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107
msr/include/P751_api.h
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107
msr/include/P751_api.h
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/********************************************************************************************
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* SIDH: an efficient supersingular isogeny cryptography library
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*
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* Abstract: API header file for P751
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*********************************************************************************************/
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#ifndef __P751_API_H__
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#define __P751_API_H__
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/*********************** Key encapsulation mechanism API ***********************/
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#define CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES 644 // MSG_BYTES + SECRETKEY_B_BYTES + CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES bytes
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#define CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES 564
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#define CRYPTO_BYTES 24
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#define CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES 596 // CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES + MSG_BYTES bytes
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// Algorithm name
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#define CRYPTO_ALGNAME "SIKEp751"
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// SIKE's key generation
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// It produces a private key sk and computes the public key pk.
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// Outputs: secret key sk (CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES = 644 bytes)
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// public key pk (CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES = 564 bytes)
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int crypto_kem_keypair_SIKEp751(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk);
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// SIKE's encapsulation
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// Input: public key pk (CRYPTO_PUBLICKEYBYTES = 564 bytes)
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// Outputs: shared secret ss (CRYPTO_BYTES = 24 bytes)
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// ciphertext message ct (CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES = 596 bytes)
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int crypto_kem_enc_SIKEp751(unsigned char *ct, unsigned char *ss, const unsigned char *pk);
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// SIKE's decapsulation
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// Input: secret key sk (CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES = 644 bytes)
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// ciphertext message ct (CRYPTO_CIPHERTEXTBYTES = 596 bytes)
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// Outputs: shared secret ss (CRYPTO_BYTES = 24 bytes)
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int crypto_kem_dec_SIKEp751(unsigned char *ss, const unsigned char *ct, const unsigned char *sk);
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// Encoding of keys for KEM-based isogeny system "SIKEp751" (wire format):
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// ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Elements over GF(p751) are encoded in 94 octets in little endian format (i.e., the least significant octet is located in the lowest memory address).
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// Elements (a+b*i) over GF(p751^2), where a and b are defined over GF(p751), are encoded as {a, b}, with a in the lowest memory portion.
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//
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// Private keys sk consist of the concatenation of a 32-byte random value, a value in the range [0, 2^378-1] and the public key pk. In the SIKE API,
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// private keys are encoded in 644 octets in little endian format.
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// Public keys pk consist of 3 elements in GF(p751^2). In the SIKE API, pk is encoded in 564 octets.
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// Ciphertexts ct consist of the concatenation of a public key value and a 32-byte value. In the SIKE API, ct is encoded in 564 + 32 = 596 octets.
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// Shared keys ss consist of a value of 24 octets.
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/*********************** Ephemeral key exchange API ***********************/
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#define SIDH_SECRETKEYBYTES 48
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#define SIDH_PUBLICKEYBYTES 564
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#define SIDH_BYTES 188
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// SECURITY NOTE: SIDH supports ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange. It is NOT secure to use it with static keys.
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// See "On the Security of Supersingular Isogeny Cryptosystems", S.D. Galbraith, C. Petit, B. Shani and Y.B. Ti, in ASIACRYPT 2016, 2016.
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// Extended version available at: http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/859
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// Generation of Alice's secret key
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// Outputs random value in [0, 2^372 - 1] to be used as Alice's private key
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void random_mod_order_A_SIDHp751(unsigned char* random_digits);
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// Generation of Bob's secret key
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// Outputs random value in [0, 2^Floor(Log(2,3^239)) - 1] to be used as Bob's private key
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void random_mod_order_B_SIDHp751(unsigned char* random_digits);
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// Alice's ephemeral public key generation
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// Input: a private key PrivateKeyA in the range [0, 2^372 - 1], stored in 47 bytes.
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// Output: the public key PublicKeyA consisting of 3 GF(p751^2) elements encoded in 564 bytes.
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int EphemeralKeyGeneration_A_SIDHp751(const unsigned char* PrivateKeyA, unsigned char* PublicKeyA);
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// Bob's ephemeral key-pair generation
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// It produces a private key PrivateKeyB and computes the public key PublicKeyB.
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// The private key is an integer in the range [0, 2^Floor(Log(2,3^239)) - 1], stored in 48 bytes.
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// The public key consists of 3 GF(p751^2) elements encoded in 564 bytes.
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int EphemeralKeyGeneration_B_SIDHp751(const unsigned char* PrivateKeyB, unsigned char* PublicKeyB);
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// Alice's ephemeral shared secret computation
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// It produces a shared secret key SharedSecretA using her secret key PrivateKeyA and Bob's public key PublicKeyB
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// Inputs: Alice's PrivateKeyA is an integer in the range [0, 2^372 - 1], stored in 47 bytes.
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// Bob's PublicKeyB consists of 3 GF(p751^2) elements encoded in 564 bytes.
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// Output: a shared secret SharedSecretA that consists of one element in GF(p751^2) encoded in 188 bytes.
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int EphemeralSecretAgreement_A_SIDHp751(const unsigned char* PrivateKeyA, const unsigned char* PublicKeyB, unsigned char* SharedSecretA);
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// Bob's ephemeral shared secret computation
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// It produces a shared secret key SharedSecretB using his secret key PrivateKeyB and Alice's public key PublicKeyA
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// Inputs: Bob's PrivateKeyB is an integer in the range [0, 2^Floor(Log(2,3^239)) - 1], stored in 48 bytes.
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// Alice's PublicKeyA consists of 3 GF(p751^2) elements encoded in 564 bytes.
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// Output: a shared secret SharedSecretB that consists of one element in GF(p751^2) encoded in 188 bytes.
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int EphemeralSecretAgreement_B_SIDHp751(const unsigned char* PrivateKeyB, const unsigned char* PublicKeyA, unsigned char* SharedSecretB);
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// Encoding of keys for KEX-based isogeny system "SIDHp751" (wire format):
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// ----------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Elements over GF(p751) are encoded in 94 octets in little endian format (i.e., the least significant octet is located in the lowest memory address).
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// Elements (a+b*i) over GF(p751^2), where a and b are defined over GF(p751), are encoded as {a, b}, with a in the lowest memory portion.
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//
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// Private keys PrivateKeyA and PrivateKeyB can have values in the range [0, 2^372-1] and [0, 2^378-1], resp. In the SIDH API, private keys are encoded
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// in 48 octets in little endian format.
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// Public keys PublicKeyA and PublicKeyB consist of 3 elements in GF(p751^2). In the SIDH API, they are encoded in 564 octets.
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// Shared keys SharedSecretA and SharedSecretB consist of one element in GF(p751^2). In the SIDH API, they are encoded in 188 octets.
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#endif
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BIN
msr/lib/libsidh751.a
Normal file
BIN
msr/lib/libsidh751.a
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Binary file not shown.
329
src/runner.go
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329
src/runner.go
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package main
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/*
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#cgo CFLAGS: -I../msr/include
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#cgo LDFLAGS: -L../msr/lib -lsidh751
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#include <P751_api.h>
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*/
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import "C"
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import "fmt"
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import rand "crypto/rand"
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import sidh "github.com/henrydcase/nobs/dh/sidh"
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import sike "github.com/henrydcase/nobs/kem/sike"
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import "unsafe"
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const (
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CSKsz = 644
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GSKsz = 80 // 80 because MSR concatenates public key to the secret key
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PKsz = 564
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CTsz = 596
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SSsz = 24
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)
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// Helpers for byte convertion
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func convBytesGoToC(goBytes []byte, cBytes []C.uchar) {
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for i,v:=range(goBytes) {
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cBytes[i] = C.uchar(v)
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}
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}
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func convBytesCToGo(cBytes []C.uchar, goBytes []byte) {
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goBytes=C.GoBytes(unsafe.Pointer(&cBytes[0]), GSKsz)
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}
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// Helpers for key generation
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func keygenMsr() (*sidh.PublicKey, *sidh.PrivateKey) {
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var prvKey = sidh.NewPrivateKey(sidh.FP_751, sidh.KeyVariant_SIKE)
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var pubKey = sidh.NewPublicKey(sidh.FP_751, sidh.KeyVariant_SIKE)
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var msrPK [PKsz]C.uchar
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var msrSK [CSKsz]C.uchar
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if C.crypto_kem_keypair_SIKEp751(&msrPK[0], &msrSK[0]) != 0 {
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panic(0)
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}
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if prvKey.Import(C.GoBytes(unsafe.Pointer(&msrSK[0]), GSKsz)) != nil {
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panic(0)
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}
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if pubKey.Import(C.GoBytes(unsafe.Pointer(&msrPK[0]), PKsz)) != nil {
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panic(0)
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}
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return pubKey, prvKey
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}
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func keygenCf() (*sidh.PublicKey, *sidh.PrivateKey) {
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var prvKey = sidh.NewPrivateKey(sidh.FP_751, sidh.KeyVariant_SIKE)
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err := prvKey.Generate(rand.Reader)
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if err!=nil {
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fmt.Errorf("ERR: Generate private key for CF failed")
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}
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pubKey, _ := sidh.GeneratePublicKey(prvKey)
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return pubKey,prvKey
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}
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// MSR keygen
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// MSR Encapsulate
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// CF Decapsulate
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func test_msrK_msrE_cfD() {
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var msrCipherText [CTsz]C.uchar
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var ss2 [SSsz]C.uchar
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var msrSK [CSKsz]C.uchar
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pubKey, prvKey := keygenMsr()
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ctext, ss1, err := sike.Encapsulate(rand.Reader, pubKey)
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if err != nil {
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panic(0)
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}
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for i,_:=range(ctext) {
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msrCipherText[i] = C.uchar(ctext[i])
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}
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convBytesGoToC(prvKey.Export(), msrSK[:])
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convBytesGoToC(pubKey.Export(), msrSK[80:])
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if C.crypto_kem_dec_SIKEp751(&msrSK[0], &msrCipherText[0], &ss2[0]) != 0 {
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panic(0)
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}
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for _,i:=range(ss2) {
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if byte(ss2[i]) != ss1[i] {
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fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(ss2), ss2)
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// fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(ss1), ss1)
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fmt.Println("ERR: shared secrets differ")
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break
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}
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}
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}
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// CF keygen
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// CF Encapsulate
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// MSR Decapsulate
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func test_cfK_cfE_msrD() {
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// C variables
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var cSS [SSsz]C.uchar
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var cCT [CTsz]C.uchar
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var cPK [PKsz]C.uchar
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var cSK [CSKsz]C.uchar
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pubKey, prvKey := keygenCf()
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convBytesGoToC(pubKey.Export(), cPK[:])
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gCT, gSS, err := sike.Encapsulate(rand.Reader, pubKey)
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if err != nil {
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panic("err: SIKE CF encapsulation")
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}
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convBytesGoToC(gCT[:], cCT[:])
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convBytesGoToC(prvKey.Export(), cSK[:])
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convBytesGoToC(pubKey.Export(), cSK[80:])
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if C.crypto_kem_dec_SIKEp751(&cSS[0], &cCT[0], &cSK[0]) != 0 {
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panic("Decapsulation failed")
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}
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for i,_:=range(gSS) {
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if gSS[i] != byte(cSS[i]) {
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fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(gSS), gSS)
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fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(cSS), cSS)
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fmt.Println("ERR: shared secrets differ")
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break
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}
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}
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}
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// CF keygen
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// MSR Encapsulate
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// CF Decapsulate
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func test_cfK_msrE_cfD() {
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// C variables
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var cSS [SSsz]C.uchar
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var cCT [CTsz]C.uchar
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var cPK [PKsz]C.uchar
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// GO variables
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var gCT [CTsz]byte
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pubKey, prvKey := keygenCf()
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convBytesGoToC(pubKey.Export(), cPK[:])
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C.crypto_kem_enc_SIKEp751(&cCT[0], &cSS[0], &cPK[0])
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convBytesCToGo(cCT[:], gCT[:])
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gSS, err := sike.Decapsulate(prvKey, pubKey, gCT[:])
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if err != nil {
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panic("Decapsulation failed")
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|
}
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for i,_:=range(gSS) {
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if gSS[i] != byte(cSS[i]) {
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|
fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(gSS), gSS)
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fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(cSS), cSS)
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fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(gCT), gCT)
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fmt.Println("ERR: shared secrets differ")
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|
break
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||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
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||||||
|
}
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|
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|
func test_cfK_msrK_msrD() {
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// C variables
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var cSS [SSsz]C.uchar
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var cSS2 [SSsz]C.uchar
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var cCT [CTsz]C.uchar
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var cPK [PKsz]C.uchar
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var cSK [CSKsz]C.uchar
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// GO variables
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pubKey, prvKey := keygenCf()
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|
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convBytesGoToC(pubKey.Export(), cPK[:])
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C.crypto_kem_enc_SIKEp751(&cCT[0], &cSS[0], &cPK[0])
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||||||
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convBytesGoToC(prvKey.Export(), cSK[:])
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convBytesGoToC(pubKey.Export(), cSK[80:])
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|
C.crypto_kem_dec_SIKEp751(&cSS2[0], &cCT[0], &cSK[0])
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|
for i,_:=range(cSS) {
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|
if cSS[i] != cSS2[i] {//gSS[i] != byte(cSS[i]) {
|
||||||
|
fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(cSS2), cSS2)
|
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|
fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(cSS), cSS)
|
||||||
|
fmt.Println("ERR: shared secrets differ")
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
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|
// MSR keygen
|
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// CF Encapsulate
|
||||||
|
// MSR Decapsulate
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|
func test_msrK_cfE_msrD() {
|
||||||
|
var cCT [CTsz]C.uchar
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||||||
|
var cSS [SSsz]C.uchar
|
||||||
|
var cSK [CSKsz]C.uchar
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
pubKey, prvKey := keygenMsr()
|
||||||
|
gCT, gSS, err := sike.Encapsulate(rand.Reader, pubKey)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
panic(0)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
convBytesGoToC(gCT, cCT[:])
|
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|
convBytesGoToC(prvKey.Export(), cSK[:])
|
||||||
|
convBytesGoToC(pubKey.Export(), cSK[80:])
|
||||||
|
if C.crypto_kem_dec_SIKEp751(&cSS[0], &cCT[0], &cSK[0]) != 0 {
|
||||||
|
panic(0)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
for i:=0; i<SSsz; i++ {
|
||||||
|
if byte(cSS[i]) != gSS[i] {
|
||||||
|
fmt.Println("ERR: shared secrets differ")
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// MSR keygen
|
||||||
|
// MSR Encapsulate
|
||||||
|
// CF Decapsulate
|
||||||
|
func test_msrK_msrK_cfD() {
|
||||||
|
// C variables
|
||||||
|
var cSS [SSsz]C.uchar
|
||||||
|
var cCT [CTsz]C.uchar
|
||||||
|
var cPK [PKsz]C.uchar
|
||||||
|
var cSK [CSKsz]C.uchar
|
||||||
|
var gCT [CTsz]byte
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// GO variables
|
||||||
|
pubKey, prvKey := keygenMsr()
|
||||||
|
convBytesGoToC(prvKey.Export(), cSK[:])
|
||||||
|
convBytesGoToC(pubKey.Export(), cSK[80:])
|
||||||
|
convBytesGoToC(pubKey.Export(), cPK[:])
|
||||||
|
C.crypto_kem_enc_SIKEp751(&cCT[0], &cSS[0], &cPK[0])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
convBytesCToGo(cCT[:], gCT[:])
|
||||||
|
gSS, err := sike.Decapsulate(prvKey, pubKey, gCT[:])
|
||||||
|
if err!=nil {
|
||||||
|
panic(0)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
for i,_:=range(cSS) {
|
||||||
|
if byte(cSS[i]) != gSS[i] {
|
||||||
|
fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(gSS), gSS)
|
||||||
|
fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(cSS), cSS)
|
||||||
|
fmt.Println("ERR: shared secrets differ")
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// MSR keygen
|
||||||
|
// CF Encapsulate
|
||||||
|
// CF Decapsulate
|
||||||
|
func test_msrK_cfE_cfD() {
|
||||||
|
pubKey, prvKey := keygenMsr()
|
||||||
|
gCT, gSS1, err := sike.Encapsulate(rand.Reader, pubKey)
|
||||||
|
if err != nil {
|
||||||
|
panic("err: SIKE CF encapsulation")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
gSS2, err := sike.Decapsulate(prvKey, pubKey, gCT)
|
||||||
|
if err!=nil || len(gSS1) != len(gSS2) {
|
||||||
|
panic("Decapsulation failed")
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for i,_:=range(gSS1) {
|
||||||
|
if gSS1[i] != gSS2[i] {
|
||||||
|
fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(gSS1), gSS1)
|
||||||
|
fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(gSS2), gSS2)
|
||||||
|
fmt.Println("ERR: shared secrets differ")
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// For CGO testing really
|
||||||
|
// ----------------------
|
||||||
|
func test_msrK_msrK_msrD() {
|
||||||
|
// C variables
|
||||||
|
var cSS [SSsz]C.uchar
|
||||||
|
var cSS2 [SSsz]C.uchar
|
||||||
|
var cCT [CTsz]C.uchar
|
||||||
|
var cPK [PKsz]C.uchar
|
||||||
|
var cSK [CSKsz]C.uchar
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// GO variables
|
||||||
|
pubKey, prvKey := keygenMsr()
|
||||||
|
convBytesGoToC(prvKey.Export(), cSK[:])
|
||||||
|
convBytesGoToC(pubKey.Export(), cSK[80:])
|
||||||
|
convBytesGoToC(pubKey.Export(), cPK[:])
|
||||||
|
C.crypto_kem_enc_SIKEp751(&cCT[0], &cSS[0], &cPK[0])
|
||||||
|
C.crypto_kem_dec_SIKEp751(&cSS2[0], &cCT[0], &cSK[0])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
for i,_:=range(cSS) {
|
||||||
|
if cSS[i] != cSS2[i] {
|
||||||
|
fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(cSS2), cSS2)
|
||||||
|
fmt.Printf("LEN=%d %X\n", len(cSS), cSS)
|
||||||
|
fmt.Println("ERR: shared secrets differ")
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func debug() {
|
||||||
|
// fmt.Println("MSR+MSR+MSR")
|
||||||
|
// test_msrK_msrK_msrD()
|
||||||
|
// fmt.Println("CF+MSR+CF")
|
||||||
|
// test_cfK_msrE_cfD()
|
||||||
|
// fmt.Println("MSR+CF+MSR")
|
||||||
|
// test_msrK_cfE_msrD()
|
||||||
|
// fmt.Println("MSR+MSR+CF")
|
||||||
|
// test_msrK_msrK_cfD()
|
||||||
|
// fmt.Println("MSR+CF+CF")
|
||||||
|
// test_msrK_cfE_cfD()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
fmt.Println("CF+CF+MSR")
|
||||||
|
test_cfK_cfE_msrD()
|
||||||
|
fmt.Println("CF+MSR+MSR")
|
||||||
|
test_cfK_msrK_msrD()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
func main() {
|
||||||
|
for i:=0; i<1000; i++ {
|
||||||
|
debug()
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user