
- }
-
- /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
- * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
- * and strict mode.
- */
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
- {
- int default_nid;
- unsigned char rsign = 0;
- if (c->peer_sigalgs)
- default_nid = 0;
- /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
- else
- {
- switch(idx)
- {
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
- default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
- break;
-
- case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
- default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
- break;
-
- default:
- default_nid = -1;
- break;
- }
- }
- /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
- * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
- * sha1.
- */
- if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
- {
- size_t j;
- const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
- for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
- {
- if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
- break;
- }
- if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
- {
- if (check_flags)
- goto skip_sigs;
- else
- goto end;
- }
- }
- /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
- if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
- {
- if (!check_flags) goto end;
- }
- else
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
- {
- if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
- default_nid))
- {
- if (check_flags)
- {
- rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
- break;
- }
- else
- goto end;
- }
- }
- }
- /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
- else if(check_flags)
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
- skip_sigs:
- /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
- if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
- else if (!check_flags)
- goto end;
- if (!s->server)
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
- /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
- else if (strict_mode)
- {
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
- {
- X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
- {
- if (check_flags)
- {
- rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
- break;
- }
- else
- goto end;
- }
- }
- }
- if (!s->server && strict_mode)
- {
- STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
- uint8_t check_type = 0;
- switch (pk->type)
- {
- case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
- check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
- break;
- case EVP_PKEY_EC:
- check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
- break;
- }
- if (check_type)
- {
- if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_types &&
- memchr(s->s3->tmp.certificate_types, check_type, s->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types))
- {
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
- }
- if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
- goto end;
- }
- else
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
-
-
- ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
-
- if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
-
- if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
- {
- if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
- }
- if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
- {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
- {
- X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
- {
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
- goto end;
- }
- else
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
-
- if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
-
- end:
-
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
- {
- if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
- else if (cpk->digest)
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
- }
- else
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
-
- /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
- * if the chain is invalid.
- */
- if (!check_flags)
- {
- if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
- cpk->valid_flags = rv;
- else
- {
- /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
- cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return rv;
- }
-
- /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
- void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
- {
- tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
- tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
- tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
- }
- /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
- int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
- {
- return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
- }
|