dd9f217e6a
Fixes #1146. R=rsc, agl1 CC=golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/2380042
281 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
281 lines
8.0 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tls
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// The handshake goroutine reads handshake messages from the record processor
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// and outputs messages to be written on another channel. It updates the record
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// processor with the state of the connection via the control channel. In the
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// case of handshake messages that need synchronous processing (because they
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// affect the handling of the next record) the record processor knows about
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// them and either waits for a control message (Finished) or includes a reply
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// channel in the message (ChangeCipherSpec).
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import (
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/rc4"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"io"
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"os"
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)
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type cipherSuite struct {
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id uint16 // The number of this suite on the wire.
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hashLength, cipherKeyLength int
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// TODO(agl): need a method to create the cipher and hash interfaces.
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}
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var cipherSuites = []cipherSuite{
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cipherSuite{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 20, 16},
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}
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func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() os.Error {
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config := c.config
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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vers, ok := mutualVersion(clientHello.vers)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
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}
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c.vers = vers
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c.haveVers = true
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finishedHash := newFinishedHash()
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finishedHash.Write(clientHello.marshal())
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hello := new(serverHelloMsg)
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// We only support a single ciphersuite so we look for it in the list
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// of client supported suites.
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//
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// TODO(agl): Add additional cipher suites.
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var suite *cipherSuite
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for _, id := range clientHello.cipherSuites {
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for _, supported := range cipherSuites {
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if supported.id == id {
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suite = &supported
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break
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}
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}
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}
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foundCompression := false
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// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
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for _, compression := range clientHello.compressionMethods {
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if compression == compressionNone {
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foundCompression = true
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break
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}
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}
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if suite == nil || !foundCompression {
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return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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}
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hello.vers = vers
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hello.cipherSuite = suite.id
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t := uint32(config.Time())
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hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
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hello.random[0] = byte(t >> 24)
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hello.random[1] = byte(t >> 16)
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hello.random[2] = byte(t >> 8)
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hello.random[3] = byte(t)
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_, err = io.ReadFull(config.Rand, hello.random[4:])
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if err != nil {
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return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
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if clientHello.nextProtoNeg {
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hello.nextProtoNeg = true
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hello.nextProtos = config.NextProtos
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}
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finishedHash.Write(hello.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal())
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if len(config.Certificates) == 0 {
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return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
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certMsg.certificates = config.Certificates[0].Certificate
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finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
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if config.AuthenticateClient {
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// Request a client certificate
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certReq := new(certificateRequestMsg)
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certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{certTypeRSASign}
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// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
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// the client that it may send any certificate in response
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// to our request.
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finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal())
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}
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helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
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finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal())
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var pub *rsa.PublicKey
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if config.AuthenticateClient {
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// Get client certificate
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certMsg, ok = msg.(*certificateMsg)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
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for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
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cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return os.ErrorString("could not parse client's certificate: " + err.String())
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}
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certs[i] = cert
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}
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// TODO(agl): do better validation of certs: max path length, name restrictions etc.
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for i := 1; i < len(certs); i++ {
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if err := certs[i-1].CheckSignatureFrom(certs[i]); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return os.ErrorString("could not validate certificate signature: " + err.String())
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}
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}
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if len(certs) > 0 {
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key, ok := certs[0].PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
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}
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pub = key
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c.peerCertificates = certs
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}
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}
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// Get client key exchange
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
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// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
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// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
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// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a MD5SHA1 digest of all preceeding
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// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
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// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
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// posession of the private key of the certificate.
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if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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digest := make([]byte, 36)
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copy(digest[0:16], finishedHash.serverMD5.Sum())
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copy(digest[16:36], finishedHash.serverSHA1.Sum())
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err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, rsa.HashMD5SHA1, digest, certVerify.signature)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return os.ErrorString("could not validate signature of connection nonces: " + err.String())
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}
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finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
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}
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preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48)
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_, err = io.ReadFull(config.Rand, preMasterSecret[2:])
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if err != nil {
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return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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}
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err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(config.Rand, config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey, ckx.ciphertext, preMasterSecret)
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if err != nil {
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return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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}
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// We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one,
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// by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the
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// encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small
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// benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the
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// wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section
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// 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346.
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masterSecret, clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey :=
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keysFromPreMasterSecret11(preMasterSecret, clientHello.random, hello.random, suite.hashLength, suite.cipherKeyLength)
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cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(clientKey)
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c.in.prepareCipherSpec(cipher, hmac.NewSHA1(clientMAC))
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c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
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if err := c.error(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if hello.nextProtoNeg {
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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nextProto, ok := msg.(*nextProtoMsg)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
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c.clientProtocol = nextProto.proto
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
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if !ok {
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return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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}
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verify := finishedHash.clientSum(masterSecret)
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if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
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subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
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return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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}
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finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
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cipher2, _ := rc4.NewCipher(serverKey)
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c.out.prepareCipherSpec(cipher2, hmac.NewSHA1(serverMAC))
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
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finished := new(finishedMsg)
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finished.verifyData = finishedHash.serverSum(masterSecret)
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c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())
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c.handshakeComplete = true
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c.cipherSuite = TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
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return nil
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}
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