2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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package sidh
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import (
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"crypto/subtle"
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"errors"
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"io"
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2020-05-16 21:14:48 +01:00
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"github.com/henrydcase/nobs/dh/sidh/common"
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2020-05-14 09:51:20 +01:00
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"github.com/henrydcase/nobs/hash/sha3"
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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)
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// SIKE KEM interface.
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type KEM struct {
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allocated bool
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rng io.Reader
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msg []byte
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secretBytes []byte
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params *common.SidhParams
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2020-05-14 09:51:20 +01:00
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shake sha3.ShakeHash
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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}
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// NewSike434 instantiates SIKE/p434 KEM.
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func NewSike434(rng io.Reader) *KEM {
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var c KEM
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c.Allocate(Fp434, rng)
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return &c
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}
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// NewSike503 instantiates SIKE/p503 KEM.
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func NewSike503(rng io.Reader) *KEM {
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var c KEM
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c.Allocate(Fp503, rng)
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return &c
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}
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// NewSike751 instantiates SIKE/p751 KEM.
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func NewSike751(rng io.Reader) *KEM {
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var c KEM
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c.Allocate(Fp751, rng)
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return &c
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}
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// Allocate allocates KEM object for multiple SIKE operations. The rng
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// must be cryptographically secure PRNG.
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func (c *KEM) Allocate(id uint8, rng io.Reader) {
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c.rng = rng
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c.params = common.Params(id)
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c.msg = make([]byte, c.params.MsgLen)
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c.secretBytes = make([]byte, c.params.A.SecretByteLen)
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2020-05-14 09:51:20 +01:00
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c.shake = sha3.NewShake256()
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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c.allocated = true
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}
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// Encapsulate receives the public key and generates SIKE ciphertext and shared secret.
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// The generated ciphertext is used for authentication.
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// Error is returned in case PRNG fails. Function panics in case wrongly formated
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// input was provided.
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func (c *KEM) Encapsulate(ciphertext, secret []byte, pub *PublicKey) error {
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if !c.allocated {
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panic("KEM unallocated")
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}
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2020-05-16 23:37:41 +01:00
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if KeyVariantSike != pub.KeyVariant {
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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panic("Wrong type of public key")
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}
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if len(secret) < c.SharedSecretSize() {
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panic("shared secret buffer to small")
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}
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if len(ciphertext) < c.CiphertextSize() {
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panic("ciphertext buffer to small")
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}
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// Generate ephemeral value
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_, err := io.ReadFull(c.rng, c.msg[:])
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var buf [3 * common.MaxSharedSecretBsz]byte
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var skA = PrivateKey{
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Key: Key{
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Params: c.params,
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KeyVariant: KeyVariantSidhA},
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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Scalar: c.secretBytes}
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var pkA = NewPublicKey(c.params.ID, KeyVariantSidhA)
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pub.Export(buf[:])
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c.shake.Reset()
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_, _ = c.shake.Write(c.msg)
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_, _ = c.shake.Write(buf[:3*c.params.SharedSecretSize])
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_, _ = c.shake.Read(skA.Scalar)
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// Ensure bitlength is not bigger then to 2^e2-1
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skA.Scalar[len(skA.Scalar)-1] &= (1 << (c.params.A.SecretBitLen % 8)) - 1
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skA.GeneratePublicKey(pkA)
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c.generateCiphertext(ciphertext, &skA, pkA, pub, c.msg[:])
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// K = H(msg||(c0||c1))
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c.shake.Reset()
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_, _ = c.shake.Write(c.msg)
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_, _ = c.shake.Write(ciphertext)
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_, _ = c.shake.Read(secret[:c.SharedSecretSize()])
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return nil
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}
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// Decapsulate given the keypair and ciphertext as inputs, Decapsulate outputs a shared
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// secret if plaintext verifies correctly, otherwise function outputs random value.
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// Decapsulation may panic in case input is wrongly formated, in particular, size of
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// the 'ciphertext' must be exactly equal to c.CiphertextSize().
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func (c *KEM) Decapsulate(secret []byte, prv *PrivateKey, pub *PublicKey, ciphertext []byte) error {
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if !c.allocated {
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panic("KEM unallocated")
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}
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2020-05-16 23:37:41 +01:00
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if KeyVariantSike != pub.KeyVariant {
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panic("Wrong type of public key")
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}
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2020-05-16 23:37:41 +01:00
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if pub.KeyVariant != prv.KeyVariant {
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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panic("Public and private key are of different type")
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}
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if len(secret) < c.SharedSecretSize() {
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panic("shared secret buffer to small")
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}
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if len(ciphertext) != c.CiphertextSize() {
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panic("ciphertext buffer to small")
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}
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var m [common.MaxMsgBsz]byte
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var r [common.MaxSidhPrivateKeyBsz]byte
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var pkBytes [3 * common.MaxSharedSecretBsz]byte
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var skA = PrivateKey{
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Key: Key{
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Params: c.params,
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KeyVariant: KeyVariantSidhA},
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Scalar: c.secretBytes}
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var pkA = NewPublicKey(c.params.ID, KeyVariantSidhA)
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c1Len, err := c.decrypt(m[:], prv, ciphertext)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// r' = G(m'||pub)
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pub.Export(pkBytes[:])
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c.shake.Reset()
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_, _ = c.shake.Write(m[:c1Len])
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_, _ = c.shake.Write(pkBytes[:3*c.params.SharedSecretSize])
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_, _ = c.shake.Read(r[:c.params.A.SecretByteLen])
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// Ensure bitlength is not bigger than 2^e2-1
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r[c.params.A.SecretByteLen-1] &= (1 << (c.params.A.SecretBitLen % 8)) - 1
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err = skA.Import(r[:c.params.A.SecretByteLen])
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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skA.GeneratePublicKey(pkA)
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pkA.Export(pkBytes[:])
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// S is chosen at random when generating a key and unknown to other party. It is
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// important that S is unpredictable to the other party. Without this check, would
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// be possible to recover a secret, by providing series of invalid ciphertexts.
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//
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// See more details in "On the security of supersingular isogeny cryptosystems"
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// (S. Galbraith, et al., 2016, ePrint #859).
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mask := subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(pkBytes[:c.params.PublicKeySize], ciphertext[:pub.Params.PublicKeySize])
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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common.Cpick(mask, m[:c1Len], m[:c1Len], prv.S)
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c.shake.Reset()
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_, _ = c.shake.Write(m[:c1Len])
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_, _ = c.shake.Write(ciphertext)
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_, _ = c.shake.Read(secret[:c.SharedSecretSize()])
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return nil
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}
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// Resets internal state of KEM. Function should be used
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// after Allocate and between subsequent calls to Encapsulate
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// and/or Decapsulate.
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func (c *KEM) Reset() {
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for i := range c.msg {
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c.msg[i] = 0
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}
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for i := range c.secretBytes {
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c.secretBytes[i] = 0
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}
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}
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// Returns size of resulting ciphertext.
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func (c *KEM) CiphertextSize() int {
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return c.params.CiphertextSize
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}
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// Returns size of resulting shared secret.
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func (c *KEM) SharedSecretSize() int {
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return c.params.KemSize
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}
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func (c *KEM) generateCiphertext(ctext []byte, skA *PrivateKey, pkA, pkB *PublicKey, ptext []byte) {
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var n [common.MaxMsgBsz]byte
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var j [common.MaxSharedSecretBsz]byte
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2020-05-16 23:37:41 +01:00
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var ptextLen = skA.Params.MsgLen
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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skA.DeriveSecret(j[:], pkB)
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c.shake.Reset()
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2020-05-16 23:37:41 +01:00
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_, _ = c.shake.Write(j[:skA.Params.SharedSecretSize])
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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_, _ = c.shake.Read(n[:ptextLen])
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for i := range ptext {
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n[i] ^= ptext[i]
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}
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pkA.Export(ctext)
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copy(ctext[pkA.Size():], n[:ptextLen])
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}
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// encrypt uses SIKE public key to encrypt plaintext. Requires cryptographically secure
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// PRNG. Returns ciphertext in case encryption succeeds. Returns error in case PRNG fails
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// or wrongly formated input was provided.
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func (c *KEM) encrypt(ctext []byte, rng io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, ptext []byte) error {
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var ptextLen = len(ptext)
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// c1 must be security level + 64 bits (see [SIKE] 1.4 and 4.3.3)
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2020-05-16 23:37:41 +01:00
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if ptextLen != pub.Params.KemSize {
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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return errors.New("unsupported message length")
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}
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2020-05-16 23:37:41 +01:00
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skA := NewPrivateKey(pub.Params.ID, KeyVariantSidhA)
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pkA := NewPublicKey(pub.Params.ID, KeyVariantSidhA)
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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err := skA.Generate(rng)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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skA.GeneratePublicKey(pkA)
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c.generateCiphertext(ctext, skA, pkA, pub, ptext)
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return nil
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}
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// decrypt uses SIKE private key to decrypt ciphertext. Returns plaintext in case
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// decryption succeeds or error in case unexptected input was provided.
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// Constant time.
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func (c *KEM) decrypt(n []byte, prv *PrivateKey, ctext []byte) (int, error) {
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var c1Len int
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var j [common.MaxSharedSecretBsz]byte
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2020-05-16 23:37:41 +01:00
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var pkLen = prv.Params.PublicKeySize
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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// ctext is a concatenation of (ciphertext = pubkey_A || c1)
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// it must be security level + 64 bits (see [SIKE] 1.4 and 4.3.3)
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// Lengths has been already checked by Decapsulate()
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c1Len = len(ctext) - pkLen
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2020-05-16 23:37:41 +01:00
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c0 := NewPublicKey(prv.Params.ID, KeyVariantSidhA)
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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err := c0.Import(ctext[:pkLen])
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prv.DeriveSecret(j[:], c0)
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c.shake.Reset()
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2020-05-16 23:37:41 +01:00
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_, _ = c.shake.Write(j[:prv.Params.SharedSecretSize])
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2020-05-14 01:02:32 +01:00
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_, _ = c.shake.Read(n[:c1Len])
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for i := range n[:c1Len] {
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n[i] ^= ctext[pkLen+i]
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}
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return c1Len, err
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}
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