Partially validate return codes
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@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ _The checking of items on this list is still being developed. Checked items shou
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* [ ] `aes.c`
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* [x] `randombytes.c`
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* [ ] API functions return `0` on success, negative on failure
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* [x] 0 on success
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* [ ] Negative on failure (currently: partially)
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* [ ] No dynamic memory allocations
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* [ ] No branching on secret data (dynamically checked using valgrind)
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* [ ] No access to secret memory locations (dynamically checked using valgrind)
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@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ static int check_canary(const unsigned char *d) {
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#define crypto_kem_enc NAMESPACE(crypto_kem_enc)
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#define crypto_kem_dec NAMESPACE(crypto_kem_dec)
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#define RETURNS_ZERO(f) \
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if ((f) != 0) { \
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puts(#f " returned non-zero returncode"); \
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return -1; \
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}
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static int test_keys(void) {
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unsigned char key_a[CRYPTO_BYTES + 16], key_b[CRYPTO_BYTES + 16];
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unsigned char pk[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 16];
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@ -50,25 +56,26 @@ static int test_keys(void) {
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for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
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// Alice generates a public key
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crypto_kem_keypair(pk + 8, sk_a + 8);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_keypair(pk + 8, sk_a + 8));
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// Bob derives a secret key and creates a response
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crypto_kem_enc(sendb + 8, key_b + 8, pk + 8);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_enc(sendb + 8, key_b + 8, pk + 8));
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// Alice uses Bobs response to get her secret key
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crypto_kem_dec(key_a + 8, sendb + 8, sk_a + 8);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_dec(key_a + 8, sendb + 8, sk_a + 8));
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if (memcmp(key_a + 8, key_b + 8, CRYPTO_BYTES) != 0) {
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printf("ERROR KEYS\n");
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return 1;
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return -1;
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}
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if (check_canary(key_a) || check_canary(key_a + sizeof(key_a) - 8) ||
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check_canary(key_b) || check_canary(key_b + sizeof(key_b) - 8) ||
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check_canary(pk) || check_canary(pk + sizeof(pk) - 8) ||
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check_canary(sendb) || check_canary(sendb + sizeof(sendb) - 8) ||
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check_canary(sk_a) || check_canary(sk_a + sizeof(sk_a) - 8)) {
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printf("ERROR canary overwritten\n");
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return 1;
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return -1;
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}
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}
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@ -81,19 +88,23 @@ static int test_invalid_sk_a(void) {
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unsigned char pk[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
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unsigned char sendb[CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES];
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int i;
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int returncode;
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for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
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// Alice generates a public key
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crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk_a);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk_a));
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// Bob derives a secret key and creates a response
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crypto_kem_enc(sendb, key_b, pk);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_enc(sendb, key_b, pk));
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// Replace secret key with random values
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randombytes(sk_a, CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES);
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// Alice uses Bobs response to get her secret key
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crypto_kem_dec(key_a, sendb, sk_a);
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if ((returncode = crypto_kem_dec(key_a, sendb, sk_a)) > -1) {
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printf("ERROR failing crypto_kem_dec returned %d instead of negative code\n", returncode);
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return -1;
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}
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if (!memcmp(key_a, key_b, CRYPTO_BYTES)) {
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printf("ERROR invalid sk_a\n");
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@ -111,21 +122,25 @@ static int test_invalid_ciphertext(void) {
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unsigned char sendb[CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES];
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int i;
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size_t pos;
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int returncode;
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for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
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randombytes((unsigned char *)&pos, sizeof(size_t));
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// Alice generates a public key
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crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk_a);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk_a));
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// Bob derives a secret key and creates a response
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crypto_kem_enc(sendb, key_b, pk);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_enc(sendb, key_b, pk));
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// Change some byte in the ciphertext (i.e., encapsulated key)
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sendb[pos % CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES] ^= 23;
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// Alice uses Bobs response to get her secret key
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crypto_kem_dec(key_a, sendb, sk_a);
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if ((returncode = crypto_kem_dec(key_a, sendb, sk_a)) > -1) {
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printf("ERROR crypto_kem_dec should fail (negative returncode) but returned %d\n", returncode);
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return -1;
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}
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if (!memcmp(key_a, key_b, CRYPTO_BYTES)) {
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printf("ERROR invalid ciphertext\n");
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@ -30,6 +30,13 @@ static int check_canary(const unsigned char *d) {
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#define crypto_sign NAMESPACE(crypto_sign)
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#define crypto_sign_open NAMESPACE(crypto_sign_open)
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#define RETURNS_ZERO(f) \
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if ((f) != 0) { \
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puts("(f) returned non-zero returncode"); \
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return -1; \
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}
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static int test_sign(void) {
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unsigned char pk[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 16];
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unsigned char sk[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 16];
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@ -38,6 +45,7 @@ static int test_sign(void) {
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unsigned long long mlen;
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unsigned long long smlen;
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int returncode;
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int i;
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write_canary(pk);
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@ -50,15 +58,18 @@ static int test_sign(void) {
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write_canary(m + sizeof(m) - 8);
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for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
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crypto_sign_keypair(pk + 8, sk + 8);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign_keypair(pk + 8, sk + 8));
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randombytes(m + 8, MLEN);
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crypto_sign(sm + 8, &smlen, m + 8, MLEN, sk + 8);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign(sm + 8, &smlen, m + 8, MLEN, sk + 8));
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// By relying on m == sm we prevent having to allocate CRYPTO_BYTES
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// twice
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if (crypto_sign_open(sm + 8, &mlen, sm + 8, smlen, pk + 8)) {
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if ((returncode = crypto_sign_open(sm + 8, &mlen, sm + 8, smlen, pk + 8)) != 0) {
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printf("ERROR Signature did not verify correctly!\n");
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if (returncode > 0) {
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puts("ERROR return code should be < 0 on failure");
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}
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return 1;
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}
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if (check_canary(pk) || check_canary(pk + sizeof(pk) - 8) ||
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@ -83,21 +94,26 @@ static int test_wrong_pk(void) {
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unsigned long long mlen;
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unsigned long long smlen;
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int returncode;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
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crypto_sign_keypair(pk2, sk);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign_keypair(pk2, sk));
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crypto_sign_keypair(pk, sk);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign_keypair(pk, sk));
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randombytes(m, MLEN);
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crypto_sign(sm, &smlen, m, MLEN, sk);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign(sm, &smlen, m, MLEN, sk));
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// By relying on m == sm we prevent having to allocate CRYPTO_BYTES
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// twice
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if (!crypto_sign_open(sm, &mlen, sm, smlen, pk2)) {
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if (!(returncode = crypto_sign_open(sm, &mlen, sm, smlen, pk2))) {
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printf("ERROR Signature did verify correctly under wrong public "
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"key!\n");
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if (returncode > 0) {
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puts("ERROR return code should be < 0");
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}
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return 1;
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}
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}
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