crypto/tls: enforce that either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify be given.
crypto/tls has two functions for creating a client connection: Dial, which most users are expected to use, and Client, which is the lower-level API. Dial does what you expect: it gives you a secure connection to the host that you specify and the majority of users of crypto/tls appear to work fine with it. Client gives more control but needs more care. Specifically, if it wasn't given a server name in the tls.Config then it didn't check that the server's certificates match any hostname - because it doesn't have one to check against. It was assumed that users of the low-level API call VerifyHostname on the certificate themselves if they didn't supply a hostname. A review of the uses of Client both within Google and in a couple of external libraries has shown that nearly all of them got this wrong. Thus, this change enforces that either a ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify is given. This does not affect tls.Dial. See discussion at https://groups.google.com/d/msg/golang-nuts/4vnt7NdLvVU/b1SJ4u0ikb0J. Fixes #7342. LGTM=bradfitz R=golang-codereviews, bradfitz CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/67010043
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@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
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c.config = defaultConfig()
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c.config = defaultConfig()
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}
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}
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if len(c.config.ServerName) == 0 && !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
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return errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config")
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}
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hello := &clientHelloMsg{
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hello := &clientHelloMsg{
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vers: c.config.maxVersion(),
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vers: c.config.maxVersion(),
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compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
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compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
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