5ecb88b95b
EnableAllCiphers is problematic since some (version, cipher) combinations aren't even defined and crash. Instead, use the SendCipherSuite bug to mask the true cipher (which is becomes arbitrary) for failure tests. The shim should fail long before we get further. This lets us remove a number of weird checks in the TLS 1.3 code. This also fixes the UnknownCipher tests which weren't actually testing anything. EnableAllCiphers is now AdvertiseAllConfiguredCiphers and does not filter out garbage values. Change-Id: I7102fa893146bb0d096739e768c5a7aa339e51a8 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11481 Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
502 lines
15 KiB
Go
502 lines
15 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package runner
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import (
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"crypto"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/md5"
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"crypto/sha1"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"hash"
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)
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// Split a premaster secret in two as specified in RFC 4346, section 5.
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func splitPreMasterSecret(secret []byte) (s1, s2 []byte) {
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s1 = secret[0 : (len(secret)+1)/2]
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s2 = secret[len(secret)/2:]
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return
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}
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// pHash implements the P_hash function, as defined in RFC 4346, section 5.
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func pHash(result, secret, seed []byte, hash func() hash.Hash) {
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h := hmac.New(hash, secret)
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h.Write(seed)
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a := h.Sum(nil)
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j := 0
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for j < len(result) {
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h.Reset()
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h.Write(a)
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h.Write(seed)
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b := h.Sum(nil)
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todo := len(b)
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if j+todo > len(result) {
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todo = len(result) - j
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}
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copy(result[j:j+todo], b)
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j += todo
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h.Reset()
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h.Write(a)
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a = h.Sum(nil)
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}
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}
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// prf10 implements the TLS 1.0 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 2246, section 5.
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func prf10(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
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hashSHA1 := sha1.New
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hashMD5 := md5.New
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labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
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copy(labelAndSeed, label)
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copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
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s1, s2 := splitPreMasterSecret(secret)
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pHash(result, s1, labelAndSeed, hashMD5)
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result2 := make([]byte, len(result))
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pHash(result2, s2, labelAndSeed, hashSHA1)
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for i, b := range result2 {
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result[i] ^= b
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}
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}
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// prf12 implements the TLS 1.2 pseudo-random function, as defined in RFC 5246, section 5.
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func prf12(hashFunc func() hash.Hash) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
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return func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
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labelAndSeed := make([]byte, len(label)+len(seed))
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copy(labelAndSeed, label)
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copy(labelAndSeed[len(label):], seed)
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pHash(result, secret, labelAndSeed, hashFunc)
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}
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}
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// prf30 implements the SSL 3.0 pseudo-random function, as defined in
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// www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft302.txt section 6.
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func prf30(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
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hashSHA1 := sha1.New()
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hashMD5 := md5.New()
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done := 0
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i := 0
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// RFC5246 section 6.3 says that the largest PRF output needed is 128
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// bytes. Since no more ciphersuites will be added to SSLv3, this will
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// remain true. Each iteration gives us 16 bytes so 10 iterations will
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// be sufficient.
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var b [11]byte
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for done < len(result) {
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for j := 0; j <= i; j++ {
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b[j] = 'A' + byte(i)
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}
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hashSHA1.Reset()
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hashSHA1.Write(b[:i+1])
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hashSHA1.Write(secret)
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hashSHA1.Write(seed)
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digest := hashSHA1.Sum(nil)
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hashMD5.Reset()
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hashMD5.Write(secret)
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hashMD5.Write(digest)
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done += copy(result[done:], hashMD5.Sum(nil))
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i++
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}
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}
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const (
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tlsRandomLength = 32 // Length of a random nonce in TLS 1.1.
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masterSecretLength = 48 // Length of a master secret in TLS 1.1.
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finishedVerifyLength = 12 // Length of verify_data in a Finished message.
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)
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var masterSecretLabel = []byte("master secret")
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var extendedMasterSecretLabel = []byte("extended master secret")
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var keyExpansionLabel = []byte("key expansion")
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var clientFinishedLabel = []byte("client finished")
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var serverFinishedLabel = []byte("server finished")
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var channelIDLabel = []byte("TLS Channel ID signature\x00")
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var channelIDResumeLabel = []byte("Resumption\x00")
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func prfForVersion(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite) func(result, secret, label, seed []byte) {
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switch version {
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case VersionSSL30:
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return prf30
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case VersionTLS10, VersionTLS11:
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return prf10
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// TODO(nharper): VersionTLS13 is in the case statement below only to
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// support Fake TLS 1.3. Real TLS 1.3 should never call this function.
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// Once we no longer support Fake TLS 1.3, the VersionTLS13 should be
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// removed from this case statement.
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case VersionTLS12, VersionTLS13:
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if version == VersionTLS12 {
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return prf12(suite.hash().New)
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}
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}
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panic("unknown version")
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}
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// masterFromPreMasterSecret generates the master secret from the pre-master
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// secret. See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-8.1
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func masterFromPreMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, preMasterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte) []byte {
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var seed [tlsRandomLength * 2]byte
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copy(seed[0:len(clientRandom)], clientRandom)
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copy(seed[len(clientRandom):], serverRandom)
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masterSecret := make([]byte, masterSecretLength)
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prfForVersion(version, suite)(masterSecret, preMasterSecret, masterSecretLabel, seed[0:])
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return masterSecret
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}
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// extendedMasterFromPreMasterSecret generates the master secret from the
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// pre-master secret when the Triple Handshake fix is in effect. See
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7627
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func extendedMasterFromPreMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, preMasterSecret []byte, h finishedHash) []byte {
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masterSecret := make([]byte, masterSecretLength)
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prfForVersion(version, suite)(masterSecret, preMasterSecret, extendedMasterSecretLabel, h.Sum())
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return masterSecret
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}
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// keysFromMasterSecret generates the connection keys from the master
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// secret, given the lengths of the MAC key, cipher key and IV, as defined in
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// RFC 2246, section 6.3.
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func keysFromMasterSecret(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, masterSecret, clientRandom, serverRandom []byte, macLen, keyLen, ivLen int) (clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV []byte) {
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var seed [tlsRandomLength * 2]byte
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copy(seed[0:len(clientRandom)], serverRandom)
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copy(seed[len(serverRandom):], clientRandom)
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n := 2*macLen + 2*keyLen + 2*ivLen
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keyMaterial := make([]byte, n)
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prfForVersion(version, suite)(keyMaterial, masterSecret, keyExpansionLabel, seed[0:])
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clientMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
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keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
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serverMAC = keyMaterial[:macLen]
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keyMaterial = keyMaterial[macLen:]
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clientKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
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keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
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serverKey = keyMaterial[:keyLen]
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keyMaterial = keyMaterial[keyLen:]
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clientIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
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keyMaterial = keyMaterial[ivLen:]
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serverIV = keyMaterial[:ivLen]
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return
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}
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func newFinishedHash(version uint16, cipherSuite *cipherSuite) finishedHash {
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var ret finishedHash
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if version >= VersionTLS12 {
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ret.hash = cipherSuite.hash()
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ret.client = ret.hash.New()
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ret.server = ret.hash.New()
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if version == VersionTLS12 {
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ret.prf = prf12(ret.hash.New)
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}
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} else {
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ret.hash = crypto.MD5SHA1
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ret.client = sha1.New()
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ret.server = sha1.New()
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ret.clientMD5 = md5.New()
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ret.serverMD5 = md5.New()
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ret.prf = prf10
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}
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ret.buffer = []byte{}
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ret.version = version
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return ret
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}
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// A finishedHash calculates the hash of a set of handshake messages suitable
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// for including in a Finished message.
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type finishedHash struct {
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hash crypto.Hash
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client hash.Hash
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server hash.Hash
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// Prior to TLS 1.2, an additional MD5 hash is required.
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clientMD5 hash.Hash
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serverMD5 hash.Hash
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// In TLS 1.2 (and SSL 3 for implementation convenience), a
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// full buffer is required.
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buffer []byte
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// TLS 1.3 has a resumption context which is carried over on PSK
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// resumption.
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resumptionContextHash []byte
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version uint16
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prf func(result, secret, label, seed []byte)
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}
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func (h *finishedHash) Write(msg []byte) (n int, err error) {
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h.client.Write(msg)
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h.server.Write(msg)
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if h.version < VersionTLS12 {
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h.clientMD5.Write(msg)
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h.serverMD5.Write(msg)
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}
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if h.buffer != nil {
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h.buffer = append(h.buffer, msg...)
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}
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return len(msg), nil
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}
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func (h finishedHash) Sum() []byte {
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if h.version >= VersionTLS12 {
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return h.client.Sum(nil)
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}
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out := make([]byte, 0, md5.Size+sha1.Size)
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out = h.clientMD5.Sum(out)
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return h.client.Sum(out)
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}
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// finishedSum30 calculates the contents of the verify_data member of a SSLv3
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// Finished message given the MD5 and SHA1 hashes of a set of handshake
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// messages.
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func finishedSum30(md5, sha1 hash.Hash, masterSecret []byte, magic []byte) []byte {
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md5.Write(magic)
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md5.Write(masterSecret)
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md5.Write(ssl30Pad1[:])
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md5Digest := md5.Sum(nil)
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md5.Reset()
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md5.Write(masterSecret)
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md5.Write(ssl30Pad2[:])
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md5.Write(md5Digest)
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md5Digest = md5.Sum(nil)
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sha1.Write(magic)
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sha1.Write(masterSecret)
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sha1.Write(ssl30Pad1[:40])
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sha1Digest := sha1.Sum(nil)
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sha1.Reset()
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sha1.Write(masterSecret)
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sha1.Write(ssl30Pad2[:40])
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sha1.Write(sha1Digest)
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sha1Digest = sha1.Sum(nil)
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ret := make([]byte, len(md5Digest)+len(sha1Digest))
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copy(ret, md5Digest)
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copy(ret[len(md5Digest):], sha1Digest)
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return ret
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}
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var ssl3ClientFinishedMagic = [4]byte{0x43, 0x4c, 0x4e, 0x54}
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var ssl3ServerFinishedMagic = [4]byte{0x53, 0x52, 0x56, 0x52}
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// clientSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a client's
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// Finished message.
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func (h finishedHash) clientSum(baseKey []byte) []byte {
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if h.version == VersionSSL30 {
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return finishedSum30(h.clientMD5, h.client, baseKey, ssl3ClientFinishedMagic[:])
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}
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if h.version < VersionTLS13 {
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out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
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h.prf(out, baseKey, clientFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
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return out
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}
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clientFinishedKey := hkdfExpandLabel(h.hash, baseKey, clientFinishedLabel, nil, h.hash.Size())
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finishedHMAC := hmac.New(h.hash.New, clientFinishedKey)
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finishedHMAC.Write(h.appendContextHashes(nil))
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return finishedHMAC.Sum(nil)
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}
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// serverSum returns the contents of the verify_data member of a server's
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// Finished message.
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func (h finishedHash) serverSum(baseKey []byte) []byte {
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if h.version == VersionSSL30 {
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return finishedSum30(h.serverMD5, h.server, baseKey, ssl3ServerFinishedMagic[:])
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}
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if h.version < VersionTLS13 {
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out := make([]byte, finishedVerifyLength)
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h.prf(out, baseKey, serverFinishedLabel, h.Sum())
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return out
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}
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serverFinishedKey := hkdfExpandLabel(h.hash, baseKey, serverFinishedLabel, nil, h.hash.Size())
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finishedHMAC := hmac.New(h.hash.New, serverFinishedKey)
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finishedHMAC.Write(h.appendContextHashes(nil))
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return finishedHMAC.Sum(nil)
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}
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// hashForClientCertificateSSL3 returns the hash to be signed for client
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// certificates in SSL 3.0.
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func (h finishedHash) hashForClientCertificateSSL3(masterSecret []byte) []byte {
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md5Hash := md5.New()
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md5Hash.Write(h.buffer)
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sha1Hash := sha1.New()
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sha1Hash.Write(h.buffer)
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return finishedSum30(md5Hash, sha1Hash, masterSecret, nil)
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}
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// hashForChannelID returns the hash to be signed for TLS Channel
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// ID. If a resumption, resumeHash has the previous handshake
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// hash. Otherwise, it is nil.
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func (h finishedHash) hashForChannelID(resumeHash []byte) []byte {
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hash := sha256.New()
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hash.Write(channelIDLabel)
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if resumeHash != nil {
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hash.Write(channelIDResumeLabel)
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hash.Write(resumeHash)
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}
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hash.Write(h.server.Sum(nil))
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return hash.Sum(nil)
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}
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// discardHandshakeBuffer is called when there is no more need to
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// buffer the entirety of the handshake messages.
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func (h *finishedHash) discardHandshakeBuffer() {
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h.buffer = nil
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}
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// zeroSecretTLS13 returns the default all zeros secret for TLS 1.3, used when a
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// given secret is not available in the handshake. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-13,
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// section 7.1.
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func (h *finishedHash) zeroSecret() []byte {
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return make([]byte, h.hash.Size())
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}
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// setResumptionContext sets the TLS 1.3 resumption context.
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func (h *finishedHash) setResumptionContext(resumptionContext []byte) {
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hash := h.hash.New()
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hash.Write(resumptionContext)
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h.resumptionContextHash = hash.Sum(nil)
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}
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// extractKey combines two secrets together with HKDF-Expand in the TLS 1.3 key
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// derivation schedule.
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func (h *finishedHash) extractKey(salt, ikm []byte) []byte {
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return hkdfExtract(h.hash.New, salt, ikm)
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}
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// hkdfExpandLabel implements TLS 1.3's HKDF-Expand-Label function, as defined
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// in section 7.1 of draft-ietf-tls-tls13-13.
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func hkdfExpandLabel(hash crypto.Hash, secret, label, hashValue []byte, length int) []byte {
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if len(label) > 255 || len(hashValue) > 255 {
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panic("hkdfExpandLabel: label or hashValue too long")
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}
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hkdfLabel := make([]byte, 3+9+len(label)+1+len(hashValue))
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x := hkdfLabel
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x[0] = byte(length >> 8)
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x[1] = byte(length)
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x[2] = byte(9 + len(label))
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x = x[3:]
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copy(x, []byte("TLS 1.3, "))
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x = x[9:]
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copy(x, label)
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x = x[len(label):]
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x[0] = byte(len(hashValue))
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copy(x[1:], hashValue)
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return hkdfExpand(hash.New, secret, hkdfLabel, length)
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}
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// appendContextHashes returns the concatenation of the handshake hash and the
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// resumption context hash, as used in TLS 1.3.
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func (h *finishedHash) appendContextHashes(b []byte) []byte {
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b = h.client.Sum(b)
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b = append(b, h.resumptionContextHash...)
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return b
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}
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// The following are labels for traffic secret derivation in TLS 1.3.
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var (
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earlyTrafficLabel = []byte("early traffic secret")
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handshakeTrafficLabel = []byte("handshake traffic secret")
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applicationTrafficLabel = []byte("application traffic secret")
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exporterLabel = []byte("exporter master secret")
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resumptionLabel = []byte("resumption master secret")
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)
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// deriveSecret implements TLS 1.3's Derive-Secret function, as defined in
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// section 7.1 of draft ietf-tls-tls13-13.
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func (h *finishedHash) deriveSecret(secret, label []byte) []byte {
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if h.resumptionContextHash == nil {
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panic("Resumption context not set.")
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}
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return hkdfExpandLabel(h.hash, secret, label, h.appendContextHashes(nil), h.hash.Size())
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}
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// The following are context strings for CertificateVerify in TLS 1.3.
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var (
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clientCertificateVerifyContextTLS13 = []byte("TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify")
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serverCertificateVerifyContextTLS13 = []byte("TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify")
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)
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// certificateVerifyMessage returns the input to be signed for CertificateVerify
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// in TLS 1.3.
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func (h *finishedHash) certificateVerifyInput(context []byte) []byte {
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const paddingLen = 64
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b := make([]byte, paddingLen, paddingLen+len(context)+1+2*h.hash.Size())
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for i := 0; i < paddingLen; i++ {
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b[i] = 32
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}
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b = append(b, context...)
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b = append(b, 0)
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b = h.appendContextHashes(b)
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return b
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}
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// The following are phase values for traffic key derivation in TLS 1.3.
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var (
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earlyHandshakePhase = []byte("early handshake key expansion")
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earlyApplicationPhase = []byte("early application data key expansion")
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handshakePhase = []byte("handshake key expansion")
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applicationPhase = []byte("application data key expansion")
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)
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type trafficDirection int
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const (
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clientWrite trafficDirection = iota
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serverWrite
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)
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|
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// deriveTrafficAEAD derives traffic keys and constructs an AEAD given a traffic
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// secret.
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func deriveTrafficAEAD(version uint16, suite *cipherSuite, secret, phase []byte, side trafficDirection) interface{} {
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label := make([]byte, 0, len(phase)+2+16)
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label = append(label, phase...)
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if side == clientWrite {
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label = append(label, []byte(", client write key")...)
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|
} else {
|
|
label = append(label, []byte(", server write key")...)
|
|
}
|
|
key := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.hash(), secret, label, nil, suite.keyLen)
|
|
|
|
label = label[:len(label)-3] // Remove "key" from the end.
|
|
label = append(label, []byte("iv")...)
|
|
iv := hkdfExpandLabel(suite.hash(), secret, label, nil, suite.ivLen(version))
|
|
|
|
return suite.aead(version, key, iv)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func updateTrafficSecret(hash crypto.Hash, secret []byte) []byte {
|
|
return hkdfExpandLabel(hash, secret, applicationTrafficLabel, nil, hash.Size())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func deriveResumptionPSK(suite *cipherSuite, resumptionSecret []byte) []byte {
|
|
return hkdfExpandLabel(suite.hash(), resumptionSecret, []byte("resumption psk"), nil, suite.hash().Size())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func deriveResumptionContext(suite *cipherSuite, resumptionSecret []byte) []byte {
|
|
return hkdfExpandLabel(suite.hash(), resumptionSecret, []byte("resumption context"), nil, suite.hash().Size())
|
|
}
|