2016-11-06 17:01:12 +00:00
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package tls
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"golang_org/x/crypto/curve25519"
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)
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doTLS13Handshake() error {
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config := hs.c.config
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c := hs.c
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hs.c.cipherSuite, hs.hello13.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id, hs.suite.id
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2016-11-05 00:07:36 +00:00
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hs.c.clientHello = hs.clientHello.marshal()
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2016-11-06 17:01:12 +00:00
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// When picking the group for the handshake, priority is given to groups
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// that the client provided a keyShare for, so to avoid a round-trip.
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// After that the order of CurvePreferences is respected.
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var ks keyShare
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for _, curveID := range config.curvePreferences() {
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for _, keyShare := range hs.clientHello.keyShares {
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if curveID == keyShare.group {
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ks = keyShare
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break
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}
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}
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}
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if ks.group == 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: HelloRetryRequest not implemented") // TODO(filippo)
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}
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privateKey, serverKS, err := config.generateKeyShare(ks.group)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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hs.hello13.keyShare = serverKS
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hash := crypto.SHA256
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if hs.suite.flags&suiteSHA384 != 0 {
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hash = crypto.SHA384
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}
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hashSize := hash.Size()
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ecdheSecret := deriveECDHESecret(ks, privateKey)
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if ecdheSecret == nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return errors.New("tls: bad ECDHE client share")
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}
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hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite)
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hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello13.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello13.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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earlySecret := hkdfExtract(hash, nil, nil)
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handshakeSecret := hkdfExtract(hash, ecdheSecret, earlySecret)
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handshakeCtx := hs.finishedHash.Sum()
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cHandshakeTS := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, handshakeSecret, handshakeCtx, "client handshake traffic secret", hashSize)
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cKey := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, cHandshakeTS, nil, "key", hs.suite.keyLen)
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cIV := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, cHandshakeTS, nil, "iv", 12)
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sHandshakeTS := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, handshakeSecret, handshakeCtx, "server handshake traffic secret", hashSize)
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sKey := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, sHandshakeTS, nil, "key", hs.suite.keyLen)
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sIV := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, sHandshakeTS, nil, "iv", 12)
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clientCipher := hs.suite.aead(cKey, cIV)
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c.in.setCipher(c.vers, clientCipher)
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serverCipher := hs.suite.aead(sKey, sIV)
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c.out.setCipher(c.vers, serverCipher)
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello13Enc.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello13Enc.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certMsg := &certificateMsg13{
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certificates: hs.cert.Certificate,
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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sigScheme, err := hs.selectTLS13SignatureScheme()
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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sigHash := hashForSignatureScheme(sigScheme)
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opts := crypto.SignerOpts(sigHash)
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if signatureSchemeIsPSS(sigScheme) {
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opts = &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash, Hash: sigHash}
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}
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toSign := prepareDigitallySigned(sigHash, "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", hs.finishedHash.Sum())
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signature, err := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(config.rand(), toSign[:], opts)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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verifyMsg := &certificateVerifyMsg{
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hasSignatureAndHash: true,
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signatureAndHash: sigSchemeToSigAndHash(sigScheme),
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signature: signature,
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(verifyMsg.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, verifyMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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serverFinishedKey := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, sHandshakeTS, nil, "finished", hashSize)
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clientFinishedKey := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, cHandshakeTS, nil, "finished", hashSize)
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h := hmac.New(hash.New, serverFinishedKey)
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h.Write(hs.finishedHash.Sum())
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verifyData := h.Sum(nil)
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serverFinished := &finishedMsg{
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verifyData: verifyData,
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, serverFinished.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
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}
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h = hmac.New(hash.New, clientFinishedKey)
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h.Write(hs.finishedHash.Sum())
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expectedVerifyData := h.Sum(nil)
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if len(expectedVerifyData) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
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subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedVerifyData, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
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}
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masterSecret := hkdfExtract(hash, nil, handshakeSecret)
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handshakeCtx = hs.finishedHash.Sum()
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cTrafficSecret0 := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, masterSecret, handshakeCtx, "client application traffic secret", hashSize)
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cKey = hkdfExpandLabel(hash, cTrafficSecret0, nil, "key", hs.suite.keyLen)
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cIV = hkdfExpandLabel(hash, cTrafficSecret0, nil, "iv", 12)
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sTrafficSecret0 := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, masterSecret, handshakeCtx, "server application traffic secret", hashSize)
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sKey = hkdfExpandLabel(hash, sTrafficSecret0, nil, "key", hs.suite.keyLen)
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sIV = hkdfExpandLabel(hash, sTrafficSecret0, nil, "iv", 12)
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clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(cKey, cIV)
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c.in.setCipher(c.vers, clientCipher)
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serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(sKey, sIV)
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c.out.setCipher(c.vers, serverCipher)
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return nil
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}
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// selectTLS13SignatureScheme chooses the SignatureScheme for the CertificateVerify
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// based on the certificate type and client supported schemes. If no overlap is found,
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// a fallback is selected.
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//
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// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.4.1.2
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) selectTLS13SignatureScheme() (sigScheme SignatureScheme, err error) {
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var supportedSchemes []SignatureScheme
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signer, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
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if !ok {
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return 0, errors.New("tls: certificate private key does not implement crypto.Signer")
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}
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pk := signer.Public()
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if _, ok := pk.(*rsa.PublicKey); ok {
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sigScheme = PSSWithSHA256
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supportedSchemes = []SignatureScheme{PSSWithSHA256, PSSWithSHA384, PSSWithSHA512}
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} else if pk, ok := pk.(*ecdsa.PublicKey); ok {
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switch pk.Curve {
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case elliptic.P256():
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sigScheme = ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256
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supportedSchemes = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256}
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case elliptic.P384():
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sigScheme = ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384
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supportedSchemes = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384}
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case elliptic.P521():
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sigScheme = ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512
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supportedSchemes = []SignatureScheme{ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512}
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default:
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return 0, errors.New("tls: unknown ECDSA certificate curve")
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}
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} else {
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return 0, errors.New("tls: unknown certificate key type")
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}
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for _, ss := range supportedSchemes {
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for _, cs := range hs.clientHello.signatureAndHashes {
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if ss == sigAndHashToSigScheme(cs) {
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return ss, nil
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}
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}
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}
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return sigScheme, nil
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}
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func sigSchemeToSigAndHash(s SignatureScheme) (sah signatureAndHash) {
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sah.hash = byte(s >> 8)
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sah.signature = byte(s)
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return
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}
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func sigAndHashToSigScheme(sah signatureAndHash) SignatureScheme {
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return SignatureScheme(sah.hash)<<8 | SignatureScheme(sah.signature)
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}
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func signatureSchemeIsPSS(s SignatureScheme) bool {
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return s == PSSWithSHA256 || s == PSSWithSHA384 || s == PSSWithSHA512
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}
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// hashForSignatureScheme returns the Hash used by a SignatureScheme which is
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// supported by selectTLS13SignatureScheme.
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func hashForSignatureScheme(ss SignatureScheme) crypto.Hash {
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switch ss {
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case PSSWithSHA256, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256:
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return crypto.SHA256
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case PSSWithSHA384, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384:
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return crypto.SHA384
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case PSSWithSHA512, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
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return crypto.SHA512
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default:
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panic("unsupported SignatureScheme passed to hashForSignatureScheme")
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}
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}
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func prepareDigitallySigned(hash crypto.Hash, context string, data []byte) []byte {
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message := bytes.Repeat([]byte{32}, 64)
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message = append(message, context...)
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message = append(message, 0)
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message = append(message, data...)
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h := hash.New()
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h.Write(message)
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return h.Sum(nil)
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}
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func (c *Config) generateKeyShare(curveID CurveID) ([]byte, keyShare, error) {
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if curveID == X25519 {
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var scalar, public [32]byte
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), scalar[:]); err != nil {
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return nil, keyShare{}, err
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}
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curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&public, &scalar)
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return scalar[:], keyShare{group: curveID, data: public[:]}, nil
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}
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curve, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID)
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if !ok {
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return nil, keyShare{}, errors.New("tls: preferredCurves includes unsupported curve")
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}
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privateKey, x, y, err := elliptic.GenerateKey(curve, c.rand())
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if err != nil {
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return nil, keyShare{}, err
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}
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ecdhePublic := elliptic.Marshal(curve, x, y)
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return privateKey, keyShare{group: curveID, data: ecdhePublic}, nil
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}
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func deriveECDHESecret(ks keyShare, pk []byte) []byte {
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if ks.group == X25519 {
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if len(ks.data) != 32 {
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return nil
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}
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var theirPublic, sharedKey, scalar [32]byte
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copy(theirPublic[:], ks.data)
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copy(scalar[:], pk)
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curve25519.ScalarMult(&sharedKey, &scalar, &theirPublic)
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return sharedKey[:]
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}
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curve, ok := curveForCurveID(ks.group)
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if !ok {
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return nil
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}
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x, y := elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, ks.data)
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if x == nil {
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return nil
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}
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x, _ = curve.ScalarMult(x, y, pk)
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xBytes := x.Bytes()
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curveSize := (curve.Params().BitSize + 8 - 1) >> 3
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if len(xBytes) == curveSize {
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return xBytes
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}
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buf := make([]byte, curveSize)
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copy(buf[len(buf)-len(xBytes):], xBytes)
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return buf
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}
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func hkdfExpandLabel(hash crypto.Hash, secret, hashValue []byte, label string, L int) []byte {
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hkdfLabel := make([]byte, 4+len("TLS 1.3, ")+len(label)+len(hashValue))
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hkdfLabel[0] = byte(L >> 8)
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hkdfLabel[1] = byte(L)
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hkdfLabel[2] = byte(len("TLS 1.3, ") + len(label))
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copy(hkdfLabel[3:], "TLS 1.3, ")
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z := hkdfLabel[3+len("TLS 1.3, "):]
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copy(z, label)
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z = z[len(label):]
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z[0] = byte(len(hashValue))
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copy(z[1:], hashValue)
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return hkdfExpand(hash, secret, hkdfLabel, L)
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}
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