69522117a6
This only works at TLS 1.2 and above as, before TLS 1.2, there is no way to advertise support for Ed25519 or negotiate the correct signature algorithm. Add tests for this accordingly. For now, this is disabled by default on the verifying side but may be enabled per SSL_CTX. Notably, projects like Chromium which use an external verifier may need changes elsewhere before they can enable it. (On the signing side, we can assume that if the caller gave us an Ed25519 certificate, they mean for us to use it.) BUG=187 Change-Id: Id25b0a677dcbe205ddd26d8dbba11c04bb520756 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/14450 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
506 lines
17 KiB
C
506 lines
17 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/type_check.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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int ssl_is_key_type_supported(int key_type) {
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return key_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA || key_type == EVP_PKEY_EC ||
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key_type == EVP_PKEY_ED25519;
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}
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static int ssl_set_pkey(CERT *cert, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
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if (!ssl_is_key_type_supported(pkey->type)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (cert->chain != NULL &&
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sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0) != NULL &&
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/* Sanity-check that the private key and the certificate match. */
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!ssl_cert_check_private_key(cert, pkey)) {
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
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EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pkey);
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cert->privatekey = pkey;
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return 1;
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}
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int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa) {
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EVP_PKEY *pkey;
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int ret;
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if (rsa == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
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if (pkey == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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RSA_up_ref(rsa);
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EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
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ret = ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return ret;
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}
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int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
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if (pkey == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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return ssl_set_pkey(ssl->cert, pkey);
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}
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int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *der,
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size_t der_len) {
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if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return 0;
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}
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const uint8_t *p = der;
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EVP_PKEY *pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
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if (pkey == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return ret;
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}
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int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa) {
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int ret;
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EVP_PKEY *pkey;
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if (rsa == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
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if (pkey == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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RSA_up_ref(rsa);
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EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
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ret = ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return ret;
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}
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int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *der,
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size_t der_len) {
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RSA *rsa = RSA_private_key_from_bytes(der, der_len);
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if (rsa == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(ctx, rsa);
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RSA_free(rsa);
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return ret;
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}
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int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
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if (pkey == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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return ssl_set_pkey(ctx->cert, pkey);
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}
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int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int type, SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *der,
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size_t der_len) {
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if (der_len > LONG_MAX) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
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return 0;
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}
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const uint8_t *p = der;
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EVP_PKEY *pkey = d2i_PrivateKey(type, NULL, &p, (long)der_len);
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if (pkey == NULL || p != der + der_len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return 0;
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}
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int ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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return ret;
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}
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void SSL_set_private_key_method(SSL *ssl,
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const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method) {
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ssl->cert->key_method = key_method;
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}
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void SSL_CTX_set_private_key_method(SSL_CTX *ctx,
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const SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD *key_method) {
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ctx->cert->key_method = key_method;
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}
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static int set_signing_algorithm_prefs(CERT *cert, const uint16_t *prefs,
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size_t num_prefs) {
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OPENSSL_free(cert->sigalgs);
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cert->num_sigalgs = 0;
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cert->sigalgs = BUF_memdup(prefs, num_prefs * sizeof(prefs[0]));
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if (cert->sigalgs == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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cert->num_sigalgs = num_prefs;
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return 1;
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}
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int SSL_CTX_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL_CTX *ctx, const uint16_t *prefs,
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size_t num_prefs) {
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return set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ctx->cert, prefs, num_prefs);
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}
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int SSL_set_signing_algorithm_prefs(SSL *ssl, const uint16_t *prefs,
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size_t num_prefs) {
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return set_signing_algorithm_prefs(ssl->cert, prefs, num_prefs);
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}
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int SSL_set_private_key_digest_prefs(SSL *ssl, const int *digest_nids,
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size_t num_digests) {
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OPENSSL_free(ssl->cert->sigalgs);
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(int) >= 2 * sizeof(uint16_t),
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digest_list_conversion_cannot_overflow);
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ssl->cert->num_sigalgs = 0;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * 2 * num_digests);
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if (ssl->cert->sigalgs == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Convert the digest list to a signature algorithms list.
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*
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* TODO(davidben): Replace this API with one that can express RSA-PSS, etc. */
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for (size_t i = 0; i < num_digests; i++) {
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switch (digest_nids[i]) {
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case NID_sha1:
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1;
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ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
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break;
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case NID_sha256:
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] =
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256;
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ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
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break;
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case NID_sha384:
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] =
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384;
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ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
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break;
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case NID_sha512:
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs] = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512;
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ssl->cert->sigalgs[ssl->cert->num_sigalgs + 1] =
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SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512;
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ssl->cert->num_sigalgs += 2;
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break;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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typedef struct {
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uint16_t sigalg;
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int pkey_type;
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int curve;
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const EVP_MD *(*digest_func)(void);
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char is_rsa_pss;
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} SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
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static const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM kSignatureAlgorithms[] = {
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{SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_md5_sha1, 0},
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{SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha1, 0},
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{SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha256, 0},
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{SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha384, 0},
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{SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha512, 0},
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{SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA256, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha256, 1},
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{SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA384, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha384, 1},
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{SSL_SIGN_RSA_PSS_SHA512, EVP_PKEY_RSA, NID_undef, &EVP_sha512, 1},
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{SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_undef, &EVP_sha1, 0},
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{SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
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&EVP_sha256, 0},
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{SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_secp384r1, &EVP_sha384,
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0},
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{SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512, EVP_PKEY_EC, NID_secp521r1, &EVP_sha512,
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0},
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{SSL_SIGN_ED25519, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, NID_undef, NULL, 0},
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};
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static const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *get_signature_algorithm(uint16_t sigalg) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kSignatureAlgorithms); i++) {
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if (kSignatureAlgorithms[i].sigalg == sigalg) {
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return &kSignatureAlgorithms[i];
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}
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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int ssl_has_private_key(const SSL *ssl) {
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return ssl->cert->privatekey != NULL || ssl->cert->key_method != NULL;
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}
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static int pkey_supports_algorithm(const SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
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uint16_t sigalg) {
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const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *alg = get_signature_algorithm(sigalg);
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if (alg == NULL ||
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EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != alg->pkey_type) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
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/* RSA keys may only be used with RSA-PSS. */
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if (alg->pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !alg->is_rsa_pss) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* EC keys have a curve requirement. */
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if (alg->pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
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(alg->curve == NID_undef ||
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EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(
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EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) != alg->curve)) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int setup_ctx(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, uint16_t sigalg) {
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if (!pkey_supports_algorithm(ssl, EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx), sigalg)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
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return 0;
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}
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const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *alg = get_signature_algorithm(sigalg);
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if (alg->digest_func != NULL &&
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!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(ctx, alg->digest_func())) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (alg->is_rsa_pss) {
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if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
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!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, -1 /* salt len = hash len */)) {
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int legacy_sign_digest_supported(const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *alg) {
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return (alg->pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_EC || alg->pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) &&
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!alg->is_rsa_pss;
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}
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enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_sign(
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SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
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uint16_t sigalg, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
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if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
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if (ssl->cert->key_method->sign != NULL) {
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return ssl->cert->key_method->sign(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, sigalg, in,
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in_len);
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}
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/* TODO(davidben): Remove support for |sign_digest|-only
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* |SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_METHOD|s. */
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const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *alg = get_signature_algorithm(sigalg);
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if (alg == NULL ||
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!legacy_sign_digest_supported(alg)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FOR_CUSTOM_KEY);
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return ssl_private_key_failure;
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}
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const EVP_MD *md = alg->digest_func();
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uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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unsigned hash_len;
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if (!EVP_Digest(in, in_len, hash, &hash_len, md, NULL)) {
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return ssl_private_key_failure;
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}
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return ssl->cert->key_method->sign_digest(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, md,
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hash, hash_len);
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}
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*out_len = max_out;
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EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ssl->cert->privatekey, NULL);
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int ret = ctx != NULL &&
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EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx) &&
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setup_ctx(ssl, ctx, sigalg) &&
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EVP_PKEY_sign_message(ctx, out, out_len, in, in_len);
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EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
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return ret ? ssl_private_key_success : ssl_private_key_failure;
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}
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int ssl_public_key_verify(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *signature,
|
|
size_t signature_len, uint16_t signature_algorithm,
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
|
|
int ret = ctx != NULL &&
|
|
EVP_PKEY_verify_init(ctx) &&
|
|
setup_ctx(ssl, ctx, signature_algorithm) &&
|
|
EVP_PKEY_verify_message(ctx, signature, signature_len, in, in_len);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_decrypt(
|
|
SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, size_t max_out,
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len) {
|
|
if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL) {
|
|
return ssl->cert->key_method->decrypt(ssl, out, out_len, max_out, in,
|
|
in_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ssl->cert->privatekey);
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
|
/* Decrypt operations are only supported for RSA keys. */
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part
|
|
* of the timing-sensitive code by the caller. */
|
|
if (!RSA_decrypt(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, RSA_NO_PADDING)) {
|
|
return ssl_private_key_failure;
|
|
}
|
|
return ssl_private_key_success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_private_key_result_t ssl_private_key_complete(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out,
|
|
size_t *out_len,
|
|
size_t max_out) {
|
|
/* Only custom keys may be asynchronous. */
|
|
return ssl->cert->key_method->complete(ssl, out, out_len, max_out);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int ssl_private_key_supports_signature_algorithm(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs,
|
|
uint16_t sigalg) {
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
|
if (!pkey_supports_algorithm(ssl, hs->local_pubkey, sigalg)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure the RSA key is large enough for the hash. RSASSA-PSS requires that
|
|
* emLen be at least hLen + sLen + 2. Both hLen and sLen are the size of the
|
|
* hash in TLS. Reasonable RSA key sizes are large enough for the largest
|
|
* defined RSASSA-PSS algorithm, but 1024-bit RSA is slightly too small for
|
|
* SHA-512. 1024-bit RSA is sometimes used for test credentials, so check the
|
|
* size so that we can fall back to another algorithm in that case. */
|
|
const SSL_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM *alg = get_signature_algorithm(sigalg);
|
|
if (alg->is_rsa_pss &&
|
|
(size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey) <
|
|
2 * EVP_MD_size(alg->digest_func()) + 2) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Newer algorithms require message-based private keys.
|
|
* TODO(davidben): Remove this check when sign_digest is gone. */
|
|
if (ssl->cert->key_method != NULL &&
|
|
ssl->cert->key_method->sign == NULL &&
|
|
!legacy_sign_digest_supported(alg)) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|