4e47a4aef7
A new attack on CBC padding in SSLv3 was released yesterday[1]. Go only supports SSLv3 as a server, not as a client. An easy fix is to change the default minimum version to TLS 1.0 but that seems a little much this late in the 1.4 process as it may break some things. Thus this patch adds server support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV[2] -- a mechanism for solving the fallback problem overall. Chrome has implemented this since February and Google has urged others to do so in light of yesterday's news. With this change, clients can indicate that they are doing a fallback connection and Go servers will be able to correctly reject them. [1] http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2014/10/this-poodle-bites-exploiting-ssl-30.html [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 LGTM=rsc R=rsc CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/157090043
276 lines
9.3 KiB
Go
276 lines
9.3 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
|
|
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
|
|
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
|
|
|
|
package tls
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"crypto/aes"
|
|
"crypto/cipher"
|
|
"crypto/des"
|
|
"crypto/hmac"
|
|
"crypto/rc4"
|
|
"crypto/sha1"
|
|
"crypto/x509"
|
|
"hash"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// a keyAgreement implements the client and server side of a TLS key agreement
|
|
// protocol by generating and processing key exchange messages.
|
|
type keyAgreement interface {
|
|
// On the server side, the first two methods are called in order.
|
|
|
|
// In the case that the key agreement protocol doesn't use a
|
|
// ServerKeyExchange message, generateServerKeyExchange can return nil,
|
|
// nil.
|
|
generateServerKeyExchange(*Config, *Certificate, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg) (*serverKeyExchangeMsg, error)
|
|
processClientKeyExchange(*Config, *Certificate, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, uint16) ([]byte, error)
|
|
|
|
// On the client side, the next two methods are called in order.
|
|
|
|
// This method may not be called if the server doesn't send a
|
|
// ServerKeyExchange message.
|
|
processServerKeyExchange(*Config, *clientHelloMsg, *serverHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate, *serverKeyExchangeMsg) error
|
|
generateClientKeyExchange(*Config, *clientHelloMsg, *x509.Certificate) ([]byte, *clientKeyExchangeMsg, error)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
// suiteECDH indicates that the cipher suite involves elliptic curve
|
|
// Diffie-Hellman. This means that it should only be selected when the
|
|
// client indicates that it supports ECC with a curve and point format
|
|
// that we're happy with.
|
|
suiteECDHE = 1 << iota
|
|
// suiteECDSA indicates that the cipher suite involves an ECDSA
|
|
// signature and therefore may only be selected when the server's
|
|
// certificate is ECDSA. If this is not set then the cipher suite is
|
|
// RSA based.
|
|
suiteECDSA
|
|
// suiteTLS12 indicates that the cipher suite should only be advertised
|
|
// and accepted when using TLS 1.2.
|
|
suiteTLS12
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// A cipherSuite is a specific combination of key agreement, cipher and MAC
|
|
// function. All cipher suites currently assume RSA key agreement.
|
|
type cipherSuite struct {
|
|
id uint16
|
|
// the lengths, in bytes, of the key material needed for each component.
|
|
keyLen int
|
|
macLen int
|
|
ivLen int
|
|
ka func(version uint16) keyAgreement
|
|
// flags is a bitmask of the suite* values, above.
|
|
flags int
|
|
cipher func(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{}
|
|
mac func(version uint16, macKey []byte) macFunction
|
|
aead func(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var cipherSuites = []*cipherSuite{
|
|
// Ciphersuite order is chosen so that ECDHE comes before plain RSA
|
|
// and RC4 comes before AES (because of the Lucky13 attack).
|
|
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
|
|
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 16, 0, 4, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA | suiteTLS12, nil, nil, aeadAESGCM},
|
|
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
|
|
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
|
|
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
|
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
|
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
|
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, ecdheECDSAKA, suiteECDHE | suiteECDSA, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
|
{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 16, 20, 0, rsaKA, 0, cipherRC4, macSHA1, nil},
|
|
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 16, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
|
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, 32, 20, 16, rsaKA, 0, cipherAES, macSHA1, nil},
|
|
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, ecdheRSAKA, suiteECDHE, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
|
|
{TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 24, 20, 8, rsaKA, 0, cipher3DES, macSHA1, nil},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func cipherRC4(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} {
|
|
cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(key)
|
|
return cipher
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func cipher3DES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} {
|
|
block, _ := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key)
|
|
if isRead {
|
|
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
|
|
}
|
|
return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func cipherAES(key, iv []byte, isRead bool) interface{} {
|
|
block, _ := aes.NewCipher(key)
|
|
if isRead {
|
|
return cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(block, iv)
|
|
}
|
|
return cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(block, iv)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// macSHA1 returns a macFunction for the given protocol version.
|
|
func macSHA1(version uint16, key []byte) macFunction {
|
|
if version == VersionSSL30 {
|
|
mac := ssl30MAC{
|
|
h: sha1.New(),
|
|
key: make([]byte, len(key)),
|
|
}
|
|
copy(mac.key, key)
|
|
return mac
|
|
}
|
|
return tls10MAC{hmac.New(sha1.New, key)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type macFunction interface {
|
|
Size() int
|
|
MAC(digestBuf, seq, header, data []byte) []byte
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// fixedNonceAEAD wraps an AEAD and prefixes a fixed portion of the nonce to
|
|
// each call.
|
|
type fixedNonceAEAD struct {
|
|
// sealNonce and openNonce are buffers where the larger nonce will be
|
|
// constructed. Since a seal and open operation may be running
|
|
// concurrently, there is a separate buffer for each.
|
|
sealNonce, openNonce []byte
|
|
aead cipher.AEAD
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fixedNonceAEAD) NonceSize() int { return 8 }
|
|
func (f *fixedNonceAEAD) Overhead() int { return f.aead.Overhead() }
|
|
|
|
func (f *fixedNonceAEAD) Seal(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) []byte {
|
|
copy(f.sealNonce[len(f.sealNonce)-8:], nonce)
|
|
return f.aead.Seal(out, f.sealNonce, plaintext, additionalData)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fixedNonceAEAD) Open(out, nonce, plaintext, additionalData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
copy(f.openNonce[len(f.openNonce)-8:], nonce)
|
|
return f.aead.Open(out, f.openNonce, plaintext, additionalData)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func aeadAESGCM(key, fixedNonce []byte) cipher.AEAD {
|
|
aes, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
panic(err)
|
|
}
|
|
aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(aes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
panic(err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
nonce1, nonce2 := make([]byte, 12), make([]byte, 12)
|
|
copy(nonce1, fixedNonce)
|
|
copy(nonce2, fixedNonce)
|
|
|
|
return &fixedNonceAEAD{nonce1, nonce2, aead}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ssl30MAC implements the SSLv3 MAC function, as defined in
|
|
// www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft302.txt section 5.2.3.1
|
|
type ssl30MAC struct {
|
|
h hash.Hash
|
|
key []byte
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s ssl30MAC) Size() int {
|
|
return s.h.Size()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var ssl30Pad1 = [48]byte{0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36}
|
|
|
|
var ssl30Pad2 = [48]byte{0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c}
|
|
|
|
func (s ssl30MAC) MAC(digestBuf, seq, header, data []byte) []byte {
|
|
padLength := 48
|
|
if s.h.Size() == 20 {
|
|
padLength = 40
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s.h.Reset()
|
|
s.h.Write(s.key)
|
|
s.h.Write(ssl30Pad1[:padLength])
|
|
s.h.Write(seq)
|
|
s.h.Write(header[:1])
|
|
s.h.Write(header[3:5])
|
|
s.h.Write(data)
|
|
digestBuf = s.h.Sum(digestBuf[:0])
|
|
|
|
s.h.Reset()
|
|
s.h.Write(s.key)
|
|
s.h.Write(ssl30Pad2[:padLength])
|
|
s.h.Write(digestBuf)
|
|
return s.h.Sum(digestBuf[:0])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// tls10MAC implements the TLS 1.0 MAC function. RFC 2246, section 6.2.3.
|
|
type tls10MAC struct {
|
|
h hash.Hash
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s tls10MAC) Size() int {
|
|
return s.h.Size()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s tls10MAC) MAC(digestBuf, seq, header, data []byte) []byte {
|
|
s.h.Reset()
|
|
s.h.Write(seq)
|
|
s.h.Write(header)
|
|
s.h.Write(data)
|
|
return s.h.Sum(digestBuf[:0])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func rsaKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
|
return rsaKeyAgreement{}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func ecdheECDSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
|
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
|
|
sigType: signatureECDSA,
|
|
version: version,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func ecdheRSAKA(version uint16) keyAgreement {
|
|
return &ecdheKeyAgreement{
|
|
sigType: signatureRSA,
|
|
version: version,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mutualCipherSuite returns a cipherSuite given a list of supported
|
|
// ciphersuites and the id requested by the peer.
|
|
func mutualCipherSuite(have []uint16, want uint16) *cipherSuite {
|
|
for _, id := range have {
|
|
if id == want {
|
|
for _, suite := range cipherSuites {
|
|
if suite.id == want {
|
|
return suite
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// A list of the possible cipher suite ids. Taken from
|
|
// http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml
|
|
const (
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0x0005
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x000a
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x002f
|
|
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0x0035
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc007
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc009
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc00a
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA uint16 = 0xc011
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc012
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc013
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA uint16 = 0xc014
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02f
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 uint16 = 0xc02b
|
|
|
|
// TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV isn't a standard cipher suite but an indicator
|
|
// that the client is doing version fallback. See
|
|
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00.
|
|
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV uint16 = 0x5600
|
|
)
|