|
- /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
- /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
- *
- * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
- * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
- * license.
- *
- * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
- * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
- * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
- *
- * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
- * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
- * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
- *
- * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
- * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
- * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
- * to make use of the Contribution.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
- * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
- * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
- * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
- * OTHERWISE. */
-
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <assert.h>
-
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/hmac.h>
- #include <openssl/md5.h>
- #include <openssl/mem.h>
- #include <openssl/obj.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-
- #include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-
- /* tls1_P_hash computes the TLS P_<hash> function as described in RFC 5246,
- * section 5. It writes |out_len| bytes to |out|, using |md| as the hash and
- * |secret| as the secret. |seed1| through |seed3| are concatenated to form the
- * seed parameter. It returns one on success and zero on failure. */
- static int tls1_P_hash(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const EVP_MD *md,
- const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len,
- const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
- const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
- const uint8_t *seed3, size_t seed3_len) {
- size_t chunk;
- HMAC_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init;
- uint8_t A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned A1_len;
- int ret = 0;
-
- chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
-
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_init);
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_init, secret, secret_len, md, NULL) ||
- !HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init) ||
- (seed1_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) ||
- (seed2_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) ||
- (seed3_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) ||
- !HMAC_Final(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- /* Reinit mac contexts. */
- if (!HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, &ctx_init) ||
- !HMAC_Update(&ctx, A1, A1_len) ||
- (out_len > chunk && !HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp, &ctx)) ||
- (seed1_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) ||
- (seed2_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) ||
- (seed3_len && !HMAC_Update(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len))) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (out_len > chunk) {
- unsigned len;
- if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, out, &len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- assert(len == chunk);
- out += len;
- out_len -= len;
- /* Calculate the next A1 value. */
- if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- /* Last chunk. */
- if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- memcpy(out, A1, out_len);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
- return ret;
- }
-
- int tls1_prf(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t *secret,
- size_t secret_len, const char *label, size_t label_len,
- const uint8_t *seed1, size_t seed1_len,
- const uint8_t *seed2, size_t seed2_len) {
- size_t idx, len, count, i;
- const uint8_t *S1;
- long m;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- int ret = 0;
- uint8_t *tmp;
-
- if (out_len == 0) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Allocate a temporary buffer. */
- tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len);
- if (tmp == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_prf, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Count number of digests and partition |secret| evenly. */
- count = 0;
- for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
- if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) {
- count++;
- }
- }
- /* TODO(davidben): The only case where count isn't 1 is the old MD5/SHA-1
- * combination. The logic around multiple handshake digests can probably be
- * simplified. */
- assert(count == 1 || count == 2);
- len = secret_len / count;
- if (count == 1) {
- secret_len = 0;
- }
- S1 = secret;
- memset(out, 0, out_len);
- for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) {
- if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) {
- /* If |count| is 2 and |secret_len| is odd, |secret| is partitioned into
- * two halves with an overlapping byte. */
- if (!tls1_P_hash(tmp, out_len, md, S1, len + (secret_len & 1),
- (const uint8_t *)label, label_len, seed1, seed1_len,
- seed2, seed2_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
- S1 += len;
- for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
- out[i] ^= tmp[i];
- }
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, out_len);
- OPENSSL_free(tmp);
- return ret;
- }
-
- static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
- return s->enc_method->prf(s, out, out_len, s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length,
- TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
- TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random,
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- }
-
- /* tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates |*aead_ctx|, if needed and returns 1. It
- * returns 0 on malloc error. */
- static int tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx) {
- if (*aead_ctx != NULL) {
- EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx);
- } else {
- *aead_ctx = (SSL_AEAD_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX));
- if (*aead_ctx == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_aead_ctx_init, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- static int tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read,
- const uint8_t *key, unsigned key_len,
- const uint8_t *iv, unsigned iv_len,
- const uint8_t *mac_secret,
- unsigned mac_secret_len) {
- const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
- SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx;
- /* merged_key is used to merge the MAC, cipher, and IV keys for an AEAD which
- * simulates pre-AEAD cipher suites. */
- uint8_t merged_key[EVP_AEAD_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
-
- if (mac_secret_len > 0) {
- /* This is a "stateful" AEAD (for compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher
- * suites). */
- if (mac_secret_len + key_len + iv_len > sizeof(merged_key)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state_aead,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(merged_key, mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
- memcpy(merged_key + mac_secret_len, key, key_len);
- memcpy(merged_key + mac_secret_len + key_len, iv, iv_len);
- key = merged_key;
- key_len += mac_secret_len;
- key_len += iv_len;
- }
-
- if (is_read) {
- if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_read_ctx)) {
- return 0;
- }
- aead_ctx = s->aead_read_ctx;
- } else {
- /* When updating the cipher state for DTLS, we do not wish to overwrite the
- * old ones because DTLS stores pointers to them in order to implement
- * retransmission. See dtls1_hm_fragment_free.
- *
- * TODO(davidben): Simplify aead_write_ctx ownership, probably by just
- * forbidding DTLS renego. */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- s->aead_write_ctx = NULL;
- }
- if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_write_ctx)) {
- return 0;
- }
- aead_ctx = s->aead_write_ctx;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len,
- EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL /* engine */)) {
- OPENSSL_free(aead_ctx);
- if (is_read) {
- s->aead_read_ctx = NULL;
- } else {
- s->aead_write_ctx = NULL;
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (mac_secret_len == 0) {
- /* For a real AEAD, the IV is the fixed part of the nonce. */
- if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state_aead, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len);
- aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len;
- aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record =
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 &
- SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_INCLUDED_IN_RECORD) != 0;
- aead_ctx->random_variable_nonce = 0;
- aead_ctx->omit_length_in_ad = 0;
- } else {
- aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = 0;
- aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record = 1;
- aead_ctx->random_variable_nonce = 1;
- aead_ctx->omit_length_in_ad = 1;
- }
- aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = s->s3->tmp.new_variable_iv_len;
- aead_ctx->omit_version_in_ad = (s->version == SSL3_VERSION);
-
- if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len !=
- EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state_aead, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead);
-
- return 1;
- }
-
- int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) {
- /* is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message - i.e. we
- * need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have just written one. */
- const char is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0;
- /* use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client write"
- * direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a ChangeCipherSpec,
- * or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. */
- const char use_client_keys = which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE ||
- which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
- const uint8_t *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret, *mac_secret;
- const uint8_t *client_write_key, *server_write_key, *key;
- const uint8_t *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv, *iv;
- const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead;
- size_t key_len, iv_len, mac_secret_len;
- const uint8_t *key_data;
-
- /* Reset sequence number to zero. */
- if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- memset(is_read ? s->s3->read_sequence : s->s3->write_sequence, 0, 8);
- }
-
- mac_secret_len = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len;
- iv_len = s->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len;
-
- if (aead == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
- if (mac_secret_len > 0) {
- /* For "stateful" AEADs (i.e. compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher
- * suites) the key length reported by |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will
- * include the MAC and IV key bytes. */
- if (key_len < mac_secret_len + iv_len) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- key_len -= mac_secret_len + iv_len;
- }
-
- key_data = s->s3->tmp.key_block;
- client_write_mac_secret = key_data;
- key_data += mac_secret_len;
- server_write_mac_secret = key_data;
- key_data += mac_secret_len;
- client_write_key = key_data;
- key_data += key_len;
- server_write_key = key_data;
- key_data += key_len;
- client_write_iv = key_data;
- key_data += iv_len;
- server_write_iv = key_data;
- key_data += iv_len;
-
- if (use_client_keys) {
- mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret;
- key = client_write_key;
- iv = client_write_iv;
- } else {
- mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret;
- key = server_write_key;
- iv = server_write_iv;
- }
-
- if (key_data - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, key, key_len, iv, iv_len,
- mac_secret, mac_secret_len);
- }
-
- int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) {
- uint8_t *p;
- const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
- size_t mac_secret_len, fixed_iv_len, variable_iv_len, key_len;
- size_t key_block_len;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) {
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
- goto cipher_unavailable_err;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(&aead, &mac_secret_len, &fixed_iv_len,
- s->session->cipher,
- ssl3_version_from_wire(s, s->version))) {
- goto cipher_unavailable_err;
- }
- key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead);
- variable_iv_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
- if (mac_secret_len > 0) {
- /* For "stateful" AEADs (i.e. compatibility with pre-AEAD cipher suites) the
- * key length reported by |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will include the MAC key
- * bytes and initial implicit IV. */
- if (key_len < mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- key_len -= mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len;
- } else {
- /* The nonce is split into a fixed portion and a variable portion. */
- if (variable_iv_len < fixed_iv_len) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- variable_iv_len -= fixed_iv_len;
- }
-
- assert(mac_secret_len < 256);
- assert(fixed_iv_len < 256);
- assert(variable_iv_len < 256);
-
- s->s3->tmp.new_aead = aead;
- s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_len = (uint8_t)mac_secret_len;
- s->s3->tmp.new_fixed_iv_len = (uint8_t)fixed_iv_len;
- s->s3->tmp.new_variable_iv_len = (uint8_t)variable_iv_len;
-
- key_block_len = key_len + mac_secret_len + fixed_iv_len;
- key_block_len *= 2;
-
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- p = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(key_block_len);
- if (p == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = key_block_len;
- s->s3->tmp.key_block = p;
-
- if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, key_block_len)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
- (s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0) {
- /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV
- * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). */
- s->s3->need_record_splitting = 1;
-
- if (s->session->cipher != NULL &&
- s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) {
- s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 1;
-
- err:
- return ret;
-
- cipher_unavailable_err:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block,
- SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|,
- * respectively. It returns one on success and zero on failure. */
- int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) {
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead;
-
- if (send) {
- rec = &s->s3->wrec;
- aead = s->aead_write_ctx;
- } else {
- rec = &s->s3->rrec;
- aead = s->aead_read_ctx;
- }
-
- if (s->session == NULL || aead == NULL) {
- /* Handle the initial NULL cipher. */
- memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
- rec->input = rec->data;
- return 1;
- }
-
- uint8_t ad[13], *seq, *in, *out, nonce[EVP_AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LENGTH];
- unsigned nonce_used;
- size_t n, ad_len;
-
- seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence;
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- uint8_t dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
-
- s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p);
- memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
- memcpy(ad, dtlsseq, 8);
- } else {
- int i;
- memcpy(ad, seq, 8);
- for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0) {
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-
- ad[8] = rec->type;
- ad_len = 9;
- if (!aead->omit_version_in_ad) {
- ad[ad_len++] = (uint8_t)(s->version >> 8);
- ad[ad_len++] = (uint8_t)(s->version);
- }
-
- if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_enc, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, aead->fixed_nonce_len);
- nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len;
-
- if (send) {
- size_t len = rec->length;
- size_t eivlen = 0;
- in = rec->input;
- out = rec->data;
-
- uint8_t *variable_nonce = nonce + nonce_used;
- if (aead->random_variable_nonce) {
- assert(aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record);
- if (!RAND_bytes(nonce + nonce_used, aead->variable_nonce_len)) {
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- /* When sending we use the sequence number as the variable part of the
- * nonce. */
- if (aead->variable_nonce_len != 8) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_enc, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len);
- }
- nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-
- /* in do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by variable_nonce_len in
- * order to leave space for the variable nonce. Thus we can copy the
- * sequence number bytes into place without overwriting any of the
- * plaintext. */
- if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record) {
- memcpy(out, variable_nonce, aead->variable_nonce_len);
- len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
- eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len;
- }
-
- if (!aead->omit_length_in_ad) {
- ad[ad_len++] = len >> 8;
- ad[ad_len++] = len & 0xff;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(&aead->ctx, out + eivlen, &n, len + aead->tag_len,
- nonce, nonce_used, in + eivlen, len, ad, ad_len)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record) {
- n += aead->variable_nonce_len;
- }
- } else {
- /* receive */
- size_t len = rec->length;
-
- if (rec->data != rec->input) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_enc, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- out = in = rec->input;
-
- if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len) {
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(nonce + nonce_used,
- aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record ? in : ad,
- aead->variable_nonce_len);
- nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len;
-
- if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record) {
- in += aead->variable_nonce_len;
- len -= aead->variable_nonce_len;
- out += aead->variable_nonce_len;
- }
-
- if (!aead->omit_length_in_ad) {
- if (len < aead->tag_len) {
- return 0;
- }
- size_t plaintext_len = len - aead->tag_len;
-
- ad[ad_len++] = plaintext_len >> 8;
- ad[ad_len++] = plaintext_len & 0xff;
- }
-
- if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open(&aead->ctx, out, &n, rec->length, nonce, nonce_used, in,
- len, ad, ad_len)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- rec->data = rec->input = out;
- }
-
- rec->length = n;
- return 1;
- }
-
- int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, uint8_t *out) {
- unsigned int ret;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL;
- int i;
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
- !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] &&
- EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) {
- d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (!d) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_cert_verify_mac, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret);
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* tls1_handshake_digest calculates the current handshake hash and writes it to
- * |out|, which has space for |out_len| bytes. It returns the number of bytes
- * written or -1 in the event of an error. This function works on a copy of the
- * underlying digests so can be called multiple times and prior to the final
- * update etc. */
- int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
- const EVP_MD *md;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- int err = 0, len = 0;
- size_t i;
- long mask;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
- for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++) {
- size_t hash_size;
- unsigned int digest_len;
- EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
-
- if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) == 0) {
- continue;
- }
-
- hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
- if (!hdgst ||
- hash_size > out_len ||
- !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) ||
- !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &digest_len) ||
- digest_len != hash_size /* internal error */) {
- err = 1;
- break;
- }
-
- out += digest_len;
- out_len -= digest_len;
- len += digest_len;
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-
- if (err != 0) {
- return -1;
- }
- return len;
- }
-
- int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, int slen, uint8_t *out) {
- uint8_t buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- int err = 0;
- int digests_len;
-
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
- !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (digests_len < 0) {
- err = 1;
- digests_len = 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->enc_method->prf(s, out, 12, s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length, str, slen, buf,
- digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
- err = 1;
- }
-
- if (err) {
- return 0;
- } else {
- return 12;
- }
- }
-
- int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *premaster,
- size_t premaster_len) {
- if (s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
- uint8_t digests[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- int digests_len;
-
- /* The master secret is based on the handshake hash just after sending the
- * ClientKeyExchange. However, we might have a client certificate to send,
- * in which case we might need different hashes for the verification and
- * thus still need the handshake buffer around. Keeping both a handshake
- * buffer *and* running hashes isn't yet supported so, when it comes to
- * calculating the Finished hash, we'll have to hash the handshake buffer
- * again. */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
- !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, dont_free_handshake_buffer)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, digests, sizeof(digests));
- if (digests_len == -1) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->enc_method->prf(s, out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster,
- premaster_len, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
- TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, digests,
- digests_len, NULL, 0)) {
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- if (!s->enc_method->prf(s, out, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, premaster,
- premaster_len, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE;
- }
-
- int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t olen,
- const char *label, size_t llen,
- const uint8_t *context, size_t contextlen,
- int use_context) {
- uint8_t *val = NULL;
- size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
- int ret;
-
- /* construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than
- * passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation
- * of values does not create a prohibited label. */
- vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
- if (use_context) {
- vallen += 2 + contextlen;
- }
-
- val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
- if (val == NULL) {
- goto err2;
- }
-
- currentvalpos = 0;
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (uint8_t *)label, llen);
- currentvalpos += llen;
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- if (use_context) {
- val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
- currentvalpos++;
- val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
- currentvalpos++;
- if (contextlen > 0 || context != NULL) {
- memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
- }
- }
-
- /* disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited
- * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
- * comparisons won't have buffer overflow. */
- if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0 ||
- memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0 ||
- memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
- TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0 ||
- memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
- TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) {
- goto err1;
- }
-
- /* SSL_export_keying_material is not implemented for SSLv3, so passing
- * everything through the label parameter works. */
- assert(s->version != SSL3_VERSION);
- ret = s->enc_method->prf(s, out, olen, s->session->master_key,
- s->session->master_key_length, (const char *)val,
- vallen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
- goto out;
-
- err1:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
- ret = 0;
- goto out;
-
- err2:
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_export_keying_material, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ret = 0;
-
- out:
- if (val != NULL) {
- OPENSSL_free(val);
- }
-
- return ret;
- }
-
- int tls1_alert_code(int code) {
- switch (code) {
- case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
- return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
-
- case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
- return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
-
- case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
- return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
-
- case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
- return TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
-
- case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
- return TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-
- case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
- return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
-
- case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
- return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-
- case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE:
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
- return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-
- case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
- return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
-
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
- return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
-
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
- return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
-
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
- return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
-
- case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
- return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
-
- case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
- return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
-
- case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
- return TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED;
-
- case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
- return TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-
- case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
- return TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
- return TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
-
- case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
- return TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
-
- case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
- return TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY;
-
- case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
- return TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
- case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
- return TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED;
-
- case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
- return TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
-
- case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION:
- return TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-
- case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE:
- return TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE;
-
- case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME:
- return TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE:
- return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
-
- case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE:
- return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE;
-
- case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:
- return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
-
- case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:
- return SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
-
- default:
- return -1;
- }
- }
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