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pqcrypto/crypto_kem/ntruhps2048677/clean/owcpa.c

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#include "owcpa.h"
#include "poly.h"
#include "sample.h"
static int owcpa_check_r(const poly *r) {
/* Check that r is in message space. */
/* Note: Assumes that r has coefficients in {0, 1, ..., q-1} */
int i;
uint64_t t = 0;
uint16_t c;
for (i = 0; i < NTRU_N; i++) {
c = MODQ(r->coeffs[i] + 1);
t |= c & (NTRU_Q - 4); /* 0 if c is in {0,1,2,3} */
t |= (c + 1) & 0x4; /* 0 if c is in {0,1,2} */
}
t |= MODQ(r->coeffs[NTRU_N - 1]); /* Coefficient n-1 must be zero */
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t = (~t + 1); // two's complement
t >>= 63;
return (int) t;
}
static int owcpa_check_m(const poly *m) {
/* Check that m is in message space. */
/* Note: Assumes that m has coefficients in {0,1,2}. */
int i;
uint64_t t = 0;
uint16_t p1 = 0;
uint16_t m1 = 0;
for (i = 0; i < NTRU_N; i++) {
p1 += m->coeffs[i] & 0x01;
m1 += (m->coeffs[i] & 0x02) >> 1;
}
/* Need p1 = m1 and p1 + m1 = NTRU_WEIGHT */
t |= p1 ^ m1;
t |= (p1 + m1) ^ NTRU_WEIGHT;
t = (~t + 1); // two's complement
t >>= 63;
return (int) t;
}
void PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_owcpa_keypair(unsigned char *pk,
unsigned char *sk,
const unsigned char seed[NTRU_SAMPLE_FG_BYTES]) {
int i;
poly x1, x2, x3, x4, x5;
poly *f = &x1, *g = &x2, *invf_mod3 = &x3;
poly *gf = &x3, *invgf = &x4, *tmp = &x5;
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poly *invh = &x3, *h = &x3;
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_sample_fg(f, g, seed);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_S3_inv(invf_mod3, f);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_S3_tobytes(sk, f);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_S3_tobytes(sk + NTRU_PACK_TRINARY_BYTES, invf_mod3);
/* Lift coeffs of f and g from Z_p to Z_q */
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Z3_to_Zq(f);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Z3_to_Zq(g);
/* g = 3*g */
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for (i = 0; i < NTRU_N; i++) {
g->coeffs[i] = 3 * g->coeffs[i];
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}
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_mul(gf, g, f);
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PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_inv(invgf, gf);
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PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_mul(tmp, invgf, f);
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PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Sq_mul(invh, tmp, f);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Sq_tobytes(sk + 2 * NTRU_PACK_TRINARY_BYTES, invh);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_mul(tmp, invgf, g);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_mul(h, tmp, g);
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PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_sum_zero_tobytes(pk, h);
}
void PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_owcpa_enc(unsigned char *c,
const poly *r,
const poly *m,
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const unsigned char *pk) {
int i;
poly x1, x2;
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poly *h = &x1, *liftm = &x1;
poly *ct = &x2;
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PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_sum_zero_frombytes(h, pk);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_mul(ct, r, h);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_lift(liftm, m);
for (i = 0; i < NTRU_N; i++) {
ct->coeffs[i] = ct->coeffs[i] + liftm->coeffs[i];
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}
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_sum_zero_tobytes(c, ct);
}
int PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_owcpa_dec(unsigned char *rm,
const unsigned char *ciphertext,
const unsigned char *secretkey) {
int i;
int fail;
poly x1, x2, x3, x4;
poly *c = &x1, *f = &x2, *cf = &x3;
poly *mf = &x2, *finv3 = &x3, *m = &x4;
poly *liftm = &x2, *invh = &x3, *r = &x4;
poly *b = &x1;
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_sum_zero_frombytes(c, ciphertext);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_S3_frombytes(f, secretkey);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Z3_to_Zq(f);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_mul(cf, c, f);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Rq_to_S3(mf, cf);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_S3_frombytes(finv3, secretkey + NTRU_PACK_TRINARY_BYTES);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_S3_mul(m, mf, finv3);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_S3_tobytes(rm + NTRU_PACK_TRINARY_BYTES, m);
fail = 0;
/* Check that unused bits of last byte of ciphertext are zero */
fail |= ciphertext[NTRU_CIPHERTEXTBYTES - 1] & (0xff << (8 - (7 & (NTRU_LOGQ * NTRU_PACK_DEG))));
/* For the IND-CCA2 KEM we must ensure that c = Enc(h, (r,m)). */
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/* We can avoid re-computing r*h + Lift(m) as long as we check that */
/* r (defined as b/h mod (q, Phi_n)) and m are in the message space. */
/* (m can take any value in S3 in NTRU_HRSS) */
fail |= owcpa_check_m(m);
/* b = c - Lift(m) mod (q, x^n - 1) */
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_lift(liftm, m);
for (i = 0; i < NTRU_N; i++) {
b->coeffs[i] = c->coeffs[i] - liftm->coeffs[i];
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}
/* r = b / h mod (q, Phi_n) */
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Sq_frombytes(invh, secretkey + 2 * NTRU_PACK_TRINARY_BYTES);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_Sq_mul(r, b, invh);
/* NOTE: Our definition of r as b/h mod (q, Phi_n) follows Figure 4 of */
/* [Sch18] https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1174/20181203:032458. */
/* This differs from Figure 10 of Saito--Xagawa--Yamakawa */
/* [SXY17] https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1005/20180516:055500 */
/* where r gets a final reduction modulo p. */
/* We need this change to use Proposition 1 of [Sch18]. */
/* Proposition 1 of [Sch18] shows that re-encryption with (r,m) yields c. */
/* if and only if fail==0 after the following call to owcpa_check_r */
/* The procedure given in Fig. 8 of [Sch18] can be skipped because we have */
/* c(1) = 0 due to the use of poly_Rq_sum_zero_{to,from}bytes. */
fail |= owcpa_check_r(r);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_trinary_Zq_to_Z3(r);
PQCLEAN_NTRUHPS2048677_CLEAN_poly_S3_tobytes(rm, r);
return fail;
}