mirror of
https://github.com/henrydcase/pqc.git
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223 lines
7.0 KiB
C
223 lines
7.0 KiB
C
#include <stdint.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "api.h"
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#include "randombytes.h"
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#define NTESTS 5
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const uint8_t canary[8] = {
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0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF
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};
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/* allocate a bit more for all keys and messages and
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* make sure it is not touched by the implementations.
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*/
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static void write_canary(uint8_t *d) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
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d[i] = canary[i];
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}
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}
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static int check_canary(const uint8_t *d) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
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if (d[i] != canary[i]) {
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return -1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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// https://stackoverflow.com/a/1489985/1711232
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#define PASTER(x, y) x##_##y
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#define EVALUATOR(x, y) PASTER(x, y)
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#define NAMESPACE(fun) EVALUATOR(PQCLEAN_NAMESPACE, fun)
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#define CRYPTO_BYTES NAMESPACE(CRYPTO_BYTES)
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#define CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES NAMESPACE(CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES)
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#define CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES NAMESPACE(CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES)
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#define CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES NAMESPACE(CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES)
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#define CRYPTO_ALGNAME NAMESPACE(CRYPTO_ALGNAME)
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#define crypto_kem_keypair NAMESPACE(crypto_kem_keypair)
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#define crypto_kem_enc NAMESPACE(crypto_kem_enc)
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#define crypto_kem_dec NAMESPACE(crypto_kem_dec)
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#define RETURNS_ZERO(f) \
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if ((f) != 0) { \
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puts(#f " returned non-zero returncode"); \
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return -1; \
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}
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// https://stackoverflow.com/a/55243651/248065
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#define MY_TRUTHY_VALUE_X 1
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#define CAT(x,y) CAT_(x,y)
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#define CAT_(x,y) x##y
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#define HAS_NAMESPACE(x) CAT(CAT(MY_TRUTHY_VALUE_,CAT(PQCLEAN_NAMESPACE,CAT(_,x))),X)
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#if !HAS_NAMESPACE(API_H)
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#error "namespace not properly defined for header guard"
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#endif
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static int test_keys(void) {
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/*
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* This is most likely going to be aligned by the compiler.
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* 16 extra bytes for canary
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* 1 extra byte for unalignment
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*/
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uint8_t key_a_aligned[CRYPTO_BYTES + 16 + 1];
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uint8_t key_b_aligned[CRYPTO_BYTES + 16 + 1];
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uint8_t pk_aligned[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 16 + 1];
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uint8_t sendb_aligned[CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + 16 + 1];
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uint8_t sk_a_aligned[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 16 + 1];
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/*
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* Make sure all pointers are odd.
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* This ensures that the implementation does not assume anything about the
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* data alignment. For example this would catch if an implementation
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* directly uses these pointers to load into vector registers using movdqa.
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*/
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uint8_t *key_a = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) key_a_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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uint8_t *key_b = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) key_b_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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uint8_t *pk = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) pk_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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uint8_t *sendb = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) sendb_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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uint8_t *sk_a = (uint8_t *) ((uintptr_t) sk_a_aligned|(uintptr_t) 1);
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/*
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* Write 8 byte canary before and after the actual memory regions.
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* This is used to validate that the implementation does not assume
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* anything about the placement of data in memory
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* (e.g., assuming that the pk is always behind the sk)
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*/
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write_canary(key_a);
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write_canary(key_a + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8);
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write_canary(key_b);
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write_canary(key_b + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8);
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write_canary(pk);
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write_canary(pk + CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 8);
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write_canary(sendb);
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write_canary(sendb + CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + 8);
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write_canary(sk_a);
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write_canary(sk_a + CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 8);
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
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// Alice generates a public key
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_keypair(pk + 8, sk_a + 8));
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// Bob derives a secret key and creates a response
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_enc(sendb + 8, key_b + 8, pk + 8));
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// Alice uses Bobs response to get her secret key
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_dec(key_a + 8, sendb + 8, sk_a + 8));
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if (memcmp(key_a + 8, key_b + 8, CRYPTO_BYTES) != 0) {
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printf("ERROR KEYS\n");
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return -1;
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}
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// Validate that the implementation did not touch the canary
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if (check_canary(key_a) || check_canary(key_a + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8) ||
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check_canary(key_b) || check_canary(key_b + CRYPTO_BYTES + 8 ) ||
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check_canary(pk) || check_canary(pk + CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + 8 ) ||
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check_canary(sendb) || check_canary(sendb + CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + 8 ) ||
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check_canary(sk_a) || check_canary(sk_a + CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES + 8 )) {
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printf("ERROR canary overwritten\n");
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return -1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int test_invalid_sk_a(void) {
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uint8_t sk_a[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES];
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uint8_t key_a[CRYPTO_BYTES], key_b[CRYPTO_BYTES];
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uint8_t pk[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
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uint8_t sendb[CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES];
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int i;
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int returncode;
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for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
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// Alice generates a public key
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk_a));
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// Bob derives a secret key and creates a response
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_enc(sendb, key_b, pk));
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// Replace secret key with random values
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randombytes(sk_a, CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES);
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// Alice uses Bobs response to get her secret key
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if ((returncode = crypto_kem_dec(key_a, sendb, sk_a)) > 0) {
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printf("ERROR failing crypto_kem_dec returned %d instead of "
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"negative or zero code\n",
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returncode);
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return -1;
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}
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if (!memcmp(key_a, key_b, CRYPTO_BYTES)) {
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printf("ERROR invalid sk_a\n");
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return -1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int test_invalid_ciphertext(void) {
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uint8_t sk_a[CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES];
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uint8_t key_a[CRYPTO_BYTES], key_b[CRYPTO_BYTES];
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uint8_t pk[CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
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uint8_t sendb[CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES];
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int i;
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size_t pos;
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int returncode;
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for (i = 0; i < NTESTS; i++) {
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randombytes((uint8_t *)&pos, sizeof(size_t));
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// Alice generates a public key
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_keypair(pk, sk_a));
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// Bob derives a secret key and creates a response
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RETURNS_ZERO(crypto_kem_enc(sendb, key_b, pk));
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// Change some byte in the ciphertext (i.e., encapsulated key)
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sendb[pos % CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES] ^= 23;
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// Alice uses Bobs response to get her secret key
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if ((returncode = crypto_kem_dec(key_a, sendb, sk_a)) > 0) {
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printf("ERROR crypto_kem_dec should either fail (negative "
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"returncode) or succeed (return 0) but returned %d\n",
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returncode);
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return -1;
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}
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if (!memcmp(key_a, key_b, CRYPTO_BYTES)) {
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printf("ERROR invalid ciphertext\n");
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return -1;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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int main(void) {
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// Check if CRYPTO_ALGNAME is printable
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puts(CRYPTO_ALGNAME);
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int result = 0;
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result += test_keys();
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result += test_invalid_sk_a();
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result += test_invalid_ciphertext();
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if (result != 0) {
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puts("Errors occurred");
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}
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return result;
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}
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