mirror of
https://github.com/henrydcase/pqc.git
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ac2c20045c
* Add McEliece reference implementations * Add Vec implementations of McEliece * Add sse implementations * Add AVX2 implementations * Get rid of stuff not supported by Mac ABI * restrict to two cores * Ditch .data files * Remove .hidden from all .S files * speed up duplicate consistency tests by batching * make cpuinfo more robust * Hope to stabilize macos cpuinfo without ccache * Revert "Hope to stabilize macos cpuinfo without ccache" This reverts commit 6129c3cabe1abbc8b956bc87e902a698e32bf322. * Just hardcode what's available at travis * Fixed-size types in api.h * namespace all header files in mceliece * Ditch operations.h * Get rid of static inline functions * fixup! Ditch operations.h
137 lines
3.2 KiB
C
137 lines
3.2 KiB
C
#include "api.h"
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#include "aes256ctr.h"
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#include "controlbits.h"
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#include "crypto_hash.h"
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#include "decrypt.h"
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#include "encrypt.h"
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#include "params.h"
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#include "pk_gen.h"
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#include "randombytes.h"
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#include "sk_gen.h"
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#include "util.h"
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <string.h>
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int PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_crypto_kem_enc(
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uint8_t *c,
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uint8_t *key,
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const uint8_t *pk
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) {
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uint8_t two_e[ 1 + SYS_N / 8 ] = {2};
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uint8_t *e = two_e + 1;
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uint8_t one_ec[ 1 + SYS_N / 8 + (SYND_BYTES + 32) ] = {1};
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PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_encrypt(c, e, pk);
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crypto_hash_32b(c + SYND_BYTES, two_e, sizeof(two_e));
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memcpy(one_ec + 1, e, SYS_N / 8);
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memcpy(one_ec + 1 + SYS_N / 8, c, SYND_BYTES + 32);
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crypto_hash_32b(key, one_ec, sizeof(one_ec));
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return 0;
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}
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int PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_crypto_kem_dec(
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uint8_t *key,
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const uint8_t *c,
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const uint8_t *sk
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) {
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int i;
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uint8_t ret_confirm = 0;
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uint8_t ret_decrypt = 0;
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uint16_t m;
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uint8_t conf[32];
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uint8_t two_e[ 1 + SYS_N / 8 ] = {2};
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uint8_t *e = two_e + 1;
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uint8_t preimage[ 1 + SYS_N / 8 + (SYND_BYTES + 32) ];
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uint8_t *x = preimage;
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//
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ret_decrypt = (uint8_t)PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_decrypt(e, sk + SYS_N / 8, c);
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crypto_hash_32b(conf, two_e, sizeof(two_e));
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for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
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ret_confirm |= conf[i] ^ c[SYND_BYTES + i];
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}
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m = ret_decrypt | ret_confirm;
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m -= 1;
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m >>= 8;
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*x++ = (~m & 0) | (m & 1);
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for (i = 0; i < SYS_N / 8; i++) {
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*x++ = (~m & sk[i]) | (m & e[i]);
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}
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for (i = 0; i < SYND_BYTES + 32; i++) {
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*x++ = c[i];
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}
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crypto_hash_32b(key, preimage, sizeof(preimage));
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return 0;
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}
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int PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_crypto_kem_keypair
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(
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uint8_t *pk,
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uint8_t *sk
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) {
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int i;
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uint8_t seed[ 32 ];
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uint8_t r[ SYS_T * 2 + (1 << GFBITS)*sizeof(uint32_t) + SYS_N / 8 + 32 ];
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uint8_t nonce[ 16 ] = {0};
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uint8_t *rp;
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gf f[ SYS_T ]; // element in GF(2^mt)
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gf irr[ SYS_T ]; // Goppa polynomial
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uint32_t perm[ 1 << GFBITS ]; // random permutation
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randombytes(seed, sizeof(seed));
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while (1) {
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rp = r;
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PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_aes256ctr(r, sizeof(r), nonce, seed);
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memcpy(seed, &r[ sizeof(r) - 32 ], 32);
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for (i = 0; i < SYS_T; i++) {
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f[i] = PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_load2(rp + i * 2);
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}
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rp += sizeof(f);
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if (PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_genpoly_gen(irr, f)) {
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continue;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < (1 << GFBITS); i++) {
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perm[i] = PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_load4(rp + i * 4);
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}
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rp += sizeof(perm);
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if (PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_perm_check(perm)) {
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continue;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < SYS_T; i++) {
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PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_store2(sk + SYS_N / 8 + i * 2, irr[i]);
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}
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if (PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_pk_gen(pk, perm, sk + SYS_N / 8)) {
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continue;
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}
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memcpy(sk, rp, SYS_N / 8);
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PQCLEAN_MCELIECE8192128_CLEAN_controlbits(sk + SYS_N / 8 + IRR_BYTES, perm);
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break;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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