mirror of
https://github.com/henrydcase/pqc.git
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758 lines
21 KiB
C
758 lines
21 KiB
C
/*
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* Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter.
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*
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* Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2014 - 2022
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*
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* Design
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* ======
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*
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* See documentation in doc/ folder.
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*
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* Interface
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* =========
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*
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* See documentation in jitterentropy(3) man page.
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*
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* License: see LICENSE file in root directory
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
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* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
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* WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
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* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
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* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
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* BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
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* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
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* USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
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* DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include "jitterentropy.h"
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#include "jitterentropy-base.h"
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#include "jitterentropy-gcd.h"
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#include "jitterentropy-health.h"
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#include "jitterentropy-noise.h"
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#include "jitterentropy-timer.h"
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#include "jitterentropy-sha3.h"
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#define MAJVERSION 3 /* API / ABI incompatible changes, functional changes that
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* require consumer to be updated (as long as this number
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* is zero, the API is not considered stable and can
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* change without a bump of the major version) */
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#define MINVERSION 4 /* API compatible, ABI may change, functional
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* enhancements only, consumer can be left unchanged if
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* enhancements are not considered */
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#define PATCHLEVEL 1 /* API / ABI compatible, no functional changes, no
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* enhancements, bug fixes only */
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/***************************************************************************
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* Jitter RNG Static Definitions
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*
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* None of the following should be altered
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***************************************************************************/
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#ifdef __OPTIMIZE__
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#error "The CPU Jitter random number generator must not be compiled with optimizations. See documentation. Use the compiler switch -O0 for compiling jitterentropy.c."
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#endif
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/*
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* JENT_POWERUP_TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge
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* systems. 100 is definitely too little.
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*
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* SP800-90B requires at least 1024 initial test cycles.
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*/
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#define JENT_POWERUP_TESTLOOPCOUNT 1024
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/**
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* jent_version() - Return machine-usable version number of jent library
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*
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* The function returns a version number that is monotonic increasing
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* for newer versions. The version numbers are multiples of 100. For example,
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* version 1.2.3 is converted to 1020300 -- the last two digits are reserved
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* for future use.
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*
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* The result of this function can be used in comparing the version number
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* in a calling program if version-specific calls need to be make.
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*
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* @return Version number of jitterentropy library
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*/
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JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
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unsigned int jent_version(void)
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{
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unsigned int version = 0;
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version = MAJVERSION * 1000000;
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version += MINVERSION * 10000;
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version += PATCHLEVEL * 100;
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return version;
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}
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/***************************************************************************
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* Helper
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***************************************************************************/
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/* Calculate log2 of given value assuming that the value is a power of 2 */
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static inline unsigned int jent_log2_simple(unsigned int val)
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{
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unsigned int idx = 0;
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while (val >>= 1)
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idx++;
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return idx;
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}
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/* Increase the memory size by one step */
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static inline unsigned int jent_update_memsize(unsigned int flags)
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{
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unsigned int global_max = JENT_FLAGS_TO_MAX_MEMSIZE(
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JENT_MAX_MEMSIZE_MAX);
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unsigned int max;
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max = JENT_FLAGS_TO_MAX_MEMSIZE(flags);
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if (!max) {
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/*
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* The safe starting value is the amount of memory we allocated
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* last round.
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*/
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max = jent_log2_simple(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE);
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/* Adjust offset */
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max = (max > JENT_MAX_MEMSIZE_OFFSET) ?
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max - JENT_MAX_MEMSIZE_OFFSET : 0;
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} else {
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max++;
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}
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max = (max > global_max) ? global_max : max;
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/* Clear out the max size */
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flags &= ~JENT_MAX_MEMSIZE_MASK;
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/* Set the freshly calculated max size */
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flags |= JENT_MAX_MEMSIZE_TO_FLAGS(max);
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return flags;
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}
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/***************************************************************************
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* Random Number Generation
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***************************************************************************/
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/**
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* Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller.
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*
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* This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate
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* as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic
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* creates 64 bit per invocation.
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*
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* This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact
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* size specified by the caller.
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*
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* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector
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* @data [out] pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must
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* already exist
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* @len [in] size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random
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* in bytes
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*
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* @return number of bytes returned when request is fulfilled or an error
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*
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* The following error codes can occur:
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* -1 entropy_collector is NULL
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* -2 RCT failed
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* -3 APT test failed
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* -4 The timer cannot be initialized
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* -5 LAG failure
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*/
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JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
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ssize_t jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, char *data, size_t len)
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{
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char *p = data;
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size_t orig_len = len;
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int ret = 0;
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if (NULL == ec)
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return -1;
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if (jent_notime_settick(ec))
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return -4;
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while (len > 0) {
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size_t tocopy;
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unsigned int health_test_result;
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jent_random_data(ec);
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if ((health_test_result = jent_health_failure(ec))) {
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if (health_test_result & JENT_RCT_FAILURE)
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ret = -2;
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else if (health_test_result & JENT_APT_FAILURE)
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ret = -3;
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else
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ret = -5;
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goto err;
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}
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if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8) < len)
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tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8);
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else
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tocopy = len;
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jent_read_random_block(ec, p, tocopy);
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len -= tocopy;
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p += tocopy;
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}
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/*
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* Enhanced backtracking support: At this point, the hash state
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* contains the digest of the previous Jitter RNG collection round
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* which is inserted there by jent_read_random_block with the SHA
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* update operation. At the current code location we completed
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* one request for a caller and we do not know how long it will
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* take until a new request is sent to us. To guarantee enhanced
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* backtracking resistance at this point (i.e. ensure that an attacker
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* cannot obtain information about prior random numbers we generated),
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* but still stirring the hash state with old data the Jitter RNG
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* obtains a new message digest from its state and re-inserts it.
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* After this operation, the Jitter RNG state is still stirred with
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* the old data, but an attacker who gets access to the memory after
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* this point cannot deduce the random numbers produced by the
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* Jitter RNG prior to this point.
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*/
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/*
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* If we use secured memory, where backtracking support may not be
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* needed because the state is protected in a different method,
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* it is permissible to drop this support. But strongly weigh the
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* pros and cons considering that the SHA3 operation is not that
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* expensive.
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*/
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#ifndef CONFIG_CRYPTO_CPU_JITTERENTROPY_SECURE_MEMORY
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jent_read_random_block(ec, NULL, 0);
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#endif
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err:
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jent_notime_unsettick(ec);
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return ret ? ret : (ssize_t)orig_len;
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}
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static struct rand_data *_jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr,
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unsigned int flags);
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/**
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* Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller.
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*
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* This is a service function to jent_read_entropy() with the difference
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* that it automatically re-allocates the entropy collector if a health
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* test failure is observed. Before reallocation, a new power-on health test
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* is performed. The allocation of the new entropy collector automatically
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* increases the OSR by one. This is done based on the idea that a health
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* test failure indicates that the assumed entropy rate is too high.
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*
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* Note the function returns with an health test error if the OSR is
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* getting too large. If an error is returned by this function, the Jitter RNG
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* is not safe to be used on the current system.
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*
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* @ec [in] Reference to entropy collector - this is a double pointer as
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* The entropy collector may be freed and reallocated.
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* @data [out] pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must
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* already exist
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* @len [in] size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random
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* in bytes
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*
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* @return see jent_read_entropy()
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*/
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JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
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ssize_t jent_read_entropy_safe(struct rand_data **ec, char *data, size_t len)
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{
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char *p = data;
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size_t orig_len = len;
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ssize_t ret = 0;
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if (!ec)
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return -1;
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while (len > 0) {
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unsigned int osr, flags, max_mem_set;
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ret = jent_read_entropy(*ec, p, len);
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switch (ret) {
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case -1:
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case -4:
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return ret;
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case -2:
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case -3:
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case -5:
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osr = (*ec)->osr + 1;
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flags = (*ec)->flags;
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max_mem_set = (*ec)->max_mem_set;
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/* generic arbitrary cutoff */
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if (osr > 20)
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return ret;
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/*
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* If the caller did not set any specific maximum value
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* let the Jitter RNG increase the maximum memory by
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* one step.
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*/
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if (!max_mem_set)
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flags = jent_update_memsize(flags);
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/*
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* re-allocate entropy collector with higher OSR and
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* memory size
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*/
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jent_entropy_collector_free(*ec);
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/* Perform new health test with updated OSR */
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if (jent_entropy_init_ex(osr, flags))
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return -1;
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*ec = _jent_entropy_collector_alloc(osr, flags);
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if (!*ec)
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return -1;
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/* Remember whether caller configured memory size */
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(*ec)->max_mem_set = !!max_mem_set;
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break;
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default:
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len -= (size_t)ret;
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p += (size_t)ret;
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}
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}
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return (ssize_t)orig_len;
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}
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/***************************************************************************
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* Initialization logic
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***************************************************************************/
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/*
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* Obtain memory size to allocate for memory access variations.
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*
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* The maximum variations we can get from the memory access is when we allocate
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* a bit more memory than we have as data cache. But allocating as much
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* memory as we have as data cache might strain the resources on the system
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* more than necessary.
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*
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* On a lot of systems it is not necessary to need so much memory as the
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* variations coming from the general Jitter RNG execution commonly provide
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* large amount of variations.
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*
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* Thus, the default is:
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*
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* min(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE, data cache size)
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*
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* In case the data cache size cannot be obtained, use JENT_MEMORY_SIZE.
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*
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* If the caller provides a maximum memory size, use
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* min(provided max memory, data cache size).
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*/
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static inline uint32_t jent_memsize(unsigned int flags)
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{
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uint32_t memsize, max_memsize;
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max_memsize = JENT_FLAGS_TO_MAX_MEMSIZE(flags);
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if (max_memsize == 0) {
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max_memsize = JENT_MEMORY_SIZE;
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} else {
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max_memsize = UINT32_C(1) << (max_memsize +
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JENT_MAX_MEMSIZE_OFFSET);
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}
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/* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory access */
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memsize = jent_cache_size_roundup();
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/* Limit the memory as defined by caller */
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memsize = (memsize > max_memsize) ? max_memsize : memsize;
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/* Set a value if none was found */
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if (!memsize)
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memsize = JENT_MEMORY_SIZE;
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return memsize;
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}
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static int jent_selftest_run = 0;
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static struct rand_data
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*jent_entropy_collector_alloc_internal(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags)
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{
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struct rand_data *entropy_collector;
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uint32_t memsize = 0;
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/*
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* Requesting disabling and forcing of internal timer
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* makes no sense.
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*/
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if ((flags & JENT_DISABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER) &&
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(flags & JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER))
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return NULL;
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/* Force the self test to be run */
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if (!jent_selftest_run && jent_entropy_init_ex(osr, flags))
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return NULL;
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/*
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* If the initial test code concludes to force the internal timer
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* and the user requests it not to be used, do not allocate
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* the Jitter RNG instance.
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*/
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if (jent_notime_forced() && (flags & JENT_DISABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER))
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return NULL;
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entropy_collector = jent_zalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data));
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if (NULL == entropy_collector)
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return NULL;
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if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) {
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memsize = jent_memsize(flags);
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entropy_collector->mem = (unsigned char *)jent_zalloc(memsize);
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#ifdef JENT_RANDOM_MEMACCESS
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/*
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* Transform the size into a mask - it is assumed that size is
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* a power of 2.
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*/
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entropy_collector->memmask = memsize - 1;
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#else /* JENT_RANDOM_MEMACCESS */
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entropy_collector->memblocksize = memsize / JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS;
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entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS;
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/* sanity check */
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if (entropy_collector->memblocksize *
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entropy_collector->memblocks != memsize)
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goto err;
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#endif /* JENT_RANDOM_MEMACCESS */
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if (entropy_collector->mem == NULL)
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goto err;
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entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS;
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}
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if (sha3_alloc(&entropy_collector->hash_state))
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goto err;
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/* Initialize the hash state */
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sha3_256_init(entropy_collector->hash_state);
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/* verify and set the oversampling rate */
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if (osr < JENT_MIN_OSR)
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osr = JENT_MIN_OSR;
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entropy_collector->osr = osr;
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entropy_collector->flags = flags;
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if ((flags & JENT_FORCE_FIPS) || jent_fips_enabled())
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entropy_collector->fips_enabled = 1;
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/* Initialize the APT */
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jent_apt_init(entropy_collector, osr);
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/* Initialize the Lag Predictor Test */
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jent_lag_init(entropy_collector, osr);
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/* Was jent_entropy_init run (establishing the common GCD)? */
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if (jent_gcd_get(&entropy_collector->jent_common_timer_gcd)) {
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/*
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* It was not. This should probably be an error, but this
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* behavior breaks the test code. Set the gcd to a value that
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* won't hurt anything.
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*/
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entropy_collector->jent_common_timer_gcd = 1;
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}
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/*
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* Use timer-less noise source - note, OSR must be set in
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* entropy_collector!
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*/
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if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER)) {
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if (jent_notime_enable(entropy_collector, flags))
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goto err;
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}
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return entropy_collector;
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err:
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if (entropy_collector->mem != NULL)
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jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem, memsize);
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jent_zfree(entropy_collector, sizeof(struct rand_data));
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return NULL;
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}
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static struct rand_data *_jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr,
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unsigned int flags)
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{
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struct rand_data *ec = jent_entropy_collector_alloc_internal(osr,
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flags);
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if (!ec)
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return ec;
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/* fill the data pad with non-zero values */
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if (jent_notime_settick(ec)) {
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jent_entropy_collector_free(ec);
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return NULL;
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}
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jent_random_data(ec);
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jent_notime_unsettick(ec);
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return ec;
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}
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JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
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struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr,
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unsigned int flags)
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{
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struct rand_data *ec = _jent_entropy_collector_alloc(osr, flags);
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/* Remember that the caller provided a maximum size flag */
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if (ec)
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ec->max_mem_set = !!JENT_FLAGS_TO_MAX_MEMSIZE(flags);
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return ec;
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}
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JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
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void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
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{
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if (entropy_collector != NULL) {
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sha3_dealloc(entropy_collector->hash_state);
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jent_notime_disable(entropy_collector);
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if (entropy_collector->mem != NULL) {
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jent_zfree(entropy_collector->mem,
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jent_memsize(entropy_collector->flags));
|
|
entropy_collector->mem = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
jent_zfree(entropy_collector, sizeof(struct rand_data));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int jent_time_entropy_init(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct rand_data *ec;
|
|
uint64_t *delta_history;
|
|
int i, time_backwards = 0, count_stuck = 0, ret = 0;
|
|
unsigned int health_test_result;
|
|
|
|
delta_history = jent_gcd_init(JENT_POWERUP_TESTLOOPCOUNT);
|
|
if (!delta_history)
|
|
return EMEM;
|
|
|
|
if (flags & JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER)
|
|
jent_notime_force();
|
|
else
|
|
flags |= JENT_DISABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the start-up health tests (including the APT and RCT) are not
|
|
* run, then the entropy source is not 90B compliant. We could test if
|
|
* fips_enabled should be set using the jent_fips_enabled() function,
|
|
* but this can be overridden using the JENT_FORCE_FIPS flag, which
|
|
* isn't passed in yet. It is better to run the tests on the small
|
|
* amount of data that we have, which should not fail unless things
|
|
* are really bad.
|
|
*/
|
|
flags |= JENT_FORCE_FIPS;
|
|
ec = jent_entropy_collector_alloc_internal(osr, flags);
|
|
if (!ec) {
|
|
ret = EMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (jent_notime_settick(ec)) {
|
|
ret = EMEM;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* To initialize the prior time. */
|
|
jent_measure_jitter(ec, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is
|
|
* that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These
|
|
* loop counts may show some slight skew leading to false positives.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or
|
|
* check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the
|
|
* following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution
|
|
* timer.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define CLEARCACHE 100
|
|
for (i = -CLEARCACHE; i < JENT_POWERUP_TESTLOOPCOUNT; i++) {
|
|
uint64_t start_time = 0, end_time = 0, delta = 0;
|
|
unsigned int stuck;
|
|
|
|
/* Invoke core entropy collection logic */
|
|
stuck = jent_measure_jitter(ec, 0, &delta);
|
|
end_time = ec->prev_time;
|
|
start_time = ec->prev_time - delta;
|
|
|
|
/* test whether timer works */
|
|
if (!start_time || !end_time) {
|
|
ret = ENOTIME;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide
|
|
* delta even when called shortly after each other -- this
|
|
* implies that we also have a high resolution timer
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!delta || (end_time == start_time)) {
|
|
ret = ECOARSETIME;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* up to here we did not modify any variable that will be
|
|
* evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we
|
|
* already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction,
|
|
* etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case
|
|
* measurements.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (stuck)
|
|
count_stuck++;
|
|
|
|
/* test whether we have an increasing timer */
|
|
if (!(end_time > start_time))
|
|
time_backwards++;
|
|
|
|
/* Watch for common adjacent GCD values */
|
|
jent_gcd_add_value(delta_history, delta, i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* we allow up to three times the time running backwards.
|
|
* CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus,
|
|
* if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it
|
|
* should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being
|
|
* performed during our test run.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (time_backwards > 3) {
|
|
ret = ENOMONOTONIC;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* First, did we encounter a health test failure? */
|
|
if ((health_test_result = jent_health_failure(ec))) {
|
|
ret = (health_test_result & JENT_RCT_FAILURE) ? ERCT : EHEALTH;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = jent_gcd_analyze(delta_history, JENT_POWERUP_TESTLOOPCOUNT);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is
|
|
* likely to not work well.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (JENT_STUCK_INIT_THRES(JENT_POWERUP_TESTLOOPCOUNT) < count_stuck)
|
|
ret = ESTUCK;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
jent_gcd_fini(delta_history, JENT_POWERUP_TESTLOOPCOUNT);
|
|
|
|
if ((flags & JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER) && ec)
|
|
jent_notime_unsettick(ec);
|
|
|
|
jent_entropy_collector_free(ec);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int jent_entropy_init_common_pre(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
jent_notime_block_switch();
|
|
jent_health_cb_block_switch();
|
|
|
|
if (sha3_tester())
|
|
return EHASH;
|
|
|
|
ret = jent_gcd_selftest();
|
|
|
|
jent_selftest_run = 1;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline int jent_entropy_init_common_post(int ret)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Unmark the execution of the self tests if they failed. */
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
jent_selftest_run = 0;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
|
|
int jent_entropy_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = jent_entropy_init_common_pre();
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = jent_time_entropy_init(0, JENT_DISABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
ret = jent_time_entropy_init(0, JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER);
|
|
#endif /* JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER */
|
|
|
|
return jent_entropy_init_common_post(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
|
|
int jent_entropy_init_ex(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = jent_entropy_init_common_pre();
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = ENOTIME;
|
|
|
|
/* Test without internal timer unless caller does not want it */
|
|
if (!(flags & JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER))
|
|
ret = jent_time_entropy_init(osr,
|
|
flags | JENT_DISABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER
|
|
/* Test with internal timer unless caller does not want it */
|
|
if (ret && !(flags & JENT_DISABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER))
|
|
ret = jent_time_entropy_init(osr,
|
|
flags | JENT_FORCE_INTERNAL_TIMER);
|
|
#endif /* JENT_CONF_ENABLE_INTERNAL_TIMER */
|
|
|
|
return jent_entropy_init_common_post(ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
|
|
int jent_entropy_switch_notime_impl(struct jent_notime_thread *new_thread)
|
|
{
|
|
return jent_notime_switch(new_thread);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
JENT_PRIVATE_STATIC
|
|
int jent_set_fips_failure_callback(jent_fips_failure_cb cb)
|
|
{
|
|
return jent_set_fips_failure_callback_internal(cb);
|
|
}
|