crypto/tls: check curve equation in ECDHE.
This change causes a TLS client and server to verify that received elliptic curve points are on the expected curve. This isn't actually necessary in the Go TLS stack, but Watson Ladd has convinced me that it's worthwhile because it's pretty cheap and it removes the possibility that some change in the future (e.g. tls-unique) will depend on it without the author checking that precondition. LGTM=bradfitz R=bradfitz CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/115290046
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@ -292,6 +292,9 @@ func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processClientKeyExchange(config *Config, cert *Cert
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if x == nil {
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return nil, errClientKeyExchange
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}
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if !ka.curve.IsOnCurve(x, y) {
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return nil, errClientKeyExchange
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}
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x, _ = ka.curve.ScalarMult(x, y, ka.privateKey)
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preMasterSecret := make([]byte, (ka.curve.Params().BitSize+7)>>3)
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xBytes := x.Bytes()
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@ -322,6 +325,9 @@ func (ka *ecdheKeyAgreement) processServerKeyExchange(config *Config, clientHell
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if ka.x == nil {
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return errServerKeyExchange
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}
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if !ka.curve.IsOnCurve(ka.x, ka.y) {
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return errServerKeyExchange
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}
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serverECDHParams := skx.key[:4+publicLen]
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sig := skx.key[4+publicLen:]
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