13be1de469
The minimum MTU (not consistently enforced) is just under 256, so it's difficult to test everything, but this is a basic test. (E.g., without renego, the only handshake message with encryption is Finished which fits in the MTU.) It tests the server side because the Certificate message is large enough to require fragmentation. Change-Id: Ida11f1057cebae2b800ad13696f98bb3a7fbbc5e Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/2824 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
328 lines
9.6 KiB
Go
328 lines
9.6 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
|
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
|
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
|
|
|
// DTLS implementation.
|
|
//
|
|
// NOTE: This is a not even a remotely production-quality DTLS
|
|
// implementation. It is the bare minimum necessary to be able to
|
|
// achieve coverage on BoringSSL's implementation. Of note is that
|
|
// this implementation assumes the underlying net.PacketConn is not
|
|
// only reliable but also ordered. BoringSSL will be expected to deal
|
|
// with simulated loss, but there is no point in forcing the test
|
|
// driver to.
|
|
|
|
package main
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"bytes"
|
|
"crypto/cipher"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"io"
|
|
"net"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func versionToWire(vers uint16, isDTLS bool) uint16 {
|
|
if isDTLS {
|
|
return ^(vers - 0x0201)
|
|
}
|
|
return vers
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func wireToVersion(vers uint16, isDTLS bool) uint16 {
|
|
if isDTLS {
|
|
return ^vers + 0x0201
|
|
}
|
|
return vers
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Conn) dtlsDoReadRecord(want recordType) (recordType, *block, error) {
|
|
recordHeaderLen := dtlsRecordHeaderLen
|
|
|
|
if c.rawInput == nil {
|
|
c.rawInput = c.in.newBlock()
|
|
}
|
|
b := c.rawInput
|
|
|
|
// Read a new packet only if the current one is empty.
|
|
if len(b.data) == 0 {
|
|
// Pick some absurdly large buffer size.
|
|
b.resize(maxCiphertext + recordHeaderLen)
|
|
n, err := c.conn.Read(c.rawInput.data)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return 0, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if c.config.Bugs.MaxPacketLength != 0 && n > c.config.Bugs.MaxPacketLength {
|
|
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("dtls: exceeded maximum packet length")
|
|
}
|
|
c.rawInput.resize(n)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Read out one record.
|
|
//
|
|
// A real DTLS implementation should be tolerant of errors,
|
|
// but this is test code. We should not be tolerant of our
|
|
// peer sending garbage.
|
|
if len(b.data) < recordHeaderLen {
|
|
return 0, nil, errors.New("dtls: failed to read record header")
|
|
}
|
|
typ := recordType(b.data[0])
|
|
vers := wireToVersion(uint16(b.data[1])<<8|uint16(b.data[2]), c.isDTLS)
|
|
if c.haveVers {
|
|
if vers != c.vers {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
|
|
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("dtls: received record with version %x when expecting version %x", vers, c.vers))
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if expect := c.config.Bugs.ExpectInitialRecordVersion; expect != 0 && vers != expect {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
|
|
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("dtls: received record with version %x when expecting version %x", vers, expect))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
seq := b.data[3:11]
|
|
// For test purposes, we assume a reliable channel. Require
|
|
// that the explicit sequence number matches the incrementing
|
|
// one we maintain. A real implementation would maintain a
|
|
// replay window and such.
|
|
if !bytes.Equal(seq, c.in.seq[:]) {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
|
|
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("dtls: bad sequence number"))
|
|
}
|
|
n := int(b.data[11])<<8 | int(b.data[12])
|
|
if n > maxCiphertext || len(b.data) < recordHeaderLen+n {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertRecordOverflow)
|
|
return 0, nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(fmt.Errorf("dtls: oversized record received with length %d", n))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Process message.
|
|
b, c.rawInput = c.in.splitBlock(b, recordHeaderLen+n)
|
|
ok, off, err := c.in.decrypt(b)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(err))
|
|
}
|
|
b.off = off
|
|
return typ, b, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Conn) dtlsWriteRecord(typ recordType, data []byte) (n int, err error) {
|
|
recordHeaderLen := dtlsRecordHeaderLen
|
|
maxLen := c.config.Bugs.MaxHandshakeRecordLength
|
|
if maxLen <= 0 {
|
|
maxLen = 1024
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
b := c.out.newBlock()
|
|
|
|
var header []byte
|
|
if typ == recordTypeHandshake {
|
|
// Handshake messages have to be modified to include
|
|
// fragment offset and length and with the header
|
|
// replicated. Save the header here.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO(davidben): This assumes that data contains
|
|
// exactly one handshake message. This is incompatible
|
|
// with FragmentAcrossChangeCipherSpec. (Which is
|
|
// unfortunate because OpenSSL's DTLS implementation
|
|
// will probably accept such fragmentation and could
|
|
// do with a fix + tests.)
|
|
if len(data) < 4 {
|
|
// This should not happen.
|
|
panic(data)
|
|
}
|
|
header = data[:4]
|
|
data = data[4:]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
firstRun := true
|
|
for firstRun || len(data) > 0 {
|
|
firstRun = false
|
|
m := len(data)
|
|
var fragment []byte
|
|
// Handshake messages get fragmented. Other records we
|
|
// pass-through as is. DTLS should be a packet
|
|
// interface.
|
|
if typ == recordTypeHandshake {
|
|
if m > maxLen {
|
|
m = maxLen
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Standard handshake header.
|
|
fragment = make([]byte, 0, 12+m)
|
|
fragment = append(fragment, header...)
|
|
// message_seq
|
|
fragment = append(fragment, byte(c.sendHandshakeSeq>>8), byte(c.sendHandshakeSeq))
|
|
// fragment_offset
|
|
fragment = append(fragment, byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n))
|
|
// fragment_length
|
|
fragment = append(fragment, byte(m>>16), byte(m>>8), byte(m))
|
|
fragment = append(fragment, data[:m]...)
|
|
} else {
|
|
fragment = data[:m]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Send the fragment.
|
|
explicitIVLen := 0
|
|
explicitIVIsSeq := false
|
|
|
|
if cbc, ok := c.out.cipher.(cbcMode); ok {
|
|
// Block cipher modes have an explicit IV.
|
|
explicitIVLen = cbc.BlockSize()
|
|
} else if _, ok := c.out.cipher.(cipher.AEAD); ok {
|
|
explicitIVLen = 8
|
|
// The AES-GCM construction in TLS has an
|
|
// explicit nonce so that the nonce can be
|
|
// random. However, the nonce is only 8 bytes
|
|
// which is too small for a secure, random
|
|
// nonce. Therefore we use the sequence number
|
|
// as the nonce.
|
|
explicitIVIsSeq = true
|
|
} else if c.out.cipher != nil {
|
|
panic("Unknown cipher")
|
|
}
|
|
b.resize(recordHeaderLen + explicitIVLen + len(fragment))
|
|
b.data[0] = byte(typ)
|
|
vers := c.vers
|
|
if vers == 0 {
|
|
// Some TLS servers fail if the record version is
|
|
// greater than TLS 1.0 for the initial ClientHello.
|
|
vers = VersionTLS10
|
|
}
|
|
vers = versionToWire(vers, c.isDTLS)
|
|
b.data[1] = byte(vers >> 8)
|
|
b.data[2] = byte(vers)
|
|
// DTLS records include an explicit sequence number.
|
|
copy(b.data[3:11], c.out.seq[0:])
|
|
b.data[11] = byte(len(fragment) >> 8)
|
|
b.data[12] = byte(len(fragment))
|
|
if explicitIVLen > 0 {
|
|
explicitIV := b.data[recordHeaderLen : recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen]
|
|
if explicitIVIsSeq {
|
|
copy(explicitIV, c.out.seq[:])
|
|
} else {
|
|
if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), explicitIV); err != nil {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
copy(b.data[recordHeaderLen+explicitIVLen:], fragment)
|
|
c.out.encrypt(b, explicitIVLen)
|
|
|
|
// TODO(davidben): A real DTLS implementation needs to
|
|
// retransmit handshake messages. For testing
|
|
// purposes, we don't actually care.
|
|
_, err = c.conn.Write(b.data)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
n += m
|
|
data = data[m:]
|
|
}
|
|
c.out.freeBlock(b)
|
|
|
|
// Increment the handshake sequence number for the next
|
|
// handshake message.
|
|
if typ == recordTypeHandshake {
|
|
c.sendHandshakeSeq++
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec {
|
|
err = c.out.changeCipherSpec(c.config)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Cannot call sendAlert directly,
|
|
// because we already hold c.out.Mutex.
|
|
c.tmp[0] = alertLevelError
|
|
c.tmp[1] = byte(err.(alert))
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:2])
|
|
return n, c.out.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Conn) dtlsDoReadHandshake() ([]byte, error) {
|
|
// Assemble a full handshake message. For test purposes, this
|
|
// implementation assumes fragments arrive in order. It may
|
|
// need to be cleverer if we ever test BoringSSL's retransmit
|
|
// behavior.
|
|
for len(c.handMsg) < 4+c.handMsgLen {
|
|
// Get a new handshake record if the previous has been
|
|
// exhausted.
|
|
if c.hand.Len() == 0 {
|
|
if err := c.in.err; err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeHandshake); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Read the next fragment. It must fit entirely within
|
|
// the record.
|
|
if c.hand.Len() < 12 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("dtls: bad handshake record")
|
|
}
|
|
header := c.hand.Next(12)
|
|
fragN := int(header[1])<<16 | int(header[2])<<8 | int(header[3])
|
|
fragSeq := uint16(header[4])<<8 | uint16(header[5])
|
|
fragOff := int(header[6])<<16 | int(header[7])<<8 | int(header[8])
|
|
fragLen := int(header[9])<<16 | int(header[10])<<8 | int(header[11])
|
|
|
|
if c.hand.Len() < fragLen {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("dtls: fragment length too long")
|
|
}
|
|
fragment := c.hand.Next(fragLen)
|
|
|
|
// Check it's a fragment for the right message.
|
|
if fragSeq != c.recvHandshakeSeq {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("dtls: bad handshake sequence number")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that the length is consistent.
|
|
if c.handMsg == nil {
|
|
c.handMsgLen = fragN
|
|
if c.handMsgLen > maxHandshake {
|
|
return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertInternalError))
|
|
}
|
|
// Start with the TLS handshake header,
|
|
// without the DTLS bits.
|
|
c.handMsg = append([]byte{}, header[:4]...)
|
|
} else if fragN != c.handMsgLen {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("dtls: bad handshake length")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add the fragment to the pending message.
|
|
if 4+fragOff != len(c.handMsg) {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("dtls: bad fragment offset")
|
|
}
|
|
if fragOff+fragLen > c.handMsgLen {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("dtls: bad fragment length")
|
|
}
|
|
c.handMsg = append(c.handMsg, fragment...)
|
|
}
|
|
c.recvHandshakeSeq++
|
|
ret := c.handMsg
|
|
c.handMsg, c.handMsgLen = nil, 0
|
|
return ret, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DTLSServer returns a new DTLS server side connection
|
|
// using conn as the underlying transport.
|
|
// The configuration config must be non-nil and must have
|
|
// at least one certificate.
|
|
func DTLSServer(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn {
|
|
c := &Conn{config: config, isDTLS: true, conn: conn}
|
|
c.init()
|
|
return c
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DTLSClient returns a new DTLS client side connection
|
|
// using conn as the underlying transport.
|
|
// The config cannot be nil: users must set either ServerHostname or
|
|
// InsecureSkipVerify in the config.
|
|
func DTLSClient(conn net.Conn, config *Config) *Conn {
|
|
c := &Conn{config: config, isClient: true, isDTLS: true, conn: conn}
|
|
c.init()
|
|
return c
|
|
}
|