boringssl/ssl/s3_pkt.cc
David Benjamin d9229f9802 Lift BIO above SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD.
This gets us closer to exposing BIO-free APIs. The next step is probably
to make the experimental bssl::OpenRecord function call a split out core
of ssl_read_impl.

Change-Id: I4acebb43f708df8c52eb4e328da8ae3551362fb9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21865
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
2017-10-17 19:53:52 +00:00

450 lines
16 KiB
C++

/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "../crypto/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
namespace bssl {
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned len);
int ssl3_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake, const uint8_t *buf,
int len) {
assert(ssl_can_write(ssl));
assert(!ssl->s3->aead_write_ctx->is_null_cipher());
*out_needs_handshake = false;
unsigned tot, n, nw;
assert(ssl->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
tot = ssl->s3->wnum;
ssl->s3->wnum = 0;
// Ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out than
// the the original len from a write which didn't complete for non-blocking
// I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for this in
// ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be possible to
// end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then promptly send
// beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and report the error in
// a way the user will notice.
if (len < 0 || (size_t)len < tot) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
const int is_early_data_write =
!ssl->server && SSL_in_early_data(ssl) && ssl->s3->hs->can_early_write;
n = len - tot;
for (;;) {
// max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put into a record.
unsigned max = ssl->max_send_fragment;
if (is_early_data_write && max > ssl->session->ticket_max_early_data -
ssl->s3->hs->early_data_written) {
max = ssl->session->ticket_max_early_data - ssl->s3->hs->early_data_written;
if (max == 0) {
ssl->s3->wnum = tot;
ssl->s3->hs->can_early_write = false;
*out_needs_handshake = true;
return -1;
}
}
if (n > max) {
nw = max;
} else {
nw = n;
}
int ret = do_ssl3_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, &buf[tot], nw);
if (ret <= 0) {
ssl->s3->wnum = tot;
return ret;
}
if (is_early_data_write) {
ssl->s3->hs->early_data_written += ret;
}
if (ret == (int)n || (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)) {
return tot + ret;
}
n -= ret;
tot += ret;
}
}
static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *buf,
unsigned int len) {
if (ssl->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len ||
(!(ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) &&
ssl->s3->wpend_buf != buf) ||
ssl->s3->wpend_type != type) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
return -1;
}
int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
ssl->s3->wpend_pending = false;
return ssl->s3->wpend_ret;
}
// do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type.
static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned len) {
// If there is still data from the previous record, flush it.
if (ssl->s3->wpend_pending) {
return ssl3_write_pending(ssl, type, buf, len);
}
if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
if (len == 0) {
return 0;
}
size_t flight_len = 0;
if (ssl->s3->pending_flight != NULL) {
flight_len =
ssl->s3->pending_flight->length - ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset;
}
size_t max_out = len + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
if (max_out < len || max_out + flight_len < max_out) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
return -1;
}
max_out += flight_len;
uint8_t *out;
size_t ciphertext_len;
if (!ssl_write_buffer_init(ssl, &out, max_out)) {
return -1;
}
// Add any unflushed handshake data as a prefix. This may be a KeyUpdate
// acknowledgment or 0-RTT key change messages. |pending_flight| must be clear
// when data is added to |write_buffer| or it will be written in the wrong
// order.
if (ssl->s3->pending_flight != NULL) {
OPENSSL_memcpy(
out, ssl->s3->pending_flight->data + ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset,
flight_len);
BUF_MEM_free(ssl->s3->pending_flight);
ssl->s3->pending_flight = NULL;
ssl->s3->pending_flight_offset = 0;
}
if (!tls_seal_record(ssl, out + flight_len, &ciphertext_len,
max_out - flight_len, type, buf, len)) {
return -1;
}
ssl_write_buffer_set_len(ssl, flight_len + ciphertext_len);
// Now that we've made progress on the connection, uncork KeyUpdate
// acknowledgments.
ssl->s3->key_update_pending = false;
// Memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries
// later.
ssl->s3->wpend_tot = len;
ssl->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
ssl->s3->wpend_type = type;
ssl->s3->wpend_ret = len;
ssl->s3->wpend_pending = true;
// We now just need to write the buffer.
return ssl3_write_pending(ssl, type, buf, len);
}
ssl_open_record_t ssl3_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out,
size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert,
Span<uint8_t> in) {
assert(ssl_can_read(ssl));
assert(!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher());
uint8_t type;
Span<uint8_t> body;
auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
return ret;
}
const bool is_early_data_read = ssl->server && SSL_in_early_data(ssl);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
// If reading 0-RTT data, reject handshake data. 0-RTT data is terminated
// by an alert.
if (is_early_data_read) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
// Post-handshake data prior to TLS 1.3 is always renegotiation, which we
// never accept as a server. Otherwise |ssl3_get_message| will send
// |SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE|.
if (ssl->server && ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) {
ssl->init_buf = BUF_MEM_new();
}
if (ssl->init_buf == NULL ||
!BUF_MEM_append(ssl->init_buf, body.data(), body.size())) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
return ssl_open_record_discard;
}
// Handle the end_of_early_data alert.
static const uint8_t kEndOfEarlyData[2] = {SSL3_AL_WARNING,
TLS1_AD_END_OF_EARLY_DATA};
if (is_early_data_read && type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && body == kEndOfEarlyData) {
// Stop accepting early data.
ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read = false;
return ssl_open_record_discard;
}
if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
if (is_early_data_read) {
if (body.size() > kMaxEarlyDataAccepted - ssl->s3->hs->early_data_read) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_READ_EARLY_DATA);
*out_alert = SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
ssl->s3->hs->early_data_read += body.size();
}
if (body.empty()) {
return ssl_open_record_discard;
}
*out = body;
return ssl_open_record_success;
}
ssl_open_record_t ssl3_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
uint8_t *out_alert,
Span<uint8_t> in) {
uint8_t type;
Span<uint8_t> body;
auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
return ret;
}
if (type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
if (body.size() != 1 || body[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return ssl_open_record_error;
}
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, body);
return ssl_open_record_success;
}
ssl_open_record_t ssl3_open_close_notify(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
// TODO(davidben): Replace this with open_app_data so we actually process
// various bad behaviors.
uint8_t type;
Span<uint8_t> body;
auto ret = tls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
if (ret == ssl_open_record_success) {
return ssl_open_record_discard;
}
return ret;
}
int ssl_send_alert(SSL *ssl, int level, int desc) {
// It is illegal to send an alert when we've already sent a closing one.
if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
return -1;
}
if (level == SSL3_AL_WARNING && desc == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
} else {
assert(level == SSL3_AL_FATAL);
assert(desc != SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
ssl->s3->write_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_error;
}
ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
ssl->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
ssl->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
if (!ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(ssl)) {
// Nothing is being written out, so the alert may be dispatched
// immediately.
return ssl->method->dispatch_alert(ssl);
}
// The alert will be dispatched later.
return -1;
}
int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl) {
int ret = do_ssl3_write(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &ssl->s3->send_alert[0], 2);
if (ret <= 0) {
return ret;
}
ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
// If the alert is fatal, flush the BIO now.
if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
BIO_flush(ssl->wbio);
}
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert);
int alert = (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | ssl->s3->send_alert[1];
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, alert);
return 1;
}
} // namespace bssl