e78bfded9f
Notably, this would have caught ed8270a55c
(although, apart from staring at code coverage, knowing to set resumeSession on
the server test isn't exactly obvious). Perhaps we should systematically set it
on all extension server tests; ClientHello extension parsing happens after
resumption has been determined and is often sensitive to it.
Change-Id: Ie83f294a26881a6a41969e9dbd102d0a93cb68b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1750
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
850 lines
24 KiB
Go
850 lines
24 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package main
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"math/big"
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)
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// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
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// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
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type serverHandshakeState struct {
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c *Conn
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clientHello *clientHelloMsg
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hello *serverHelloMsg
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suite *cipherSuite
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ellipticOk bool
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ecdsaOk bool
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sessionState *sessionState
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finishedHash finishedHash
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masterSecret []byte
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certsFromClient [][]byte
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cert *Certificate
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}
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// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
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func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() error {
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config := c.config
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// If this is the first server handshake, we generate a random key to
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// encrypt the tickets with.
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config.serverInitOnce.Do(config.serverInit)
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c.sendHandshakeSeq = 0
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c.recvHandshakeSeq = 0
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hs := serverHandshakeState{
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c: c,
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}
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isResume, err := hs.readClientHello()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// For an overview of TLS handshaking, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3
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if isResume {
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// The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
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if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if c.config.Bugs.RenewTicketOnResume {
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if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(isResume); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.didResume = true
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} else {
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// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
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// valid so we do a full handshake.
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if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(isResume); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if c.config.Bugs.ExpectFalseStart {
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if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeApplicationData); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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c.handshakeComplete = true
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return nil
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}
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// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message from the client and decides
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// whether we will perform session resumption.
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readClientHello() (isResume bool, err error) {
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config := hs.c.config
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c := hs.c
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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var ok bool
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hs.clientHello, ok = msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return false, unexpectedMessageError(hs.clientHello, msg)
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}
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if c.isDTLS && !config.Bugs.SkipHelloVerifyRequest {
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// Per RFC 6347, the version field in HelloVerifyRequest SHOULD
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// be always DTLS 1.0
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helloVerifyRequest := &helloVerifyRequestMsg{
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vers: VersionTLS10,
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cookie: make([]byte, 32),
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}
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), helloVerifyRequest.cookie); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return false, errors.New("dtls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
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}
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloVerifyRequest.marshal())
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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newClientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return false, unexpectedMessageError(hs.clientHello, msg)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(newClientHello.cookie, helloVerifyRequest.cookie) {
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return false, errors.New("dtls: invalid cookie")
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}
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// Apart from the cookie, the two ClientHellos must
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// match. Note that clientHello.equal compares the
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// serialization, so we make a copy.
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oldClientHelloCopy := *hs.clientHello
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oldClientHelloCopy.raw = nil
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oldClientHelloCopy.cookie = nil
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newClientHelloCopy := *newClientHello
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newClientHelloCopy.raw = nil
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newClientHelloCopy.cookie = nil
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if !oldClientHelloCopy.equal(&newClientHelloCopy) {
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return false, errors.New("dtls: retransmitted ClientHello does not match")
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}
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hs.clientHello = newClientHello
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}
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c.vers, ok = config.mutualVersion(hs.clientHello.vers)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
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return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered an unsupported, maximum protocol version of %x", hs.clientHello.vers)
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}
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c.haveVers = true
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hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
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hs.hello.isDTLS = c.isDTLS
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supportedCurve := false
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preferredCurves := config.curvePreferences()
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Curves:
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for _, curve := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves {
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for _, supported := range preferredCurves {
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if supported == curve {
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supportedCurve = true
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break Curves
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}
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}
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}
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supportedPointFormat := false
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for _, pointFormat := range hs.clientHello.supportedPoints {
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if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
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supportedPointFormat = true
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break
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}
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}
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hs.ellipticOk = supportedCurve && supportedPointFormat
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foundCompression := false
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// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
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for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
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if compression == compressionNone {
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foundCompression = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !foundCompression {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return false, errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
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}
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hs.hello.vers = c.vers
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hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
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_, err = io.ReadFull(config.rand(), hs.hello.random)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return false, err
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}
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hs.hello.secureRenegotiation = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation
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hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
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hs.hello.duplicateExtension = c.config.Bugs.DuplicateExtension
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if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
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c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
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}
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// Although sending an empty NPN extension is reasonable, Firefox has
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// had a bug around this. Best to send nothing at all if
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// config.NextProtos is empty. See
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// https://code.google.com/p/go/issues/detail?id=5445.
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if hs.clientHello.nextProtoNeg && len(config.NextProtos) > 0 {
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hs.hello.nextProtoNeg = true
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hs.hello.nextProtos = config.NextProtos
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}
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if len(config.Certificates) == 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return false, errors.New("tls: no certificates configured")
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}
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hs.cert = &config.Certificates[0]
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if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
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hs.cert = config.getCertificateForName(hs.clientHello.serverName)
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}
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if expected := c.config.Bugs.ExpectServerName; expected != "" && expected != hs.clientHello.serverName {
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return false, errors.New("tls: unexpected server name")
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}
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if hs.clientHello.channelIDSupported && config.RequestChannelID {
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hs.hello.channelIDRequested = true
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}
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_, hs.ecdsaOk = hs.cert.PrivateKey.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
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if hs.checkForResumption() {
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return true, nil
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}
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var scsvFound bool
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for _, cipherSuite := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
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if cipherSuite == fallbackSCSV {
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scsvFound = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !scsvFound && config.Bugs.FailIfNotFallbackSCSV {
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return false, errors.New("tls: no fallback SCSV found when expected")
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} else if scsvFound && !config.Bugs.FailIfNotFallbackSCSV {
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return false, errors.New("tls: fallback SCSV found when not expected")
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}
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var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16
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if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites {
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preferenceList = c.config.cipherSuites()
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supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
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} else {
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preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
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supportedList = c.config.cipherSuites()
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}
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for _, id := range preferenceList {
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if hs.suite = c.tryCipherSuite(id, supportedList, c.vers, hs.ellipticOk, hs.ecdsaOk); hs.suite != nil {
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break
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}
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}
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if hs.suite == nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return false, errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
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}
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return false, nil
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}
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// checkForResumption returns true if we should perform resumption on this connection.
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
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c := hs.c
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var ok bool
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if hs.sessionState, ok = c.decryptTicket(hs.clientHello.sessionTicket); !ok {
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return false
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}
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if hs.sessionState.vers > hs.clientHello.vers {
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return false
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}
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if vers, ok := c.config.mutualVersion(hs.sessionState.vers); !ok || vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
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return false
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}
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cipherSuiteOk := false
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// Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
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for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
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if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
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cipherSuiteOk = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !cipherSuiteOk {
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return false
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}
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// Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
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hs.suite = c.tryCipherSuite(hs.sessionState.cipherSuite, c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.sessionState.vers, hs.ellipticOk, hs.ecdsaOk)
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if hs.suite == nil {
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return false
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}
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sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
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needClientCerts := c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAnyClientCert || c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAndVerifyClientCert
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if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
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return false
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}
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if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
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// We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
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// that we're doing a resumption.
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hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
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hs.hello.ticketSupported = c.config.Bugs.RenewTicketOnResume
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hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
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hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
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hs.writeClientHash(hs.clientHello.marshal())
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hs.writeServerHash(hs.hello.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal())
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if len(hs.sessionState.certificates) > 0 {
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if _, err := hs.processCertsFromClient(hs.sessionState.certificates); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
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config := hs.c.config
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c := hs.c
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if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
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hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
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}
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hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !config.SessionTicketsDisabled
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hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
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hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
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hs.writeClientHash(hs.clientHello.marshal())
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hs.writeServerHash(hs.hello.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal())
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certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
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certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
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if !config.Bugs.UnauthenticatedECDH {
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hs.writeServerHash(certMsg.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
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}
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if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
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certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
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certStatus.statusType = statusTypeOCSP
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certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
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hs.writeServerHash(certStatus.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal())
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}
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keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
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skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return err
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}
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if skx != nil && !config.Bugs.SkipServerKeyExchange {
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hs.writeServerHash(skx.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal())
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}
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if config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
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// Request a client certificate
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certReq := &certificateRequestMsg{
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certificateTypes: config.ClientCertificateTypes,
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}
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if certReq.certificateTypes == nil {
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certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
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byte(CertTypeRSASign),
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byte(CertTypeECDSASign),
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}
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}
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if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
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certReq.hasSignatureAndHash = true
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certReq.signatureAndHashes = supportedClientCertSignatureAlgorithms
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}
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// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
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// the client that it may send any certificate in response
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// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
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// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
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// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
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if config.ClientCAs != nil {
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certReq.certificateAuthorities = config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
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}
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hs.writeServerHash(certReq.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal())
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}
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helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
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hs.writeServerHash(helloDone.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal())
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var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var ok bool
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// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
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// certificate message, even if it's empty.
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if config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
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if certMsg, ok = msg.(*certificateMsg); !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
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}
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hs.writeClientHash(certMsg.marshal())
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if len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
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// The client didn't actually send a certificate
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switch config.ClientAuth {
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case RequireAnyClientCert, RequireAndVerifyClientCert:
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
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}
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}
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pub, err = hs.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificates)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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// Get client key exchange
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ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
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}
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hs.writeClientHash(ckx.marshal())
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preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return err
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}
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hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
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// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
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// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
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// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
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// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
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// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
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// possession of the private key of the certificate.
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if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
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}
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// Determine the signature type.
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var signatureAndHash signatureAndHash
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if certVerify.hasSignatureAndHash {
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signatureAndHash = certVerify.signatureAndHash
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} else {
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// Before TLS 1.2 the signature algorithm was implicit
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// from the key type, and only one hash per signature
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// algorithm was possible. Leave the hash as zero.
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switch pub.(type) {
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case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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signatureAndHash.signature = signatureECDSA
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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signatureAndHash.signature = signatureRSA
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}
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}
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|
|
switch key := pub.(type) {
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
|
if signatureAndHash.signature != signatureECDSA {
|
|
err = errors.New("tls: bad signature type for client's ECDSA certificate")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
ecdsaSig := new(ecdsaSignature)
|
|
if _, err = asn1.Unmarshal(certVerify.signature, ecdsaSig); err != nil {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
|
|
err = errors.New("ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
var digest []byte
|
|
digest, _, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureAndHash, hs.masterSecret)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
if !ecdsa.Verify(key, digest, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) {
|
|
err = errors.New("ECDSA verification failure")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
|
if signatureAndHash.signature != signatureRSA {
|
|
err = errors.New("tls: bad signature type for client's RSA certificate")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
var digest []byte
|
|
var hashFunc crypto.Hash
|
|
digest, hashFunc, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureAndHash, hs.masterSecret)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(key, hashFunc, digest, certVerify.signature)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return errors.New("could not validate signature of connection nonces: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.writeClientHash(certVerify.marshal())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
|
|
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
|
|
|
|
var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
|
|
var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
|
|
|
|
if hs.suite.aead == nil {
|
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
|
|
clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
|
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
|
|
serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
|
|
} else {
|
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
|
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
|
|
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(isResume bool) error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
|
|
if err := c.in.error(); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hs.hello.nextProtoNeg {
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
nextProto, ok := msg.(*nextProtoMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(nextProto, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
hs.writeClientHash(nextProto.marshal())
|
|
c.clientProtocol = nextProto.proto
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hs.hello.channelIDRequested {
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
encryptedExtensions, ok := msg.(*encryptedExtensionsMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(encryptedExtensions, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
x := new(big.Int).SetBytes(encryptedExtensions.channelID[0:32])
|
|
y := new(big.Int).SetBytes(encryptedExtensions.channelID[32:64])
|
|
r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(encryptedExtensions.channelID[64:96])
|
|
s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(encryptedExtensions.channelID[96:128])
|
|
if !elliptic.P256().IsOnCurve(x, y) {
|
|
return errors.New("tls: invalid channel ID public key")
|
|
}
|
|
channelID := &ecdsa.PublicKey{elliptic.P256(), x, y}
|
|
var resumeHash []byte
|
|
if isResume {
|
|
resumeHash = hs.sessionState.handshakeHash
|
|
}
|
|
if !ecdsa.Verify(channelID, hs.finishedHash.hashForChannelID(resumeHash), r, s) {
|
|
return errors.New("tls: invalid channel ID signature")
|
|
}
|
|
c.channelID = channelID
|
|
|
|
hs.writeClientHash(encryptedExtensions.marshal())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
|
|
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.writeClientHash(clientFinished.marshal())
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
|
|
if !hs.hello.ticketSupported || hs.c.config.Bugs.SkipNewSessionTicket {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
|
|
|
|
var err error
|
|
state := sessionState{
|
|
vers: c.vers,
|
|
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
|
|
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
|
|
certificates: hs.certsFromClient,
|
|
handshakeHash: hs.finishedHash.server.Sum(nil),
|
|
}
|
|
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(&state)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.writeServerHash(m.marshal())
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal())
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished() error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
finished := new(finishedMsg)
|
|
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
postCCSBytes := finished.marshal()
|
|
hs.writeServerHash(postCCSBytes)
|
|
|
|
if c.config.Bugs.FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSpec {
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, postCCSBytes[:5])
|
|
postCCSBytes = postCCSBytes[5:]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !c.config.Bugs.SkipChangeCipherSpec {
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, postCCSBytes)
|
|
|
|
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
|
|
// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
|
|
// the public key of the leaf certificate.
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processCertsFromClient(certificates [][]byte) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
hs.certsFromClient = certificates
|
|
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
|
|
var err error
|
|
for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
|
|
if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
|
|
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
|
|
Roots: c.config.ClientCAs,
|
|
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
|
|
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
|
|
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
|
|
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to verify client's certificate: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ok := false
|
|
for _, ku := range certs[0].ExtKeyUsage {
|
|
if ku == x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth {
|
|
ok = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return nil, errors.New("tls: client's certificate's extended key usage doesn't permit it to be used for client authentication")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.verifiedChains = chains
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(certs) > 0 {
|
|
var pub crypto.PublicKey
|
|
switch key := certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey:
|
|
pub = key
|
|
default:
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client's certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
|
|
}
|
|
c.peerCertificates = certs
|
|
return pub, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) writeServerHash(msg []byte) {
|
|
// writeServerHash is called before writeRecord.
|
|
hs.writeHash(msg, hs.c.sendHandshakeSeq)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) writeClientHash(msg []byte) {
|
|
// writeClientHash is called after readHandshake.
|
|
hs.writeHash(msg, hs.c.recvHandshakeSeq-1)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) writeHash(msg []byte, seqno uint16) {
|
|
if hs.c.isDTLS {
|
|
// This is somewhat hacky. DTLS hashes a slightly different format.
|
|
// First, the TLS header.
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(msg[:4])
|
|
// Then the sequence number and reassembled fragment offset (always 0).
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write([]byte{byte(seqno >> 8), byte(seqno), 0, 0, 0})
|
|
// Then the reassembled fragment (always equal to the message length).
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(msg[1:4])
|
|
// And then the message body.
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(msg[4:])
|
|
} else {
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(msg)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// tryCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite with the given id if that cipher suite
|
|
// is acceptable to use.
|
|
func (c *Conn) tryCipherSuite(id uint16, supportedCipherSuites []uint16, version uint16, ellipticOk, ecdsaOk bool) *cipherSuite {
|
|
for _, supported := range supportedCipherSuites {
|
|
if id == supported {
|
|
var candidate *cipherSuite
|
|
|
|
for _, s := range cipherSuites {
|
|
if s.id == id {
|
|
candidate = s
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if candidate == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
// Don't select a ciphersuite which we can't
|
|
// support for this client.
|
|
if (candidate.flags&suiteECDHE != 0) && !ellipticOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if (candidate.flags&suiteECDSA != 0) != ecdsaOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if !c.config.Bugs.SkipCipherVersionCheck && version < VersionTLS12 && candidate.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if c.isDTLS && candidate.flags&suiteNoDTLS != 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
return candidate
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|