boringssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
David Benjamin 69522117a6 Support Ed25519 in TLS.
This only works at TLS 1.2 and above as, before TLS 1.2, there is no way
to advertise support for Ed25519 or negotiate the correct signature
algorithm. Add tests for this accordingly.

For now, this is disabled by default on the verifying side but may be
enabled per SSL_CTX. Notably, projects like Chromium which use an
external verifier may need changes elsewhere before they can enable it.
(On the signing side, we can assume that if the caller gave us an
Ed25519 certificate, they mean for us to use it.)

BUG=187

Change-Id: Id25b0a677dcbe205ddd26d8dbba11c04bb520756
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14450
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2017-04-06 15:30:17 +00:00

920 lines
28 KiB
C

/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include "../crypto/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
CERT *ssl_cert_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method) {
CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
ret->x509_method = x509_method;
return ret;
}
static CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer_up_ref(CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer);
return buffer;
}
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) {
CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
OPENSSL_memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
ret->chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_deep_copy(cert->chain, buffer_up_ref,
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
if (cert->privatekey != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cert->privatekey);
ret->privatekey = cert->privatekey;
}
ret->key_method = cert->key_method;
ret->x509_method = cert->x509_method;
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) {
ret->sigalgs =
BUF_memdup(cert->sigalgs, cert->num_sigalgs * sizeof(cert->sigalgs[0]));
if (ret->sigalgs == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
ret->num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs;
ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
ret->x509_method->cert_dup(ret, cert);
if (cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
ret->signed_cert_timestamp_list = cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list;
}
if (cert->ocsp_response != NULL) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(cert->ocsp_response);
ret->ocsp_response = cert->ocsp_response;
}
ret->sid_ctx_length = cert->sid_ctx_length;
OPENSSL_memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, cert->sid_ctx, sizeof(ret->sid_ctx));
ret->enable_early_data = cert->enable_early_data;
return ret;
err:
ssl_cert_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *cert) {
if (cert == NULL) {
return;
}
cert->x509_method->cert_clear(cert);
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(cert->chain, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
cert->chain = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
cert->privatekey = NULL;
cert->key_method = NULL;
}
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) {
if (c == NULL) {
return;
}
DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
c->x509_method->cert_free(c);
OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs);
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(c->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(c->ocsp_response);
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
static void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg),
void *arg) {
c->cert_cb = cb;
c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
}
enum leaf_cert_and_privkey_result_t {
leaf_cert_and_privkey_error,
leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok,
leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch,
};
/* check_leaf_cert_and_privkey checks whether the certificate in |leaf_buffer|
* and the private key in |privkey| are suitable and coherent. It returns
* |leaf_cert_and_privkey_error| and pushes to the error queue if a problem is
* found. If the certificate and private key are valid, but incoherent, it
* returns |leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch|. Otherwise it returns
* |leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok|. */
static enum leaf_cert_and_privkey_result_t check_leaf_cert_and_privkey(
CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf_buffer, EVP_PKEY *privkey) {
enum leaf_cert_and_privkey_result_t ret = leaf_cert_and_privkey_error;
CBS cert_cbs;
CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(leaf_buffer, &cert_cbs);
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs);
if (pubkey == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto out;
}
if (!ssl_is_key_type_supported(pubkey->type)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto out;
}
/* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH or ECDSA. We only support ECDSA
* certificates, so sanity-check the key usage extension. */
if (pubkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
!ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&cert_cbs)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto out;
}
if (privkey != NULL &&
/* Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match. */
!ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey, privkey)) {
ERR_clear_error();
ret = leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch;
goto out;
}
ret = leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok;
out:
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
return ret;
}
static int cert_set_chain_and_key(
CERT *cert, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs, size_t num_certs,
EVP_PKEY *privkey, const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) {
if (num_certs == 0 ||
(privkey == NULL && privkey_method == NULL)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
if (privkey != NULL && privkey_method != NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_HAVE_BOTH_PRIVKEY_AND_METHOD);
return 0;
}
switch (check_leaf_cert_and_privkey(certs[0], privkey)) {
case leaf_cert_and_privkey_error:
return 0;
case leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_AND_PRIVATE_KEY_MISMATCH);
return 0;
case leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok:
break;
}
STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *certs_sk = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
if (certs_sk == NULL) {
return 0;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_certs; i++) {
if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(certs_sk, certs[i])) {
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(certs_sk, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
return 0;
}
CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(certs[i]);
}
EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
cert->privatekey = privkey;
if (privkey != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(privkey);
}
cert->key_method = privkey_method;
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(cert->chain, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
cert->chain = certs_sk;
return 1;
}
int SSL_set_chain_and_key(SSL *ssl, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs,
size_t num_certs, EVP_PKEY *privkey,
const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) {
return cert_set_chain_and_key(ssl->cert, certs, num_certs, privkey,
privkey_method);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_chain_and_key(SSL_CTX *ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER *const *certs,
size_t num_certs, EVP_PKEY *privkey,
const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *privkey_method) {
return cert_set_chain_and_key(ctx->cert, certs, num_certs, privkey,
privkey_method);
}
int ssl_set_cert(CERT *cert, CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer) {
switch (check_leaf_cert_and_privkey(buffer, cert->privatekey)) {
case leaf_cert_and_privkey_error:
return 0;
case leaf_cert_and_privkey_mismatch:
/* don't fail for a cert/key mismatch, just free current private key
* (when switching to a different cert & key, first this function should
* be used, then |ssl_set_pkey|. */
EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
cert->privatekey = NULL;
break;
case leaf_cert_and_privkey_ok:
break;
}
cert->x509_method->cert_flush_cached_leaf(cert);
if (cert->chain != NULL) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0));
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_set(cert->chain, 0, buffer);
CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer);
return 1;
}
cert->chain = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
if (cert->chain == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(cert->chain, buffer)) {
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->chain);
cert->chain = NULL;
return 0;
}
CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer);
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t der_len,
const uint8_t *der) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(der, der_len, NULL);
if (buffer == NULL) {
return 0;
}
const int ok = ssl_set_cert(ctx->cert, buffer);
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
return ok;
}
int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der, size_t der_len) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(der, der_len, NULL);
if (buffer == NULL) {
return 0;
}
const int ok = ssl_set_cert(ssl->cert, buffer);
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
return ok;
}
int ssl_has_certificate(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->cert->chain != NULL &&
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->cert->chain, 0) != NULL &&
ssl_has_private_key(ssl);
}
STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *ssl_parse_cert_chain(uint8_t *out_alert,
EVP_PKEY **out_pubkey,
uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256,
CBS *cbs,
CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *pool) {
*out_pubkey = NULL;
STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *ret = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
if (ret == NULL) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
CBS certificate_list;
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(cbs, &certificate_list)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
CBS certificate;
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate) ||
CBS_len(&certificate) == 0) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(ret) == 0) {
*out_pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&certificate);
if (*out_pubkey == NULL) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto err;
}
/* Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested. */
if (out_leaf_sha256 != NULL) {
SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), out_leaf_sha256);
}
}
CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf =
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&certificate, pool);
if (buf == NULL) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto err;
}
if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret, buf)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buf);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
return ret;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(*out_pubkey);
*out_pubkey = NULL;
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ret, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
return NULL;
}
int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
return CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0);
}
CBB certs;
if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &certs)) {
goto err;
}
STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *chain = ssl->cert->chain;
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(chain); i++) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(chain, i);
CBB child;
if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certs, &child) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buffer),
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buffer)) ||
!CBB_flush(&certs)) {
goto err;
}
}
return CBB_flush(cbb);
err:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* ssl_cert_skip_to_spki parses a DER-encoded, X.509 certificate from |in| and
* positions |*out_tbs_cert| to cover the TBSCertificate, starting at the
* subjectPublicKeyInfo. */
static int ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(const CBS *in, CBS *out_tbs_cert) {
/* From RFC 5280, section 4.1
* Certificate ::= SEQUENCE {
* tbsCertificate TBSCertificate,
* signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* signatureValue BIT STRING }
* TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
* version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
* serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber,
* signature AlgorithmIdentifier,
* issuer Name,
* validity Validity,
* subject Name,
* subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
* ... } */
CBS buf = *in;
CBS toplevel;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&buf, &toplevel, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
CBS_len(&buf) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&toplevel, out_tbs_cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
/* version */
!CBS_get_optional_asn1(
out_tbs_cert, NULL, NULL,
CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0) ||
/* serialNumber */
!CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
/* signature algorithm */
!CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
/* issuer */
!CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
/* validity */
!CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
/* subject */
!CBS_get_asn1(out_tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
EVP_PKEY *ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(const CBS *in) {
CBS buf = *in, tbs_cert;
if (!ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(&buf, &tbs_cert)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
return NULL;
}
return EVP_parse_public_key(&tbs_cert);
}
int ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pubkey,
const EVP_PKEY *privkey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_is_opaque(privkey)) {
/* We cannot check an opaque private key and have to trust that it
* matches. */
return 1;
}
int ret = 0;
switch (EVP_PKEY_cmp(pubkey, privkey)) {
case 1:
ret = 1;
break;
case 0:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
break;
case -1:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
break;
case -2:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
default:
assert(0);
break;
}
return ret;
}
int ssl_cert_check_private_key(const CERT *cert, const EVP_PKEY *privkey) {
if (privkey == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
return 0;
}
if (cert->chain == NULL ||
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
return 0;
}
CBS cert_cbs;
CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0), &cert_cbs);
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&cert_cbs);
if (!pubkey) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
return 0;
}
const int ok = ssl_compare_public_and_private_key(pubkey, privkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
return ok;
}
int ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(const CBS *in) {
CBS buf = *in;
CBS tbs_cert, outer_extensions;
int has_extensions;
if (!ssl_cert_skip_to_spki(&buf, &tbs_cert) ||
/* subjectPublicKeyInfo */
!CBS_get_asn1(&tbs_cert, NULL, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
/* issuerUniqueID */
!CBS_get_optional_asn1(
&tbs_cert, NULL, NULL,
CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 1) ||
/* subjectUniqueID */
!CBS_get_optional_asn1(
&tbs_cert, NULL, NULL,
CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 2) ||
!CBS_get_optional_asn1(
&tbs_cert, &outer_extensions, &has_extensions,
CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 3)) {
goto parse_err;
}
if (!has_extensions) {
return 1;
}
CBS extensions;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&outer_extensions, &extensions, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
goto parse_err;
}
while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) {
CBS extension, oid, contents;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&extensions, &extension, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&extension, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
(CBS_peek_asn1_tag(&extension, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) &&
!CBS_get_asn1(&extension, NULL, CBS_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) ||
!CBS_get_asn1(&extension, &contents, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
goto parse_err;
}
static const uint8_t kKeyUsageOID[3] = {0x55, 0x1d, 0x0f};
if (CBS_len(&oid) != sizeof(kKeyUsageOID) ||
OPENSSL_memcmp(CBS_data(&oid), kKeyUsageOID, sizeof(kKeyUsageOID)) !=
0) {
continue;
}
CBS bit_string;
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &bit_string, CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING) ||
CBS_len(&contents) != 0) {
goto parse_err;
}
/* This is the KeyUsage extension. See
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3 */
if (!CBS_is_valid_asn1_bitstring(&bit_string)) {
goto parse_err;
}
if (!CBS_asn1_bitstring_has_bit(&bit_string, 0)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* No KeyUsage extension found. */
return 1;
parse_err:
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CANNOT_PARSE_LEAF_CERT);
return 0;
}
STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *
ssl_parse_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *cbs) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER_POOL *const pool = ssl->ctx->pool;
STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *ret = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
if (ret == NULL) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
CBS child;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &child)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
CBS distinguished_name;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &distinguished_name)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer =
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&distinguished_name, pool);
if (buffer == NULL ||
!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(ret, buffer)) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buffer);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->check_client_CA_list(ret)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return ret;
err:
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(ret, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
return NULL;
}
int ssl_add_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
CBB child, name_cbb;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) {
return 0;
}
STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *names = ssl->client_CA;
if (names == NULL) {
names = ssl->ctx->client_CA;
}
if (names == NULL) {
return CBB_flush(cbb);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(names); i++) {
const CRYPTO_BUFFER *name = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(names, i);
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &name_cbb) ||
!CBB_add_bytes(&name_cbb, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(name),
CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(name))) {
return 0;
}
}
return CBB_flush(cbb);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg),
void *arg) {
ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ctx->cert, cb, arg);
}
void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) {
ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(ssl->cert, cb, arg);
}
STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *SSL_get0_peer_certificates(const SSL *ssl) {
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
if (session == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return session->certs;
}
STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *SSL_get0_server_requested_CAs(const SSL *ssl) {
if (ssl->s3->hs == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return ssl->s3->hs->ca_names;
}
int ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
const CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
assert(ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION);
/* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */
if (!(hs->new_cipher->algorithm_auth & ssl_cipher_auth_mask_for_key(pkey))) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/* Check key usages for all key types but RSA. This is needed to distinguish
* ECDH certificates, which we do not support, from ECDSA certificates. In
* principle, we should check RSA key usages based on cipher, but this breaks
* buggy antivirus deployments. Other key types are always used for signing.
*
* TODO(davidben): Get more recent data on RSA key usages. */
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
CBS leaf_cbs;
CBS_init(&leaf_cbs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(leaf), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(leaf));
if (!ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&leaf_cbs)) {
return 0;
}
}
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
/* Check the key's group and point format are acceptable. */
EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
uint16_t group_id;
if (!ssl_nid_to_group_id(
&group_id, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key))) ||
!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id) ||
EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec_key) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_on_certificate_selected(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
/* Nothing to do. */
return 1;
}
if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->ssl_auto_chain_if_needed(ssl)) {
return 0;
}
CBS leaf;
CRYPTO_BUFFER_init_CBS(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(ssl->cert->chain, 0), &leaf);
EVP_PKEY_free(hs->local_pubkey);
hs->local_pubkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&leaf);
return hs->local_pubkey != NULL;
}
static int set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(CERT *cert, const uint8_t *list,
size_t list_len) {
CBS sct_list;
CBS_init(&sct_list, list, list_len);
if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(&sct_list)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_SCT_LIST);
return 0;
}
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list);
cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list =
CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(CBS_data(&sct_list), CBS_len(&sct_list), NULL);
return cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL;
}
int SSL_CTX_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *list,
size_t list_len) {
return set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ctx->cert, list, list_len);
}
int SSL_set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *list,
size_t list_len) {
return set_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ssl->cert, list, list_len);
}
int SSL_CTX_set_ocsp_response(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *response,
size_t response_len) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ctx->cert->ocsp_response);
ctx->cert->ocsp_response = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(response, response_len, NULL);
return ctx->cert->ocsp_response != NULL;
}
int SSL_set_ocsp_response(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *response,
size_t response_len) {
CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(ssl->cert->ocsp_response);
ssl->cert->ocsp_response = CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(response, response_len, NULL);
return ssl->cert->ocsp_response != NULL;
}