In the public comments to draft version of NIST Special Publication 800-208, ETSI TC CYBER WG QSC identified a multi-target attack against the method of pseudorandom key generation used in this referrence implementation. ETSI TC CYBER WG QSC suggested using the pseudorandom key generation method from SPHINCS+, however, there is still a multi-user attack against that key generation method.
This commit revises the pseudorandom key generation method by using the method from SPINCS+, but adding SEED as an input in order to protect against multi-user attacks. Since prf() only accepts 32-byte inputs, the new key generation method uses a new PRF. The resulting key generation method is sk[i] = prf_keygen(sk_seed, pub_seed || adrs).
The reference implemention of XMSS currently assumes that n bytes of padding is used for the prefix in the functions prf, hash_message, thash_h, and thash_f. While this is the case for all of the parameter sets in RFC 8391, the draft version of NIST Special Publication 800-208 specifies paramter sets in which the amount of padding is different than n.
This commit allows for the padding length for a parameter set to be specified separately from n.
The RFC suggests root||pubseed (in algorithm 10); note that
this choice does not influence interoperability.
Thanks go to Rafael Misoczki for bringing this up.
Force the OIDs read from input files to be interpreted as big-endian integers.
Leaving them as little-endian results in invalid values in params, eventually
leading to a crash.
This ensures that xmss_core and xmss_core_fast offer the same API.
Note that xmss_core_fast still needs a major refactor, and this
wrapper is not exactly very clean. There is a considerable chance
this refactor will change the format of the state in the secret key.
Previous code allocated an array on the stack of mlen bytes, but
it should be possible to also sign heap-space messages. By relying
on the fact that sm and m fit the message + signature, we move
the message so that 4*n bytes of prefix can be added.
