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tris: implement draft-22 middlebox compatibility mode

Send/Skip CCS, set legacy record version to 3,3 and echo session ID.
CCS must be ignored while the handshake is running, but not thereafter:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-22#section-5

Unconditionally send CCS as server because bogo requires it, even if no
session ID is included in the Client Hello. TLS 1.3 clients MUST ignore
it anyway, so it should not hurt.

Fixes interop with boringssl and openssl and passes bogo.
tls13
Peter Wu 7 年前
committed by Peter Wu
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当前提交
824987c5ad
共有 4 个文件被更改,包括 30 次插入2 次删除
  1. +11
    -0
      13.go
  2. +13
    -2
      conn.go
  3. +5
    -0
      handshake_client.go
  4. +1
    -0
      handshake_server.go

+ 11
- 0
13.go 查看文件

@@ -197,6 +197,11 @@ CurvePreferenceLoop:
return err
}

// middlebox compatibility mode: send CCS after first handshake message
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
return err
}

hs.keySchedule.setSecret(ecdheSecret)
clientCipher, cTrafficSecret := hs.keySchedule.prepareCipher(secretHandshakeClient)
hs.hsClientCipher = clientCipher
@@ -792,6 +797,12 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeState) doTLS13Handshake() error {
hash := hashForSuite(hs.suite)
hashSize := hash.Size()
serverHello := hs.serverHello

// middlebox compatibility mode, send CCS before second flight.
if _, err := c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1}); err != nil {
return err
}

// TODO check if keyshare is unacceptable, raise HRR.

clientKS := hs.hello.keyShares[0]


+ 13
- 2
conn.go 查看文件

@@ -713,6 +713,16 @@ Again:

// Process message.
b, c.rawInput = c.in.splitBlock(b, recordHeaderLen+n)

// TLS 1.3 middlebox compatibility: skip over unencrypted CCS.
if c.vers >= VersionTLS13 && typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec && c.phase != handshakeConfirmed {
if len(b.data) != 6 || b.data[5] != 1 {
c.in.setErrorLocked(c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage))
}
c.in.freeBlock(b)
return c.in.err
}

peekedAlert := peekAlert(b) // peek at a possible alert before decryption
ok, off, alertValue := c.in.decrypt(b)
switch {
@@ -1044,7 +1054,8 @@ func (c *Conn) writeRecordLocked(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) {
if c.vers >= VersionTLS13 {
// TLS 1.3 froze the record layer version at { 3, 1 }.
// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18#section-5.1.
vers = VersionTLS10
// But for draft 22, this was changed to { 3, 3 }.
vers = VersionTLS12
}
b.data[1] = byte(vers >> 8)
b.data[2] = byte(vers)
@@ -1069,7 +1080,7 @@ func (c *Conn) writeRecordLocked(typ recordType, data []byte) (int, error) {
data = data[m:]
}

if typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec {
if typ == recordTypeChangeCipherSpec && c.vers < VersionTLS13 {
if err := c.out.changeCipherSpec(); err != nil {
return n, c.sendAlertLocked(err.(alert))
}


+ 5
- 0
handshake_client.go 查看文件

@@ -197,6 +197,11 @@ func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
return err
}
hello.keyShares = []keyShare{clientKS}
// middlebox compatibility mode, provide a non-empty session ID
hello.sessionId = make([]byte, 16)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.sessionId); err != nil {
return errors.New("tls: short read from Rand: " + err.Error())
}
}

if err = hs.handshake(); err != nil {


+ 1
- 0
handshake_server.go 查看文件

@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ Curves:
hs.hello13Enc = new(encryptedExtensionsMsg)
hs.hello.vers = c.vers
hs.hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
hs.hello.sessionId = hs.clientHello.sessionId
_, err = io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hs.hello.random)
if err != nil {
c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)


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