th5/handshake_client.go
Adam Langley 6f38414b48 crypto/tls: support renegotiation extension.
The renegotiation extension was introduced[1] due to an attack by Ray in
which a client's handshake was spliced into a connection that was
renegotiating, thus giving an attacker the ability to inject an
arbitary prefix into the connection.

Go has never supported renegotiation as a server and so this attack
doesn't apply. As a client, it's possible that at some point in the
future the population of servers will be sufficiently updated that
it'll be possible to reject connections where the server hasn't
demonstrated that it has been updated to address this problem.

We're not at that point yet, but it's good for Go servers to support
the extension so that it might be possible to do in the future.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc5746

R=golang-codereviews, mikioh.mikioh
CC=golang-codereviews
https://golang.org/cl/48580043
2014-01-09 13:38:11 -05:00

413 lines
11 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package tls
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/subtle"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/asn1"
"errors"
"io"
"strconv"
)
func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
if c.config == nil {
c.config = defaultConfig()
}
hello := &clientHelloMsg{
vers: c.config.maxVersion(),
compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
random: make([]byte, 32),
ocspStapling: true,
serverName: c.config.ServerName,
supportedCurves: []uint16{curveP256, curveP384, curveP521},
supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed},
nextProtoNeg: len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0,
secureRenegotiation: true,
}
possibleCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites))
NextCipherSuite:
for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites {
for _, suite := range cipherSuites {
if suite.id != suiteId {
continue
}
// Don't advertise TLS 1.2-only cipher suites unless
// we're attempting TLS 1.2.
if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
continue
}
hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId)
continue NextCipherSuite
}
}
t := uint32(c.config.time().Unix())
hello.random[0] = byte(t >> 24)
hello.random[1] = byte(t >> 16)
hello.random[2] = byte(t >> 8)
hello.random[3] = byte(t)
_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.random[4:])
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("short read from Rand")
}
if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
hello.signatureAndHashes = supportedSKXSignatureAlgorithms
}
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal())
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
if !ok {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
vers, ok := c.config.mutualVersion(serverHello.vers)
if !ok || vers < VersionTLS10 {
// TLS 1.0 is the minimum version supported as a client.
return c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
}
c.vers = vers
c.haveVers = true
finishedHash := newFinishedHash(c.vers)
finishedHash.Write(hello.marshal())
finishedHash.Write(serverHello.marshal())
if serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
if !hello.nextProtoNeg && serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("server advertised unrequested NPN")
}
suite := mutualCipherSuite(c.config.cipherSuites(), serverHello.cipherSuite)
if suite == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error())
}
certs[i] = cert
}
if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: c.config.RootCAs,
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
DNSName: c.config.ServerName,
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
}
for i, cert := range certs {
if i == 0 {
continue
}
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey:
break
default:
return c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
}
c.peerCertificates = certs
if serverHello.ocspStapling {
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
if !ok {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
c.ocspResponse = cs.response
}
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
keyAgreement := suite.ka(c.vers)
skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
if ok {
finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hello, serverHello, certs[0], skx)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
var chainToSend *Certificate
var certRequested bool
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
if ok {
certRequested = true
// RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field:
// A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate
// authorities. These distinguished names may specify a desired
// distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA;
// thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots
// and a desired authorization space. If the
// certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY
// send any certificate of the appropriate
// ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external
// arrangement to the contrary.
finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
var rsaAvail, ecdsaAvail bool
for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
switch certType {
case certTypeRSASign:
rsaAvail = true
case certTypeECDSASign:
ecdsaAvail = true
}
}
// We need to search our list of client certs for one
// where SignatureAlgorithm is RSA and the Issuer is in
// certReq.certificateAuthorities
findCert:
for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates {
if !rsaAvail && !ecdsaAvail {
continue
}
for j, cert := range chain.Certificate {
x509Cert := chain.Leaf
// parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf
// node, or if chain.Leaf was nil
if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil {
if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error())
}
}
switch {
case rsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
case ecdsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
default:
continue findCert
}
if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 {
// they gave us an empty list, so just take the
// first RSA cert from c.config.Certificates
chainToSend = &chain
break findCert
}
for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities {
if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) {
chainToSend = &chain
break findCert
}
}
}
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
if !ok {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
// If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
// Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
// certificate to send.
if certRequested {
certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
if chainToSend != nil {
certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
}
finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
}
preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hello, certs[0])
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
if ckx != nil {
finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal())
}
if chainToSend != nil {
var signed []byte
certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{
hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12,
}
switch key := c.config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey.(type) {
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
digest, _, hashId := finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureECDSA)
r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(c.config.rand(), key, digest)
if err == nil {
signed, err = asn1.Marshal(ecdsaSignature{r, s})
}
certVerify.signatureAndHash.signature = signatureECDSA
certVerify.signatureAndHash.hash = hashId
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
digest, hashFunc, hashId := finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureRSA)
signed, err = rsa.SignPKCS1v15(c.config.rand(), key, hashFunc, digest)
certVerify.signatureAndHash.signature = signatureRSA
certVerify.signatureAndHash.hash = hashId
default:
err = errors.New("unknown private key type")
}
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
certVerify.signature = signed
finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal())
}
masterSecret := masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, preMasterSecret, hello.random, serverHello.random)
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, masterSecret, hello.random, serverHello.random, suite.macLen, suite.keyLen, suite.ivLen)
var clientCipher interface{}
var clientHash macFunction
if suite.cipher != nil {
clientCipher = suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */)
clientHash = suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
} else {
clientCipher = suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
}
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
if serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg)
proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, serverHello.nextProtos)
nextProto.proto = proto
c.clientProtocol = proto
c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback
finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, nextProto.marshal())
}
finished := new(finishedMsg)
finished.verifyData = finishedHash.clientSum(masterSecret)
finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())
var serverCipher interface{}
var serverHash macFunction
if suite.cipher != nil {
serverCipher = suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */)
serverHash = suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
} else {
serverCipher = suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
}
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
if err := c.error(); err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
verify := finishedHash.serverSum(masterSecret)
if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
}
c.handshakeComplete = true
c.cipherSuite = suite.id
return nil
}
// mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation protocol given the
// set of client and server supported protocols. The set of client supported
// protocols must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag
// indicating if the fallback case was reached.
func mutualProtocol(clientProtos, serverProtos []string) (string, bool) {
for _, s := range serverProtos {
for _, c := range clientProtos {
if s == c {
return s, false
}
}
}
return clientProtos[0], true
}