2013-12-20 16:37:05 +00:00
|
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|
>>> Flow 1 (client to server)
|
2015-02-04 00:15:18 +00:00
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00000000 16 03 01 00 79 01 00 00 75 03 03 00 00 00 00 00 |....y...u.......|
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2013-12-20 16:37:05 +00:00
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00000010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................|
|
2015-02-04 00:15:18 +00:00
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00000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 1e c0 2f |.............../|
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00000030 c0 2b c0 30 c0 2c c0 11 c0 07 c0 13 c0 09 c0 14 |.+.0.,..........|
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00000040 c0 0a 00 05 00 2f 00 35 c0 12 00 0a 01 00 00 2e |...../.5........|
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00000050 00 05 00 05 01 00 00 00 00 00 0a 00 08 00 06 00 |................|
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00000060 17 00 18 00 19 00 0b 00 02 01 00 00 0d 00 0a 00 |................|
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00000070 08 04 01 04 03 02 01 02 03 ff 01 00 01 00 |..............|
|
2013-12-20 16:37:05 +00:00
|
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>>> Flow 2 (server to client)
|
2015-02-04 00:15:18 +00:00
|
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00000000 16 03 03 00 51 02 00 00 4d 03 03 7a 6c c2 d1 69 |....Q...M..zl..i|
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00000010 af 86 6f 03 3c e4 70 ae 03 39 fd c6 3a a9 a4 b2 |..o.<.p..9..:...|
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00000020 96 1e 50 f2 f4 16 50 e4 a2 f2 41 20 f8 83 3b 45 |..P...P...A ..;E|
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00000030 0d 5b 88 bc 87 6c 81 23 e3 1d e0 7e 22 f5 6d 95 |.[...l.#...~".m.|
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00000040 58 63 39 cf 4f 80 80 cc 41 bb b1 4c 00 05 00 00 |Xc9.O...A..L....|
|
2014-01-09 18:38:11 +00:00
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00000050 05 ff 01 00 01 00 16 03 03 02 be 0b 00 02 ba 00 |................|
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00000060 02 b7 00 02 b4 30 82 02 b0 30 82 02 19 a0 03 02 |.....0...0......|
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00000070 01 02 02 09 00 85 b0 bb a4 8a 7f b8 ca 30 0d 06 |.............0..|
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00000080 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 05 05 00 30 45 31 0b |.*.H........0E1.|
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00000090 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 41 55 31 13 30 11 06 |0...U....AU1.0..|
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000000a0 03 55 04 08 13 0a 53 6f 6d 65 2d 53 74 61 74 65 |.U....Some-State|
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000000b0 31 21 30 1f 06 03 55 04 0a 13 18 49 6e 74 65 72 |1!0...U....Inter|
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000000c0 6e 65 74 20 57 69 64 67 69 74 73 20 50 74 79 20 |net Widgits Pty |
|
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000000d0 4c 74 64 30 1e 17 0d 31 30 30 34 32 34 30 39 30 |Ltd0...100424090|
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000000e0 39 33 38 5a 17 0d 31 31 30 34 32 34 30 39 30 39 |938Z..1104240909|
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000000f0 33 38 5a 30 45 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 |38Z0E1.0...U....|
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00000100 41 55 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 08 13 0a 53 6f 6d |AU1.0...U....Som|
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00000110 65 2d 53 74 61 74 65 31 21 30 1f 06 03 55 04 0a |e-State1!0...U..|
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00000120 13 18 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 20 57 69 64 67 69 |..Internet Widgi|
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00000130 74 73 20 50 74 79 20 4c 74 64 30 81 9f 30 0d 06 |ts Pty Ltd0..0..|
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00000140 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 81 8d 00 |.*.H............|
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00000150 30 81 89 02 81 81 00 bb 79 d6 f5 17 b5 e5 bf 46 |0.......y......F|
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00000160 10 d0 dc 69 be e6 2b 07 43 5a d0 03 2d 8a 7a 43 |...i..+.CZ..-.zC|
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00000170 85 b7 14 52 e7 a5 65 4c 2c 78 b8 23 8c b5 b4 82 |...R..eL,x.#....|
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00000180 e5 de 1f 95 3b 7e 62 a5 2c a5 33 d6 fe 12 5c 7a |....;~b.,.3...\z|
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00000190 56 fc f5 06 bf fa 58 7b 26 3f b5 cd 04 d3 d0 c9 |V.....X{&?......|
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000001a0 21 96 4a c7 f4 54 9f 5a bf ef 42 71 00 fe 18 99 |!.J..T.Z..Bq....|
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000001b0 07 7f 7e 88 7d 7d f1 04 39 c4 a2 2e db 51 c9 7c |..~.}}..9....Q.||
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000001c0 e3 c0 4c 3b 32 66 01 cf af b1 1d b8 71 9a 1d db |..L;2f......q...|
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000001d0 db 89 6b ae da 2d 79 02 03 01 00 01 a3 81 a7 30 |..k..-y........0|
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000001e0 81 a4 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e 04 16 04 14 b1 ad e2 |..0...U.........|
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000001f0 85 5a cf cb 28 db 69 ce 23 69 de d3 26 8e 18 88 |.Z..(.i.#i..&...|
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00000200 39 30 75 06 03 55 1d 23 04 6e 30 6c 80 14 b1 ad |90u..U.#.n0l....|
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00000210 e2 85 5a cf cb 28 db 69 ce 23 69 de d3 26 8e 18 |..Z..(.i.#i..&..|
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00000220 88 39 a1 49 a4 47 30 45 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 |.9.I.G0E1.0...U.|
|
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00000230 06 13 02 41 55 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 08 13 0a |...AU1.0...U....|
|
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|
00000240 53 6f 6d 65 2d 53 74 61 74 65 31 21 30 1f 06 03 |Some-State1!0...|
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00000250 55 04 0a 13 18 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 20 57 69 |U....Internet Wi|
|
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00000260 64 67 69 74 73 20 50 74 79 20 4c 74 64 82 09 00 |dgits Pty Ltd...|
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00000270 85 b0 bb a4 8a 7f b8 ca 30 0c 06 03 55 1d 13 04 |........0...U...|
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00000280 05 30 03 01 01 ff 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d |.0....0...*.H...|
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00000290 01 01 05 05 00 03 81 81 00 08 6c 45 24 c7 6b b1 |..........lE$.k.|
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000002a0 59 ab 0c 52 cc f2 b0 14 d7 87 9d 7a 64 75 b5 5a |Y..R.......zdu.Z|
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000002b0 95 66 e4 c5 2b 8e ae 12 66 1f eb 4f 38 b3 6e 60 |.f..+...f..O8.n`|
|
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|
000002c0 d3 92 fd f7 41 08 b5 25 13 b1 18 7a 24 fb 30 1d |....A..%...z$.0.|
|
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|
000002d0 ba ed 98 b9 17 ec e7 d7 31 59 db 95 d3 1d 78 ea |........1Y....x.|
|
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000002e0 50 56 5c d5 82 5a 2d 5a 5f 33 c4 b6 d8 c9 75 90 |PV\..Z-Z_3....u.|
|
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|
000002f0 96 8c 0f 52 98 b5 cd 98 1f 89 20 5f f2 a0 1c a3 |...R...... _....|
|
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00000300 1b 96 94 dd a9 fd 57 e9 70 e8 26 6d 71 99 9b 26 |......W.p.&mq..&|
|
crypto/ecdsa: make Sign safe with broken entropy sources
ECDSA is unsafe to use if an entropy source produces predictable
output for the ephemeral nonces. E.g., [Nguyen]. A simple
countermeasure is to hash the secret key, the message, and
entropy together to seed a CSPRNG, from which the ephemeral key
is derived.
Fixes #9452
--
This is a minimalist (in terms of patch size) solution, though
not the most parsimonious in its use of primitives:
- csprng_key = ChopMD-256(SHA2-512(priv.D||entropy||hash))
- reader = AES-256-CTR(k=csprng_key)
This, however, provides at most 128-bit collision-resistance,
so that Adv will have a term related to the number of messages
signed that is significantly worse than plain ECDSA. This does
not seem to be of any practical importance.
ChopMD-256(SHA2-512(x)) is used, rather than SHA2-256(x), for
two sets of reasons:
*Practical:* SHA2-512 has a larger state and 16 more rounds; it
is likely non-generically stronger than SHA2-256. And, AFAIK,
cryptanalysis backs this up. (E.g., [Biryukov] gives a
distinguisher on 47-round SHA2-256 with cost < 2^85.) This is
well below a reasonable security-strength target.
*Theoretical:* [Coron] and [Chang] show that Chop-MD(F(x)) is
indifferentiable from a random oracle for slightly beyond the
birthday barrier. It seems likely that this makes a generic
security proof that this construction remains UF-CMA is
possible in the indifferentiability framework.
--
Many thanks to Payman Mohassel for reviewing this construction;
any mistakes are mine, however. And, as he notes, reusing the
private key in this way means that the generic-group (non-RO)
proof of ECDSA's security given in [Brown] no longer directly
applies.
--
[Brown]: http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2000/corr2000-54.ps
"Brown. The exact security of ECDSA. 2000"
[Coron]: https://www.cs.nyu.edu/~puniya/papers/merkle.pdf
"Coron et al. Merkle-Damgard revisited. 2005"
[Chang]: https://www.iacr.org/archive/fse2008/50860436/50860436.pdf
"Chang and Nandi. Improved indifferentiability security analysis
of chopMD hash function. 2008"
[Biryukov]: http://www.iacr.org/archive/asiacrypt2011/70730269/70730269.pdf
"Biryukov et al. Second-order differential collisions for reduced
SHA-256. 2011"
[Nguyen]: ftp://ftp.di.ens.fr/pub/users/pnguyen/PubECDSA.ps
"Nguyen and Shparlinski. The insecurity of the elliptic curve
digital signature algorithm with partially known nonces. 2003"
New tests:
TestNonceSafety: Check that signatures are safe even with a
broken entropy source.
TestINDCCA: Check that signatures remain non-deterministic
with a functional entropy source.
Updated "golden" KATs in crypto/tls/testdata that use ECDSA suites.
Change-Id: I55337a2fbec2e42a36ce719bd2184793682d678a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/3340
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-01-27 07:00:21 +00:00
|
|
|
00000310 6e 38 50 29 6c 90 a7 bd d9 16 03 03 00 2e 0d 00 |n8P)l...........|
|
|
|
|
|
00000320 00 26 03 01 02 40 00 1e 06 01 06 02 06 03 05 01 |.&...@..........|
|
2014-01-09 18:38:11 +00:00
|
|
|
00000330 05 02 05 03 04 01 04 02 04 03 03 01 03 02 03 03 |................|
|
crypto/ecdsa: make Sign safe with broken entropy sources
ECDSA is unsafe to use if an entropy source produces predictable
output for the ephemeral nonces. E.g., [Nguyen]. A simple
countermeasure is to hash the secret key, the message, and
entropy together to seed a CSPRNG, from which the ephemeral key
is derived.
Fixes #9452
--
This is a minimalist (in terms of patch size) solution, though
not the most parsimonious in its use of primitives:
- csprng_key = ChopMD-256(SHA2-512(priv.D||entropy||hash))
- reader = AES-256-CTR(k=csprng_key)
This, however, provides at most 128-bit collision-resistance,
so that Adv will have a term related to the number of messages
signed that is significantly worse than plain ECDSA. This does
not seem to be of any practical importance.
ChopMD-256(SHA2-512(x)) is used, rather than SHA2-256(x), for
two sets of reasons:
*Practical:* SHA2-512 has a larger state and 16 more rounds; it
is likely non-generically stronger than SHA2-256. And, AFAIK,
cryptanalysis backs this up. (E.g., [Biryukov] gives a
distinguisher on 47-round SHA2-256 with cost < 2^85.) This is
well below a reasonable security-strength target.
*Theoretical:* [Coron] and [Chang] show that Chop-MD(F(x)) is
indifferentiable from a random oracle for slightly beyond the
birthday barrier. It seems likely that this makes a generic
security proof that this construction remains UF-CMA is
possible in the indifferentiability framework.
--
Many thanks to Payman Mohassel for reviewing this construction;
any mistakes are mine, however. And, as he notes, reusing the
private key in this way means that the generic-group (non-RO)
proof of ECDSA's security given in [Brown] no longer directly
applies.
--
[Brown]: http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2000/corr2000-54.ps
"Brown. The exact security of ECDSA. 2000"
[Coron]: https://www.cs.nyu.edu/~puniya/papers/merkle.pdf
"Coron et al. Merkle-Damgard revisited. 2005"
[Chang]: https://www.iacr.org/archive/fse2008/50860436/50860436.pdf
"Chang and Nandi. Improved indifferentiability security analysis
of chopMD hash function. 2008"
[Biryukov]: http://www.iacr.org/archive/asiacrypt2011/70730269/70730269.pdf
"Biryukov et al. Second-order differential collisions for reduced
SHA-256. 2011"
[Nguyen]: ftp://ftp.di.ens.fr/pub/users/pnguyen/PubECDSA.ps
"Nguyen and Shparlinski. The insecurity of the elliptic curve
digital signature algorithm with partially known nonces. 2003"
New tests:
TestNonceSafety: Check that signatures are safe even with a
broken entropy source.
TestINDCCA: Check that signatures remain non-deterministic
with a functional entropy source.
Updated "golden" KATs in crypto/tls/testdata that use ECDSA suites.
Change-Id: I55337a2fbec2e42a36ce719bd2184793682d678a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/3340
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-01-27 07:00:21 +00:00
|
|
|
00000340 02 01 02 02 02 03 00 00 0e 00 00 00 |............|
|
2013-12-20 16:37:05 +00:00
|
|
|
>>> Flow 3 (client to server)
|
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|
00000000 16 03 03 02 0a 0b 00 02 06 00 02 03 00 02 00 30 |...............0|
|
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|
00000010 82 01 fc 30 82 01 5e 02 09 00 9a 30 84 6c 26 35 |...0..^....0.l&5|
|
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00000020 d9 17 30 09 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 30 45 31 |..0...*.H.=..0E1|
|
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00000030 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 41 55 31 13 30 11 |.0...U....AU1.0.|
|
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|
00000040 06 03 55 04 08 13 0a 53 6f 6d 65 2d 53 74 61 74 |..U....Some-Stat|
|
|
|
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|
00000050 65 31 21 30 1f 06 03 55 04 0a 13 18 49 6e 74 65 |e1!0...U....Inte|
|
|
|
|
|
00000060 72 6e 65 74 20 57 69 64 67 69 74 73 20 50 74 79 |rnet Widgits Pty|
|
|
|
|
|
00000070 20 4c 74 64 30 1e 17 0d 31 32 31 31 31 34 31 33 | Ltd0...12111413|
|
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00000080 32 35 35 33 5a 17 0d 32 32 31 31 31 32 31 33 32 |2553Z..221112132|
|
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00000090 35 35 33 5a 30 41 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 |553Z0A1.0...U...|
|
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000000a0 02 41 55 31 0c 30 0a 06 03 55 04 08 13 03 4e 53 |.AU1.0...U....NS|
|
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000000b0 57 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 07 13 07 50 79 72 6d |W1.0...U....Pyrm|
|
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000000c0 6f 6e 74 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 03 13 09 4a 6f |ont1.0...U....Jo|
|
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000000d0 65 6c 20 53 69 6e 67 30 81 9b 30 10 06 07 2a 86 |el Sing0..0...*.|
|
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000000e0 48 ce 3d 02 01 06 05 2b 81 04 00 23 03 81 86 00 |H.=....+...#....|
|
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|
000000f0 04 00 95 8c 91 75 14 c0 5e c4 57 b4 d4 c3 6f 8d |.....u..^.W...o.|
|
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|
00000100 ae 68 1e dd 6f ce 86 e1 7e 6e b2 48 3e 81 e5 4e |.h..o...~n.H>..N|
|
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|
00000110 e2 c6 88 4b 64 dc f5 30 bb d3 ff 65 cc 5b f4 dd |...Kd..0...e.[..|
|
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|
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|
00000120 b5 6a 3e 3e d0 1d de 47 c3 76 ad 19 f6 45 2c 8c |.j>>...G.v...E,.|
|
|
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|
00000130 bc d8 1d 01 4c 1f 70 90 46 76 48 8b 8f 83 cc 4a |....L.p.FvH....J|
|
|
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|
00000140 5c 8f 40 76 da e0 89 ec 1d 2b c4 4e 30 76 28 41 |\.@v.....+.N0v(A|
|
|
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|
00000150 b2 62 a8 fb 5b f1 f9 4e 7a 8d bd 09 b8 ae ea 8b |.b..[..Nz.......|
|
|
|
|
|
00000160 18 27 4f 2e 70 fe 13 96 ba c3 d3 40 16 cd 65 4e |.'O.p......@..eN|
|
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|
00000170 ac 11 1e e6 f1 30 09 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 |.....0...*.H.=..|
|
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00000180 03 81 8c 00 30 81 88 02 42 00 e0 14 c4 60 60 0b |....0...B....``.|
|
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00000190 72 68 b0 32 5d 61 4a 02 74 5c c2 81 b9 16 a8 3f |rh.2]aJ.t\.....?|
|
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000001a0 29 c8 36 c7 81 ff 6c b6 5b d9 70 f1 38 3b 50 48 |).6...l.[.p.8;PH|
|
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000001b0 28 94 cb 09 1a 52 f1 5d ee 8d f2 b9 f0 f0 da d9 |(....R.]........|
|
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000001c0 15 3a f9 bd 03 7a 87 a2 23 35 ec 02 42 01 a3 d4 |.:...z..#5..B...|
|
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000001d0 8a 78 35 1c 4a 9a 23 d2 0a be 2b 10 31 9d 9c 5f |.x5.J.#...+.1.._|
|
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|
000001e0 be e8 91 b3 da 1a f5 5d a3 23 f5 26 8b 45 70 8d |.......].#.&.Ep.|
|
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|
000001f0 65 62 9b 7e 01 99 3d 18 f6 10 9a 38 61 9b 2e 57 |eb.~..=....8a..W|
|
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|
00000200 e4 fa cc b1 8a ce e2 23 a0 87 f0 e1 67 51 eb 16 |.......#....gQ..|
|
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00000210 03 03 00 86 10 00 00 82 00 80 6d 51 f3 7f f9 3e |..........mQ...>|
|
|
|
|
|
00000220 fb 75 82 41 36 83 e8 6a ee 2a 2e 25 90 67 4c 8e |.u.A6..j.*.%.gL.|
|
|
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|
|
00000230 62 2f 30 81 17 e0 85 09 0c 2b b7 23 d7 b0 e2 1d |b/0......+.#....|
|
|
|
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|
00000240 f7 3b d7 f5 a1 27 b6 ee 24 b6 1b cc 5b ea 66 0d |.;...'..$...[.f.|
|
|
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|
00000250 6a f4 e5 85 f9 da 43 b4 0e 86 85 e1 f5 aa be c8 |j.....C.........|
|
|
|
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|
00000260 ce 39 4c 9c 86 00 08 c2 4b e2 c6 ec 2f f7 ce e6 |.9L.....K.../...|
|
|
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|
00000270 bd 77 82 6f 23 b6 e0 bd a2 92 b7 3a ac e8 56 f1 |.w.o#......:..V.|
|
|
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|
|
00000280 af 54 5e 46 87 e9 3b 33 e7 b8 28 b7 d6 c8 90 35 |.T^F..;3..(....5|
|
2015-02-04 00:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
00000290 d4 1c 43 d1 30 6f 55 4e 0a 70 16 03 03 00 93 0f |..C.0oUN.p......|
|
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|
000002a0 00 00 8f 04 03 00 8b 30 81 88 02 42 00 87 a3 50 |.......0...B...P|
|
|
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|
000002b0 77 2a 46 97 68 1e ca 47 d2 46 a3 f7 37 e7 1c 3c |w*F.h..G.F..7..<|
|
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|
000002c0 e3 16 dc b9 93 b9 76 af da 46 b1 da 47 bc 8b 9c |......v..F..G...|
|
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|
000002d0 ff 61 76 45 2b cf a6 85 4a 45 d4 51 98 18 31 c5 |.avE+...JE.Q..1.|
|
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|
000002e0 61 54 3b ae 88 ca 56 ac 90 29 de f2 20 a6 02 42 |aT;...V..).. ..B|
|
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|
000002f0 01 0d 54 c6 a5 14 c2 c0 83 5d ee 32 d3 c6 05 d7 |..T......].2....|
|
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00000300 0c 40 42 ca 8a 69 5e cc 9b f5 c4 9b 7c 81 e9 b7 |.@B..i^.....|...|
|
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|
00000310 dd 01 c0 e5 93 de 75 d2 6b 26 dd 16 2a ec d0 0e |......u.k&..*...|
|
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|
|
00000320 50 76 ee 36 ac 42 a3 0b 64 dd 4d 47 18 3e 5c 18 |Pv.6.B..d.MG.>\.|
|
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|
|
00000330 16 3b 14 03 03 00 01 01 16 03 03 00 24 c2 c7 3a |.;..........$..:|
|
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|
00000340 a2 9b 93 ea 75 1c b6 47 60 2e 15 cf b8 63 73 8a |....u..G`....cs.|
|
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|
00000350 2c b8 86 a8 12 1d cb 30 e2 38 fe 0f 02 57 43 f0 |,......0.8...WC.|
|
|
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|
00000360 07 |.|
|
2013-12-20 16:37:05 +00:00
|
|
|
>>> Flow 4 (server to client)
|
2015-02-04 00:15:18 +00:00
|
|
|
00000000 14 03 03 00 01 01 16 03 03 00 24 ca e7 84 5c 1b |..........$...\.|
|
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|
00000010 94 4c d8 78 6f 3f 80 b2 f9 9f fd c5 a5 fd 6f 89 |.L.xo?........o.|
|
|
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|
00000020 d7 50 a1 81 bf d0 9d eb 75 10 69 97 35 74 06 |.P......u.i.5t.|
|
2013-12-20 16:37:05 +00:00
|
|
|
>>> Flow 5 (client to server)
|
2015-02-04 00:15:18 +00:00
|
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00000000 17 03 03 00 1a 4a 11 45 18 75 a7 47 d3 36 ad 24 |.....J.E.u.G.6.$|
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00000010 fc d0 68 44 f2 9a 05 54 a2 44 e3 a7 33 74 99 15 |..hD...T.D..3t..|
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00000020 03 03 00 16 d5 d5 75 a9 a9 ef f5 31 50 f7 00 08 |......u....1P...|
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00000030 78 0a 00 1f c8 42 db c7 15 6b |x....B...k|
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