9323f900fd
Adam (agl@) had already done an initial review of this CL in a branch. Added ClientSessionState to Config which now allows clients to keep state required to resume a TLS session with a server. A client handshake will try and use the SessionTicket/MasterSecret in this cached state if the server acknowledged resumption. We also added support to cache ClientSessionState object in Config that will be looked up by server remote address during the handshake. R=golang-codereviews, agl, rsc, agl, agl, bradfitz, mikioh.mikioh CC=golang-codereviews https://golang.org/cl/15680043
590 lines
16 KiB
Go
590 lines
16 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tls
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"net"
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"strconv"
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)
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type clientHandshakeState struct {
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c *Conn
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serverHello *serverHelloMsg
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hello *clientHelloMsg
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suite *cipherSuite
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finishedHash finishedHash
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masterSecret []byte
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session *ClientSessionState
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}
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func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
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if c.config == nil {
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c.config = defaultConfig()
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}
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hello := &clientHelloMsg{
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vers: c.config.maxVersion(),
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compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
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random: make([]byte, 32),
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ocspStapling: true,
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serverName: c.config.ServerName,
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supportedCurves: []uint16{curveP256, curveP384, curveP521},
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supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed},
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nextProtoNeg: len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0,
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secureRenegotiation: true,
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}
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possibleCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
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hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites))
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NextCipherSuite:
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for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites {
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for _, suite := range cipherSuites {
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if suite.id != suiteId {
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continue
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}
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// Don't advertise TLS 1.2-only cipher suites unless
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// we're attempting TLS 1.2.
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if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
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continue
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}
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hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId)
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continue NextCipherSuite
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}
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}
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t := uint32(c.config.time().Unix())
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hello.random[0] = byte(t >> 24)
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hello.random[1] = byte(t >> 16)
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hello.random[2] = byte(t >> 8)
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hello.random[3] = byte(t)
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_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.random[4:])
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
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}
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if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
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hello.signatureAndHashes = supportedSKXSignatureAlgorithms
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}
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var session *ClientSessionState
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var cacheKey string
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sessionCache := c.config.ClientSessionCache
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if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
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sessionCache = nil
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}
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if sessionCache != nil {
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hello.ticketSupported = true
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// Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if
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// available.
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cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
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candidateSession, ok := sessionCache.Get(cacheKey)
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if ok {
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// Check that the ciphersuite/version used for the
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// previous session are still valid.
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cipherSuiteOk := false
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for _, id := range hello.cipherSuites {
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if id == candidateSession.cipherSuite {
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cipherSuiteOk = true
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break
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}
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}
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versOk := candidateSession.vers >= c.config.minVersion() &&
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candidateSession.vers <= c.config.maxVersion()
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if versOk && cipherSuiteOk {
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session = candidateSession
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}
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}
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}
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if session != nil {
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hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket
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// A random session ID is used to detect when the
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// server accepted the ticket and is resuming a session
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// (see RFC 5077).
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hello.sessionId = make([]byte, 16)
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
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}
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}
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal())
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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vers, ok := c.config.mutualVersion(serverHello.vers)
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if !ok || vers < VersionTLS10 {
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// TLS 1.0 is the minimum version supported as a client.
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return c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
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}
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c.vers = vers
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c.haveVers = true
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suite := mutualCipherSuite(c.config.cipherSuites(), serverHello.cipherSuite)
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if suite == nil {
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return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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}
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hs := &clientHandshakeState{
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c: c,
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serverHello: serverHello,
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hello: hello,
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suite: suite,
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finishedHash: newFinishedHash(c.vers),
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session: session,
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
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isResume, err := hs.processServerHello()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if isResume {
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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} else {
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if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if sessionCache != nil && hs.session != nil && session != hs.session {
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sessionCache.Put(cacheKey, hs.session)
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}
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c.didResume = isResume
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c.handshakeComplete = true
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c.cipherSuite = suite.id
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
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if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
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for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return errors.New("failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error())
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}
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certs[i] = cert
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}
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if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
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opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
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Roots: c.config.RootCAs,
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CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
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DNSName: c.config.ServerName,
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Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
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}
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for i, cert := range certs {
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if i == 0 {
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continue
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}
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opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
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}
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c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return err
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}
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}
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switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
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case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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break
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default:
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
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}
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c.peerCertificates = certs
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if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling {
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
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if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
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c.ocspResponse = cs.response
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}
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
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skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
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if ok {
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hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
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err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, certs[0], skx)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return err
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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var chainToSend *Certificate
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var certRequested bool
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certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
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if ok {
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certRequested = true
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// RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field:
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// A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate
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// authorities. These distinguished names may specify a desired
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// distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA;
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// thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots
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// and a desired authorization space. If the
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// certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY
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// send any certificate of the appropriate
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// ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external
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// arrangement to the contrary.
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
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var rsaAvail, ecdsaAvail bool
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for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
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switch certType {
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case certTypeRSASign:
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rsaAvail = true
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case certTypeECDSASign:
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ecdsaAvail = true
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}
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}
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// We need to search our list of client certs for one
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// where SignatureAlgorithm is RSA and the Issuer is in
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// certReq.certificateAuthorities
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findCert:
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for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates {
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if !rsaAvail && !ecdsaAvail {
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continue
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}
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for j, cert := range chain.Certificate {
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x509Cert := chain.Leaf
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// parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf
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// node, or if chain.Leaf was nil
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if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil {
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if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error())
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}
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}
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switch {
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case rsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
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case ecdsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
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default:
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continue findCert
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}
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if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 {
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// they gave us an empty list, so just take the
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// first RSA cert from c.config.Certificates
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chainToSend = &chain
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break findCert
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}
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for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities {
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if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) {
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chainToSend = &chain
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break findCert
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}
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}
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}
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
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// If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
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// Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
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// certificate to send.
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if certRequested {
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certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
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if chainToSend != nil {
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certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
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}
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preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, certs[0])
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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if ckx != nil {
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hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal())
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}
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if chainToSend != nil {
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var signed []byte
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certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{
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hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12,
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}
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switch key := c.config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey.(type) {
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case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
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digest, _, hashId := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureECDSA)
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r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(c.config.rand(), key, digest)
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if err == nil {
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signed, err = asn1.Marshal(ecdsaSignature{r, s})
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}
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certVerify.signatureAndHash.signature = signatureECDSA
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certVerify.signatureAndHash.hash = hashId
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case *rsa.PrivateKey:
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digest, hashFunc, hashId := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureRSA)
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signed, err = rsa.SignPKCS1v15(c.config.rand(), key, hashFunc, digest)
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certVerify.signatureAndHash.signature = signatureRSA
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certVerify.signatureAndHash.hash = hashId
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default:
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err = errors.New("unknown private key type")
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}
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if err != nil {
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return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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certVerify.signature = signed
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal())
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}
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hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random)
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
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c := hs.c
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clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
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keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
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var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
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var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
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if hs.suite.cipher != nil {
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clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */)
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clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
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serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */)
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serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
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} else {
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clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
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serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
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}
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c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
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c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) serverResumedSession() bool {
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// If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the
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// sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session.
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return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil &&
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bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId)
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processServerHello() (bool, error) {
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c := hs.c
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if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
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return false, c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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if !hs.hello.nextProtoNeg && hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested NPN")
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}
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if hs.serverResumedSession() {
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// Restore masterSecret and peerCerts from previous state
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hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret
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c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
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return true, nil
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}
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return false, nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished() error {
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c := hs.c
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c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
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if err := c.error(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
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if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
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subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
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return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal())
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
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if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported {
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return nil
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}
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c := hs.c
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal())
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hs.session = &ClientSessionState{
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sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket,
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vers: c.vers,
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cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
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masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
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serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
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}
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return nil
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}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished() error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
|
|
if hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
|
|
nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg)
|
|
proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, hs.serverHello.nextProtos)
|
|
nextProto.proto = proto
|
|
c.clientProtocol = proto
|
|
c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, nextProto.marshal())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finished := new(finishedMsg)
|
|
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// clientSessionCacheKey returns a key used to cache sessionTickets that could
|
|
// be used to resume previously negotiated TLS sessions with a server.
|
|
func clientSessionCacheKey(serverAddr net.Addr, config *Config) string {
|
|
if len(config.ServerName) > 0 {
|
|
return config.ServerName
|
|
}
|
|
return serverAddr.String()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation protocol given the
|
|
// set of client and server supported protocols. The set of client supported
|
|
// protocols must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag
|
|
// indicating if the fallback case was reached.
|
|
func mutualProtocol(clientProtos, serverProtos []string) (string, bool) {
|
|
for _, s := range serverProtos {
|
|
for _, c := range clientProtos {
|
|
if s == c {
|
|
return s, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return clientProtos[0], true
|
|
}
|