13e81fc971
Although the DTLS transport layer logic drops failed writes on the floor, it is actually set up to work correctly. If an SSL_write fails at the transport, dropping the buffer is fine. Arguably it works better than in TLS because we don't have the weird "half-committed to data" behavior. Likewise, the handshake keeps track of how far its gotten and resumes the message at the right point. This broke when the buffering logic was rewritten because I didn't understand what the DTLS code was doing. The one thing that doesn't work as one might expect is non-fatal write errors during rexmit are not recoverable. The next timeout must fire before we try again. This code is quite badly sprinkled in here, so add tests to guard it against future turbulence. Because of the rexmit issues, the tests need some hacks around calls which may trigger them. It also changes the Go DTLS implementation from being completely strict about sequence numbers to only requiring they be monotonic. The tests also revealed another bug. This one seems to be upstream's fault, not mine. The logic to reset the handshake hash on the second ClientHello (in the HelloVerifyRequest case) was a little overenthusiastic and breaks if the ClientHello took multiple tries to send. Change-Id: I9b38b93fff7ae62faf8e36c4beaf848850b3f4b9 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6417 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
326 lines
9.1 KiB
C
326 lines
9.1 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/bio.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/type_check.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(0xffff <= INT_MAX, uint16_fits_in_int);
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1)) == 0,
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align_to_a_power_of_two);
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/* setup_buffer initializes |buf| with capacity |cap|, aligned such that data
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* written after |header_len| is aligned to a |SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD|-byte
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* boundary. It returns one on success and zero on error. */
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static int setup_buffer(SSL3_BUFFER *buf, size_t header_len, size_t cap) {
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if (buf->buf != NULL || cap > 0xffff) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Add up to |SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD| - 1 bytes of slack for alignment. */
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buf->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(cap + SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
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if (buf->buf == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Arrange the buffer such that the record body is aligned. */
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buf->offset = (0 - header_len - (uintptr_t)buf->buf) &
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(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
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buf->len = 0;
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buf->cap = cap;
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return 1;
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}
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static void consume_buffer(SSL3_BUFFER *buf, size_t len) {
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if (len > buf->len) {
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abort();
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}
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buf->offset += (uint16_t)len;
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buf->len -= (uint16_t)len;
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buf->cap -= (uint16_t)len;
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}
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static void clear_buffer(SSL3_BUFFER *buf) {
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OPENSSL_free(buf->buf);
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memset(buf, 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
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}
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH +
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SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA <= 0xffff,
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maximum_read_buffer_too_large);
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/* setup_read_buffer initializes the read buffer if not already initialized. It
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* returns one on success and zero on failure. */
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static int setup_read_buffer(SSL *ssl) {
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SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
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if (buf->buf != NULL) {
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return 1;
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}
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size_t header_len = ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl);
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size_t cap = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
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cap += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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} else {
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cap += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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}
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if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) {
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cap += SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
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}
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return setup_buffer(buf, header_len, cap);
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}
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uint8_t *ssl_read_buffer(SSL *ssl) {
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return ssl->s3->read_buffer.buf + ssl->s3->read_buffer.offset;
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}
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size_t ssl_read_buffer_len(const SSL *ssl) {
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return ssl->s3->read_buffer.len;
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}
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static int dtls_read_buffer_next_packet(SSL *ssl) {
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SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
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if (buf->len > 0) {
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/* It is an error to call |dtls_read_buffer_extend| when the read buffer is
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* not empty. */
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Read a single packet from |ssl->rbio|. |buf->cap| must fit in an int. */
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ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
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int ret = BIO_read(ssl->rbio, buf->buf + buf->offset, (int)buf->cap);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
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/* |BIO_read| was bound by |buf->cap|, so this cannot overflow. */
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buf->len = (uint16_t)ret;
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return 1;
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}
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static int tls_read_buffer_extend_to(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
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SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
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if (len > buf->cap) {
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/* This may occur if |SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER| was toggled after
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* |setup_read_buffer| was called. Stay within bounds, but do not attempt to
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* recover. */
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Read until the target length is reached. */
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while (buf->len < len) {
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/* The amount of data to read is bounded by |buf->cap|, which must fit in an
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* int. */
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ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
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int ret = BIO_read(ssl->rbio, buf->buf + buf->offset + buf->len,
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(int)(len - buf->len));
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if (ret <= 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
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/* |BIO_read| was bound by |buf->cap - buf->len|, so this cannot
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* overflow. */
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buf->len += (uint16_t)ret;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
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/* |ssl_read_buffer_extend_to| implicitly discards any consumed data. */
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ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
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if (!setup_read_buffer(ssl)) {
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return -1;
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}
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if (ssl->rbio == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
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return -1;
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}
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ERR_clear_system_error();
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int ret;
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
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/* |len| is ignored for a datagram transport. */
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ret = dtls_read_buffer_next_packet(ssl);
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} else {
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ret = tls_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, len);
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}
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if (ret <= 0) {
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/* If the buffer was empty originally and remained empty after attempting to
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* extend it, release the buffer until the next attempt. */
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ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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void ssl_read_buffer_consume(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
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SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->read_buffer;
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consume_buffer(buf, len);
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if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
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/* The TLS stack never reads beyond the current record, so there will never
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* be unconsumed data. If read-ahead is ever reimplemented,
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* |ssl_read_buffer_discard| will require a |memcpy| to shift the excess
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* back to the front of the buffer, to ensure there is enough space for the
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* next record. */
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assert(buf->len == 0);
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}
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}
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void ssl_read_buffer_discard(SSL *ssl) {
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if (ssl->s3->read_buffer.len == 0) {
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ssl_read_buffer_clear(ssl);
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}
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}
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void ssl_read_buffer_clear(SSL *ssl) {
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clear_buffer(&ssl->s3->read_buffer);
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}
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int ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(const SSL *ssl) {
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return ssl->s3->write_buffer.len > 0;
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}
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH * 2 +
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SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD * 2 +
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SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH <= 0xffff,
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maximum_tls_write_buffer_too_large);
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OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH +
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SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD +
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SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH <= 0xffff,
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maximum_dtls_write_buffer_too_large);
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int ssl_write_buffer_init(SSL *ssl, uint8_t **out_ptr, size_t max_len) {
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SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
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if (buf->buf != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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size_t header_len = ssl_seal_prefix_len(ssl);
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/* TODO(davidben): This matches the original behavior in keeping the malloc
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* size consistent. Does this matter? |cap| could just be |max_len|. */
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size_t cap = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
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cap += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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} else {
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cap += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) {
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cap += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD;
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}
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}
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if (max_len > cap) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!setup_buffer(buf, header_len, cap)) {
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return 0;
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}
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*out_ptr = buf->buf + buf->offset;
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return 1;
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}
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void ssl_write_buffer_set_len(SSL *ssl, size_t len) {
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SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
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if (len > buf->cap) {
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abort();
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}
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buf->len = len;
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}
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static int tls_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
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SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
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while (buf->len > 0) {
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ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
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int ret = BIO_write(ssl->wbio, buf->buf + buf->offset, buf->len);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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return ret;
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}
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ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
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consume_buffer(buf, (size_t)ret);
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}
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ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
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return 1;
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}
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static int dtls_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
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SSL3_BUFFER *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer;
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if (buf->len == 0) {
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return 1;
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}
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ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
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int ret = BIO_write(ssl->wbio, buf->buf + buf->offset, buf->len);
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if (ret <= 0) {
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/* If the write failed, drop the write buffer anyway. Datagram transports
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* can't write half a packet, so the caller is expected to retry from the
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* top. */
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ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
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return ret;
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}
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ssl->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
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ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
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return 1;
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}
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int ssl_write_buffer_flush(SSL *ssl) {
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if (ssl->wbio == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
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return -1;
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}
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ERR_clear_system_error();
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if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
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return dtls_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
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} else {
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return tls_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
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}
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}
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void ssl_write_buffer_clear(SSL *ssl) {
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clear_buffer(&ssl->s3->write_buffer);
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}
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