Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Adam Langley
6918d87d90 crypto/tls: switch to OpenSSL 1.1.0 for test data.
We will need OpenSSL 1.1.0 in order to test some of the features
expected for Go 1.8. However, 1.1.0 also disables (by default) some
things that we still want to test, such as RC4, 3DES and SSLv3. Thus
developers wanting to update the crypto/tls test data will need to build
OpenSSL from source.

This change updates the test data with transcripts generated by 1.1.0
(in order to reduce future diffs) and also causes a banner to be printed
if 1.1.0 is not used when updating.

(The test for an ALPN mismatch is removed because OpenSSL now terminates
the connection with a fatal alert if no known ALPN protocols are
offered. There's no point testing against this because it's an OpenSSL
behaviour.)

Change-Id: I957516975e0b8c7def84184f65c81d0b68f1c551
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/30821
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
2016-10-12 17:03:46 +00:00
Adam Langley
cde0e97e4c crypto/x509: require a NULL parameters for RSA public keys.
The RFC is clear that the Parameters in an AlgorithmIdentifer for an RSA
public key must be NULL. BoringSSL enforces this so we have strong
evidence that this is a widely compatible change.

Embarrassingly enough, the major source of violations of this is us. Go
used to get this correct in only one of two places. This was only fixed
in 2013 (with 4874bc9b). That's why lots of test certificates are
updated in this change.

Fixes #16166.

Change-Id: Ib9a4551349354c66e730d44eb8cee4ec402ea8ab
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/27312
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
2016-08-17 23:47:18 +00:00
Shenghou Ma
e90a6f8498 crypto/tls: add TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 cipher suites
Fixes #9894.

Change-Id: I9c7ce771df2e2d1c99a06f800dce63c4e1875993
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/16924
Run-TryBot: Minux Ma <minux@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-11-15 20:59:11 +00:00
Adam Langley
bd4954ddeb crypto/tls: update testing certificates.
This change alters the certificate used in many tests so that it's no
longer self-signed. This allows some tests to exercise the standard
certificate verification paths in the future.

Change-Id: I9c3fcd6847eed8269ff3b86d9b6966406bf0642d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/13244
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-08-05 19:06:51 +00:00
Adam Langley
594d36e1f7 crypto/tls: update the supported signature algorithms.
This is the second in a two-part change. See https://golang.org/cl/9415
for details of the overall change.

This change updates the supported signature algorithms to include
SHA-384 and updates all the testdata/ files accordingly. Even some of
the testdata/ files named “TLS1.0” and “TLS1.1” have been updated
because they have TLS 1.2 ClientHello's even though the server picks a
lower version.

Fixes #9757.

Change-Id: Ia76de2b548d3b39cd4aa3f71132b0da7c917debd
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/9472
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
2015-04-30 03:47:51 +00:00
Adam Langley
728bcd44b6 crypto/tls: decouple handshake signatures from the handshake hash.
Prior to TLS 1.2, the handshake had a pleasing property that one could
incrementally hash it and, from that, get the needed hashes for both
the CertificateVerify and Finished messages.

TLS 1.2 introduced negotiation for the signature and hash and it became
possible for the handshake hash to be, say, SHA-384, but for the
CertificateVerify to sign the handshake with SHA-1. The problem is that
one doesn't know in advance which hashes will be needed and thus the
handshake needs to be buffered.

Go ignored this, always kept a single handshake hash, and any signatures
over the handshake had to use that hash.

However, there are a set of servers that inspect the client's offered
signature hash functions and will abort the handshake if one of the
server's certificates is signed with a hash function outside of that
set. https://robertsspaceindustries.com/ is an example of such a server.

Clearly not a lot of thought happened when that server code was written,
but its out there and we have to deal with it.

This change decouples the handshake hash from the CertificateVerify
hash. This lays the groundwork for advertising support for SHA-384 but
doesn't actually make that change in the interests of reviewability.
Updating the advertised hash functions will cause changes in many of the
testdata/ files and some errors might get lost in the noise. This change
only needs to update four testdata/ files: one because a SHA-384-based
handshake is now being signed with SHA-256 and the others because the
TLS 1.2 CertificateRequest message now includes SHA-1.

This change also has the effect of adding support for
client-certificates in SSLv3 servers. However, SSLv3 is now disabled by
default so this should be moot.

It would be possible to avoid much of this change and just support
SHA-384 for the ServerKeyExchange as the SKX only signs over the nonces
and SKX params (a design mistake in TLS). However, that would leave Go
in the odd situation where it advertised support for SHA-384, but would
only use the handshake hash when signing client certificates. I fear
that'll just cause problems in the future.

Much of this code was written by davidben@ for the purposes of testing
BoringSSL.

Partly addresses #9757

Change-Id: I5137a472b6076812af387a5a69fc62c7373cd485
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/9415
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
2015-04-30 03:47:02 +00:00
Adam Langley
6f38414b48 crypto/tls: support renegotiation extension.
The renegotiation extension was introduced[1] due to an attack by Ray in
which a client's handshake was spliced into a connection that was
renegotiating, thus giving an attacker the ability to inject an
arbitary prefix into the connection.

Go has never supported renegotiation as a server and so this attack
doesn't apply. As a client, it's possible that at some point in the
future the population of servers will be sufficiently updated that
it'll be possible to reject connections where the server hasn't
demonstrated that it has been updated to address this problem.

We're not at that point yet, but it's good for Go servers to support
the extension so that it might be possible to do in the future.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc5746

R=golang-codereviews, mikioh.mikioh
CC=golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/48580043
2014-01-09 13:38:11 -05:00
Adam Langley
98968dca72 crypto/tls: rework reference tests.
The practice of storing reference connections for testing has worked
reasonably well, but the large blocks of literal data in the .go files
is ugly and updating the tests is a real problem because their number
has grown.

This CL changes the way that reference tests work. It's now possible to
automatically update the tests and the test data is now stored in
testdata/. This should make it easier to implement changes that affect
all connections, like implementing the renegotiation extension.

R=golang-codereviews, r
CC=golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/42060044
2013-12-20 11:37:05 -05:00