eaa1196b44
Change-Id: I3ff478912a5a178492d544d2f4ee9cc7570d9acc Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/84475 Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <hi@filippo.io> Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
1187 lines
40 KiB
Go
1187 lines
40 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tls
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import (
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"container/list"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/internal/cipherhw"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha512"
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"crypto/x509"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"math/big"
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"net"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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const (
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VersionSSL30 = 0x0300
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VersionTLS10 = 0x0301
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VersionTLS11 = 0x0302
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VersionTLS12 = 0x0303
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VersionTLS13 = 0x0304
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VersionTLS13Draft18 = 0x7f00 | 18
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VersionTLS13Draft21 = 0x7f00 | 21
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VersionTLS13Draft22 = 0x7f00 | 22
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)
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const (
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maxPlaintext = 16384 // maximum plaintext payload length
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maxCiphertext = 16384 + 2048 // maximum ciphertext payload length
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recordHeaderLen = 5 // record header length
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maxHandshake = 65536 // maximum handshake we support (protocol max is 16 MB)
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maxWarnAlertCount = 5 // maximum number of consecutive warning alerts
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minVersion = VersionTLS10
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maxVersion = VersionTLS12
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)
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// TLS record types.
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type recordType uint8
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const (
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recordTypeChangeCipherSpec recordType = 20
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recordTypeAlert recordType = 21
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recordTypeHandshake recordType = 22
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recordTypeApplicationData recordType = 23
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)
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// TLS handshake message types.
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const (
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typeHelloRequest uint8 = 0
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typeClientHello uint8 = 1
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typeServerHello uint8 = 2
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typeNewSessionTicket uint8 = 4
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typeEndOfEarlyData uint8 = 5
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typeEncryptedExtensions uint8 = 8
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typeCertificate uint8 = 11
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typeServerKeyExchange uint8 = 12
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typeCertificateRequest uint8 = 13
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typeServerHelloDone uint8 = 14
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typeCertificateVerify uint8 = 15
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typeClientKeyExchange uint8 = 16
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typeFinished uint8 = 20
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typeCertificateStatus uint8 = 22
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typeNextProtocol uint8 = 67 // Not IANA assigned
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)
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// TLS compression types.
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const (
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compressionNone uint8 = 0
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)
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// TLS extension numbers
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const (
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extensionServerName uint16 = 0
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extensionStatusRequest uint16 = 5
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extensionSupportedCurves uint16 = 10 // Supported Groups in 1.3 nomenclature
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extensionSupportedPoints uint16 = 11
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extensionSignatureAlgorithms uint16 = 13
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extensionALPN uint16 = 16
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extensionSCT uint16 = 18 // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-6
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extensionSessionTicket uint16 = 35
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extensionKeyShare uint16 = 40
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extensionPreSharedKey uint16 = 41
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extensionEarlyData uint16 = 42
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extensionSupportedVersions uint16 = 43
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extensionPSKKeyExchangeModes uint16 = 45
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extensionNextProtoNeg uint16 = 13172 // not IANA assigned
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extensionRenegotiationInfo uint16 = 0xff01
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)
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// TLS signaling cipher suite values
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const (
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scsvRenegotiation uint16 = 0x00ff
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)
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// PSK Key Exchange Modes
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.7
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const (
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pskDHEKeyExchange uint8 = 1
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)
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// CurveID is the type of a TLS identifier for an elliptic curve. See
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// http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-8
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//
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// TLS 1.3 refers to these as Groups, but this library implements only
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// curve-based ones anyway. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.4.
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type CurveID uint16
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const (
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CurveP256 CurveID = 23
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CurveP384 CurveID = 24
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CurveP521 CurveID = 25
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X25519 CurveID = 29
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)
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// TLS 1.3 Key Share
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// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.5
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type keyShare struct {
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group CurveID
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data []byte
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}
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// TLS 1.3 PSK Identity and Binder, as sent by the client
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.6
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type psk struct {
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identity []byte
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obfTicketAge uint32
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binder []byte
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}
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// TLS Elliptic Curve Point Formats
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// http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml#tls-parameters-9
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const (
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pointFormatUncompressed uint8 = 0
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)
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// TLS CertificateStatusType (RFC 3546)
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const (
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statusTypeOCSP uint8 = 1
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)
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// Certificate types (for certificateRequestMsg)
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const (
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certTypeRSASign = 1 // A certificate containing an RSA key
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certTypeDSSSign = 2 // A certificate containing a DSA key
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certTypeRSAFixedDH = 3 // A certificate containing a static DH key
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certTypeDSSFixedDH = 4 // A certificate containing a static DH key
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// See RFC 4492 sections 3 and 5.5.
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certTypeECDSASign = 64 // A certificate containing an ECDSA-capable public key, signed with ECDSA.
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certTypeRSAFixedECDH = 65 // A certificate containing an ECDH-capable public key, signed with RSA.
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certTypeECDSAFixedECDH = 66 // A certificate containing an ECDH-capable public key, signed with ECDSA.
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// Rest of these are reserved by the TLS spec
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)
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// Signature algorithms for TLS 1.2 (See RFC 5246, section A.4.1)
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const (
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signaturePKCS1v15 uint8 = iota + 1
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signatureECDSA
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signatureRSAPSS
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)
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// supportedSignatureAlgorithms contains the signature and hash algorithms that
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// the code advertises as supported in a TLS 1.2 ClientHello and in a TLS 1.2
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// CertificateRequest. The two fields are merged to match with TLS 1.3.
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// Note that in TLS 1.2, the ECDSA algorithms are not constrained to P-256, etc.
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var supportedSignatureAlgorithms = []SignatureScheme{
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PKCS1WithSHA256,
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ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
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PKCS1WithSHA384,
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ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384,
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PKCS1WithSHA512,
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ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
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PKCS1WithSHA1,
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ECDSAWithSHA1,
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}
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// supportedSignatureAlgorithms13 lists the advertised signature algorithms
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// allowed for digital signatures. It includes TLS 1.2 + PSS.
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var supportedSignatureAlgorithms13 = []SignatureScheme{
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PSSWithSHA256,
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PKCS1WithSHA256,
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ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
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PSSWithSHA384,
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PKCS1WithSHA384,
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ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384,
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PSSWithSHA512,
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PKCS1WithSHA512,
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ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512,
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PKCS1WithSHA1,
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ECDSAWithSHA1,
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}
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// ConnectionState records basic TLS details about the connection.
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type ConnectionState struct {
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ConnectionID []byte // Random unique connection id
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Version uint16 // TLS version used by the connection (e.g. VersionTLS12)
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HandshakeComplete bool // TLS handshake is complete
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DidResume bool // connection resumes a previous TLS connection
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CipherSuite uint16 // cipher suite in use (TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, ...)
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NegotiatedProtocol string // negotiated next protocol (not guaranteed to be from Config.NextProtos)
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NegotiatedProtocolIsMutual bool // negotiated protocol was advertised by server (client side only)
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ServerName string // server name requested by client, if any (server side only)
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PeerCertificates []*x509.Certificate // certificate chain presented by remote peer
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VerifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate // verified chains built from PeerCertificates
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SignedCertificateTimestamps [][]byte // SCTs from the server, if any
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OCSPResponse []byte // stapled OCSP response from server, if any
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// TLSUnique contains the "tls-unique" channel binding value (see RFC
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// 5929, section 3). For resumed sessions this value will be nil
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// because resumption does not include enough context (see
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// https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE#channelbindings). This will
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// change in future versions of Go once the TLS master-secret fix has
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// been standardized and implemented.
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TLSUnique []byte
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// HandshakeConfirmed is true once all data returned by Read
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// (past and future) is guaranteed not to be replayed.
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HandshakeConfirmed bool
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// Unique0RTTToken is a value that never repeats, and can be used
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// to detect replay attacks against 0-RTT connections.
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// Unique0RTTToken is only present if HandshakeConfirmed is false.
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Unique0RTTToken []byte
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ClientHello []byte // ClientHello packet
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}
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// ClientAuthType declares the policy the server will follow for
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// TLS Client Authentication.
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type ClientAuthType int
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const (
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NoClientCert ClientAuthType = iota
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RequestClientCert
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RequireAnyClientCert
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VerifyClientCertIfGiven
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RequireAndVerifyClientCert
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)
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// ClientSessionState contains the state needed by clients to resume TLS
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// sessions.
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type ClientSessionState struct {
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sessionTicket []uint8 // Encrypted ticket used for session resumption with server
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vers uint16 // SSL/TLS version negotiated for the session
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cipherSuite uint16 // Ciphersuite negotiated for the session
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masterSecret []byte // MasterSecret generated by client on a full handshake
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serverCertificates []*x509.Certificate // Certificate chain presented by the server
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verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate // Certificate chains we built for verification
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}
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// ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState objects that can be used
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// by a client to resume a TLS session with a given server. ClientSessionCache
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// implementations should expect to be called concurrently from different
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// goroutines. Only ticket-based resumption is supported, not SessionID-based
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// resumption.
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type ClientSessionCache interface {
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// Get searches for a ClientSessionState associated with the given key.
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// On return, ok is true if one was found.
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Get(sessionKey string) (session *ClientSessionState, ok bool)
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// Put adds the ClientSessionState to the cache with the given key.
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Put(sessionKey string, cs *ClientSessionState)
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}
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// SignatureScheme identifies a signature algorithm supported by TLS. See
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-4.2.3.
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type SignatureScheme uint16
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const (
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PKCS1WithSHA1 SignatureScheme = 0x0201
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PKCS1WithSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0401
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PKCS1WithSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0501
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PKCS1WithSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0601
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PSSWithSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0804
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PSSWithSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0805
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PSSWithSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0806
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ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256 SignatureScheme = 0x0403
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ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384 SignatureScheme = 0x0503
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ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512 SignatureScheme = 0x0603
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// Legacy signature and hash algorithms for TLS 1.2.
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ECDSAWithSHA1 SignatureScheme = 0x0203
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)
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// ClientHelloInfo contains information from a ClientHello message in order to
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// guide certificate selection in the GetCertificate callback.
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type ClientHelloInfo struct {
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// CipherSuites lists the CipherSuites supported by the client (e.g.
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// TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA).
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CipherSuites []uint16
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// ServerName indicates the name of the server requested by the client
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// in order to support virtual hosting. ServerName is only set if the
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// client is using SNI (see
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// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4366#section-3.1).
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ServerName string
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// SupportedCurves lists the elliptic curves supported by the client.
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// SupportedCurves is set only if the Supported Elliptic Curves
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// Extension is being used (see
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// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.1).
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SupportedCurves []CurveID
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// SupportedPoints lists the point formats supported by the client.
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// SupportedPoints is set only if the Supported Point Formats Extension
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// is being used (see
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// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.2).
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SupportedPoints []uint8
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// SignatureSchemes lists the signature and hash schemes that the client
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// is willing to verify. SignatureSchemes is set only if the Signature
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// Algorithms Extension is being used (see
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1).
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SignatureSchemes []SignatureScheme
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// SupportedProtos lists the application protocols supported by the client.
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// SupportedProtos is set only if the Application-Layer Protocol
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// Negotiation Extension is being used (see
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301#section-3.1).
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//
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// Servers can select a protocol by setting Config.NextProtos in a
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// GetConfigForClient return value.
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SupportedProtos []string
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// SupportedVersions lists the TLS versions supported by the client.
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// For TLS versions less than 1.3, this is extrapolated from the max
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// version advertised by the client, so values other than the greatest
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// might be rejected if used.
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SupportedVersions []uint16
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// Conn is the underlying net.Conn for the connection. Do not read
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// from, or write to, this connection; that will cause the TLS
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// connection to fail.
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Conn net.Conn
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// Offered0RTTData is true if the client announced that it will send
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// 0-RTT data. If the server Config.Accept0RTTData is true, and the
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// client offered a session ticket valid for that purpose, it will
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// be notified that the 0-RTT data is accepted and it will be made
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// immediately available for Read.
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Offered0RTTData bool
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// The Fingerprint is an sequence of bytes unique to this Client Hello.
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// It can be used to prevent or mitigate 0-RTT data replays as it's
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// guaranteed that a replayed connection will have the same Fingerprint.
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Fingerprint []byte
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}
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// CertificateRequestInfo contains information from a server's
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// CertificateRequest message, which is used to demand a certificate and proof
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// of control from a client.
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type CertificateRequestInfo struct {
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// AcceptableCAs contains zero or more, DER-encoded, X.501
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// Distinguished Names. These are the names of root or intermediate CAs
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// that the server wishes the returned certificate to be signed by. An
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// empty slice indicates that the server has no preference.
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AcceptableCAs [][]byte
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// SignatureSchemes lists the signature schemes that the server is
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// willing to verify.
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SignatureSchemes []SignatureScheme
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}
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// RenegotiationSupport enumerates the different levels of support for TLS
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// renegotiation. TLS renegotiation is the act of performing subsequent
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// handshakes on a connection after the first. This significantly complicates
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// the state machine and has been the source of numerous, subtle security
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// issues. Initiating a renegotiation is not supported, but support for
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// accepting renegotiation requests may be enabled.
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//
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// Even when enabled, the server may not change its identity between handshakes
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// (i.e. the leaf certificate must be the same). Additionally, concurrent
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// handshake and application data flow is not permitted so renegotiation can
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// only be used with protocols that synchronise with the renegotiation, such as
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// HTTPS.
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type RenegotiationSupport int
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const (
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// RenegotiateNever disables renegotiation.
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RenegotiateNever RenegotiationSupport = iota
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// RenegotiateOnceAsClient allows a remote server to request
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// renegotiation once per connection.
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RenegotiateOnceAsClient
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// RenegotiateFreelyAsClient allows a remote server to repeatedly
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// request renegotiation.
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RenegotiateFreelyAsClient
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)
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// A Config structure is used to configure a TLS client or server.
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// After one has been passed to a TLS function it must not be
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// modified. A Config may be reused; the tls package will also not
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// modify it.
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type Config struct {
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// Rand provides the source of entropy for nonces and RSA blinding.
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// If Rand is nil, TLS uses the cryptographic random reader in package
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// crypto/rand.
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// The Reader must be safe for use by multiple goroutines.
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Rand io.Reader
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// Time returns the current time as the number of seconds since the epoch.
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// If Time is nil, TLS uses time.Now.
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Time func() time.Time
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// Certificates contains one or more certificate chains to present to
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// the other side of the connection. Server configurations must include
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// at least one certificate or else set GetCertificate. Clients doing
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// client-authentication may set either Certificates or
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// GetClientCertificate.
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Certificates []Certificate
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// NameToCertificate maps from a certificate name to an element of
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// Certificates. Note that a certificate name can be of the form
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// '*.example.com' and so doesn't have to be a domain name as such.
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// See Config.BuildNameToCertificate
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// The nil value causes the first element of Certificates to be used
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// for all connections.
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NameToCertificate map[string]*Certificate
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// GetCertificate returns a Certificate based on the given
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// ClientHelloInfo. It will only be called if the client supplies SNI
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// information or if Certificates is empty.
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//
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// If GetCertificate is nil or returns nil, then the certificate is
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// retrieved from NameToCertificate. If NameToCertificate is nil, the
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// first element of Certificates will be used.
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GetCertificate func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error)
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// GetClientCertificate, if not nil, is called when a server requests a
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// certificate from a client. If set, the contents of Certificates will
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// be ignored.
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//
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// If GetClientCertificate returns an error, the handshake will be
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// aborted and that error will be returned. Otherwise
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// GetClientCertificate must return a non-nil Certificate. If
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// Certificate.Certificate is empty then no certificate will be sent to
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// the server. If this is unacceptable to the server then it may abort
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// the handshake.
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//
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// GetClientCertificate may be called multiple times for the same
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// connection if renegotiation occurs or if TLS 1.3 is in use.
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GetClientCertificate func(*CertificateRequestInfo) (*Certificate, error)
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// GetConfigForClient, if not nil, is called after a ClientHello is
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// received from a client. It may return a non-nil Config in order to
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// change the Config that will be used to handle this connection. If
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// the returned Config is nil, the original Config will be used. The
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// Config returned by this callback may not be subsequently modified.
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//
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// If GetConfigForClient is nil, the Config passed to Server() will be
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// used for all connections.
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//
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// Uniquely for the fields in the returned Config, session ticket keys
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// will be duplicated from the original Config if not set.
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// Specifically, if SetSessionTicketKeys was called on the original
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// config but not on the returned config then the ticket keys from the
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// original config will be copied into the new config before use.
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// Otherwise, if SessionTicketKey was set in the original config but
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// not in the returned config then it will be copied into the returned
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// config before use. If neither of those cases applies then the key
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// material from the returned config will be used for session tickets.
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GetConfigForClient func(*ClientHelloInfo) (*Config, error)
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// VerifyPeerCertificate, if not nil, is called after normal
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// certificate verification by either a TLS client or server. It
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// receives the raw ASN.1 certificates provided by the peer and also
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// any verified chains that normal processing found. If it returns a
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// non-nil error, the handshake is aborted and that error results.
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//
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// If normal verification fails then the handshake will abort before
|
|
// considering this callback. If normal verification is disabled by
|
|
// setting InsecureSkipVerify, or (for a server) when ClientAuth is
|
|
// RequestClientCert or RequireAnyClientCert, then this callback will
|
|
// be considered but the verifiedChains argument will always be nil.
|
|
VerifyPeerCertificate func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error
|
|
|
|
// RootCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities
|
|
// that clients use when verifying server certificates.
|
|
// If RootCAs is nil, TLS uses the host's root CA set.
|
|
RootCAs *x509.CertPool
|
|
|
|
// NextProtos is a list of supported, application level protocols.
|
|
NextProtos []string
|
|
|
|
// ServerName is used to verify the hostname on the returned
|
|
// certificates unless InsecureSkipVerify is given. It is also included
|
|
// in the client's handshake to support virtual hosting unless it is
|
|
// an IP address.
|
|
ServerName string
|
|
|
|
// ClientAuth determines the server's policy for
|
|
// TLS Client Authentication. The default is NoClientCert.
|
|
ClientAuth ClientAuthType
|
|
|
|
// ClientCAs defines the set of root certificate authorities
|
|
// that servers use if required to verify a client certificate
|
|
// by the policy in ClientAuth.
|
|
ClientCAs *x509.CertPool
|
|
|
|
// InsecureSkipVerify controls whether a client verifies the
|
|
// server's certificate chain and host name.
|
|
// If InsecureSkipVerify is true, TLS accepts any certificate
|
|
// presented by the server and any host name in that certificate.
|
|
// In this mode, TLS is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks.
|
|
// This should be used only for testing.
|
|
InsecureSkipVerify bool
|
|
|
|
// CipherSuites is a list of supported cipher suites to be used in
|
|
// TLS 1.0-1.2. If CipherSuites is nil, TLS uses a list of suites
|
|
// supported by the implementation.
|
|
CipherSuites []uint16
|
|
|
|
// PreferServerCipherSuites controls whether the server selects the
|
|
// client's most preferred ciphersuite, or the server's most preferred
|
|
// ciphersuite. If true then the server's preference, as expressed in
|
|
// the order of elements in CipherSuites, is used.
|
|
PreferServerCipherSuites bool
|
|
|
|
// SessionTicketsDisabled may be set to true to disable session ticket
|
|
// (resumption) support.
|
|
SessionTicketsDisabled bool
|
|
|
|
// SessionTicketKey is used by TLS servers to provide session
|
|
// resumption. See RFC 5077. If zero, it will be filled with
|
|
// random data before the first server handshake.
|
|
//
|
|
// If multiple servers are terminating connections for the same host
|
|
// they should all have the same SessionTicketKey. If the
|
|
// SessionTicketKey leaks, previously recorded and future TLS
|
|
// connections using that key are compromised.
|
|
SessionTicketKey [32]byte
|
|
|
|
// ClientSessionCache is a cache of ClientSessionState entries for TLS
|
|
// session resumption.
|
|
ClientSessionCache ClientSessionCache
|
|
|
|
// MinVersion contains the minimum SSL/TLS version that is acceptable.
|
|
// If zero, then TLS 1.0 is taken as the minimum.
|
|
MinVersion uint16
|
|
|
|
// MaxVersion contains the maximum SSL/TLS version that is acceptable.
|
|
// If zero, then the maximum version supported by this package is used,
|
|
// which is currently TLS 1.2.
|
|
MaxVersion uint16
|
|
|
|
// CurvePreferences contains the elliptic curves that will be used in
|
|
// an ECDHE handshake, in preference order. If empty, the default will
|
|
// be used.
|
|
CurvePreferences []CurveID
|
|
|
|
// DynamicRecordSizingDisabled disables adaptive sizing of TLS records.
|
|
// When true, the largest possible TLS record size is always used. When
|
|
// false, the size of TLS records may be adjusted in an attempt to
|
|
// improve latency.
|
|
DynamicRecordSizingDisabled bool
|
|
|
|
// Renegotiation controls what types of renegotiation are supported.
|
|
// The default, none, is correct for the vast majority of applications.
|
|
Renegotiation RenegotiationSupport
|
|
|
|
// KeyLogWriter optionally specifies a destination for TLS master secrets
|
|
// in NSS key log format that can be used to allow external programs
|
|
// such as Wireshark to decrypt TLS connections.
|
|
// See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS/Key_Log_Format.
|
|
// Use of KeyLogWriter compromises security and should only be
|
|
// used for debugging.
|
|
KeyLogWriter io.Writer
|
|
|
|
// If Max0RTTDataSize is not zero, the client will be allowed to use
|
|
// session tickets to send at most this number of bytes of 0-RTT data.
|
|
// 0-RTT data is subject to replay and has memory DoS implications.
|
|
// The server will later be able to refuse the 0-RTT data with
|
|
// Accept0RTTData, or wait for the client to prove that it's not
|
|
// replayed with Conn.ConfirmHandshake.
|
|
//
|
|
// It has no meaning on the client.
|
|
//
|
|
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-2.3.
|
|
Max0RTTDataSize uint32
|
|
|
|
// Accept0RTTData makes the 0-RTT data received from the client
|
|
// immediately available to Read. 0-RTT data is subject to replay.
|
|
// Use Conn.ConfirmHandshake to wait until the data is known not
|
|
// to be replayed after reading it.
|
|
//
|
|
// It has no meaning on the client.
|
|
//
|
|
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-2.3.
|
|
Accept0RTTData bool
|
|
|
|
// SessionTicketSealer, if not nil, is used to wrap and unwrap
|
|
// session tickets, instead of SessionTicketKey.
|
|
SessionTicketSealer SessionTicketSealer
|
|
|
|
serverInitOnce sync.Once // guards calling (*Config).serverInit
|
|
|
|
// mutex protects sessionTicketKeys.
|
|
mutex sync.RWMutex
|
|
// sessionTicketKeys contains zero or more ticket keys. If the length
|
|
// is zero, SessionTicketsDisabled must be true. The first key is used
|
|
// for new tickets and any subsequent keys can be used to decrypt old
|
|
// tickets.
|
|
sessionTicketKeys []ticketKey
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ticketKeyNameLen is the number of bytes of identifier that is prepended to
|
|
// an encrypted session ticket in order to identify the key used to encrypt it.
|
|
const ticketKeyNameLen = 16
|
|
|
|
// ticketKey is the internal representation of a session ticket key.
|
|
type ticketKey struct {
|
|
// keyName is an opaque byte string that serves to identify the session
|
|
// ticket key. It's exposed as plaintext in every session ticket.
|
|
keyName [ticketKeyNameLen]byte
|
|
aesKey [16]byte
|
|
hmacKey [16]byte
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ticketKeyFromBytes converts from the external representation of a session
|
|
// ticket key to a ticketKey. Externally, session ticket keys are 32 random
|
|
// bytes and this function expands that into sufficient name and key material.
|
|
func ticketKeyFromBytes(b [32]byte) (key ticketKey) {
|
|
hashed := sha512.Sum512(b[:])
|
|
copy(key.keyName[:], hashed[:ticketKeyNameLen])
|
|
copy(key.aesKey[:], hashed[ticketKeyNameLen:ticketKeyNameLen+16])
|
|
copy(key.hmacKey[:], hashed[ticketKeyNameLen+16:ticketKeyNameLen+32])
|
|
return key
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Clone returns a shallow clone of c. It is safe to clone a Config that is
|
|
// being used concurrently by a TLS client or server.
|
|
func (c *Config) Clone() *Config {
|
|
// Running serverInit ensures that it's safe to read
|
|
// SessionTicketsDisabled.
|
|
c.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { c.serverInit(nil) })
|
|
|
|
var sessionTicketKeys []ticketKey
|
|
c.mutex.RLock()
|
|
sessionTicketKeys = c.sessionTicketKeys
|
|
c.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
|
|
return &Config{
|
|
Rand: c.Rand,
|
|
Time: c.Time,
|
|
Certificates: c.Certificates,
|
|
NameToCertificate: c.NameToCertificate,
|
|
GetCertificate: c.GetCertificate,
|
|
GetClientCertificate: c.GetClientCertificate,
|
|
GetConfigForClient: c.GetConfigForClient,
|
|
VerifyPeerCertificate: c.VerifyPeerCertificate,
|
|
RootCAs: c.RootCAs,
|
|
NextProtos: c.NextProtos,
|
|
ServerName: c.ServerName,
|
|
ClientAuth: c.ClientAuth,
|
|
ClientCAs: c.ClientCAs,
|
|
InsecureSkipVerify: c.InsecureSkipVerify,
|
|
CipherSuites: c.CipherSuites,
|
|
PreferServerCipherSuites: c.PreferServerCipherSuites,
|
|
SessionTicketsDisabled: c.SessionTicketsDisabled,
|
|
SessionTicketKey: c.SessionTicketKey,
|
|
ClientSessionCache: c.ClientSessionCache,
|
|
MinVersion: c.MinVersion,
|
|
MaxVersion: c.MaxVersion,
|
|
CurvePreferences: c.CurvePreferences,
|
|
DynamicRecordSizingDisabled: c.DynamicRecordSizingDisabled,
|
|
Renegotiation: c.Renegotiation,
|
|
KeyLogWriter: c.KeyLogWriter,
|
|
Accept0RTTData: c.Accept0RTTData,
|
|
Max0RTTDataSize: c.Max0RTTDataSize,
|
|
SessionTicketSealer: c.SessionTicketSealer,
|
|
sessionTicketKeys: sessionTicketKeys,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serverInit is run under c.serverInitOnce to do initialization of c. If c was
|
|
// returned by a GetConfigForClient callback then the argument should be the
|
|
// Config that was passed to Server, otherwise it should be nil.
|
|
func (c *Config) serverInit(originalConfig *Config) {
|
|
if c.SessionTicketsDisabled || len(c.ticketKeys()) != 0 || c.SessionTicketSealer != nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
alreadySet := false
|
|
for _, b := range c.SessionTicketKey {
|
|
if b != 0 {
|
|
alreadySet = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !alreadySet {
|
|
if originalConfig != nil {
|
|
copy(c.SessionTicketKey[:], originalConfig.SessionTicketKey[:])
|
|
} else if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), c.SessionTicketKey[:]); err != nil {
|
|
c.SessionTicketsDisabled = true
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if originalConfig != nil {
|
|
originalConfig.mutex.RLock()
|
|
c.sessionTicketKeys = originalConfig.sessionTicketKeys
|
|
originalConfig.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
} else {
|
|
c.sessionTicketKeys = []ticketKey{ticketKeyFromBytes(c.SessionTicketKey)}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Config) ticketKeys() []ticketKey {
|
|
c.mutex.RLock()
|
|
// c.sessionTicketKeys is constant once created. SetSessionTicketKeys
|
|
// will only update it by replacing it with a new value.
|
|
ret := c.sessionTicketKeys
|
|
c.mutex.RUnlock()
|
|
return ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetSessionTicketKeys updates the session ticket keys for a server. The first
|
|
// key will be used when creating new tickets, while all keys can be used for
|
|
// decrypting tickets. It is safe to call this function while the server is
|
|
// running in order to rotate the session ticket keys. The function will panic
|
|
// if keys is empty.
|
|
func (c *Config) SetSessionTicketKeys(keys [][32]byte) {
|
|
if len(keys) == 0 {
|
|
panic("tls: keys must have at least one key")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newKeys := make([]ticketKey, len(keys))
|
|
for i, bytes := range keys {
|
|
newKeys[i] = ticketKeyFromBytes(bytes)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.mutex.Lock()
|
|
c.sessionTicketKeys = newKeys
|
|
c.mutex.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Config) rand() io.Reader {
|
|
r := c.Rand
|
|
if r == nil {
|
|
return rand.Reader
|
|
}
|
|
return r
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Config) time() time.Time {
|
|
t := c.Time
|
|
if t == nil {
|
|
t = time.Now
|
|
}
|
|
return t()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func hasOverlappingCipherSuites(cs1, cs2 []uint16) bool {
|
|
for _, c1 := range cs1 {
|
|
for _, c2 := range cs2 {
|
|
if c1 == c2 {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Config) cipherSuites() []uint16 {
|
|
s := c.CipherSuites
|
|
if s == nil {
|
|
s = defaultCipherSuites()
|
|
} else if c.maxVersion() >= VersionTLS13 {
|
|
// Ensure that TLS 1.3 suites are always present, but respect
|
|
// the application cipher suite preferences.
|
|
s13 := defaultTLS13CipherSuites()
|
|
if !hasOverlappingCipherSuites(s, s13) {
|
|
allSuites := make([]uint16, len(s13)+len(s))
|
|
allSuites = append(allSuites, s13...)
|
|
s = append(allSuites, s...)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return s
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Config) minVersion() uint16 {
|
|
if c == nil || c.MinVersion == 0 {
|
|
return minVersion
|
|
}
|
|
return c.MinVersion
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Config) maxVersion() uint16 {
|
|
if c == nil || c.MaxVersion == 0 {
|
|
return maxVersion
|
|
}
|
|
return c.MaxVersion
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var defaultCurvePreferences = []CurveID{X25519, CurveP256, CurveP384, CurveP521}
|
|
|
|
func (c *Config) curvePreferences() []CurveID {
|
|
if c == nil || len(c.CurvePreferences) == 0 {
|
|
return defaultCurvePreferences
|
|
}
|
|
return c.CurvePreferences
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mutualVersion returns the protocol version to use given the advertised
|
|
// version of the peer using the legacy non-extension methods.
|
|
func (c *Config) mutualVersion(vers uint16) (uint16, bool) {
|
|
minVersion := c.minVersion()
|
|
maxVersion := c.maxVersion()
|
|
|
|
// Version 1.3 and higher are not negotiated via this mechanism.
|
|
if maxVersion > VersionTLS12 {
|
|
maxVersion = VersionTLS12
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if vers < minVersion {
|
|
return 0, false
|
|
}
|
|
if vers > maxVersion {
|
|
vers = maxVersion
|
|
}
|
|
return vers, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// pickVersion returns the protocol version to use given the advertised
|
|
// versions of the peer using the Supported Versions extension.
|
|
func (c *Config) pickVersion(peerSupportedVersions []uint16) (uint16, bool) {
|
|
supportedVersions := c.getSupportedVersions()
|
|
for _, supportedVersion := range supportedVersions {
|
|
for _, version := range peerSupportedVersions {
|
|
if version == supportedVersion {
|
|
return version, true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// configSuppVersArray is the backing array of Config.getSupportedVersions
|
|
var configSuppVersArray = [...]uint16{VersionTLS13, VersionTLS12, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS10, VersionSSL30}
|
|
|
|
// tls13DraftSuppVersArray is the backing array of Config.getSupportedVersions
|
|
// with TLS 1.3 draft versions included.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO: remove once TLS 1.3 is finalised.
|
|
var tls13DraftSuppVersArray = [...]uint16{VersionTLS13Draft22, VersionTLS12, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS10, VersionSSL30}
|
|
|
|
// getSupportedVersions returns the protocol versions that are supported by the
|
|
// current configuration.
|
|
func (c *Config) getSupportedVersions() []uint16 {
|
|
minVersion := c.minVersion()
|
|
maxVersion := c.maxVersion()
|
|
// Sanity check to avoid advertising unsupported versions.
|
|
if minVersion < VersionSSL30 {
|
|
minVersion = VersionSSL30
|
|
}
|
|
if maxVersion > VersionTLS13 {
|
|
maxVersion = VersionTLS13
|
|
}
|
|
if maxVersion < minVersion {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
// TODO: remove once TLS 1.3 is finalised.
|
|
if maxVersion == VersionTLS13 {
|
|
return tls13DraftSuppVersArray[:len(tls13DraftSuppVersArray)-int(minVersion-VersionSSL30)]
|
|
}
|
|
return configSuppVersArray[VersionTLS13-maxVersion : VersionTLS13-minVersion+1]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getCertificate returns the best certificate for the given ClientHelloInfo,
|
|
// defaulting to the first element of c.Certificates.
|
|
func (c *Config) getCertificate(clientHello *ClientHelloInfo) (*Certificate, error) {
|
|
if c.GetCertificate != nil &&
|
|
(len(c.Certificates) == 0 || len(clientHello.ServerName) > 0) {
|
|
cert, err := c.GetCertificate(clientHello)
|
|
if cert != nil || err != nil {
|
|
return cert, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(c.Certificates) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("tls: no certificates configured")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(c.Certificates) == 1 || c.NameToCertificate == nil {
|
|
// There's only one choice, so no point doing any work.
|
|
return &c.Certificates[0], nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
name := strings.ToLower(clientHello.ServerName)
|
|
for len(name) > 0 && name[len(name)-1] == '.' {
|
|
name = name[:len(name)-1]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if cert, ok := c.NameToCertificate[name]; ok {
|
|
return cert, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// try replacing labels in the name with wildcards until we get a
|
|
// match.
|
|
labels := strings.Split(name, ".")
|
|
for i := range labels {
|
|
labels[i] = "*"
|
|
candidate := strings.Join(labels, ".")
|
|
if cert, ok := c.NameToCertificate[candidate]; ok {
|
|
return cert, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If nothing matches, return the first certificate.
|
|
return &c.Certificates[0], nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// BuildNameToCertificate parses c.Certificates and builds c.NameToCertificate
|
|
// from the CommonName and SubjectAlternateName fields of each of the leaf
|
|
// certificates.
|
|
func (c *Config) BuildNameToCertificate() {
|
|
c.NameToCertificate = make(map[string]*Certificate)
|
|
for i := range c.Certificates {
|
|
cert := &c.Certificates[i]
|
|
x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(cert.Certificate[0])
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if len(x509Cert.Subject.CommonName) > 0 {
|
|
c.NameToCertificate[x509Cert.Subject.CommonName] = cert
|
|
}
|
|
for _, san := range x509Cert.DNSNames {
|
|
c.NameToCertificate[san] = cert
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// writeKeyLog logs client random and master secret if logging was enabled by
|
|
// setting c.KeyLogWriter.
|
|
func (c *Config) writeKeyLog(what string, clientRandom, masterSecret []byte) error {
|
|
if c.KeyLogWriter == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
logLine := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s %x %x\n", what, clientRandom, masterSecret))
|
|
|
|
writerMutex.Lock()
|
|
_, err := c.KeyLogWriter.Write(logLine)
|
|
writerMutex.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// writerMutex protects all KeyLogWriters globally. It is rarely enabled,
|
|
// and is only for debugging, so a global mutex saves space.
|
|
var writerMutex sync.Mutex
|
|
|
|
// A Certificate is a chain of one or more certificates, leaf first.
|
|
type Certificate struct {
|
|
Certificate [][]byte
|
|
// PrivateKey contains the private key corresponding to the public key
|
|
// in Leaf. For a server, this must implement crypto.Signer and/or
|
|
// crypto.Decrypter, with an RSA or ECDSA PublicKey. For a client
|
|
// (performing client authentication), this must be a crypto.Signer
|
|
// with an RSA or ECDSA PublicKey.
|
|
PrivateKey crypto.PrivateKey
|
|
// OCSPStaple contains an optional OCSP response which will be served
|
|
// to clients that request it.
|
|
OCSPStaple []byte
|
|
// SignedCertificateTimestamps contains an optional list of Signed
|
|
// Certificate Timestamps which will be served to clients that request it.
|
|
SignedCertificateTimestamps [][]byte
|
|
// Leaf is the parsed form of the leaf certificate, which may be
|
|
// initialized using x509.ParseCertificate to reduce per-handshake
|
|
// processing for TLS clients doing client authentication. If nil, the
|
|
// leaf certificate will be parsed as needed.
|
|
Leaf *x509.Certificate
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type handshakeMessage interface {
|
|
marshal() []byte
|
|
unmarshal([]byte) alert
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// lruSessionCache is a ClientSessionCache implementation that uses an LRU
|
|
// caching strategy.
|
|
type lruSessionCache struct {
|
|
sync.Mutex
|
|
|
|
m map[string]*list.Element
|
|
q *list.List
|
|
capacity int
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type lruSessionCacheEntry struct {
|
|
sessionKey string
|
|
state *ClientSessionState
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewLRUClientSessionCache returns a ClientSessionCache with the given
|
|
// capacity that uses an LRU strategy. If capacity is < 1, a default capacity
|
|
// is used instead.
|
|
func NewLRUClientSessionCache(capacity int) ClientSessionCache {
|
|
const defaultSessionCacheCapacity = 64
|
|
|
|
if capacity < 1 {
|
|
capacity = defaultSessionCacheCapacity
|
|
}
|
|
return &lruSessionCache{
|
|
m: make(map[string]*list.Element),
|
|
q: list.New(),
|
|
capacity: capacity,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Put adds the provided (sessionKey, cs) pair to the cache.
|
|
func (c *lruSessionCache) Put(sessionKey string, cs *ClientSessionState) {
|
|
c.Lock()
|
|
defer c.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
if elem, ok := c.m[sessionKey]; ok {
|
|
entry := elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry)
|
|
entry.state = cs
|
|
c.q.MoveToFront(elem)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.q.Len() < c.capacity {
|
|
entry := &lruSessionCacheEntry{sessionKey, cs}
|
|
c.m[sessionKey] = c.q.PushFront(entry)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
elem := c.q.Back()
|
|
entry := elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry)
|
|
delete(c.m, entry.sessionKey)
|
|
entry.sessionKey = sessionKey
|
|
entry.state = cs
|
|
c.q.MoveToFront(elem)
|
|
c.m[sessionKey] = elem
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get returns the ClientSessionState value associated with a given key. It
|
|
// returns (nil, false) if no value is found.
|
|
func (c *lruSessionCache) Get(sessionKey string) (*ClientSessionState, bool) {
|
|
c.Lock()
|
|
defer c.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
if elem, ok := c.m[sessionKey]; ok {
|
|
c.q.MoveToFront(elem)
|
|
return elem.Value.(*lruSessionCacheEntry).state, true
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO(jsing): Make these available to both crypto/x509 and crypto/tls.
|
|
type dsaSignature struct {
|
|
R, S *big.Int
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type ecdsaSignature dsaSignature
|
|
|
|
var emptyConfig Config
|
|
|
|
func defaultConfig() *Config {
|
|
return &emptyConfig
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var (
|
|
once sync.Once
|
|
varDefaultCipherSuites []uint16
|
|
varDefaultTLS13CipherSuites []uint16
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func defaultCipherSuites() []uint16 {
|
|
once.Do(initDefaultCipherSuites)
|
|
return varDefaultCipherSuites
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func defaultTLS13CipherSuites() []uint16 {
|
|
once.Do(initDefaultCipherSuites)
|
|
return varDefaultTLS13CipherSuites
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func initDefaultCipherSuites() {
|
|
var topCipherSuites, topTLS13CipherSuites []uint16
|
|
if cipherhw.AESGCMSupport() {
|
|
// If AES-GCM hardware is provided then prioritise AES-GCM
|
|
// cipher suites.
|
|
topTLS13CipherSuites = []uint16{
|
|
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
|
|
}
|
|
topCipherSuites = []uint16{
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Without AES-GCM hardware, we put the ChaCha20-Poly1305
|
|
// cipher suites first.
|
|
topTLS13CipherSuites = []uint16{
|
|
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
|
|
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|
}
|
|
topCipherSuites = []uint16{
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
|
|
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
varDefaultTLS13CipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(cipherSuites))
|
|
varDefaultTLS13CipherSuites = append(varDefaultTLS13CipherSuites, topTLS13CipherSuites...)
|
|
varDefaultCipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(cipherSuites))
|
|
varDefaultCipherSuites = append(varDefaultCipherSuites, topCipherSuites...)
|
|
|
|
NextCipherSuite:
|
|
for _, suite := range cipherSuites {
|
|
if suite.flags&suiteDefaultOff != 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if suite.flags&suiteTLS13 != 0 {
|
|
for _, existing := range varDefaultTLS13CipherSuites {
|
|
if existing == suite.id {
|
|
continue NextCipherSuite
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
varDefaultTLS13CipherSuites = append(varDefaultTLS13CipherSuites, suite.id)
|
|
} else {
|
|
for _, existing := range varDefaultCipherSuites {
|
|
if existing == suite.id {
|
|
continue NextCipherSuite
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
varDefaultCipherSuites = append(varDefaultCipherSuites, suite.id)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
varDefaultCipherSuites = append(varDefaultTLS13CipherSuites, varDefaultCipherSuites...)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func unexpectedMessageError(wanted, got interface{}) error {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("tls: received unexpected handshake message of type %T when waiting for %T", got, wanted)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(sigAlg SignatureScheme, supportedSignatureAlgorithms []SignatureScheme) bool {
|
|
for _, s := range supportedSignatureAlgorithms {
|
|
if s == sigAlg {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// signatureFromSignatureScheme maps a signature algorithm to the underlying
|
|
// signature method (without hash function).
|
|
func signatureFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme) uint8 {
|
|
switch signatureAlgorithm {
|
|
case PKCS1WithSHA1, PKCS1WithSHA256, PKCS1WithSHA384, PKCS1WithSHA512:
|
|
return signaturePKCS1v15
|
|
case PSSWithSHA256, PSSWithSHA384, PSSWithSHA512:
|
|
return signatureRSAPSS
|
|
case ECDSAWithSHA1, ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
|
|
return signatureECDSA
|
|
default:
|
|
return 0
|
|
}
|
|
}
|