crypto/tls: use correct alerts
BoGo: Resume-Server-PSKBinderFirstExtension BoGo: Resume-Server-ExtraPSKBinder BoGo: Resume-Server-ExtraIdentityNoBinder BoGo: Renegotiate-Server-Forbidden BoGo: NoNullCompression BoGo: TrailingMessageData-*
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parent
5406418371
commit
4191962f25
58
13.go
58
13.go
@ -56,11 +56,16 @@ CurvePreferenceLoop:
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hash := hashForSuite(hs.suite)
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hashSize := hash.Size()
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earlySecret, isPSK := hs.checkPSK()
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if !isPSK {
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earlySecret, pskAlert := hs.checkPSK()
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switch {
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case pskAlert != alertSuccess:
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c.sendAlert(pskAlert)
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return errors.New("tls: invalid client PSK")
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case earlySecret == nil:
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earlySecret = hkdfExtract(hash, nil, nil)
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case earlySecret != nil:
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c.didResume = true
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}
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c.didResume = isPSK
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hs.finishedHash13 = hash.New()
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hs.finishedHash13.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
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@ -94,7 +99,7 @@ CurvePreferenceLoop:
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return err
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}
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if !isPSK {
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if !c.didResume {
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if err := hs.sendCertificate13(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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@ -151,7 +156,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readClientFinished13() error {
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expectedVerifyData := hmacOfSum(hash, hs.finishedHash13, hs.clientFinishedKey)
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if len(expectedVerifyData) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
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subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedVerifyData, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
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return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
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}
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hs.finishedHash13.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
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@ -403,9 +408,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) prepareCipher(handshakeCtx, secret []byte, label
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.8.2.
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const ticketAgeSkewAllowance = 10 * time.Second
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkPSK() (earlySecret []byte, ok bool) {
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkPSK() (earlySecret []byte, alert alert) {
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if hs.c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
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return nil, false
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return nil, alertSuccess
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}
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foundDHE := false
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@ -416,7 +421,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkPSK() (earlySecret []byte, ok bool) {
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}
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}
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if !foundDHE {
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return nil, false
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return nil, alertSuccess
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}
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hash := hashForSuite(hs.suite)
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@ -428,7 +433,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkPSK() (earlySecret []byte, ok bool) {
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continue
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}
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s := &sessionState13{}
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if ok := s.unmarshal(serializedTicket); !ok {
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if s.unmarshal(serializedTicket) != alertSuccess {
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continue
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}
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if s.vers != hs.c.vers {
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@ -465,26 +470,27 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkPSK() (earlySecret []byte, ok bool) {
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chHash.Write(hs.clientHello.rawTruncated)
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expectedBinder := hmacOfSum(hash, chHash, binderFinishedKey)
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedBinder, hs.clientHello.psks[i].binder) == 1 {
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if i == 0 && hs.clientHello.earlyData {
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// This is a ticket intended to be used for 0-RTT
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if s.maxEarlyDataLen == 0 {
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// But we had not tagged it as such. We could close the connection
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// here, but instead we just ignore the ticket and the 0-RTT data.
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continue
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}
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if hs.c.config.Accept0RTTData {
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hs.c.ticketMaxEarlyData = int64(s.maxEarlyDataLen)
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hs.hello13Enc.earlyData = true
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}
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}
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hs.hello13.psk = true
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hs.hello13.pskIdentity = uint16(i)
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return earlySecret, true
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedBinder, hs.clientHello.psks[i].binder) != 1 {
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return nil, alertDecryptError
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}
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if i == 0 && hs.clientHello.earlyData {
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// This is a ticket intended to be used for 0-RTT
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if s.maxEarlyDataLen == 0 {
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// But we had not tagged it as such.
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return nil, alertIllegalParameter
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}
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if hs.c.config.Accept0RTTData {
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hs.c.ticketMaxEarlyData = int64(s.maxEarlyDataLen)
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hs.hello13Enc.earlyData = true
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}
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}
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hs.hello13.psk = true
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hs.hello13.pskIdentity = uint16(i)
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return earlySecret, alertSuccess
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}
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return nil, false
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return nil, alertSuccess
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket13() error {
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1
alert.go
1
alert.go
@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ const (
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alertUserCanceled alert = 90
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alertNoRenegotiation alert = 100
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alertNoApplicationProtocol alert = 120
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alertSuccess alert = 255 // dummy value returned by unmarshal functions
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)
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var alertText = map[alert]string{
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@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ type Certificate struct {
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type handshakeMessage interface {
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marshal() []byte
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unmarshal([]byte) bool
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unmarshal([]byte) alert
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}
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// lruSessionCache is a ClientSessionCache implementation that uses an LRU
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4
conn.go
4
conn.go
@ -1126,8 +1126,8 @@ func (c *Conn) readHandshake() (interface{}, error) {
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// so pass in a fresh copy that won't be overwritten.
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data = append([]byte(nil), data...)
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if !m.unmarshal(data) {
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return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
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if unmarshalAlert := m.unmarshal(data); unmarshalAlert != alertSuccess {
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return nil, c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(unmarshalAlert))
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}
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return m, nil
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}
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@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
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verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
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if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
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subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
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return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect")
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal())
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@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ func TestHostnameInSNI(t *testing.T) {
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s.Close()
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var m clientHelloMsg
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if !m.unmarshal(record) {
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if m.unmarshal(record) != alertSuccess {
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t.Errorf("unmarshaling ClientHello for %q failed", tt.in)
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continue
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}
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File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ var tests = []interface{}{
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type testMessage interface {
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marshal() []byte
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unmarshal([]byte) bool
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unmarshal([]byte) alert
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equal(interface{}) bool
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}
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@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ func TestMarshalUnmarshal(t *testing.T) {
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m1 := v.Interface().(testMessage)
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marshaled := m1.marshal()
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m2 := iface.(testMessage)
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if !m2.unmarshal(marshaled) {
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if m2.unmarshal(marshaled) != alertSuccess {
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t.Errorf("#%d.%d failed to unmarshal %#v %x", i, j, m1, marshaled)
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break
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}
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@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ func TestMarshalUnmarshal(t *testing.T) {
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// data is optional and the length of the
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// Finished varies across versions.
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for j := 0; j < len(marshaled); j++ {
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if m2.unmarshal(marshaled[0:j]) {
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if m2.unmarshal(marshaled[0:j]) == alertSuccess {
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t.Errorf("#%d unmarshaled a prefix of length %d of %#v", i, j, m1)
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break
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}
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@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ func TestRejectEmptySCTList(t *testing.T) {
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serverHelloBytes := serverHello.marshal()
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var serverHelloCopy serverHelloMsg
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if !serverHelloCopy.unmarshal(serverHelloBytes) {
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if serverHelloCopy.unmarshal(serverHelloBytes) != alertSuccess {
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t.Fatal("Failed to unmarshal initial message")
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}
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@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ func TestRejectEmptySCTList(t *testing.T) {
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serverHelloEmptySCT[42] = byte((len(serverHelloEmptySCT) - 44) >> 8)
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serverHelloEmptySCT[43] = byte((len(serverHelloEmptySCT) - 44))
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if serverHelloCopy.unmarshal(serverHelloEmptySCT) {
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if serverHelloCopy.unmarshal(serverHelloEmptySCT) == alertSuccess {
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t.Fatal("Unmarshaled ServerHello with empty SCT list")
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}
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}
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@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ func TestRejectEmptySCT(t *testing.T) {
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serverHelloBytes := serverHello.marshal()
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var serverHelloCopy serverHelloMsg
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if serverHelloCopy.unmarshal(serverHelloBytes) {
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if serverHelloCopy.unmarshal(serverHelloBytes) == alertSuccess {
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t.Fatal("Unmarshaled ServerHello with zero-length SCT")
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}
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}
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@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ Curves:
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}
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if !foundCompression {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
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return false, errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
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}
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if len(hs.clientHello.compressionMethods) != 1 && c.vers >= VersionTLS13 {
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@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
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sessionTicket := append([]uint8{}, hs.clientHello.sessionTicket...)
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serializedState, usedOldKey := c.decryptTicket(sessionTicket)
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hs.sessionState = &sessionState{usedOldKey: usedOldKey}
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if ok := hs.sessionState.unmarshal(serializedState); !ok {
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if hs.sessionState.unmarshal(serializedState) != alertSuccess {
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return false
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}
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@ -570,7 +570,11 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
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preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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if err == errClientKeyExchange {
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c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
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} else {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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return err
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}
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hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
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@ -721,7 +725,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
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verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
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if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
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subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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c.sendAlert(alertDecryptError)
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return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
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}
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@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ func TestRenegotiationExtension(t *testing.T) {
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var serverHello serverHelloMsg
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// unmarshal expects to be given the handshake header, but
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// serverHelloLen doesn't include it.
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if !serverHello.unmarshal(buf[5 : 9+serverHelloLen]) {
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if serverHello.unmarshal(buf[5:9+serverHelloLen]) != alertSuccess {
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t.Fatalf("Failed to parse ServerHello")
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}
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31
ticket.go
31
ticket.go
@ -86,9 +86,9 @@ func (s *sessionState) marshal() []byte {
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return ret
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}
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func (s *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
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func (s *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) alert {
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if len(data) < 8 {
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return false
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return alertDecodeError
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}
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s.vers = uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1])
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@ -96,14 +96,14 @@ func (s *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
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masterSecretLen := int(data[4])<<8 | int(data[5])
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data = data[6:]
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if len(data) < masterSecretLen {
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return false
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return alertDecodeError
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}
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s.masterSecret = data[:masterSecretLen]
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data = data[masterSecretLen:]
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if len(data) < 2 {
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return false
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return alertDecodeError
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}
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numCerts := int(data[0])<<8 | int(data[1])
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@ -112,21 +112,24 @@ func (s *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
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s.certificates = make([][]byte, numCerts)
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for i := range s.certificates {
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if len(data) < 4 {
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return false
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return alertDecodeError
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}
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certLen := int(data[0])<<24 | int(data[1])<<16 | int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3])
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data = data[4:]
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if certLen < 0 {
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return false
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return alertDecodeError
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}
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if len(data) < certLen {
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return false
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return alertDecodeError
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}
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s.certificates[i] = data[:certLen]
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data = data[certLen:]
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}
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return len(data) == 0
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if len(data) != 0 {
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return alertDecodeError
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}
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return alertSuccess
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}
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type sessionState13 struct {
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@ -195,9 +198,9 @@ func (s *sessionState13) marshal() []byte {
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return x
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}
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func (s *sessionState13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
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func (s *sessionState13) unmarshal(data []byte) alert {
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if len(data) < 24 {
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return false
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return alertDecodeError
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}
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s.vers = uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1])
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@ -209,25 +212,25 @@ func (s *sessionState13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
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l := int(data[20])<<8 | int(data[21])
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if len(data) < 22+l+2 {
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return false
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return alertDecodeError
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}
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s.resumptionSecret = data[22 : 22+l]
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z := data[22+l:]
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l = int(z[0])<<8 | int(z[1])
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if len(z) < 2+l+2 {
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return false
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return alertDecodeError
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}
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s.alpnProtocol = string(z[2 : 2+l])
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z = z[2+l:]
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l = int(z[0])<<8 | int(z[1])
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if len(z) != 2+l {
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return false
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return alertDecodeError
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}
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s.SNI = string(z[2 : 2+l])
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return true
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return alertSuccess
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}
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func (c *Conn) encryptTicket(serialized []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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