253 lines
8.1 KiB
C
253 lines
8.1 KiB
C
#include <stddef.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "api.h"
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#include "randombytes.h"
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#define NTESTS 5
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#define MLEN 32
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const uint8_t canary[8] = {
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0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF
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};
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/* allocate a bit more for all keys and messages and
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* make sure it is not touched by the implementations.
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*/
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static void write_canary(uint8_t *d) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
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d[i] = canary[i];
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}
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}
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static int check_canary(const uint8_t *d) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
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if (d[i] != canary[i]) {
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return -1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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// https://stackoverflow.com/a/1489985/1711232
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#define PASTER(x, y) x##_##y
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#define EVALUATOR(x, y) PASTER(x, y)
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#define NAMESPACE(fun) EVALUATOR(PQCLEAN_NAMESPACE, fun)
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#define CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES NAMESPACE(CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES)
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#define CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES NAMESPACE(CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES)
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#define CRYPTO_BYTES NAMESPACE(CRYPTO_BYTES)
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#define CRYPTO_ALGNAME NAMESPACE(CRYPTO_ALGNAME)
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#define crypto_sign_keypair NAMESPACE(crypto_sign_keypair)
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#define crypto_sign NAMESPACE(crypto_sign)
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#define crypto_sign_open NAMESPACE(crypto_sign_open)
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#define crypto_sign_signature NAMESPACE(crypto_sign_signature)
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#define crypto_sign_verify NAMESPACE(crypto_sign_verify)
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#define RETURNS_ZERO(f) \
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if ((f) != 0) { \
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puts("(f) returned non-zero returncode"); \
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return -1; \
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}
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// https://stackoverflow.com/a/55243651/248065
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#define MY_TRUTHY_VALUE_X 1
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#define CAT(x,y) CAT_(x,y)
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#define CAT_(x,y) x##y
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#define HAS_NAMESPACE(x) CAT(CAT(MY_TRUTHY_VALUE_,CAT(PQCLEAN_NAMESPACE,CAT(_,x))),X)
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#if !HAS_NAMESPACE(API_H)
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#error "namespace not properly defined for header guard"
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#endif
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static int test_sign(void) {
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/*
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* This is most likely going to be aligned by the compiler.
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* 16 extra bytes for canary
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* 1 extra byte for unalignment
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*/
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uint8_t pk_aligned[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 16 + 1];
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uint8_t sk_aligned[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 16 + 1];
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uint8_t sm_aligned[MLEN + CRYPTO_BYTES + 16 + 1];
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uint8_t m_aligned[MLEN + 16 + 1];
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/*
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* Make sure all pointers are odd.
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* This ensures that the implementation does not assume anything about the
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* data alignment. For example this would catch if an implementation
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* directly uses these pointers to load into vector registers using movdqa.
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*/
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uint8_t *pk = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) pk_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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uint8_t *sk = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) sk_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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uint8_t *sm = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) sm_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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uint8_t *m = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) m_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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size_t mlen;
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size_t smlen;
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int returncode;
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int i;
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/*
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* Write 8 byte canary before and after the actual memory regions.
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* This is used to validate that the implementation does not assume
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* anything about the placement of data in memory
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* (e.g., assuming that the pk is always behind the sk)
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*/
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write_canary(pk);
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write_canary(pk + CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 8);
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write_canary(sk);
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write_canary(sk + CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 8);
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write_canary(sm);
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write_canary(sm + MLEN + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8);
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write_canary(m);
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write_canary(m + MLEN + 8);
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for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign_keypair(pk + 8, sk + 8));
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randombytes(m + 8, MLEN);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign(sm + 8, &smlen, m + 8, MLEN, sk + 8));
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// By relying on m == sm we prevent having to allocate CRYPTO_BYTES
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// twice
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if ((returncode =
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crypto_sign_open(sm + 8, &mlen, sm + 8, smlen, pk + 8)) != 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR Signature did not verify correctly!\n");
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if (returncode > 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR return code should be < 0 on failure");
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}
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return 1;
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}
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// Validate that the implementation did not touch the canary
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if (check_canary(pk) || check_canary(pk + CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 8) ||
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check_canary(sk) || check_canary(sk + CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 8) ||
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check_canary(sm) || check_canary(sm + MLEN + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8) ||
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check_canary(m) || check_canary(m + MLEN + 8)) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR canary overwritten\n");
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int test_sign_detached(void) {
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/*
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* This is most likely going to be aligned by the compiler.
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* 16 extra bytes for canary
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* 1 extra byte for unalignment
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*/
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uint8_t pk_aligned[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 16 + 1];
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uint8_t sk_aligned[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 16 + 1];
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uint8_t sig_aligned[CRYPTO_BYTES + 16 + 1];
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uint8_t m_aligned[MLEN + 16 + 1];
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/*
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* Make sure all pointers are odd.
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* This ensures that the implementation does not assume anything about the
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* data alignment. For example this would catch if an implementation
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* directly uses these pointers to load into vector registers using movdqa.
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*/
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uint8_t *pk = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) pk_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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uint8_t *sk = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) sk_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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uint8_t *sig = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) sig_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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uint8_t *m = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) m_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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size_t siglen;
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int returncode;
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int i;
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/*
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* Write 8 byte canary before and after the actual memory regions.
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* This is used to validate that the implementation does not assume
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* anything about the placement of data in memory
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* (e.g., assuming that the pk is always behind the sk)
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*/
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write_canary(pk);
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write_canary(pk + CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 8);
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write_canary(sk);
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write_canary(sk + CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 8);
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write_canary(sig);
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write_canary(sig + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8);
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write_canary(m);
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write_canary(m + MLEN + 8);
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for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign_keypair(pk + 8, sk + 8));
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randombytes(m + 8, MLEN);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign_signature(sig + 8, &siglen, m + 8, MLEN, sk + 8));
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if ((returncode =
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crypto_sign_verify(sig + 8, siglen, m + 8, MLEN, pk + 8)) != 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR Signature did not verify correctly!\n");
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if (returncode > 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR return code should be < 0 on failure");
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}
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return 1;
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}
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// Validate that the implementation did not touch the canary
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if (check_canary(pk) || check_canary(pk + CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 8) ||
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check_canary(sk) || check_canary(sk + CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 8) ||
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check_canary(sig) || check_canary(sig + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8) ||
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check_canary(m) || check_canary(m + MLEN + 8)) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR canary overwritten\n");
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int test_wrong_pk(void) {
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uint8_t pk[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
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uint8_t pk2[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
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uint8_t sk[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES];
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uint8_t sm[MLEN + CRYPTO_BYTES];
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uint8_t m[MLEN];
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size_t mlen;
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size_t smlen;
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int returncode;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign_keypair(pk2, sk));
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign_keypair(pk, sk));
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randombytes(m, MLEN);
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign(sm, &smlen, m, MLEN, sk));
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// By relying on m == sm we prevent having to allocate CRYPTO_BYTES
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// twice
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returncode = crypto_sign_open(sm, &mlen, sm, smlen, pk2);
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if (!returncode) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR Signature did verify correctly under wrong public key!\n");
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if (returncode > 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "ERROR return code should be < 0");
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}
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return 1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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int main(void) {
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// check if CRYPTO_ALGNAME is printable
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puts(CRYPTO_ALGNAME);
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int result = 0;
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result += test_sign();
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result += test_sign_detached();
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result += test_wrong_pk();
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return result;
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}
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