th5/handshake_client.go
Mikkel Krautz c8b807a37a crypto/x509: new home for root fetchers; build chains using Windows API
This moves the various CA root fetchers from crypto/tls into crypto/x509.

The move was brought about by issue 2997. Windows doesn't ship with all
its root certificates, but will instead download them as-needed when using
CryptoAPI for certificate verification.

This CL changes crypto/x509 to verify a certificate using the system root
CAs when VerifyOptions.RootCAs == nil. On Windows, this verification is
now implemented using Windows's CryptoAPI. All other root fetchers are
unchanged, and still use Go's own verification code.

The CL also fixes the hostname matching logic in crypto/tls/tls.go, in
order to be able to test whether hostname mismatches are honored by the
Windows verification code.

The move to crypto/x509 also allows other packages to use the OS-provided
root certificates, instead of hiding them inside the crypto/tls package.

Fixes #2997.

R=agl, golang-dev, alex.brainman, rsc, mikkel
CC=golang-dev
https://golang.org/cl/5700087
2012-03-07 13:12:35 -05:00

340 lines
9.0 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
package tls
import (
"bytes"
"crypto"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/subtle"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"io"
"strconv"
)
func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
finishedHash := newFinishedHash(versionTLS10)
if c.config == nil {
c.config = defaultConfig()
}
hello := &clientHelloMsg{
vers: maxVersion,
cipherSuites: c.config.cipherSuites(),
compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
random: make([]byte, 32),
ocspStapling: true,
serverName: c.config.ServerName,
supportedCurves: []uint16{curveP256, curveP384, curveP521},
supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed},
nextProtoNeg: len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0,
}
t := uint32(c.config.time().Unix())
hello.random[0] = byte(t >> 24)
hello.random[1] = byte(t >> 16)
hello.random[2] = byte(t >> 8)
hello.random[3] = byte(t)
_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.random[4:])
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("short read from Rand")
}
finishedHash.Write(hello.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal())
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
if !ok {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
finishedHash.Write(serverHello.marshal())
vers, ok := mutualVersion(serverHello.vers)
if !ok || vers < versionTLS10 {
// TLS 1.0 is the minimum version supported as a client.
return c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
}
c.vers = vers
c.haveVers = true
if serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
if !hello.nextProtoNeg && serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
return errors.New("server advertised unrequested NPN")
}
suite := mutualCipherSuite(c.config.cipherSuites(), serverHello.cipherSuite)
if suite == nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return errors.New("failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error())
}
certs[i] = cert
}
if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
Roots: c.config.RootCAs,
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
DNSName: c.config.ServerName,
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
}
for i, cert := range certs {
if i == 0 {
continue
}
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
}
c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
return err
}
}
if _, ok := certs[0].PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey); !ok {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
}
c.peerCertificates = certs
if serverHello.ocspStapling {
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
if !ok {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
c.ocspResponse = cs.response
}
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
keyAgreement := suite.ka()
skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
if ok {
finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hello, serverHello, certs[0], skx)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
return err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
var certToSend *Certificate
certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
if ok {
// RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field:
// A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate
// authorities. These distinguished names may specify a desired
// distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA;
// thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots
// and a desired authorization space. If the
// certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY
// send any certificate of the appropriate
// ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external
// arrangement to the contrary.
finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
// For now, we only know how to sign challenges with RSA
rsaAvail := false
for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
if certType == certTypeRSASign {
rsaAvail = true
break
}
}
// We need to search our list of client certs for one
// where SignatureAlgorithm is RSA and the Issuer is in
// certReq.certificateAuthorities
findCert:
for i, cert := range c.config.Certificates {
if !rsaAvail {
continue
}
leaf := cert.Leaf
if leaf == nil {
if leaf, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0]); err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error())
}
}
if leaf.PublicKeyAlgorithm != x509.RSA {
continue
}
if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 {
// they gave us an empty list, so just take the
// first RSA cert from c.config.Certificates
certToSend = &cert
break
}
for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities {
if bytes.Equal(leaf.RawIssuer, ca) {
certToSend = &cert
break findCert
}
}
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
if !ok {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
if certToSend != nil {
certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
certMsg.certificates = certToSend.Certificate
finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
}
preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hello, certs[0])
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
return err
}
if ckx != nil {
finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal())
}
if certToSend != nil {
certVerify := new(certificateVerifyMsg)
digest := make([]byte, 0, 36)
digest = finishedHash.serverMD5.Sum(digest)
digest = finishedHash.serverSHA1.Sum(digest)
signed, err := rsa.SignPKCS1v15(c.config.rand(), c.config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey), crypto.MD5SHA1, digest)
if err != nil {
return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
}
certVerify.signature = signed
finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal())
}
masterSecret, clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
keysFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, preMasterSecret, hello.random, serverHello.random, suite.macLen, suite.keyLen, suite.ivLen)
clientCipher := suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */)
clientHash := suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
if serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg)
proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, serverHello.nextProtos)
nextProto.proto = proto
c.clientProtocol = proto
c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback
finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, nextProto.marshal())
}
finished := new(finishedMsg)
finished.verifyData = finishedHash.clientSum(masterSecret)
finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())
serverCipher := suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */)
serverHash := suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
if c.err != nil {
return c.err
}
msg, err = c.readHandshake()
if err != nil {
return err
}
serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
if !ok {
return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
}
verify := finishedHash.serverSum(masterSecret)
if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
}
c.handshakeComplete = true
c.cipherSuite = suite.id
return nil
}
// mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation protocol given the
// set of client and server supported protocols. The set of client supported
// protocols must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag
// indicating if the fallback case was reached.
func mutualProtocol(clientProtos, serverProtos []string) (string, bool) {
for _, s := range serverProtos {
for _, c := range clientProtos {
if s == c {
return s, false
}
}
}
return clientProtos[0], true
}