crypto/tls: implement TLS 1.3 server 0-RTT

.travis.yml

@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ install:
   - if [ "$MODE" = "interop" ]; then ./_dev/interop.sh INSTALL $CLIENT $REVISION; fi
 
 script:
-  - if [ "$MODE" = "interop" ]; then ./_dev/interop.sh RUN $CLIENT 443; fi # ECDSA
+  - if [ "$MODE" = "interop" ]; then ./_dev/interop.sh RUN $CLIENT; fi
-  - if [ "$MODE" = "interop" ]; then ./_dev/interop.sh RUN $CLIENT 4443; fi # RSA
+  - if [ "$MODE" = "interop" ] && [ "$CLIENT" = "tstclnt" ]; then ./_dev/interop.sh 0-RTT $CLIENT; fi
   - if [ "$MODE" = "gotest" ]; then ./_dev/go.sh test -race crypto/tls; fi
 
 after_script:

13.go

@@ -60,34 +60,33 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doTLS13Handshake() error {
 	}
 	c.didResume = isPSK
 
+	hs.finishedHash13 = hash.New()
+	hs.finishedHash13.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
+
+	handshakeCtx := hs.finishedHash13.Sum(nil)
+	earlyClientCipher, _ := hs.prepareCipher(handshakeCtx, earlySecret, "client early traffic secret")
+
 	ecdheSecret := deriveECDHESecret(ks, privateKey)
 	if ecdheSecret == nil {
 		c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
 		return errors.New("tls: bad ECDHE client share")
 	}
 
-	hs.finishedHash13 = hash.New()
-	hs.finishedHash13.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
 	hs.finishedHash13.Write(hs.hello13.marshal())
 	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello13.marshal()); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
 	handshakeSecret := hkdfExtract(hash, ecdheSecret, earlySecret)
-	handshakeCtx := hs.finishedHash13.Sum(nil)
+	handshakeCtx = hs.finishedHash13.Sum(nil)
-
+	clientCipher, cTrafficSecret := hs.prepareCipher(handshakeCtx, handshakeSecret, "client handshake traffic secret")
-	cHandshakeTS := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, handshakeSecret, handshakeCtx, "client handshake traffic secret", hashSize)
+	hs.hsClientCipher = clientCipher
-	cKey := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, cHandshakeTS, nil, "key", hs.suite.keyLen)
+	serverCipher, sTrafficSecret := hs.prepareCipher(handshakeCtx, handshakeSecret, "server handshake traffic secret")
-	cIV := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, cHandshakeTS, nil, "iv", 12)
-	sHandshakeTS := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, handshakeSecret, handshakeCtx, "server handshake traffic secret", hashSize)
-	sKey := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, sHandshakeTS, nil, "key", hs.suite.keyLen)
-	sIV := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, sHandshakeTS, nil, "iv", 12)
-
-	clientCipher := hs.suite.aead(cKey, cIV)
-	c.in.setCipher(c.vers, clientCipher)
-	serverCipher := hs.suite.aead(sKey, sIV)
 	c.out.setCipher(c.vers, serverCipher)
 
+	serverFinishedKey := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, sTrafficSecret, nil, "finished", hashSize)
+	hs.clientFinishedKey = hkdfExpandLabel(hash, cTrafficSecret, nil, "finished", hashSize)
+
 	hs.finishedHash13.Write(hs.hello13Enc.marshal())
 	if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello13Enc.marshal()); err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -99,9 +98,6 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doTLS13Handshake() error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	serverFinishedKey := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, sHandshakeTS, nil, "finished", hashSize)
-	hs.clientFinishedKey = hkdfExpandLabel(hash, cHandshakeTS, nil, "finished", hashSize)
-
 	verifyData := hmacOfSum(hash, hs.finishedHash13, serverFinishedKey)
 	serverFinished := &finishedMsg{
 		verifyData: verifyData,
@@ -113,19 +109,20 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doTLS13Handshake() error {
 
 	hs.masterSecret = hkdfExtract(hash, nil, handshakeSecret)
 	handshakeCtx = hs.finishedHash13.Sum(nil)
-
+	hs.appClientCipher, _ = hs.prepareCipher(handshakeCtx, hs.masterSecret, "client application traffic secret")
-	cTrafficSecret0 := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, hs.masterSecret, handshakeCtx, "client application traffic secret", hashSize)
+	serverCipher, _ = hs.prepareCipher(handshakeCtx, hs.masterSecret, "server application traffic secret")
-	cKey = hkdfExpandLabel(hash, cTrafficSecret0, nil, "key", hs.suite.keyLen)
-	cIV = hkdfExpandLabel(hash, cTrafficSecret0, nil, "iv", 12)
-	sTrafficSecret0 := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, hs.masterSecret, handshakeCtx, "server application traffic secret", hashSize)
-	sKey = hkdfExpandLabel(hash, sTrafficSecret0, nil, "key", hs.suite.keyLen)
-	sIV = hkdfExpandLabel(hash, sTrafficSecret0, nil, "iv", 12)
-
-	hs.clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(cKey, cIV)
-	serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(sKey, sIV)
 	c.out.setCipher(c.vers, serverCipher)
 
+	if hs.hello13Enc.earlyData {
+		c.in.setCipher(c.vers, earlyClientCipher)
+		c.phase = readingEarlyData
+	} else if hs.clientHello.earlyData {
+		c.in.setCipher(c.vers, hs.hsClientCipher)
+		c.phase = discardingEarlyData
+	} else {
+		c.in.setCipher(c.vers, hs.hsClientCipher)
 		c.phase = waitingClientFinished
+	}
 
 	return nil
 }
@@ -157,11 +154,10 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readClientFinished13() error {
 	}
 	hs.finishedHash13.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
 
-	c.in.setCipher(c.vers, hs.clientCipher)
+	c.hs = nil // Discard the server handshake state
-
+	c.phase = handshakeConfirmed
-	// Discard the server handshake state
+	c.in.setCipher(c.vers, hs.appClientCipher)
-	c.hs = nil
+	c.in.traceErr, c.out.traceErr = nil, nil
-	c.phase = handshakeComplete
 
 	return hs.sendSessionTicket13()
 }
@@ -209,6 +205,15 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendCertificate13() error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+func (c *Conn) handleEndOfEarlyData() {
+	if c.phase != readingEarlyData || c.vers < VersionTLS13 {
+		c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
+		return
+	}
+	c.phase = waitingClientFinished
+	c.in.setCipher(c.vers, c.hs.hsClientCipher)
+}
+
 // selectTLS13SignatureScheme chooses the SignatureScheme for the CertificateVerify
 // based on the certificate type and client supported schemes. If no overlap is found,
 // a fallback is selected.
@@ -377,6 +382,14 @@ func hmacOfSum(f crypto.Hash, hash hash.Hash, key []byte) []byte {
 	return h.Sum(nil)
 }
 
+func (hs *serverHandshakeState) prepareCipher(handshakeCtx, secret []byte, label string) (interface{}, []byte) {
+	hash := hashForSuite(hs.suite)
+	trafficSecret := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, secret, handshakeCtx, label, hash.Size())
+	key := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, trafficSecret, nil, "key", hs.suite.keyLen)
+	iv := hkdfExpandLabel(hash, trafficSecret, nil, "iv", 12)
+	return hs.suite.aead(key, iv), trafficSecret
+}
+
 // Maximum allowed mismatch between the stated age of a ticket
 // and the server-observed one. See
 // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.8.2.
@@ -418,7 +431,14 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkPSK() (earlySecret []byte, ok bool) {
 		if clientAge-serverAge > ticketAgeSkewAllowance || clientAge-serverAge < -ticketAgeSkewAllowance {
 			continue
 		}
-		if s.hash != uint16(hash) {
+
+		// This enforces the stricter 0-RTT requirements on all ticket uses.
+		// The benefit of using PSK+ECDHE without 0-RTT are small enough that
+		// we can give them up in the edge case of changed suite or ALPN.
+		if s.suite != hs.suite.id {
+			continue
+		}
+		if s.alpnProtocol != hs.hello13Enc.alpnProtocol {
 			continue
 		}
 
@@ -433,6 +453,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkPSK() (earlySecret []byte, ok bool) {
 		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedBinder, hs.clientHello.psks[i].binder) == 1 {
 			hs.hello13.psk = true
 			hs.hello13.pskIdentity = uint16(i)
+			if i == 0 && hs.clientHello.earlyData && hs.c.config.Accept0RTTData {
+				hs.hello13Enc.earlyData = true
+			}
 			return earlySecret, true
 		}
 	}
@@ -468,7 +491,7 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket13() error {
 	}
 	sessionState := &sessionState13{
 		vers:  c.vers,
-		hash: uint16(hash),
+		suite: hs.suite.id,
 		ageAdd: uint32(ageAddBuf[0])<<24 | uint32(ageAddBuf[1])<<16 |
 			uint32(ageAddBuf[2])<<8 | uint32(ageAddBuf[3]),
 		createdAt:        uint64(time.Now().Unix()),
@@ -481,7 +504,9 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket13() error {
 		return err
 	}
 	ticketMsg := &newSessionTicketMsg13{
-		lifetime: 21600, // TODO(filippo)
+		lifetime:           24 * 3600, // TODO(filippo)
+		maxEarlyDataLength: c.config.Max0RTTDataSize,
+		withEarlyDataInfo:  c.config.Max0RTTDataSize > 0,
 		ageAdd:             sessionState.ageAdd,
 		ticket:             ticket,
 	}

_dev/Makefile

@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ ifeq ($(shell go env CGO_ENABLED),1)
 endif
 	@touch "$@"
 
-GO_COMMIT := 5782050a487e002acfd14a3f4c2c815c7854928c
+# Note: when changing this, if it doesn't change the Go version
+# (it should), you need to run make clean.
+GO_COMMIT := 5d4f37266d324e48f67b3bb82c6090f1aa94c013
 
 .PHONY: go
 go: go/.ok_$(GO_COMMIT)_$(GOENV)

_dev/interop.sh

@@ -11,8 +11,25 @@ if [ "$1" = "INSTALL" ]; then
 
 elif [ "$1" = "RUN" ]; then
 		IP=$(docker inspect -f '{{ .NetworkSettings.IPAddress }}' tris-localserver)
-		docker run --rm tls-tris:$2 $IP:$3 | tee output.txt
+
-		grep "Hello TLS 1.3" output.txt | grep -v "resumed"
+		docker run --rm tls-tris:$2 $IP:1443 | tee output.txt # RSA
-		grep "Hello TLS 1.3" output.txt | grep "resumed"
+		grep "Hello TLS 1.3" output.txt | grep -v "resumed" | grep -v "0-RTT"
+		grep "Hello TLS 1.3" output.txt | grep "resumed" | grep -v "0-RTT"
+
+		docker run --rm tls-tris:$2 $IP:2443 | tee output.txt # ECDSA
+		grep "Hello TLS 1.3" output.txt | grep -v "resumed" | grep -v "0-RTT"
+		grep "Hello TLS 1.3" output.txt | grep "resumed" | grep -v "0-RTT"
+
+elif [ "$1" = "0-RTT" ]; then
+		IP=$(docker inspect -f '{{ .NetworkSettings.IPAddress }}' tris-localserver)
+
+		docker run --rm tls-tris:$2 $IP:3443 | tee output.txt # rejecting 0-RTT
+		grep "Hello TLS 1.3" output.txt | grep "resumed" | grep -v "0-RTT"
+
+		docker run --rm tls-tris:$2 $IP:4443 | tee output.txt # accepting 0-RTT
+		grep "Hello TLS 1.3" output.txt | grep "resumed" | grep "0-RTT"
+
+		docker run --rm tls-tris:$2 $IP:5443 | tee output.txt # confirming 0-RTT
+		grep "Hello TLS 1.3" output.txt | grep "resumed" | grep -v "0-RTT"
 
 fi

_dev/tris-localserver/Dockerfile

@@ -2,10 +2,13 @@ FROM scratch
 
 ENV TLSDEBUG error
 
-EXPOSE 443
+EXPOSE 1443
+EXPOSE 2443
+EXPOSE 3443
 EXPOSE 4443
+EXPOSE 5443
 
 # GOOS=linux ../go.sh build -v -i .
 ADD tris-localserver ./
 
-CMD [ "./tris-localserver", "0.0.0.0:443", "0.0.0.0:4443" ]
+CMD [ "./tris-localserver", "0.0.0.0:1443", "0.0.0.0:2443", "0.0.0.0:3443", "0.0.0.0:4443", "0.0.0.0:5443" ]

_dev/tris-localserver/server.go

@@ -17,13 +17,49 @@ var tlsVersionToName = map[uint16]string{
 	tls.VersionTLS13Draft18: "1.3 (draft 18)",
 }
 
+func startServer(addr string, rsa, offer0RTT, accept0RTT bool) {
+	cert, err := tls.X509KeyPair([]byte(ecdsaCert), []byte(ecdsaKey))
+	if rsa {
+		cert, err = tls.X509KeyPair([]byte(rsaCert), []byte(rsaKey))
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	var Max0RTTDataSize uint32
+	if offer0RTT {
+		Max0RTTDataSize = 100 * 1024
+	}
+	s := &http.Server{
+		Addr: addr,
+		TLSConfig: &tls.Config{
+			Certificates:    []tls.Certificate{cert},
+			Max0RTTDataSize: Max0RTTDataSize,
+			Accept0RTTData:  accept0RTT,
+		},
+	}
+	log.Fatal(s.ListenAndServeTLS("", ""))
+}
+
+var confirmingAddr string
+
 func main() {
 	http.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		tlsConn := r.Context().Value(http.TLSConnContextKey).(*tls.Conn)
+		server := r.Context().Value(http.ServerContextKey).(*http.Server)
+		if server.Addr == confirmingAddr {
+			if err := tlsConn.ConfirmHandshake(); err != nil {
+				log.Fatal(err)
+			}
+		}
 		resumed := ""
 		if r.TLS.DidResume {
 			resumed = " [resumed]"
 		}
-		fmt.Fprintf(w, "<!DOCTYPE html><p>Hello TLS %s%s _o/\n", tlsVersionToName[r.TLS.Version], resumed)
+		with0RTT := ""
+		if !tlsConn.ConnectionState().HandshakeConfirmed {
+			with0RTT = " [0-RTT]"
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, "<!DOCTYPE html><p>Hello TLS %s%s%s _o/\n", tlsVersionToName[r.TLS.Version], resumed, with0RTT)
 	})
 
 	http.HandleFunc("/ch", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -31,36 +67,17 @@ func main() {
 		fmt.Fprintf(w, "Client Hello packet (%d bytes):\n%s", len(r.TLS.ClientHello), hex.Dump(r.TLS.ClientHello))
 	})
 
-	go func() {
+	switch len(os.Args) {
-		if len(os.Args) < 3 {
+	case 2:
-			return
+		startServer(os.Args[1], true, true, true)
+	case 6:
+		confirmingAddr = os.Args[5]
+		go startServer(os.Args[1], false, false, false) // first port: ECDSA (and no 0-RTT)
+		go startServer(os.Args[2], true, false, true)   // second port: RSA (and accept 0-RTT but not offer it)
+		go startServer(os.Args[3], false, true, false)  // third port: offer and reject 0-RTT
+		go startServer(os.Args[4], false, true, true)   // fourth port: offer and accept 0-RTT
+		startServer(os.Args[5], false, true, true)      // fifth port: offer and accept 0-RTT but confirm
 	}
-		cert, err := tls.X509KeyPair([]byte(rsaCert), []byte(rsaKey))
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		s := &http.Server{
-			Addr: os.Args[2],
-			TLSConfig: &tls.Config{
-				Certificates:             []tls.Certificate{cert},
-				PreferServerCipherSuites: true,
-			},
-		}
-		log.Fatal(s.ListenAndServeTLS("", ""))
-	}()
-
-	cert, err := tls.X509KeyPair([]byte(ecdsaCert), []byte(ecdsaKey))
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	s := &http.Server{
-		Addr: os.Args[1],
-		TLSConfig: &tls.Config{
-			Certificates:             []tls.Certificate{cert},
-			PreferServerCipherSuites: true,
-		},
-	}
-	log.Fatal(s.ListenAndServeTLS("", ""))
 }
 
 const (

_dev/tstclnt/run.sh

@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ shift
 HOST="${ADDR[0]}"
 PORT="${ADDR[1]}"
 
-exec /dist/OBJ-PATH/bin/tstclnt -D -V tls1.3:tls1.3 -o -O -h $HOST -p $PORT -v -A /httpreq.txt -L 2 "$@"
+exec /dist/OBJ-PATH/bin/tstclnt -D -V tls1.3:tls1.3 -o -O -h $HOST -p $PORT -v -A /httpreq.txt -L 2 -Z "$@"

alert.go

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ const (
 
 const (
 	alertCloseNotify            alert = 0
+	alertEndOfEarlyData         alert = 1
 	alertUnexpectedMessage      alert = 10
 	alertBadRecordMAC           alert = 20
 	alertDecryptionFailed       alert = 21

common.go

@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ const (
 	extensionSessionTicket       uint16 = 35
 	extensionKeyShare            uint16 = 40
 	extensionPreSharedKey        uint16 = 41
+	extensionEarlyData           uint16 = 42
 	extensionSupportedVersions   uint16 = 43
 	extensionPSKKeyExchangeModes uint16 = 45
 	extensionTicketEarlyDataInfo uint16 = 46
@@ -213,6 +214,10 @@ type ConnectionState struct {
 	// been standardized and implemented.
 	TLSUnique []byte
 
+	// HandshakeConfirmed is true once all data returned by Read
+	// (past and future) is guaranteed not to be replayed.
+	HandshakeConfirmed bool
+
 	ClientHello []byte // ClientHello packet
 }
 
@@ -322,6 +327,18 @@ type ClientHelloInfo struct {
 	// from, or write to, this connection; that will cause the TLS
 	// connection to fail.
 	Conn net.Conn
+
+	// Offered0RTTData is true if the client announced that it will send
+	// 0-RTT data. If the server Config.Accept0RTTData is true, and the
+	// client offered a session ticket valid for that purpose, it will
+	// be notified that the 0-RTT data is accepted and it will be made
+	// immediately available for Read.
+	Offered0RTTData bool
+
+	// The Fingerprint is an sequence of bytes unique to this Client Hello.
+	// It can be used to prevent or mitigate 0-RTT data replays as it's
+	// guaranteed that a replayed connection will have the same Fingerprint.
+	Fingerprint []byte
 }
 
 // CertificateRequestInfo contains information from a server's
@@ -548,6 +565,28 @@ type Config struct {
 	// used for debugging.
 	KeyLogWriter io.Writer
 
+	// If Max0RTTDataSize is not zero, the client will be allowed to use
+	// session tickets to send at most this number of bytes of 0-RTT data.
+	// 0-RTT data is subject to replay and has memory DoS implications.
+	// The server will later be able to refuse the 0-RTT data with
+	// Accept0RTTData, or wait for the client to prove that it's not
+	// replayed with Conn.ConfirmHandshake.
+	//
+	// It has no meaning on the client.
+	//
+	// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-2.3.
+	Max0RTTDataSize uint32
+
+	// Accept0RTTData makes the 0-RTT data received from the client
+	// immediately available to Read. 0-RTT data is subject to replay.
+	// Use Conn.ConfirmHandshake to wait until the data is known not
+	// to be replayed after reading it.
+	//
+	// It has no meaning on the client.
+	//
+	// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-2.3.
+	Accept0RTTData bool
+
 	serverInitOnce sync.Once // guards calling (*Config).serverInit
 
 	// mutex protects sessionTicketKeys.
@@ -622,6 +661,8 @@ func (c *Config) Clone() *Config {
 		DynamicRecordSizingDisabled: c.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled,
 		Renegotiation:               c.Renegotiation,
 		KeyLogWriter:                c.KeyLogWriter,
+		Accept0RTTData:              c.Accept0RTTData,
+		Max0RTTDataSize:             c.Max0RTTDataSize,
 		sessionTicketKeys:           sessionTicketKeys,
 	}
 }

conn.go

@@ -27,14 +27,15 @@ type Conn struct {
 	conn     net.Conn
 	isClient bool
 
-	phase handshakePhase
-
 	// constant after handshake; protected by handshakeMutex
 	handshakeMutex sync.Mutex // handshakeMutex < in.Mutex, out.Mutex, errMutex
 	// handshakeCond, if not nil, indicates that a goroutine is committed
 	// to running the handshake for this Conn. Other goroutines that need
 	// to wait for the handshake can wait on this, under handshakeMutex.
 	handshakeCond *sync.Cond
+	// The transition from handshakeRunning to the next phase is covered by
+	// handshakeMutex. All others by in.Mutex.
+	phase        handshakeStatus
 	handshakeErr error   // error resulting from handshake
 	connID       []byte  // Random connection id
 	clientHello  []byte  // ClientHello packet contents
@@ -103,16 +104,22 @@ type Conn struct {
 	// TLS 1.3 needs the server state until it reaches the Client Finished
 	hs *serverHandshakeState
 
+	// earlyDataBytes is the number of bytes of early data received so
+	// far. Tracked to enforce max_early_data_size.
+	earlyDataBytes int64
+
 	tmp [16]byte
 }
 
-type handshakePhase int
+type handshakeStatus int
 
 const (
-	earlyHandshake handshakePhase = iota
+	handshakeRunning handshakeStatus = iota
+	discardingEarlyData
+	readingEarlyData
 	waitingClientFinished
 	readingClientFinished
-	handshakeComplete
+	handshakeConfirmed
 )
 
 // Access to net.Conn methods.
@@ -548,6 +555,9 @@ func (b *block) readFromUntil(r io.Reader, n int) error {
 func (b *block) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
 	n = copy(p, b.data[b.off:])
 	b.off += n
+	if b.off >= len(b.data) {
+		err = io.EOF
+	}
 	return
 }
 
@@ -606,6 +616,7 @@ func (c *Conn) newRecordHeaderError(msg string) (err RecordHeaderError) {
 // readRecord reads the next TLS record from the connection
 // and updates the record layer state.
 // c.in.Mutex <= L; c.input == nil.
+// c.input can still be nil after a call, retry if so.
 func (c *Conn) readRecord(want recordType) error {
 	// Caller must be in sync with connection:
 	// handshake data if handshake not yet completed,
@@ -615,18 +626,17 @@ func (c *Conn) readRecord(want recordType) error {
 		c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
 		return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: unknown record type requested"))
 	case recordTypeHandshake, recordTypeChangeCipherSpec:
-		if c.phase != earlyHandshake && c.phase != readingClientFinished {
+		if c.phase != handshakeRunning && c.phase != readingClientFinished {
 			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
 			return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: handshake or ChangeCipherSpec requested while not in handshake"))
 		}
 	case recordTypeApplicationData:
-		if c.phase == earlyHandshake || c.phase == earlyHandshake {
+		if c.phase == handshakeRunning || c.phase == readingClientFinished {
 			c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
 			return c.in.setErrorLocked(errors.New("tls: application data record requested while in handshake"))
 		}
 	}
 
-Again:
 	if c.rawInput == nil {
 		c.rawInput = c.in.newBlock()
 	}
@@ -686,7 +696,15 @@ Again:
 	// Process message.
 	b, c.rawInput = c.in.splitBlock(b, recordHeaderLen+n)
 	ok, off, alertValue := c.in.decrypt(b)
-	if !ok {
+	switch {
+	case !ok && c.phase == discardingEarlyData:
+		// If the client said that it's sending early data and we did not
+		// accept it, we are expected to fail decryption.
+		c.in.freeBlock(b)
+		return nil
+	case ok && c.phase == discardingEarlyData:
+		c.phase = waitingClientFinished
+	case !ok:
 		c.in.freeBlock(b)
 		return c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertValue))
 	}
@@ -730,11 +748,15 @@ Again:
 			c.in.setErrorLocked(io.EOF)
 			break
 		}
+		if alert(data[1]) == alertEndOfEarlyData {
+			c.handleEndOfEarlyData()
+			break
+		}
 		switch data[0] {
 		case alertLevelWarning:
 			// drop on the floor
 			c.in.freeBlock(b)
-			goto Again
+			return nil
 		case alertLevelError:
 			c.in.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "remote error", Err: alert(data[1])})
 		default:
@@ -742,7 +764,7 @@ Again:
 		}
 
 	case recordTypeChangeCipherSpec:
-		if typ != want || len(data) != 1 || data[0] != 1 {
+		if typ != want || len(data) != 1 || data[0] != 1 || c.vers >= VersionTLS13 {
 			c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
 			break
 		}
@@ -752,11 +774,7 @@ Again:
 		}
 
 	case recordTypeApplicationData:
-		if c.phase == waitingClientFinished {
+		if typ != want || c.phase == waitingClientFinished {
-			c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
-			break
-		}
-		if typ != want {
 			c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
 			break
 		}
@@ -775,7 +793,6 @@ Again:
 				c.in.setErrorLocked(err)
 				break
 			}
-			goto Again
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1131,7 +1148,7 @@ func (c *Conn) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
 		return 0, err
 	}
 
-	if c.phase == earlyHandshake {
+	if c.phase == handshakeRunning {
 		return 0, alertInternalError
 	}
 
@@ -1181,6 +1198,10 @@ func (c *Conn) handleRenegotiation() error {
 		return c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation)
 	}
 
+	if c.vers >= VersionTLS13 {
+		return c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation)
+	}
+
 	switch c.config.Renegotiation {
 	case RenegotiateNever:
 		return c.sendAlert(alertNoRenegotiation)
@@ -1198,13 +1219,102 @@ func (c *Conn) handleRenegotiation() error {
 	c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
 	defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
 
-	c.phase = earlyHandshake
+	c.phase = handshakeRunning
 	if c.handshakeErr = c.clientHandshake(); c.handshakeErr == nil {
 		c.handshakes++
 	}
 	return c.handshakeErr
 }
 
+// ConfirmHandshake waits for the handshake to reach a point at which
+// the connection is certainly not replayed. That is, after receiving
+// the Client Finished.
+//
+// If ConfirmHandshake returns an error and until ConfirmHandshake
+// returns, the 0-RTT data should not be trusted not to be replayed.
+//
+// This is only meaningful in TLS 1.3 when Accept0RTTData is true and the
+// client sent valid 0-RTT data. In any other case it's equivalent to
+// calling Handshake.
+func (c *Conn) ConfirmHandshake() error {
+	if err := c.Handshake(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	c.in.Lock()
+	defer c.in.Unlock()
+
+	if c.phase == handshakeConfirmed {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	var input *block
+	if c.phase == readingEarlyData || c.input != nil {
+		buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
+		if _, err := buf.ReadFrom(earlyDataReader{c}); err != nil {
+			c.in.setErrorLocked(err)
+			return err
+		}
+		input = &block{data: buf.Bytes()}
+	}
+
+	for c.phase != handshakeConfirmed {
+		if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeApplicationData); err != nil {
+			c.in.setErrorLocked(err)
+			return err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if c.phase != handshakeConfirmed {
+		panic("should have reached handshakeConfirmed state")
+	}
+	if c.input != nil {
+		panic("should not have read past the Client Finished")
+	}
+
+	c.input = input
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// earlyDataReader wraps a Conn with in locked and reads only early data,
+// both buffered and still on the wire.
+type earlyDataReader struct {
+	c *Conn
+}
+
+func (r earlyDataReader) Read(b []byte) (n int, err error) {
+	c := r.c
+
+	if c.phase == handshakeConfirmed {
+		// c.input might not be early data
+		panic("earlyDataReader called at handshakeConfirmed")
+	}
+
+	for c.input == nil && c.in.err == nil && c.phase == readingEarlyData {
+		if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeApplicationData); err != nil {
+			return 0, err
+		}
+	}
+	if err := c.in.err; err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+
+	if c.input != nil {
+		n, err = c.input.Read(b)
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			err = nil
+			c.in.freeBlock(c.input)
+			c.input = nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	if err == nil && c.phase != readingEarlyData && c.input == nil {
+		err = io.EOF
+	}
+	return
+}
+
 // Read can be made to time out and return a net.Error with Timeout() == true
 // after a fixed time limit; see SetDeadline and SetReadDeadline.
 func (c *Conn) Read(b []byte) (n int, err error) {
@@ -1242,7 +1352,8 @@ func (c *Conn) Read(b []byte) (n int, err error) {
 		}
 
 		n, err = c.input.Read(b)
-		if c.input.off >= len(c.input.data) {
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			err = nil
 			c.in.freeBlock(c.input)
 			c.input = nil
 		}
@@ -1300,7 +1411,17 @@ func (c *Conn) Close() error {
 	var alertErr error
 
 	c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
-	if c.phase != earlyHandshake {
+	for c.phase == readingEarlyData {
+		if err := c.readRecord(recordTypeApplicationData); err != nil {
+			alertErr = err
+		}
+	}
+	if alertErr == nil && c.phase == waitingClientFinished {
+		if err := c.hs.readClientFinished13(); err != nil {
+			alertErr = err
+		}
+	}
+	if alertErr == nil && c.phase != handshakeRunning {
 		alertErr = c.closeNotify()
 	}
 	c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
@@ -1319,7 +1440,7 @@ var errEarlyCloseWrite = errors.New("tls: CloseWrite called before handshake com
 func (c *Conn) CloseWrite() error {
 	c.handshakeMutex.Lock()
 	defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
-	if c.phase == earlyHandshake {
+	if c.phase == handshakeRunning {
 		return errEarlyCloseWrite
 	}
 
@@ -1341,8 +1462,11 @@ func (c *Conn) closeNotify() error {
 // protocol if it has not yet been run.
 // Most uses of this package need not call Handshake
 // explicitly: the first Read or Write will call it automatically.
+//
+// In TLS 1.3 Handshake returns after the client and server first flights,
+// without waiting for the Client Finished.
 func (c *Conn) Handshake() error {
-	// c.handshakeErr and c.phase == earlyHandshake are protected by
+	// c.handshakeErr and c.phase == handshakeRunning are protected by
 	// c.handshakeMutex. In order to perform a handshake, we need to lock
 	// c.in also and c.handshakeMutex must be locked after c.in.
 	//
@@ -1371,7 +1495,7 @@ func (c *Conn) Handshake() error {
 		if err := c.handshakeErr; err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-		if c.phase != earlyHandshake {
+		if c.phase != handshakeRunning {
 			return nil
 		}
 		if c.handshakeCond == nil {
@@ -1393,7 +1517,7 @@ func (c *Conn) Handshake() error {
 
 	// The handshake cannot have completed when handshakeMutex was unlocked
 	// because this goroutine set handshakeCond.
-	if c.handshakeErr != nil || c.phase != earlyHandshake {
+	if c.handshakeErr != nil || c.phase != handshakeRunning {
 		panic("handshake should not have been able to complete after handshakeCond was set")
 	}
 
@@ -1415,7 +1539,7 @@ func (c *Conn) Handshake() error {
 		c.flush()
 	}
 
-	if c.handshakeErr == nil && c.phase == earlyHandshake {
+	if c.handshakeErr == nil && c.phase == handshakeRunning {
 		panic("handshake should have had a result.")
 	}
 
@@ -1433,7 +1557,7 @@ func (c *Conn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState {
 	defer c.handshakeMutex.Unlock()
 
 	var state ConnectionState
-	state.HandshakeComplete = c.phase != earlyHandshake
+	state.HandshakeComplete = c.phase != handshakeRunning
 	state.ServerName = c.serverName
 
 	if state.HandshakeComplete {
@@ -1448,6 +1572,7 @@ func (c *Conn) ConnectionState() ConnectionState {
 		state.VerifiedChains = c.verifiedChains
 		state.SignedCertificateTimestamps = c.scts
 		state.OCSPResponse = c.ocspResponse
+		state.HandshakeConfirmed = c.phase == handshakeConfirmed
 		if !c.didResume {
 			if c.clientFinishedIsFirst {
 				state.TLSUnique = c.clientFinished[:]
@@ -1478,7 +1603,7 @@ func (c *Conn) VerifyHostname(host string) error {
 	if !c.isClient {
 		return errors.New("tls: VerifyHostname called on TLS server connection")
 	}
-	if c.phase == earlyHandshake {
+	if c.phase == handshakeRunning {
 		return errors.New("tls: handshake has not yet been performed")
 	}
 	if len(c.verifiedChains) == 0 {

handshake_client.go

@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ NextCipherSuite:
 	}
 
 	c.didResume = isResume
-	c.phase = handshakeComplete
+	c.phase = handshakeConfirmed
 	c.cipherSuite = suite.id
 	return nil
 }

handshake_client_test.go

@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ func (i opensslInput) Read(buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
 }
 
 // opensslOutputSink is an io.Writer that receives the stdout and stderr from
-// an `openssl` process and sends a value to handshakeComplete when it sees a
+// an `openssl` process and sends a value to handshakeConfirmed when it sees a
 // log message from a completed server handshake.
 type opensslOutputSink struct {
-	handshakeComplete chan struct{}
+	handshakeConfirmed chan struct{}
 	all                []byte
 	line               []byte
 }
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func (o *opensslOutputSink) Write(data []byte) (n int, err error) {
 		}
 
 		if bytes.Equal([]byte(opensslEndOfHandshake), o.line[:i]) {
-			o.handshakeComplete <- struct{}{}
+			o.handshakeConfirmed <- struct{}{}
 		}
 		o.line = o.line[i+1:]
 	}
@@ -315,9 +315,9 @@ func (test *clientTest) run(t *testing.T, write bool) {
 
 		for i := 1; i <= test.numRenegotiations; i++ {
 			// The initial handshake will generate a
-			// handshakeComplete signal which needs to be quashed.
+			// handshakeConfirmed signal which needs to be quashed.
 			if i == 1 && write {
-				<-stdout.handshakeComplete
+				<-stdout.handshakeConfirmed
 			}
 
 			// OpenSSL will try to interleave application data and
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ func (test *clientTest) run(t *testing.T, write bool) {
 			}()
 
 			if write && test.renegotiationExpectedToFail != i {
-				<-stdout.handshakeComplete
+				<-stdout.handshakeConfirmed
 				stdin <- opensslSendSentinel
 			}
 			<-signalChan

handshake_messages.go

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ type clientHelloMsg struct {
 	supportedVersions            []uint16
 	psks                         []psk
 	pskKeyExchangeModes          []uint8
+	earlyData                    bool
 }
 
 func (m *clientHelloMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool {
@@ -60,7 +61,8 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool {
 		bytes.Equal(m.secureRenegotiation, m1.secureRenegotiation) &&
 		eqStrings(m.alpnProtocols, m1.alpnProtocols) &&
 		eqKeyShares(m.keyShares, m1.keyShares) &&
-		eqUint16s(m.supportedVersions, m1.supportedVersions)
+		eqUint16s(m.supportedVersions, m1.supportedVersions) &&
+		m.earlyData == m1.earlyData
 }
 
 func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshal() []byte {
@@ -127,6 +129,9 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshal() []byte {
 		extensionsLength += 1 + 2*len(m.supportedVersions)
 		numExtensions++
 	}
+	if m.earlyData {
+		numExtensions++
+	}
 	if numExtensions > 0 {
 		extensionsLength += 4 * numExtensions
 		length += 2 + extensionsLength
@@ -350,6 +355,11 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) marshal() []byte {
 			z = z[2:]
 		}
 	}
+	if m.earlyData {
+		z[0] = byte(extensionEarlyData >> 8)
+		z[1] = byte(extensionEarlyData)
+		z = z[4:]
+	}
 
 	m.raw = x
 
@@ -413,6 +423,7 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
 	m.supportedVersions = nil
 	m.psks = nil
 	m.pskKeyExchangeModes = nil
+	m.earlyData = false
 
 	if len(data) == 0 {
 		// ClientHello is optionally followed by extension data
@@ -668,6 +679,9 @@ func (m *clientHelloMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
 				return false
 			}
 			m.pskKeyExchangeModes = data[1:length]
+		case extensionEarlyData:
+			// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.8
+			m.earlyData = true
 		}
 		data = data[length:]
 		bindersOffset += length
@@ -1144,6 +1158,7 @@ func (m *serverHelloMsg13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
 type encryptedExtensionsMsg struct {
 	raw          []byte
 	alpnProtocol string
+	earlyData    bool
 }
 
 func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool {
@@ -1153,7 +1168,8 @@ func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) equal(i interface{}) bool {
 	}
 
 	return bytes.Equal(m.raw, m1.raw) &&
-		m.alpnProtocol == m1.alpnProtocol
+		m.alpnProtocol == m1.alpnProtocol &&
+		m.earlyData == m1.earlyData
 }
 
 func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) marshal() []byte {
@@ -1163,6 +1179,9 @@ func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) marshal() []byte {
 
 	length := 2
 
+	if m.earlyData {
+		length += 4
+	}
 	alpnLen := len(m.alpnProtocol)
 	if alpnLen > 0 {
 		if alpnLen >= 256 {
@@ -1196,6 +1215,12 @@ func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) marshal() []byte {
 		z = z[7+alpnLen:]
 	}
 
+	if m.earlyData {
+		z[0] = byte(extensionEarlyData >> 8)
+		z[1] = byte(extensionEarlyData)
+		z = z[4:]
+	}
+
 	m.raw = x
 	return x
 }
@@ -1205,31 +1230,38 @@ func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
 		return false
 	}
 	m.raw = data
-	l := int(data[4])<<8 | int(data[5])
+
-	if l != len(data)-6 {
-		return false
-	}
 	m.alpnProtocol = ""
-	if l == 0 {
+	m.earlyData = false
-		return true
+
+	extensionsLength := int(data[4])<<8 | int(data[5])
+	data = data[6:]
+	if len(data) != extensionsLength {
+		return false
 	}
 
-	d := data[6:]
+	for len(data) != 0 {
-	if len(d) < 5 {
+		if len(data) < 4 {
 			return false
 		}
-	if uint16(d[0])<<8|uint16(d[1]) != extensionALPN {
+		extension := uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1])
+		length := int(data[2])<<8 | int(data[3])
+		data = data[4:]
+		if len(data) < length {
 			return false
 		}
-	l = int(d[2])<<8 | int(d[3])
+
-	if l != len(d)-4 {
+		switch extension {
+		case extensionALPN:
+			d := data[:length]
+			if len(d) < 3 {
 				return false
 			}
-	l = int(d[4])<<8 | int(d[5])
+			l := int(d[0])<<8 | int(d[1])
-	if l != len(d)-6 {
+			if l != len(d)-2 {
 				return false
 			}
-	d = d[6:]
+			d = d[2:]
 			l = int(d[0])
 			if l != len(d)-1 {
 				return false
@@ -1240,6 +1272,13 @@ func (m *encryptedExtensionsMsg) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
 				return false
 			}
 			m.alpnProtocol = string(d)
+		case extensionEarlyData:
+			// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.8
+			m.earlyData = true
+		}
+
+		data = data[length:]
+	}
 
 	return true
 }

handshake_messages_test.go

@@ -164,6 +164,9 @@ func (*clientHelloMsg) Generate(rand *rand.Rand, size int) reflect.Value {
 	for i := range m.supportedVersions {
 		m.supportedVersions[i] = uint16(rand.Intn(30000))
 	}
+	if rand.Intn(10) > 5 {
+		m.earlyData = true
+	}
 
 	return reflect.ValueOf(m)
 }
@@ -222,7 +225,12 @@ func (*serverHelloMsg13) Generate(rand *rand.Rand, size int) reflect.Value {
 
 func (*encryptedExtensionsMsg) Generate(rand *rand.Rand, size int) reflect.Value {
 	m := &encryptedExtensionsMsg{}
+	if rand.Intn(10) > 5 {
 		m.alpnProtocol = randomString(rand.Intn(32)+1, rand)
+	}
+	if rand.Intn(10) > 5 {
+		m.earlyData = true
+	}
 
 	return reflect.ValueOf(m)
 }
@@ -328,10 +336,11 @@ func (*sessionState) Generate(rand *rand.Rand, size int) reflect.Value {
 func (*sessionState13) Generate(rand *rand.Rand, size int) reflect.Value {
 	s := &sessionState13{}
 	s.vers = uint16(rand.Intn(10000))
-	s.hash = uint16(rand.Intn(10000))
+	s.suite = uint16(rand.Intn(10000))
 	s.ageAdd = uint32(rand.Intn(0xffffffff))
 	s.createdAt = uint64(rand.Int63n(0xfffffffffffffff))
 	s.resumptionSecret = randomBytes(rand.Intn(100), rand)
+	s.alpnProtocol = randomString(rand.Intn(100), rand)
 	return reflect.ValueOf(s)
 }
 

handshake_server.go

@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ type serverHandshakeState struct {
 	hello13Enc        *encryptedExtensionsMsg
 	finishedHash13    hash.Hash
 	clientFinishedKey []byte
-	clientCipher      interface{}
+	hsClientCipher    interface{}
+	appClientCipher   interface{}
 }
 
 // serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
@@ -61,7 +62,6 @@ func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() error {
 	}
 	c.in.traceErr = hs.traceErr
 	c.out.traceErr = hs.traceErr
-	defer func() { c.in.traceErr, c.out.traceErr = nil, nil }()
 	isResume, err := hs.readClientHello()
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() error {
 			return err
 		}
 		c.didResume = true
-		c.phase = handshakeComplete
+		c.phase = handshakeConfirmed
 	} else {
 		// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
 		// valid so we do a full handshake.
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() error {
 		if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
-		c.phase = handshakeComplete
+		c.phase = handshakeConfirmed
 	}
 
 	return nil
@@ -910,6 +910,11 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) clientHelloInfo() *ClientHelloInfo {
 		signatureSchemes = append(signatureSchemes, SignatureScheme(sah.hash)<<8+SignatureScheme(sah.signature))
 	}
 
+	var pskBinder []byte
+	if len(hs.clientHello.psks) > 0 {
+		pskBinder = hs.clientHello.psks[0].binder
+	}
+
 	hs.cachedClientHelloInfo = &ClientHelloInfo{
 		CipherSuites:      hs.clientHello.cipherSuites,
 		ServerName:        hs.clientHello.serverName,
@@ -919,6 +924,8 @@ func (hs *serverHandshakeState) clientHelloInfo() *ClientHelloInfo {
 		SupportedProtos:   hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols,
 		SupportedVersions: supportedVersions,
 		Conn:              hs.c.conn,
+		Offered0RTTData:   hs.clientHello.earlyData,
+		Fingerprint:       pskBinder,
 	}
 
 	return hs.cachedClientHelloInfo

ticket.go

@@ -131,10 +131,13 @@ func (s *sessionState) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
 
 type sessionState13 struct {
 	vers             uint16
-	hash             uint16 // crypto.Hash value
+	suite            uint16
 	ageAdd           uint32
 	createdAt        uint64
 	resumptionSecret []byte
+	alpnProtocol     string
+	// TODO(filippo): add and check SNI
+	// TODO(filippo): add and check maxEarlyDataLength
 }
 
 func (s *sessionState13) equal(i interface{}) bool {
@@ -144,19 +147,20 @@ func (s *sessionState13) equal(i interface{}) bool {
 	}
 
 	return s.vers == s1.vers &&
-		s.hash == s1.hash &&
+		s.suite == s1.suite &&
+		s.alpnProtocol == s1.alpnProtocol &&
 		s.ageAdd == s1.ageAdd &&
 		bytes.Equal(s.resumptionSecret, s1.resumptionSecret)
 }
 
 func (s *sessionState13) marshal() []byte {
-	length := 2 + 2 + 4 + 8 + 2 + len(s.resumptionSecret)
+	length := 2 + 2 + 4 + 8 + 2 + len(s.resumptionSecret) + 2 + len(s.alpnProtocol)
 
 	x := make([]byte, length)
 	x[0] = byte(s.vers >> 8)
 	x[1] = byte(s.vers)
-	x[2] = byte(s.hash >> 8)
+	x[2] = byte(s.suite >> 8)
-	x[3] = byte(s.hash)
+	x[3] = byte(s.suite)
 	x[4] = byte(s.ageAdd >> 24)
 	x[5] = byte(s.ageAdd >> 16)
 	x[6] = byte(s.ageAdd >> 8)
@@ -171,8 +175,11 @@ func (s *sessionState13) marshal() []byte {
 	x[15] = byte(s.createdAt)
 	x[16] = byte(len(s.resumptionSecret) >> 8)
 	x[17] = byte(len(s.resumptionSecret))
-
 	copy(x[18:], s.resumptionSecret)
+	z := x[18+len(s.resumptionSecret):]
+	z[0] = byte(len(s.alpnProtocol) >> 8)
+	z[1] = byte(len(s.alpnProtocol))
+	copy(z[2:], s.alpnProtocol)
 
 	return x
 }
@@ -183,14 +190,19 @@ func (s *sessionState13) unmarshal(data []byte) bool {
 	}
 
 	s.vers = uint16(data[0])<<8 | uint16(data[1])
-	s.hash = uint16(data[2])<<8 | uint16(data[3])
+	s.suite = uint16(data[2])<<8 | uint16(data[3])
 	s.ageAdd = uint32(data[4])<<24 | uint32(data[5])<<16 | uint32(data[6])<<8 | uint32(data[7])
 	s.createdAt = uint64(data[8])<<56 | uint64(data[9])<<48 | uint64(data[10])<<40 | uint64(data[11])<<32 |
 		uint64(data[12])<<24 | uint64(data[13])<<16 | uint64(data[14])<<8 | uint64(data[15])
-	l := uint16(data[16])<<8 | uint16(data[17])
+	l := int(data[16])<<8 | int(data[17])
-	s.resumptionSecret = data[18:]
+	if len(data) < 18+l+2 {
-
+		return false
-	return int(l) == len(s.resumptionSecret)
+	}
+	s.resumptionSecret = data[18 : 18+l]
+	z := data[18+l:]
+	l = int(z[0])<<8 | int(z[1])
+	s.alpnProtocol = string(z[2:])
+	return l == len(s.alpnProtocol)
 }
 
 func (c *Conn) encryptTicket(serialized []byte) ([]byte, error) {

tls_test.go

@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ func TestCloneNonFuncFields(t *testing.T) {
 			f.Set(reflect.ValueOf("b"))
 		case "ClientAuth":
 			f.Set(reflect.ValueOf(VerifyClientCertIfGiven))
-		case "InsecureSkipVerify", "SessionTicketsDisabled", "DynamicRecordSizingDisabled", "PreferServerCipherSuites":
+		case "InsecureSkipVerify", "SessionTicketsDisabled", "DynamicRecordSizingDisabled", "PreferServerCipherSuites", "Accept0RTTData":
 			f.Set(reflect.ValueOf(true))
 		case "MinVersion", "MaxVersion":
 			f.Set(reflect.ValueOf(uint16(VersionTLS12)))
@@ -654,6 +654,8 @@ func TestCloneNonFuncFields(t *testing.T) {
 			f.Set(reflect.ValueOf([]CurveID{CurveP256}))
 		case "Renegotiation":
 			f.Set(reflect.ValueOf(RenegotiateOnceAsClient))
+		case "Max0RTTDataSize":
+			f.Set(reflect.ValueOf(uint32(0)))
 		default:
 			t.Errorf("all fields must be accounted for, but saw unknown field %q", fn)
 		}