6c380f3bb6
Consolidate the signature and hash fields (SignatureAndHashAlgorithm in TLS 1.2) into a single uint16 (SignatureScheme in TLS 1.3 draft 21). This makes it easier to add RSASSA-PSS for TLS 1.2 in the future. Fields were named like "signatureAlgorithm" rather than "signatureScheme" since that name is also used throughout the 1.3 draft. The only new public symbol is ECDSAWithSHA1, other than that this is an internal change with no new functionality. Change-Id: Iba63d262ab1af895420583ac9e302d9705a7e0f0 Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/62210 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
837 lines
23 KiB
Go
837 lines
23 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package tls
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import (
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/asn1"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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)
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// serverHandshakeState contains details of a server handshake in progress.
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// It's discarded once the handshake has completed.
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type serverHandshakeState struct {
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c *Conn
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clientHello *clientHelloMsg
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hello *serverHelloMsg
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suite *cipherSuite
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ellipticOk bool
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ecdsaOk bool
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rsaDecryptOk bool
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rsaSignOk bool
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sessionState *sessionState
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finishedHash finishedHash
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masterSecret []byte
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certsFromClient [][]byte
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cert *Certificate
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cachedClientHelloInfo *ClientHelloInfo
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}
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// serverHandshake performs a TLS handshake as a server.
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// c.out.Mutex <= L; c.handshakeMutex <= L.
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func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() error {
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// If this is the first server handshake, we generate a random key to
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// encrypt the tickets with.
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c.config.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { c.config.serverInit(nil) })
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hs := serverHandshakeState{
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c: c,
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}
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isResume, err := hs.readClientHello()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// For an overview of TLS handshaking, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.3
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c.buffering = true
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if isResume {
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// The client has included a session ticket and so we do an abbreviated handshake.
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if err := hs.doResumeHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// ticketSupported is set in a resumption handshake if the
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// ticket from the client was encrypted with an old session
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// ticket key and thus a refreshed ticket should be sent.
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if hs.hello.ticketSupported {
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if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(c.serverFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.clientFinishedIsFirst = false
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if err := hs.readFinished(nil); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.didResume = true
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} else {
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// The client didn't include a session ticket, or it wasn't
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// valid so we do a full handshake.
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if err := hs.doFullHandshake(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.establishKeys(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.readFinished(c.clientFinished[:]); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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c.clientFinishedIsFirst = true
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c.buffering = true
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if err := hs.sendSessionTicket(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if err := hs.sendFinished(nil); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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c.handshakeComplete = true
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return nil
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}
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// readClientHello reads a ClientHello message from the client and decides
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// whether we will perform session resumption.
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readClientHello() (isResume bool, err error) {
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c := hs.c
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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var ok bool
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hs.clientHello, ok = msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return false, unexpectedMessageError(hs.clientHello, msg)
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}
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if c.config.GetConfigForClient != nil {
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if newConfig, err := c.config.GetConfigForClient(hs.clientHelloInfo()); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return false, err
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} else if newConfig != nil {
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newConfig.serverInitOnce.Do(func() { newConfig.serverInit(c.config) })
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c.config = newConfig
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}
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}
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c.vers, ok = c.config.mutualVersion(hs.clientHello.vers)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
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return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: client offered an unsupported, maximum protocol version of %x", hs.clientHello.vers)
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}
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c.haveVers = true
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hs.hello = new(serverHelloMsg)
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supportedCurve := false
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preferredCurves := c.config.curvePreferences()
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Curves:
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for _, curve := range hs.clientHello.supportedCurves {
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for _, supported := range preferredCurves {
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if supported == curve {
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supportedCurve = true
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break Curves
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}
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}
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}
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supportedPointFormat := false
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for _, pointFormat := range hs.clientHello.supportedPoints {
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if pointFormat == pointFormatUncompressed {
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supportedPointFormat = true
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break
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}
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}
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hs.ellipticOk = supportedCurve && supportedPointFormat
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foundCompression := false
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// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
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for _, compression := range hs.clientHello.compressionMethods {
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if compression == compressionNone {
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foundCompression = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !foundCompression {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return false, errors.New("tls: client does not support uncompressed connections")
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}
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hs.hello.vers = c.vers
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hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
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_, err = io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return false, err
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}
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if len(hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiation) != 0 {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return false, errors.New("tls: initial handshake had non-empty renegotiation extension")
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}
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hs.hello.secureRenegotiationSupported = hs.clientHello.secureRenegotiationSupported
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hs.hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
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if len(hs.clientHello.serverName) > 0 {
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c.serverName = hs.clientHello.serverName
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}
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if len(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols) > 0 {
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if selectedProto, fallback := mutualProtocol(hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols, c.config.NextProtos); !fallback {
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hs.hello.alpnProtocol = selectedProto
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c.clientProtocol = selectedProto
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}
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} else {
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// Although sending an empty NPN extension is reasonable, Firefox has
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// had a bug around this. Best to send nothing at all if
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// c.config.NextProtos is empty. See
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// https://golang.org/issue/5445.
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if hs.clientHello.nextProtoNeg && len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0 {
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hs.hello.nextProtoNeg = true
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hs.hello.nextProtos = c.config.NextProtos
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}
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}
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hs.cert, err = c.config.getCertificate(hs.clientHelloInfo())
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return false, err
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}
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if hs.clientHello.scts {
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hs.hello.scts = hs.cert.SignedCertificateTimestamps
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}
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if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer); ok {
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switch priv.Public().(type) {
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case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
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hs.ecdsaOk = true
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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hs.rsaSignOk = true
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported signing key type (%T)", priv.Public())
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}
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}
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if priv, ok := hs.cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter); ok {
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switch priv.Public().(type) {
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case *rsa.PublicKey:
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hs.rsaDecryptOk = true
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default:
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return false, fmt.Errorf("tls: unsupported decryption key type (%T)", priv.Public())
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}
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}
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if hs.checkForResumption() {
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return true, nil
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}
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var preferenceList, supportedList []uint16
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if c.config.PreferServerCipherSuites {
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preferenceList = c.config.cipherSuites()
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supportedList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
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} else {
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preferenceList = hs.clientHello.cipherSuites
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supportedList = c.config.cipherSuites()
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}
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for _, id := range preferenceList {
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if hs.setCipherSuite(id, supportedList, c.vers) {
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break
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}
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}
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if hs.suite == nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return false, errors.New("tls: no cipher suite supported by both client and server")
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}
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// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7507.
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for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
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if id == TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV {
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// The client is doing a fallback connection.
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if hs.clientHello.vers < c.config.maxVersion() {
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c.sendAlert(alertInappropriateFallback)
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return false, errors.New("tls: client using inappropriate protocol fallback")
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}
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break
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}
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}
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return false, nil
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}
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// checkForResumption reports whether we should perform resumption on this connection.
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) checkForResumption() bool {
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c := hs.c
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if c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled {
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return false
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}
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var ok bool
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var sessionTicket = append([]uint8{}, hs.clientHello.sessionTicket...)
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if hs.sessionState, ok = c.decryptTicket(sessionTicket); !ok {
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return false
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}
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// Never resume a session for a different TLS version.
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if c.vers != hs.sessionState.vers {
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return false
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}
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cipherSuiteOk := false
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// Check that the client is still offering the ciphersuite in the session.
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for _, id := range hs.clientHello.cipherSuites {
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if id == hs.sessionState.cipherSuite {
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cipherSuiteOk = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !cipherSuiteOk {
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return false
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}
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// Check that we also support the ciphersuite from the session.
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if !hs.setCipherSuite(hs.sessionState.cipherSuite, c.config.cipherSuites(), hs.sessionState.vers) {
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return false
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}
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sessionHasClientCerts := len(hs.sessionState.certificates) != 0
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needClientCerts := c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAnyClientCert || c.config.ClientAuth == RequireAndVerifyClientCert
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if needClientCerts && !sessionHasClientCerts {
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return false
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}
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if sessionHasClientCerts && c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
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return false
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}
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return true
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doResumeHandshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
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// We echo the client's session ID in the ServerHello to let it know
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// that we're doing a resumption.
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hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
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hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.sessionState.usedOldKey
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hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(c.vers, hs.suite)
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hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if len(hs.sessionState.certificates) > 0 {
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if _, err := hs.processCertsFromClient(hs.sessionState.certificates); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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hs.masterSecret = hs.sessionState.masterSecret
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return nil
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}
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func (hs *serverHandshakeState) doFullHandshake() error {
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c := hs.c
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if hs.clientHello.ocspStapling && len(hs.cert.OCSPStaple) > 0 {
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hs.hello.ocspStapling = true
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}
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hs.hello.ticketSupported = hs.clientHello.ticketSupported && !c.config.SessionTicketsDisabled
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hs.hello.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
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hs.finishedHash = newFinishedHash(hs.c.vers, hs.suite)
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if c.config.ClientAuth == NoClientCert {
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// No need to keep a full record of the handshake if client
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// certificates won't be used.
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hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.clientHello.marshal())
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hs.finishedHash.Write(hs.hello.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hs.hello.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
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certMsg.certificates = hs.cert.Certificate
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if hs.hello.ocspStapling {
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certStatus := new(certificateStatusMsg)
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certStatus.statusType = statusTypeOCSP
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certStatus.response = hs.cert.OCSPStaple
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certStatus.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certStatus.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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keyAgreement := hs.suite.ka(c.vers)
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skx, err := keyAgreement.generateServerKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, hs.clientHello, hs.hello)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return err
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}
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if skx != nil {
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hs.finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, skx.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
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// Request a client certificate
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certReq := new(certificateRequestMsg)
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certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{
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byte(certTypeRSASign),
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byte(certTypeECDSASign),
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}
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if c.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
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certReq.hasSignatureAndHash = true
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certReq.supportedSignatureAlgorithms = supportedSignatureAlgorithms
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}
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// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
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// the client that it may send any certificate in response
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// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
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// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
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// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
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if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
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certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
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hs.finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
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if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal()); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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if _, err := c.flush(); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var pub crypto.PublicKey // public key for client auth, if any
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msg, err := c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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var ok bool
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// If we requested a client certificate, then the client must send a
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// certificate message, even if it's empty.
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if c.config.ClientAuth >= RequestClientCert {
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if certMsg, ok = msg.(*certificateMsg); !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(certMsg, msg)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
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if len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
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// The client didn't actually send a certificate
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switch c.config.ClientAuth {
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case RequireAnyClientCert, RequireAndVerifyClientCert:
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c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
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return errors.New("tls: client didn't provide a certificate")
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}
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}
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pub, err = hs.processCertsFromClient(certMsg.certificates)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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// Get client key exchange
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ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(ckx, msg)
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}
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hs.finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
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preMasterSecret, err := keyAgreement.processClientKeyExchange(c.config, hs.cert, ckx, c.vers)
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if err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
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return err
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}
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hs.masterSecret = masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, preMasterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random)
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if err := c.config.writeKeyLog(hs.clientHello.random, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
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c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
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return err
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}
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// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
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// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
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// clientKeyExchangeMsg. This message is a digest of all preceding
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// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
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// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
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// possession of the private key of the certificate.
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if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
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msg, err = c.readHandshake()
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
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if !ok {
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c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
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return unexpectedMessageError(certVerify, msg)
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}
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// Determine the signature type.
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var signatureAlgorithm SignatureScheme
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var sigType uint8
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if certVerify.hasSignatureAndHash {
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|
signatureAlgorithm = certVerify.signatureAlgorithm
|
|
if !isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm(signatureAlgorithm, supportedSignatureAlgorithms) {
|
|
return errors.New("tls: unsupported hash function for client certificate")
|
|
}
|
|
sigType = signatureFromSignatureScheme(signatureAlgorithm)
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Before TLS 1.2 the signature algorithm was implicit
|
|
// from the key type, and only one hash per signature
|
|
// algorithm was possible. Leave signatureAlgorithm
|
|
// unset.
|
|
switch pub.(type) {
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
|
sigType = signatureECDSA
|
|
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
|
sigType = signatureRSA
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch key := pub.(type) {
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
|
if sigType != signatureECDSA {
|
|
err = errors.New("tls: bad signature type for client's ECDSA certificate")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
ecdsaSig := new(ecdsaSignature)
|
|
if _, err = asn1.Unmarshal(certVerify.signature, ecdsaSig); err != nil {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
if ecdsaSig.R.Sign() <= 0 || ecdsaSig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
|
|
err = errors.New("tls: ECDSA signature contained zero or negative values")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
var digest []byte
|
|
if digest, _, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, signatureAlgorithm, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
if !ecdsa.Verify(key, digest, ecdsaSig.R, ecdsaSig.S) {
|
|
err = errors.New("tls: ECDSA verification failure")
|
|
}
|
|
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
|
if sigType != signatureRSA {
|
|
err = errors.New("tls: bad signature type for client's RSA certificate")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
var digest []byte
|
|
var hashFunc crypto.Hash
|
|
if digest, hashFunc, err = hs.finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(sigType, signatureAlgorithm, hs.masterSecret); err != nil {
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(key, hashFunc, digest, certVerify.signature)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: could not validate signature of connection nonces: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.discardHandshakeBuffer()
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) establishKeys() error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
|
|
keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, hs.suite, hs.masterSecret, hs.clientHello.random, hs.hello.random, hs.suite.macLen, hs.suite.keyLen, hs.suite.ivLen)
|
|
|
|
var clientCipher, serverCipher interface{}
|
|
var clientHash, serverHash macFunction
|
|
|
|
if hs.suite.aead == nil {
|
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, true /* for reading */)
|
|
clientHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
|
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, false /* not for reading */)
|
|
serverHash = hs.suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
|
|
} else {
|
|
clientCipher = hs.suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
|
|
serverCipher = hs.suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
|
|
c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) readFinished(out []byte) error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
|
|
if c.in.err != nil {
|
|
return c.in.err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if hs.hello.nextProtoNeg {
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
nextProto, ok := msg.(*nextProtoMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(nextProto, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
|
|
c.clientProtocol = nextProto.proto
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg, err := c.readHandshake()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
|
|
return unexpectedMessageError(clientFinished, msg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verify := hs.finishedHash.clientSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
|
|
subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
|
|
return errors.New("tls: client's Finished message is incorrect")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())
|
|
copy(out, verify)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendSessionTicket() error {
|
|
if !hs.hello.ticketSupported {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
m := new(newSessionTicketMsg)
|
|
|
|
var err error
|
|
state := sessionState{
|
|
vers: c.vers,
|
|
cipherSuite: hs.suite.id,
|
|
masterSecret: hs.masterSecret,
|
|
certificates: hs.certsFromClient,
|
|
}
|
|
m.ticket, err = c.encryptTicket(&state)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(m.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, m.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) sendFinished(out []byte) error {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finished := new(finishedMsg)
|
|
finished.verifyData = hs.finishedHash.serverSum(hs.masterSecret)
|
|
hs.finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
|
|
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal()); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.cipherSuite = hs.suite.id
|
|
copy(out, finished.verifyData)
|
|
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// processCertsFromClient takes a chain of client certificates either from a
|
|
// Certificates message or from a sessionState and verifies them. It returns
|
|
// the public key of the leaf certificate.
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) processCertsFromClient(certificates [][]byte) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
|
|
c := hs.c
|
|
|
|
hs.certsFromClient = certificates
|
|
certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certificates))
|
|
var err error
|
|
for i, asn1Data := range certificates {
|
|
if certs[i], err = x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.config.ClientAuth >= VerifyClientCertIfGiven && len(certs) > 0 {
|
|
opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
|
|
Roots: c.config.ClientCAs,
|
|
CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
|
|
Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
|
|
KeyUsages: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, cert := range certs[1:] {
|
|
opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
chains, err := certs[0].Verify(opts)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return nil, errors.New("tls: failed to verify client's certificate: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.verifiedChains = chains
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate != nil {
|
|
if err := c.config.VerifyPeerCertificate(certificates, c.verifiedChains); err != nil {
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(certs) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var pub crypto.PublicKey
|
|
switch key := certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey, *rsa.PublicKey:
|
|
pub = key
|
|
default:
|
|
c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls: client's certificate contains an unsupported public key of type %T", certs[0].PublicKey)
|
|
}
|
|
c.peerCertificates = certs
|
|
return pub, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// setCipherSuite sets a cipherSuite with the given id as the serverHandshakeState
|
|
// suite if that cipher suite is acceptable to use.
|
|
// It returns a bool indicating if the suite was set.
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) setCipherSuite(id uint16, supportedCipherSuites []uint16, version uint16) bool {
|
|
for _, supported := range supportedCipherSuites {
|
|
if id == supported {
|
|
var candidate *cipherSuite
|
|
|
|
for _, s := range cipherSuites {
|
|
if s.id == id {
|
|
candidate = s
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if candidate == nil {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
// Don't select a ciphersuite which we can't
|
|
// support for this client.
|
|
if candidate.flags&suiteECDHE != 0 {
|
|
if !hs.ellipticOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if candidate.flags&suiteECDSA != 0 {
|
|
if !hs.ecdsaOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
} else if !hs.rsaSignOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
} else if !hs.rsaDecryptOk {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if version < VersionTLS12 && candidate.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
hs.suite = candidate
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// suppVersArray is the backing array of ClientHelloInfo.SupportedVersions
|
|
var suppVersArray = [...]uint16{VersionTLS12, VersionTLS11, VersionTLS10, VersionSSL30}
|
|
|
|
func (hs *serverHandshakeState) clientHelloInfo() *ClientHelloInfo {
|
|
if hs.cachedClientHelloInfo != nil {
|
|
return hs.cachedClientHelloInfo
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var supportedVersions []uint16
|
|
if hs.clientHello.vers > VersionTLS12 {
|
|
supportedVersions = suppVersArray[:]
|
|
} else if hs.clientHello.vers >= VersionSSL30 {
|
|
supportedVersions = suppVersArray[VersionTLS12-hs.clientHello.vers:]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs.cachedClientHelloInfo = &ClientHelloInfo{
|
|
CipherSuites: hs.clientHello.cipherSuites,
|
|
ServerName: hs.clientHello.serverName,
|
|
SupportedCurves: hs.clientHello.supportedCurves,
|
|
SupportedPoints: hs.clientHello.supportedPoints,
|
|
SignatureSchemes: hs.clientHello.supportedSignatureAlgorithms,
|
|
SupportedProtos: hs.clientHello.alpnProtocols,
|
|
SupportedVersions: supportedVersions,
|
|
Conn: hs.c.conn,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return hs.cachedClientHelloInfo
|
|
}
|