2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE. */
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2015-09-15 06:48:04 +01:00
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
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#include <assert.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#include <stdio.h>
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2015-04-08 04:05:04 +01:00
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#include <string.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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2015-04-08 03:38:30 +01:00
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#include "internal.h"
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2015-04-15 21:46:09 +01:00
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by
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* SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate
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* that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information. */
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2015-01-29 00:20:02 +00:00
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static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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Reserve ex_data index zero for app_data.
In the ancient times, before ex_data and OpenSSL, SSLeay supported a
single app_data slot in various types. Later app_data begat ex_data, and
app_data was replaced by compatibility macros to ex_data index zero.
Today, app_data is still in use, but ex_data never reserved index zero
for app_data. This causes some danger where, if the first ex_data
registration did not use NULL callbacks, the registration's callbacks
would collide with app_data.
Instead, add an option to the types with app_data to reserve index zero.
Also switch SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx to always return zero
rather than allocate a new one. It used to be that you used
X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data. I only found one consumer that we probably
don't care about, but, to be safe and since it's easy, go with the
conservative option. (Although SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx wasn't
guaranteed to alias app_data, in practice it always did. No consumer
ever calls X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.)
Change-Id: Ie75b279d60aefd003ffef103f99021c5d696a5e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5313
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-30 04:36:17 +01:00
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static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
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CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session);
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session);
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static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session, int lock);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) {
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SSL_SESSION *session = (SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
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if (session == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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memset(session, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
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session->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
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session->references = 1;
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session->timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
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session->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
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CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, session, &session->ex_data);
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return session;
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}
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) {
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if (session != NULL) {
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CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&session->references);
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}
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return session;
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}
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void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session) {
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if (session == NULL ||
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!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&session->references)) {
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return;
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}
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, session, &session->ex_data);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(session->master_key, sizeof(session->master_key));
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OPENSSL_cleanse(session->session_id, sizeof(session->session_id));
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X509_free(session->peer);
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sk_X509_pop_free(session->cert_chain, X509_free);
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OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_hostname);
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OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_tick);
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OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list);
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OPENSSL_free(session->ocsp_response);
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OPENSSL_free(session->psk_identity);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(session, sizeof(*session));
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OPENSSL_free(session);
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}
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const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *session,
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unsigned *out_len) {
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if (out_len != NULL) {
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*out_len = session->session_id_length;
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}
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return session->session_id;
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}
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long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
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return session->timeout;
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}
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long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
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return session->time;
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}
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2015-09-13 19:48:12 +01:00
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uint32_t SSL_SESSION_get_key_exchange_info(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
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2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
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return session->key_exchange_info;
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}
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2015-09-13 19:48:12 +01:00
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X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
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return session->peer;
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}
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2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
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long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *session, long time) {
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if (session == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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session->time = time;
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return time;
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}
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long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *session, long timeout) {
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if (session == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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session->timeout = timeout;
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return 1;
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}
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int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
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unsigned sid_ctx_len) {
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if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
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return 0;
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}
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session->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
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memcpy(session->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
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return 1;
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}
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void) {
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return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic;
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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{
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/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
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return ssl->session;
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}
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) {
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/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
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2015-02-09 08:35:43 +00:00
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return SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ssl->session);
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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}
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
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CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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int index;
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if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, new_func,
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dup_func, free_func)) {
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return -1;
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}
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return index;
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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}
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2015-09-13 19:20:58 +01:00
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int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *session, int idx, void *arg) {
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return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx, arg);
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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}
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2015-09-13 19:20:58 +01:00
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void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *session, int idx) {
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return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx);
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2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
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}
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/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space.
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* SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random
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* gunk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to complete in one
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* iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it
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* takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a
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* reasonable point to call it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone
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* is trying to open roughly very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our
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* server. How you might store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting
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* question ... */
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static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, uint8_t *id,
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2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
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unsigned *id_len) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
static const unsigned kMaxAttempts = 10;
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned retry = 0;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
if (!RAND_bytes(id, *id_len)) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
|
|
|
|
(++retry < kMaxAttempts));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (retry < kMaxAttempts) {
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* else - woops a session_id match */
|
|
|
|
/* XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of a
|
|
|
|
* collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent creation
|
|
|
|
* of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have means to
|
|
|
|
* atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make a
|
|
|
|
* reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the internal
|
|
|
|
* cache as well). */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) {
|
|
|
|
/* This gets used by clients and servers. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int tmp;
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
|
|
|
|
GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ss = SSL_SESSION_new();
|
|
|
|
if (ss == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the context has a default timeout, use it over the default. */
|
|
|
|
if (s->initial_ctx->session_timeout != 0) {
|
|
|
|
ss->timeout = s->initial_ctx->session_timeout;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-22 21:17:58 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
|
|
|
s->session = NULL;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (session) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_VERSION ||
|
|
|
|
s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION || s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
|
|
|
|
s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
ss->ssl_version = s->version;
|
|
|
|
ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If RFC4507 ticket use empty session ID */
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
|
|
|
|
ss->session_id_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto sess_id_done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
|
|
|
|
if (s->generate_session_id) {
|
|
|
|
cb = s->generate_session_id;
|
|
|
|
} else if (s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id) {
|
|
|
|
cb = s->initial_ctx->generate_session_id;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Choose a session ID */
|
|
|
|
tmp = ss->session_id_length;
|
|
|
|
if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
|
|
|
|
/* The callback failed */
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor set it
|
|
|
|
* higher than it was. */
|
|
|
|
if (!tmp || tmp > ss->session_id_length) {
|
|
|
|
/* The callback set an illegal length */
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ss->session_id_length = tmp;
|
|
|
|
/* Finally, check for a conflict */
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, ss->session_id_length)) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sess_id_done:
|
|
|
|
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
|
|
|
|
ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
|
|
if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ss->session_id_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(ss->sid_ctx)) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
|
|
|
|
ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
|
|
|
|
s->session = ss;
|
|
|
|
ss->ssl_version = s->version;
|
|
|
|
ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/* ssl_lookup_session looks up |session_id| in the session cache and sets
|
|
|
|
* |*out_session| to an |SSL_SESSION| object if found. The caller takes
|
|
|
|
* ownership of the result. */
|
|
|
|
static enum ssl_session_result_t ssl_lookup_session(
|
|
|
|
SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session, const uint8_t *session_id,
|
|
|
|
size_t session_id_len) {
|
|
|
|
*out_session = NULL;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session_id_len == 0 || session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_success;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session;
|
|
|
|
/* Try the internal cache, if it exists. */
|
|
|
|
if (!(ssl->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode &
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION data;
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
data.ssl_version = ssl->version;
|
|
|
|
data.session_id_length = session_id_len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, session_id_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&ssl->initial_ctx->lock);
|
|
|
|
session = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->initial_ctx->sessions, &data);
|
|
|
|
if (session != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ssl->initial_ctx->lock);
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
*out_session = session;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_success;
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Fall back to the external cache, if it exists. */
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->initial_ctx->get_session_cb == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_success;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int copy = 1;
|
|
|
|
session = ssl->initial_ctx->get_session_cb(ssl, (uint8_t *)session_id,
|
|
|
|
session_id_len, ©);
|
|
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_success;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (session == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_retry;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so
|
|
|
|
* (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are shared
|
|
|
|
* between threads, it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy ==
|
|
|
|
* 0], or things won't be thread-safe). */
|
|
|
|
if (copy) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache if necessary. */
|
|
|
|
if (!(ssl->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode &
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_add_session(ssl->initial_ctx, session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_session = session;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_success;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_session_result_t ssl_get_prev_session(
|
|
|
|
SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session, int *out_send_ticket,
|
|
|
|
const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
/* This is used only by servers. */
|
|
|
|
assert(ssl->server);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int send_ticket = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If tickets are disabled, always behave as if no tickets are present. */
|
2015-07-01 23:45:03 +01:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t *ticket = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t ticket_len = 0;
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
const int tickets_supported =
|
|
|
|
!(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) &&
|
|
|
|
(ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION || ctx->extensions != NULL) &&
|
|
|
|
SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
|
|
|
|
&ticket, &ticket_len);
|
|
|
|
if (tickets_supported) {
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_process_ticket(ssl, &session, &send_ticket, ticket, ticket_len,
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len)) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* The client does not support session tickets, so the session ID should be
|
|
|
|
* used instead. */
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_session_result_t lookup_ret = ssl_lookup_session(
|
|
|
|
ssl, &session, ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len);
|
|
|
|
if (lookup_ret != ssl_session_success) {
|
|
|
|
return lookup_ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
session->sid_ctx_length != ssl->sid_ctx_length ||
|
|
|
|
memcmp(session->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) != 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto no_session;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && ssl->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context, which is
|
|
|
|
* especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application should have
|
|
|
|
* used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For this error case, we generate an error instead of treating the event
|
|
|
|
* like a cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
|
|
|
|
* effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
|
|
|
|
* noticing). */
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
goto fatal_error;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - session->time)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!tickets_supported) {
|
|
|
|
/* The session was from the cache, so remove it. */
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssl->initial_ctx, session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
goto no_session;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_session = session;
|
|
|
|
*out_send_ticket = send_ticket;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_success;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
fatal_error:
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
no_session:
|
|
|
|
*out_session = NULL;
|
|
|
|
*out_send_ticket = tickets_supported;
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_success;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *old_session;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Add just 1 reference count for the |SSL_CTX|'s session cache even though it
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and an
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
* lhash. */
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
|
|
|
|
/* If |session| is in already in cache, we take back the increment later. */
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &old_session, session)) {
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock);
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
/* |old_session| != NULL iff we already had a session with the given session
|
|
|
|
* ID. In this case, |old_session| == |session| should hold (then we did not
|
|
|
|
* really modify |ctx->sessions|), or we're in trouble. */
|
|
|
|
if (old_session != NULL && old_session != session) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We *are* in trouble ... */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, old_session);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(old_session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
* handle two |SSL_SESSION| structures with identical session ID in the same
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain the
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
* same session from an external cache). */
|
|
|
|
old_session = NULL;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache. */
|
|
|
|
if (old_session == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (old_session != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* Existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference count
|
|
|
|
* because it already takes into account the cache. */
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(old_session); /* |old_session| == |session| */
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
/* New cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large. */
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
return remove_session_lock(ctx, session, 1);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session, int lock) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session != NULL && session->session_id_length != 0) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (lock) {
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions,
|
|
|
|
session);
|
|
|
|
if (found_session == session) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, session);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (lock) {
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
found_session->not_resumable = 1;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, found_session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(found_session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->session == session) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
|
|
|
|
ssl->session = session;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (session != NULL) {
|
2015-02-09 08:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl->verify_result = session->verify_result;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long timeout) {
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
long old_timeout = ctx->session_timeout;
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_timeout = timeout;
|
|
|
|
return old_timeout;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ctx->session_timeout;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct timeout_param_st {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx;
|
|
|
|
long time;
|
2015-05-03 20:21:28 +01:00
|
|
|
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *session, void *void_param) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = void_param;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (param->time == 0 ||
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
param->time > (session->time + session->timeout)) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* timeout */
|
|
|
|
/* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
|
|
|
|
* save on locking overhead */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
(void) lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, session);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, session);
|
|
|
|
session->not_resumable = 1;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long time) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
tp.ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
tp.cache = ctx->sessions;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tp.cache == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
tp.time = time;
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp);
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->lock);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) {
|
|
|
|
if (s->session != NULL && !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) &&
|
|
|
|
!SSL_in_init(s)) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
if (session->next == NULL || session->prev == NULL) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* last element in list */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* only one element in list */
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = session->prev;
|
|
|
|
session->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* first element in list */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = session->next;
|
|
|
|
session->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
} else { /* middle of list */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
session->next->prev = session->prev;
|
|
|
|
session->prev->next = session->next;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
session->prev = session->next = NULL;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
if (session->next != NULL && session->prev != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = session;
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = session;
|
|
|
|
session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
|
|
session->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
session->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
|
|
|
|
session->next->prev = session;
|
|
|
|
session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = session;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return ctx->new_session_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session)) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return ctx->remove_session_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *id, int id_len,
|
|
|
|
int *out_copy)) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(
|
|
|
|
SSL *ssl, uint8_t *id, int id_len, int *out_copy) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return ctx->get_session_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->info_callback = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
|
|
|
|
int val) {
|
|
|
|
return ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY **pkey)) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->client_cert_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509,
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
|
|
|
|
return ctx->client_cert_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->channel_id_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
|
|
|
|
return ctx->channel_id_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|