f75fa96c2c
(This relands commit a4dcc692011bf1ceca9b1a363fd83f3e59e399ee.) https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3 states: “Literal IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are not permitted in "HostName".” However, if an IP literal was set as Config.ServerName (which could happen as easily as calling Dial with an IP address) then the code would send the IP literal as the SNI value. This change filters out IP literals, as recognised by net.ParseIP, from being sent as the SNI value. Fixes #13111. Change-Id: I6e544a78a01388f8fe98150589d073b917087f75 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/16776 Run-TryBot: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org> Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org> TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
668 lines
18 KiB
Go
668 lines
18 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tls
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"strconv"
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)
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type clientHandshakeState struct {
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c *Conn
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serverHello *serverHelloMsg
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hello *clientHelloMsg
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suite *cipherSuite
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finishedHash finishedHash
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masterSecret []byte
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session *ClientSessionState
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}
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func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
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if c.config == nil {
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c.config = defaultConfig()
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}
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if len(c.config.ServerName) == 0 && !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
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return errors.New("tls: either ServerName or InsecureSkipVerify must be specified in the tls.Config")
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}
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nextProtosLength := 0
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for _, proto := range c.config.NextProtos {
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if l := len(proto); l == 0 || l > 255 {
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return errors.New("tls: invalid NextProtos value")
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} else {
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nextProtosLength += 1 + l
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}
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}
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if nextProtosLength > 0xffff {
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return errors.New("tls: NextProtos values too large")
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}
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sni := c.config.ServerName
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// IP address literals are not permitted as SNI values. See
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// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-3.
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if net.ParseIP(sni) != nil {
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sni = ""
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}
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hello := &clientHelloMsg{
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vers: c.config.maxVersion(),
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compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
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random: make([]byte, 32),
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ocspStapling: true,
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scts: true,
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serverName: sni,
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supportedCurves: c.config.curvePreferences(),
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supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed},
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nextProtoNeg: len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0,
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secureRenegotiation: true,
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alpnProtocols: c.config.NextProtos,
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}
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possibleCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
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hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites))
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NextCipherSuite:
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for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites {
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for _, suite := range cipherSuites {
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if suite.id != suiteId {
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continue
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}
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// Don't advertise TLS 1.2-only cipher suites unless
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// we're attempting TLS 1.2.
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if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
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continue
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}
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hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId)
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continue NextCipherSuite
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}
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}
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_, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.random)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
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}
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if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
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hello.signatureAndHashes = supportedSignatureAlgorithms
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}
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var session *ClientSessionState
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var cacheKey string
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sessionCache := c.config.ClientSessionCache
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if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
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sessionCache = nil
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}
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if sessionCache != nil {
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hello.ticketSupported = true
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// Try to resume a previously negotiated TLS session, if
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// available.
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cacheKey = clientSessionCacheKey(c.conn.RemoteAddr(), c.config)
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candidateSession, ok := sessionCache.Get(cacheKey)
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if ok {
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// Check that the ciphersuite/version used for the
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// previous session are still valid.
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cipherSuiteOk := false
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for _, id := range hello.cipherSuites {
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if id == candidateSession.cipherSuite {
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cipherSuiteOk = true
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break
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}
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}
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versOk := candidateSession.vers >= c.config.minVersion() &&
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candidateSession.vers <= c.config.maxVersion()
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if versOk && cipherSuiteOk {
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session = candidateSession
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}
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}
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}
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if session != nil {
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hello.sessionTicket = session.sessionTicket
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// A random session ID is used to detect when the
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// server accepted the ticket and is resuming a session
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// (see RFC 5077).
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hello.sessionId = make([]byte, 16)
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if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
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}
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}
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal())
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(serverHello, msg)
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}
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vers, ok := c.config.mutualVersion(serverHello.vers)
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if !ok || vers < VersionTLS10 {
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// TLS 1.0 is the minimum version supported as a client.
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c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected unsupported protocol version %x", serverHello.vers)
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}
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c.vers = vers
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c.haveVers = true
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suite := mutualCipherSuite(c.config.cipherSuites(), serverHello.cipherSuite)
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if suite == nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: server selected an unsupported cipher suite")
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}
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hs := &clientHandshakeState{
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c: c,
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serverHello: serverHello,
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hello: hello,
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suite: suite,
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finishedHash: newFinishedHash(c.vers, suite),
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session: session,
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}
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isResume, err := hs.processServerHello()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// No signatures of the handshake are needed in a resumption.
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// Otherwise, in a full handshake, if we don't have any certificates
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// configured then we will never send a CertificateVerify message and
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// thus no signatures are needed in that case either.
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if isResume || len(c.config.Certificates) == 0 {
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hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
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if isResume {
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(c.firstFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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} else {
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if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(c.firstFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if sessionCache != nil && hs.session != nil && session != hs.session {
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sessionCache.Put(cacheKey, hs.session)
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}
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c.didResume = isResume
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c.handshakeComplete = true
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c.cipherSuite = suite.id
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
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if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
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for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return errors.New("tls: failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error())
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}
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certs[i] = cert
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}
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if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
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opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
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Roots: c.config.RootCAs,
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CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
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DNSName: c.config.ServerName,
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Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
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}
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for i, cert := range certs {
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if i == 0 {
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continue
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}
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opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
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}
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c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return err
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}
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}
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switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
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case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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break
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: server's certificate contains an unsupported type of public key: %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
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}
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c.peerCertificates = certs
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if hs.serverHello.ocspStapling {
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(cs, msg)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
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if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
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c.ocspResponse = cs.response
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}
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
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skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
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if ok {
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hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
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err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, hs.serverHello, certs[0], skx)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return err
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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var chainToSend *Certificate
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var certRequested bool
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certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
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if ok {
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certRequested = true
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// RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field:
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// A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate
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// authorities. These distinguished names may specify a desired
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// distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA;
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// thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots
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// and a desired authorization space. If the
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// certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY
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// send any certificate of the appropriate
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// ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external
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// arrangement to the contrary.
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
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var rsaAvail, ecdsaAvail bool
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for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
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switch certType {
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case certTypeRSASign:
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rsaAvail = true
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case certTypeECDSASign:
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ecdsaAvail = true
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}
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}
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// We need to search our list of client certs for one
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// where SignatureAlgorithm is acceptable to the server and the
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// Issuer is in certReq.certificateAuthorities
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findCert:
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for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates {
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if !rsaAvail && !ecdsaAvail {
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continue
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}
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for j, cert := range chain.Certificate {
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x509Cert := chain.Leaf
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// parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf
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// node, or if chain.Leaf was nil
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if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil {
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if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error())
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}
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}
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switch {
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case rsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
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case ecdsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
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default:
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continue findCert
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}
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if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 {
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// they gave us an empty list, so just take the
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// first cert from c.config.Certificates
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chainToSend = &chain
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break findCert
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}
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for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities {
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if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) {
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chainToSend = &chain
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break findCert
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}
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}
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}
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(shd, msg)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
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// If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
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// Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
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// certificate to send.
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if certRequested {
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certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
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if chainToSend != nil {
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certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
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}
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preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.hello, certs[0])
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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if ckx != nil {
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hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal())
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}
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if chainToSend != nil {
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certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{
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hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12,
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}
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key, ok := chainToSend.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: client certificate private key of type %T does not implement crypto.Signer", chainToSend.PrivateKey)
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}
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var signatureType uint8
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switch key.Public().(type) {
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case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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signatureType = signatureECDSA
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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signatureType = signatureRSA
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return fmt.Errorf("tls: failed to sign handshake with client certificate: unknown client certificate key type: %T", key)
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}
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certVerify.signatureAndHash, err = hs.finishedHash.selectClientCertSignatureAlgorithm(certReq.signatureAndHashes, signatureType)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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digest, hashFunc, err := hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(certVerify.signatureAndHash, hs.masterSecret)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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certVerify.signature, err = key.Sign(c.config.rand(), digest, hashFunc)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal())
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}
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hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random)
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hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
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c := hs.c
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clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
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keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.hello.random, hs.serverHello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
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var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
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var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
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if hs.suite.cipher != nil {
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clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */)
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clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
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serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */)
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serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
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} else {
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clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
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serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
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}
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c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
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c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) serverResumedSession() bool {
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// If the server responded with the same sessionId then it means the
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// sessionTicket is being used to resume a TLS session.
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return hs.session != nil && hs.hello.sessionId != nil &&
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bytes.Equal(hs.serverHello.sessionId, hs.hello.sessionId)
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}
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func (hs *clientHandshakeState) processServerHello() (bool, error) {
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c := hs.c
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if hs.serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return false, errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported compression format")
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}
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clientDidNPN := hs.hello.nextProtoNeg
|
|
clientDidALPN := len(hs.hello.alpnProtocols) > 0
|
|
serverHasNPN := hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg
|
|
serverHasALPN := len(hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol) > 0
|
|
|
|
if !clientDidNPN && serverHasNPN {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested NPN extension")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !clientDidALPN && serverHasALPN {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return false, errors.New("server advertised unrequested ALPN extension")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if serverHasNPN && serverHasALPN {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return false, errors.New("server advertised both NPN and ALPN extensions")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if serverHasALPN {
|
|
c.clientProtocol = hs.serverHello.alpnProtocol
|
|
c.clientProtocolFallback = false
|
|
}
|
|
c.scts = hs.serverHello.scts
|
|
|
|
if hs.serverResumedSession() {
|
|
// Restore masterSecret and peerCerts from previous state
|
|
hs.masterSecret = hs.session.masterSecret
|
|
c.peerCertificates = hs.session.serverCertificates
|
|
c.verifiedChains = hs.session.verifiedChains
|
|
return true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
|
|
if err := c.in.error(); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(serverFinished, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verify := hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
|
|
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: server's Finished message was incorrect")
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(serverFinished.marshal())
|
|
copy(out, verify)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) readSessionTicket() error {
|
|
if !hs.serverHello.ticketSupported {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
sessionTicketMsg, ok := msg.(*newSessionTicketMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(sessionTicketMsg, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(sessionTicketMsg.marshal())
|
|
|
|
hs.session = &ClientSessionState{
|
|
sessionTicket: sessionTicketMsg.ticket,
|
|
vers: c.vers,
|
|
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
|
|
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
|
|
serverCertificates: c.peerCertificates,
|
|
verifiedChains: c.verifiedChains,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *clientHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
|
|
if hs.serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
|
|
nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg)
|
|
proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, hs.serverHello.nextProtos)
|
|
nextProto.proto = proto
|
|
c.clientProtocol = proto
|
|
c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, nextProto.marshal())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finished := new(finishedMsg)
|
|
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
|
|
c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())
|
|
copy(out, finished.verifyData)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// clientSessionCacheKey returns a key used to cache sessionTickets that could
|
|
// be used to resume previously negotiated TLS sessions with a server.
|
|
func clientSessionCacheKey(serverAddr net.Addr, config *Config) string {
|
|
if len(config.ServerName) > 0 {
|
|
return config.ServerName
|
|
}
|
|
return serverAddr.String()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation or ALPN protocol
|
|
// given list of possible protocols and a list of the preference order. The
|
|
// first list must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag
|
|
// indicating if the fallback case was reached.
|
|
func mutualProtocol(protos, preferenceProtos []string) (string, bool) {
|
|
for _, s := range preferenceProtos {
|
|
for _, c := range protos {
|
|
if s == c {
|
|
return s, false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return protos[0], true
|
|
}
|