ec4353498c
This made sense when the cipher might have been standardized as-is, so a DHE_RSA variant could appease the IETF. Since the standardized variant is going to have some nonce tweaks anyway, there's no sense in keeping this around. Get rid of one non-standard cipher suite value early. (Even if they were to be standardized as-is, it's not clear we should implement new DHE cipher suites at this point.) Chrome UMA, unsurprisingly, shows that it's unused. Change-Id: Id83d73a4294b470ec2e94d5308fba135d6eeb228 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5750 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> |
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.. | ||
alert.go | ||
cert.pem | ||
chacha20_poly1305_test.go | ||
chacha20_poly1305.go | ||
channel_id_key.pem | ||
cipher_suites.go | ||
common.go | ||
conn.go | ||
dtls.go | ||
ecdsa_cert.pem | ||
ecdsa_key.pem | ||
handshake_client.go | ||
handshake_messages.go | ||
handshake_server.go | ||
key_agreement.go | ||
key.pem | ||
packet_adapter.go | ||
poly1305.go | ||
prf.go | ||
recordingconn.go | ||
runner.go | ||
test_output.go | ||
ticket.go | ||
tls.go |