pqc/test/crypto_sign/functest.c
Thom Wiggers fe46514836
Include full clangformat config.
Hopefully stabilizes behaviour between versions.
2019-02-11 10:05:54 +01:00

136 lines
3.8 KiB
C

#include "api.h"
#include "randombytes.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#define NTESTS 15
#define MLEN 32
const unsigned char canary[8] = {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67,
0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF};
/* allocate a bit more for all keys and messages and
* make sure it is not touched by the implementations.
*/
static void write_canary(unsigned char *d) {
for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
d[i] = canary[i];
}
}
static int check_canary(const unsigned char *d) {
for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (d[i] != canary[i])
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
// https://stackoverflow.com/a/1489985/1711232
#define PASTER(x, y) x##_##y
#define EVALUATOR(x, y) PASTER(x, y)
#define NAMESPACE(fun) EVALUATOR(PQCLEAN_NAMESPACE, fun)
#define crypto_sign_keypair NAMESPACE(crypto_sign_keypair)
#define crypto_sign NAMESPACE(crypto_sign)
#define crypto_sign_open NAMESPACE(crypto_sign_open)
#define RETURNS_ZERO(f) \
if ((f) != 0) { \
puts("(f) returned non-zero returncode"); \
return -1; \
}
static int test_sign(void) {
unsigned char pk[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 16];
unsigned char sk[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 16];
unsigned char sm[MLEN + CRYPTO_BYTES + 16];
unsigned char m[MLEN + 16];
unsigned long long mlen;
unsigned long long smlen;
int returncode;
int i;
write_canary(pk);
write_canary(pk + sizeof(pk) - 8);
write_canary(sk);
write_canary(sk + sizeof(sk) - 8);
write_canary(sm);
write_canary(sm + sizeof(sm) - 8);
write_canary(m);
write_canary(m + sizeof(m) - 8);
for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign_keypair(pk + 8, sk + 8));
randombytes(m + 8, MLEN);
RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign(sm + 8, &smlen, m + 8, MLEN, sk + 8));
// By relying on m == sm we prevent having to allocate CRYPTO_BYTES
// twice
if ((returncode =
crypto_sign_open(sm + 8, &mlen, sm + 8, smlen, pk + 8)) != 0) {
printf("ERROR Signature did not verify correctly!\n");
if (returncode > 0) {
puts("ERROR return code should be < 0 on failure");
}
return 1;
}
if (check_canary(pk) || check_canary(pk + sizeof(pk) - 8) ||
check_canary(sk) || check_canary(sk + sizeof(sk) - 8) ||
check_canary(sm) || check_canary(sm + sizeof(sm) - 8) ||
check_canary(m) || check_canary(m + sizeof(m) - 8)) {
printf("ERROR canary overwritten\n");
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int test_wrong_pk(void) {
unsigned char pk[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
unsigned char pk2[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
unsigned char sk[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES];
unsigned char sm[MLEN + CRYPTO_BYTES];
unsigned char m[MLEN];
unsigned long long mlen;
unsigned long long smlen;
int returncode;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign_keypair(pk2, sk));
RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign_keypair(pk, sk));
randombytes(m, MLEN);
RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_sign(sm, &smlen, m, MLEN, sk));
// By relying on m == sm we prevent having to allocate CRYPTO_BYTES
// twice
if (!(returncode = crypto_sign_open(sm, &mlen, sm, smlen, pk2))) {
printf("ERROR Signature did verify correctly under wrong public "
"key!\n");
if (returncode > 0) {
puts("ERROR return code should be < 0");
}
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
int main(void) {
int result = 0;
result += test_sign();
result += test_wrong_pk();
return result;
}