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crypto/tls: rework reference tests. The practice of storing reference connections for testing has worked reasonably well, but the large blocks of literal data in the .go files is ugly and updating the tests is a real problem because their number has grown. This CL changes the way that reference tests work. It's now possible to automatically update the tests and the test data is now stored in testdata/. This should make it easier to implement changes that affect all connections, like implementing the renegotiation extension. R=golang-codereviews, r CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/42060044
2013-12-20 16:37:05 +00:00
>>> Flow 1 (client to server)
crypto/tls: decouple handshake signatures from the handshake hash. Prior to TLS 1.2, the handshake had a pleasing property that one could incrementally hash it and, from that, get the needed hashes for both the CertificateVerify and Finished messages. TLS 1.2 introduced negotiation for the signature and hash and it became possible for the handshake hash to be, say, SHA-384, but for the CertificateVerify to sign the handshake with SHA-1. The problem is that one doesn't know in advance which hashes will be needed and thus the handshake needs to be buffered. Go ignored this, always kept a single handshake hash, and any signatures over the handshake had to use that hash. However, there are a set of servers that inspect the client's offered signature hash functions and will abort the handshake if one of the server's certificates is signed with a hash function outside of that set. https://robertsspaceindustries.com/ is an example of such a server. Clearly not a lot of thought happened when that server code was written, but its out there and we have to deal with it. This change decouples the handshake hash from the CertificateVerify hash. This lays the groundwork for advertising support for SHA-384 but doesn't actually make that change in the interests of reviewability. Updating the advertised hash functions will cause changes in many of the testdata/ files and some errors might get lost in the noise. This change only needs to update four testdata/ files: one because a SHA-384-based handshake is now being signed with SHA-256 and the others because the TLS 1.2 CertificateRequest message now includes SHA-1. This change also has the effect of adding support for client-certificates in SSLv3 servers. However, SSLv3 is now disabled by default so this should be moot. It would be possible to avoid much of this change and just support SHA-384 for the ServerKeyExchange as the SKX only signs over the nonces and SKX params (a design mistake in TLS). However, that would leave Go in the odd situation where it advertised support for SHA-384, but would only use the handshake hash when signing client certificates. I fear that'll just cause problems in the future. Much of this code was written by davidben@ for the purposes of testing BoringSSL. Partly addresses #9757 Change-Id: I5137a472b6076812af387a5a69fc62c7373cd485 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/9415 Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-04-28 17:13:38 +01:00
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00000040 02 06 03 05 01 05 02 05 03 04 01 04 02 04 03 03 |................|
00000050 01 03 02 03 03 02 01 02 02 02 03 00 0f 00 01 01 |................|
crypto/tls: rework reference tests. The practice of storing reference connections for testing has worked reasonably well, but the large blocks of literal data in the .go files is ugly and updating the tests is a real problem because their number has grown. This CL changes the way that reference tests work. It's now possible to automatically update the tests and the test data is now stored in testdata/. This should make it easier to implement changes that affect all connections, like implementing the renegotiation extension. R=golang-codereviews, r CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/42060044
2013-12-20 16:37:05 +00:00
>>> Flow 2 (server to client)
crypto/tls: support renegotiation extension. The renegotiation extension was introduced[1] due to an attack by Ray in which a client's handshake was spliced into a connection that was renegotiating, thus giving an attacker the ability to inject an arbitary prefix into the connection. Go has never supported renegotiation as a server and so this attack doesn't apply. As a client, it's possible that at some point in the future the population of servers will be sufficiently updated that it'll be possible to reject connections where the server hasn't demonstrated that it has been updated to address this problem. We're not at that point yet, but it's good for Go servers to support the extension so that it might be possible to do in the future. [1] https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc5746 R=golang-codereviews, mikioh.mikioh CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/48580043
2014-01-09 18:38:11 +00:00
00000000 16 03 03 00 31 02 00 00 2d 03 03 00 00 00 00 00 |....1...-.......|
crypto/tls: rework reference tests. The practice of storing reference connections for testing has worked reasonably well, but the large blocks of literal data in the .go files is ugly and updating the tests is a real problem because their number has grown. This CL changes the way that reference tests work. It's now possible to automatically update the tests and the test data is now stored in testdata/. This should make it easier to implement changes that affect all connections, like implementing the renegotiation extension. R=golang-codereviews, r CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/42060044
2013-12-20 16:37:05 +00:00
00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
crypto/tls: support renegotiation extension. The renegotiation extension was introduced[1] due to an attack by Ray in which a client's handshake was spliced into a connection that was renegotiating, thus giving an attacker the ability to inject an arbitary prefix into the connection. Go has never supported renegotiation as a server and so this attack doesn't apply. As a client, it's possible that at some point in the future the population of servers will be sufficiently updated that it'll be possible to reject connections where the server hasn't demonstrated that it has been updated to address this problem. We're not at that point yet, but it's good for Go servers to support the extension so that it might be possible to do in the future. [1] https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc5746 R=golang-codereviews, mikioh.mikioh CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/48580043
2014-01-09 18:38:11 +00:00
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crypto/tls: decouple handshake signatures from the handshake hash. Prior to TLS 1.2, the handshake had a pleasing property that one could incrementally hash it and, from that, get the needed hashes for both the CertificateVerify and Finished messages. TLS 1.2 introduced negotiation for the signature and hash and it became possible for the handshake hash to be, say, SHA-384, but for the CertificateVerify to sign the handshake with SHA-1. The problem is that one doesn't know in advance which hashes will be needed and thus the handshake needs to be buffered. Go ignored this, always kept a single handshake hash, and any signatures over the handshake had to use that hash. However, there are a set of servers that inspect the client's offered signature hash functions and will abort the handshake if one of the server's certificates is signed with a hash function outside of that set. https://robertsspaceindustries.com/ is an example of such a server. Clearly not a lot of thought happened when that server code was written, but its out there and we have to deal with it. This change decouples the handshake hash from the CertificateVerify hash. This lays the groundwork for advertising support for SHA-384 but doesn't actually make that change in the interests of reviewability. Updating the advertised hash functions will cause changes in many of the testdata/ files and some errors might get lost in the noise. This change only needs to update four testdata/ files: one because a SHA-384-based handshake is now being signed with SHA-256 and the others because the TLS 1.2 CertificateRequest message now includes SHA-1. This change also has the effect of adding support for client-certificates in SSLv3 servers. However, SSLv3 is now disabled by default so this should be moot. It would be possible to avoid much of this change and just support SHA-384 for the ServerKeyExchange as the SKX only signs over the nonces and SKX params (a design mistake in TLS). However, that would leave Go in the odd situation where it advertised support for SHA-384, but would only use the handshake hash when signing client certificates. I fear that'll just cause problems in the future. Much of this code was written by davidben@ for the purposes of testing BoringSSL. Partly addresses #9757 Change-Id: I5137a472b6076812af387a5a69fc62c7373cd485 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/9415 Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-04-28 17:13:38 +01:00
000002f0 6e 38 50 29 6c 90 a7 bd d9 16 03 03 00 13 0d 00 |n8P)l...........|
00000300 00 0f 02 01 40 00 08 04 01 04 03 02 01 02 03 00 |....@...........|
00000310 00 16 03 03 00 04 0e 00 00 00 |..........|
crypto/tls: rework reference tests. The practice of storing reference connections for testing has worked reasonably well, but the large blocks of literal data in the .go files is ugly and updating the tests is a real problem because their number has grown. This CL changes the way that reference tests work. It's now possible to automatically update the tests and the test data is now stored in testdata/. This should make it easier to implement changes that affect all connections, like implementing the renegotiation extension. R=golang-codereviews, r CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/42060044
2013-12-20 16:37:05 +00:00
>>> Flow 3 (client to server)
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00000010 82 01 ed 30 82 01 58 a0 03 02 01 02 02 01 00 30 |...0..X........0|
00000020 0b 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 05 30 26 31 10 |...*.H......0&1.|
00000030 30 0e 06 03 55 04 0a 13 07 41 63 6d 65 20 43 6f |0...U....Acme Co|
00000040 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 03 13 09 31 32 37 2e 30 |1.0...U....127.0|
00000050 2e 30 2e 31 30 1e 17 0d 31 31 31 32 30 38 30 37 |.0.10...11120807|
00000060 35 35 31 32 5a 17 0d 31 32 31 32 30 37 30 38 30 |5512Z..121207080|
00000070 30 31 32 5a 30 26 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 0a 13 |012Z0&1.0...U...|
00000080 07 41 63 6d 65 20 43 6f 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 |.Acme Co1.0...U.|
00000090 03 13 09 31 32 37 2e 30 2e 30 2e 31 30 81 9c 30 |...127.0.0.10..0|
000000a0 0b 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 03 81 8c 00 |...*.H..........|
000000b0 30 81 88 02 81 80 4e d0 7b 31 e3 82 64 d9 59 c0 |0.....N.{1..d.Y.|
000000c0 c2 87 a4 5e 1e 8b 73 33 c7 63 53 df 66 92 06 84 |...^..s3.cS.f...|
000000d0 f6 64 d5 8f e4 36 a7 1d 2b e8 b3 20 36 45 23 b5 |.d...6..+.. 6E#.|
000000e0 e3 95 ae ed e0 f5 20 9c 8d 95 df 7f 5a 12 ef 87 |...... .....Z...|
000000f0 e4 5b 68 e4 e9 0e 74 ec 04 8a 7f de 93 27 c4 01 |.[h...t......'..|
00000100 19 7a bd f2 dc 3d 14 ab d0 54 ca 21 0c d0 4d 6e |.z...=...T.!..Mn|
00000110 87 2e 5c c5 d2 bb 4d 4b 4f ce b6 2c f7 7e 88 ec |..\...MKO..,.~..|
00000120 7c d7 02 91 74 a6 1e 0c 1a da e3 4a 5a 2e de 13 ||...t......JZ...|
00000130 9c 4c 40 88 59 93 02 03 01 00 01 a3 32 30 30 30 |.L@.Y.......2000|
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000001e0 d3 1d fc 06 f1 0e e5 96 a8 0c f9 78 20 b7 44 18 |...........x .D.|
000001f0 51 8d 10 7e 4f 94 67 df a3 4e 70 73 8e 90 91 85 |Q..~O.g..Nps....|
crypto/tls: decouple handshake signatures from the handshake hash. Prior to TLS 1.2, the handshake had a pleasing property that one could incrementally hash it and, from that, get the needed hashes for both the CertificateVerify and Finished messages. TLS 1.2 introduced negotiation for the signature and hash and it became possible for the handshake hash to be, say, SHA-384, but for the CertificateVerify to sign the handshake with SHA-1. The problem is that one doesn't know in advance which hashes will be needed and thus the handshake needs to be buffered. Go ignored this, always kept a single handshake hash, and any signatures over the handshake had to use that hash. However, there are a set of servers that inspect the client's offered signature hash functions and will abort the handshake if one of the server's certificates is signed with a hash function outside of that set. https://robertsspaceindustries.com/ is an example of such a server. Clearly not a lot of thought happened when that server code was written, but its out there and we have to deal with it. This change decouples the handshake hash from the CertificateVerify hash. This lays the groundwork for advertising support for SHA-384 but doesn't actually make that change in the interests of reviewability. Updating the advertised hash functions will cause changes in many of the testdata/ files and some errors might get lost in the noise. This change only needs to update four testdata/ files: one because a SHA-384-based handshake is now being signed with SHA-256 and the others because the TLS 1.2 CertificateRequest message now includes SHA-1. This change also has the effect of adding support for client-certificates in SSLv3 servers. However, SSLv3 is now disabled by default so this should be moot. It would be possible to avoid much of this change and just support SHA-384 for the ServerKeyExchange as the SKX only signs over the nonces and SKX params (a design mistake in TLS). However, that would leave Go in the odd situation where it advertised support for SHA-384, but would only use the handshake hash when signing client certificates. I fear that'll just cause problems in the future. Much of this code was written by davidben@ for the purposes of testing BoringSSL. Partly addresses #9757 Change-Id: I5137a472b6076812af387a5a69fc62c7373cd485 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/9415 Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-04-28 17:13:38 +01:00
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00000290 0f 00 00 84 04 01 00 80 0f 8a 5c 80 aa 8e d3 c9 |..........\.....|
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00000340 55 a0 92 c2 08 72 1c |U....r.|
crypto/tls: rework reference tests. The practice of storing reference connections for testing has worked reasonably well, but the large blocks of literal data in the .go files is ugly and updating the tests is a real problem because their number has grown. This CL changes the way that reference tests work. It's now possible to automatically update the tests and the test data is now stored in testdata/. This should make it easier to implement changes that affect all connections, like implementing the renegotiation extension. R=golang-codereviews, r CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/42060044
2013-12-20 16:37:05 +00:00
>>> Flow 4 (server to client)
crypto/tls: decouple handshake signatures from the handshake hash. Prior to TLS 1.2, the handshake had a pleasing property that one could incrementally hash it and, from that, get the needed hashes for both the CertificateVerify and Finished messages. TLS 1.2 introduced negotiation for the signature and hash and it became possible for the handshake hash to be, say, SHA-384, but for the CertificateVerify to sign the handshake with SHA-1. The problem is that one doesn't know in advance which hashes will be needed and thus the handshake needs to be buffered. Go ignored this, always kept a single handshake hash, and any signatures over the handshake had to use that hash. However, there are a set of servers that inspect the client's offered signature hash functions and will abort the handshake if one of the server's certificates is signed with a hash function outside of that set. https://robertsspaceindustries.com/ is an example of such a server. Clearly not a lot of thought happened when that server code was written, but its out there and we have to deal with it. This change decouples the handshake hash from the CertificateVerify hash. This lays the groundwork for advertising support for SHA-384 but doesn't actually make that change in the interests of reviewability. Updating the advertised hash functions will cause changes in many of the testdata/ files and some errors might get lost in the noise. This change only needs to update four testdata/ files: one because a SHA-384-based handshake is now being signed with SHA-256 and the others because the TLS 1.2 CertificateRequest message now includes SHA-1. This change also has the effect of adding support for client-certificates in SSLv3 servers. However, SSLv3 is now disabled by default so this should be moot. It would be possible to avoid much of this change and just support SHA-384 for the ServerKeyExchange as the SKX only signs over the nonces and SKX params (a design mistake in TLS). However, that would leave Go in the odd situation where it advertised support for SHA-384, but would only use the handshake hash when signing client certificates. I fear that'll just cause problems in the future. Much of this code was written by davidben@ for the purposes of testing BoringSSL. Partly addresses #9757 Change-Id: I5137a472b6076812af387a5a69fc62c7373cd485 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/9415 Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-04-28 17:13:38 +01:00
00000000 14 03 03 00 01 01 16 03 03 00 24 4e b8 9c fd 56 |..........$N...V|
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00000020 f8 92 09 09 0f ea 04 08 e8 14 e1 8a 0b f8 23 17 |..............#.|
00000030 03 03 00 21 1f 22 bc 5a ce d7 5e ca c4 d3 be f5 |...!.".Z..^.....|
00000040 d4 f6 4e b9 aa 10 be d3 b6 a9 ad 3e f5 f6 69 fd |..N........>..i.|
00000050 23 a8 cd e2 4d 15 03 03 00 16 29 1d 72 73 aa 62 |#...M.....).rs.b|
00000060 c7 ac 8b 19 8f 72 27 b2 12 ac ce 72 2c c4 47 19 |.....r'....r,.G.|
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