e4a9dbcf02
clang-format mangled this a little. Change-Id: Ic4d8de0e1f6e926efbe8d14e390fe874b4a7cdcb Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12467 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
463 lines
13 KiB
C
463 lines
13 KiB
C
/* Originally written by Bodo Moeller for the OpenSSL project.
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* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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*
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* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
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* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
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*
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* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license provided above.
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*
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* The elliptic curve binary polynomial software is originally written by
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* Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila of Sun Microsystems
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* Laboratories. */
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/thread.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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#include "../internal.h"
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/* This file implements the wNAF-based interleaving multi-exponentation method
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* (<URL:http://www.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/TI/Mitarbeiter/moeller.html#multiexp>);
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* */
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/* Determine the modified width-(w+1) Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) of 'scalar'.
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* This is an array r[] of values that are either zero or odd with an
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* absolute value less than 2^w satisfying
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* scalar = \sum_j r[j]*2^j
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* where at most one of any w+1 consecutive digits is non-zero
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* with the exception that the most significant digit may be only
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* w-1 zeros away from that next non-zero digit.
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*/
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static signed char *compute_wNAF(const BIGNUM *scalar, int w, size_t *ret_len) {
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int window_val;
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int ok = 0;
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signed char *r = NULL;
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int sign = 1;
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int bit, next_bit, mask;
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size_t len = 0, j;
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if (BN_is_zero(scalar)) {
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r = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
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if (!r) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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r[0] = 0;
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*ret_len = 1;
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return r;
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}
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/* 'signed char' can represent integers with absolute values less than 2^7 */
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if (w <= 0 || w > 7) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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bit = 1 << w; /* at most 128 */
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next_bit = bit << 1; /* at most 256 */
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mask = next_bit - 1; /* at most 255 */
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if (BN_is_negative(scalar)) {
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sign = -1;
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}
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if (scalar->d == NULL || scalar->top == 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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len = BN_num_bits(scalar);
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/* The modified wNAF may be one digit longer than binary representation
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* (*ret_len will be set to the actual length, i.e. at most
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* BN_num_bits(scalar) + 1). */
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r = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
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if (r == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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window_val = scalar->d[0] & mask;
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j = 0;
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/* If j+w+1 >= len, window_val will not increase. */
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while (window_val != 0 || j + w + 1 < len) {
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int digit = 0;
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/* 0 <= window_val <= 2^(w+1) */
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if (window_val & 1) {
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/* 0 < window_val < 2^(w+1) */
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if (window_val & bit) {
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digit = window_val - next_bit; /* -2^w < digit < 0 */
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#if 1 /* modified wNAF */
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if (j + w + 1 >= len) {
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/* special case for generating modified wNAFs:
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* no new bits will be added into window_val,
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* so using a positive digit here will decrease
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* the total length of the representation */
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digit = window_val & (mask >> 1); /* 0 < digit < 2^w */
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}
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#endif
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} else {
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digit = window_val; /* 0 < digit < 2^w */
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}
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if (digit <= -bit || digit >= bit || !(digit & 1)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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window_val -= digit;
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/* Now window_val is 0 or 2^(w+1) in standard wNAF generation;
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* for modified window NAFs, it may also be 2^w. */
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if (window_val != 0 && window_val != next_bit && window_val != bit) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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r[j++] = sign * digit;
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window_val >>= 1;
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window_val += bit * BN_is_bit_set(scalar, j + w);
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if (window_val > next_bit) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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}
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if (j > len + 1) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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len = j;
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ok = 1;
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err:
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if (!ok) {
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OPENSSL_free(r);
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r = NULL;
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}
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if (ok) {
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*ret_len = len;
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}
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return r;
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}
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/* TODO: table should be optimised for the wNAF-based implementation,
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* sometimes smaller windows will give better performance
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* (thus the boundaries should be increased)
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*/
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static size_t window_bits_for_scalar_size(size_t b) {
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if (b >= 2000) {
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return 6;
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}
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if (b >= 800) {
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return 5;
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}
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if (b >= 300) {
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return 4;
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}
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if (b >= 70) {
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return 3;
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}
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if (b >= 20) {
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return 2;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *g_scalar,
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const EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *p_scalar, BN_CTX *ctx) {
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BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
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const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
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EC_POINT *tmp = NULL;
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size_t total_num;
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size_t i, j;
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int k;
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int r_is_inverted = 0;
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int r_is_at_infinity = 1;
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size_t *wsize = NULL; /* individual window sizes */
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signed char **wNAF = NULL; /* individual wNAFs */
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size_t *wNAF_len = NULL;
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size_t max_len = 0;
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size_t num_val;
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EC_POINT **val = NULL; /* precomputation */
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EC_POINT **v;
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EC_POINT ***val_sub = NULL; /* pointers to sub-arrays of 'val' */
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int ret = 0;
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if (ctx == NULL) {
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ctx = new_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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/* TODO: This function used to take |points| and |scalars| as arrays of
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* |num| elements. The code below should be simplified to work in terms of |p|
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* and |p_scalar|. */
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size_t num = p != NULL ? 1 : 0;
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const EC_POINT **points = p != NULL ? &p : NULL;
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const BIGNUM **scalars = p != NULL ? &p_scalar : NULL;
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total_num = num;
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if (g_scalar != NULL) {
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generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group);
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if (generator == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR);
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goto err;
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}
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++total_num; /* treat 'g_scalar' like 'num'-th element of 'scalars' */
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}
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wsize = OPENSSL_malloc(total_num * sizeof wsize[0]);
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wNAF_len = OPENSSL_malloc(total_num * sizeof wNAF_len[0]);
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wNAF = OPENSSL_malloc((total_num + 1) *
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sizeof wNAF[0]); /* includes space for pivot */
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val_sub = OPENSSL_malloc(total_num * sizeof val_sub[0]);
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/* Ensure wNAF is initialised in case we end up going to err. */
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if (wNAF) {
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wNAF[0] = NULL; /* preliminary pivot */
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}
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if (!wsize || !wNAF_len || !wNAF || !val_sub) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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/* num_val will be the total number of temporarily precomputed points */
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num_val = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < total_num; i++) {
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size_t bits;
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bits = i < num ? BN_num_bits(scalars[i]) : BN_num_bits(g_scalar);
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wsize[i] = window_bits_for_scalar_size(bits);
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num_val += (size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1);
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wNAF[i + 1] = NULL; /* make sure we always have a pivot */
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wNAF[i] =
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compute_wNAF((i < num ? scalars[i] : g_scalar), wsize[i], &wNAF_len[i]);
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if (wNAF[i] == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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if (wNAF_len[i] > max_len) {
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max_len = wNAF_len[i];
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}
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}
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/* All points we precompute now go into a single array 'val'. 'val_sub[i]' is
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* a pointer to the subarray for the i-th point. */
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val = OPENSSL_malloc((num_val + 1) * sizeof val[0]);
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if (val == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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goto err;
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}
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val[num_val] = NULL; /* pivot element */
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/* allocate points for precomputation */
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v = val;
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for (i = 0; i < total_num; i++) {
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val_sub[i] = v;
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for (j = 0; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) {
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*v = EC_POINT_new(group);
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if (*v == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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v++;
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}
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}
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if (!(v == val + num_val)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!(tmp = EC_POINT_new(group))) {
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goto err;
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}
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/* prepare precomputed values:
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* val_sub[i][0] := points[i]
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* val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i]
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* val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i]
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* ...
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < total_num; i++) {
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if (i < num) {
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if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], points[i])) {
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goto err;
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}
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} else if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], generator)) {
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goto err;
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}
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if (wsize[i] > 1) {
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if (!EC_POINT_dbl(group, tmp, val_sub[i][0], ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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for (j = 1; j < ((size_t)1 << (wsize[i] - 1)); j++) {
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if (!EC_POINT_add(group, val_sub[i][j], val_sub[i][j - 1], tmp, ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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#if 1 /* optional; window_bits_for_scalar_size assumes we do this step */
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if (!EC_POINTs_make_affine(group, num_val, val, ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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#endif
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r_is_at_infinity = 1;
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for (k = max_len - 1; k >= 0; k--) {
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if (!r_is_at_infinity && !EC_POINT_dbl(group, r, r, ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < total_num; i++) {
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if (wNAF_len[i] > (size_t)k) {
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int digit = wNAF[i][k];
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int is_neg;
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if (digit) {
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is_neg = digit < 0;
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if (is_neg) {
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digit = -digit;
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}
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if (is_neg != r_is_inverted) {
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if (!r_is_at_infinity && !EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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r_is_inverted = !r_is_inverted;
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}
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/* digit > 0 */
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if (r_is_at_infinity) {
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if (!EC_POINT_copy(r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1])) {
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goto err;
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}
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r_is_at_infinity = 0;
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} else {
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if (!EC_POINT_add(group, r, r, val_sub[i][digit >> 1], ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if (r_is_at_infinity) {
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if (!EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r)) {
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goto err;
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}
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} else if (r_is_inverted && !EC_POINT_invert(group, r, ctx)) {
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goto err;
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
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EC_POINT_free(tmp);
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OPENSSL_free(wsize);
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OPENSSL_free(wNAF_len);
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if (wNAF != NULL) {
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signed char **w;
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for (w = wNAF; *w != NULL; w++) {
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OPENSSL_free(*w);
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}
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OPENSSL_free(wNAF);
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}
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if (val != NULL) {
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for (v = val; *v != NULL; v++) {
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EC_POINT_clear_free(*v);
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}
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OPENSSL_free(val);
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}
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OPENSSL_free(val_sub);
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return ret;
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}
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