We will need OpenSSL 1.1.0 in order to test some of the features
expected for Go 1.8. However, 1.1.0 also disables (by default) some
things that we still want to test, such as RC4, 3DES and SSLv3. Thus
developers wanting to update the crypto/tls test data will need to build
OpenSSL from source.
This change updates the test data with transcripts generated by 1.1.0
(in order to reduce future diffs) and also causes a banner to be printed
if 1.1.0 is not used when updating.
(The test for an ALPN mismatch is removed because OpenSSL now terminates
the connection with a fatal alert if no known ALPN protocols are
offered. There's no point testing against this because it's an OpenSSL
behaviour.)
Change-Id: I957516975e0b8c7def84184f65c81d0b68f1c551
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/30821
Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The RFC is clear that the Parameters in an AlgorithmIdentifer for an RSA
public key must be NULL. BoringSSL enforces this so we have strong
evidence that this is a widely compatible change.
Embarrassingly enough, the major source of violations of this is us. Go
used to get this correct in only one of two places. This was only fixed
in 2013 (with 4874bc9b). That's why lots of test certificates are
updated in this change.
Fixes#16166.
Change-Id: Ib9a4551349354c66e730d44eb8cee4ec402ea8ab
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/27312
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
ECDSA is unsafe to use if an entropy source produces predictable
output for the ephemeral nonces. E.g., [Nguyen]. A simple
countermeasure is to hash the secret key, the message, and
entropy together to seed a CSPRNG, from which the ephemeral key
is derived.
Fixes#9452
--
This is a minimalist (in terms of patch size) solution, though
not the most parsimonious in its use of primitives:
- csprng_key = ChopMD-256(SHA2-512(priv.D||entropy||hash))
- reader = AES-256-CTR(k=csprng_key)
This, however, provides at most 128-bit collision-resistance,
so that Adv will have a term related to the number of messages
signed that is significantly worse than plain ECDSA. This does
not seem to be of any practical importance.
ChopMD-256(SHA2-512(x)) is used, rather than SHA2-256(x), for
two sets of reasons:
*Practical:* SHA2-512 has a larger state and 16 more rounds; it
is likely non-generically stronger than SHA2-256. And, AFAIK,
cryptanalysis backs this up. (E.g., [Biryukov] gives a
distinguisher on 47-round SHA2-256 with cost < 2^85.) This is
well below a reasonable security-strength target.
*Theoretical:* [Coron] and [Chang] show that Chop-MD(F(x)) is
indifferentiable from a random oracle for slightly beyond the
birthday barrier. It seems likely that this makes a generic
security proof that this construction remains UF-CMA is
possible in the indifferentiability framework.
--
Many thanks to Payman Mohassel for reviewing this construction;
any mistakes are mine, however. And, as he notes, reusing the
private key in this way means that the generic-group (non-RO)
proof of ECDSA's security given in [Brown] no longer directly
applies.
--
[Brown]: http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2000/corr2000-54.ps
"Brown. The exact security of ECDSA. 2000"
[Coron]: https://www.cs.nyu.edu/~puniya/papers/merkle.pdf
"Coron et al. Merkle-Damgard revisited. 2005"
[Chang]: https://www.iacr.org/archive/fse2008/50860436/50860436.pdf
"Chang and Nandi. Improved indifferentiability security analysis
of chopMD hash function. 2008"
[Biryukov]: http://www.iacr.org/archive/asiacrypt2011/70730269/70730269.pdf
"Biryukov et al. Second-order differential collisions for reduced
SHA-256. 2011"
[Nguyen]: ftp://ftp.di.ens.fr/pub/users/pnguyen/PubECDSA.ps
"Nguyen and Shparlinski. The insecurity of the elliptic curve
digital signature algorithm with partially known nonces. 2003"
New tests:
TestNonceSafety: Check that signatures are safe even with a
broken entropy source.
TestINDCCA: Check that signatures remain non-deterministic
with a functional entropy source.
Updated "golden" KATs in crypto/tls/testdata that use ECDSA suites.
Change-Id: I55337a2fbec2e42a36ce719bd2184793682d678a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/3340
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Currently an ECDHE handshake uses the client's curve preference. This
generally means that we use P-521. However, P-521's strength is
mismatched with the rest of the cipher suite in most cases and we have
a fast, constant-time implementation of P-256.
With this change, Go servers will use P-256 where the client supports
it although that can be overridden in the Config.
LGTM=bradfitz
R=bradfitz
CC=golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/66060043
The renegotiation extension was introduced[1] due to an attack by Ray in
which a client's handshake was spliced into a connection that was
renegotiating, thus giving an attacker the ability to inject an
arbitary prefix into the connection.
Go has never supported renegotiation as a server and so this attack
doesn't apply. As a client, it's possible that at some point in the
future the population of servers will be sufficiently updated that
it'll be possible to reject connections where the server hasn't
demonstrated that it has been updated to address this problem.
We're not at that point yet, but it's good for Go servers to support
the extension so that it might be possible to do in the future.
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc5746
R=golang-codereviews, mikioh.mikioh
CC=golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/48580043
The practice of storing reference connections for testing has worked
reasonably well, but the large blocks of literal data in the .go files
is ugly and updating the tests is a real problem because their number
has grown.
This CL changes the way that reference tests work. It's now possible to
automatically update the tests and the test data is now stored in
testdata/. This should make it easier to implement changes that affect
all connections, like implementing the renegotiation extension.
R=golang-codereviews, r
CC=golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/42060044
