2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
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#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_RSA_H
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#define OPENSSL_HEADER_RSA_H
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#include <openssl/base.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
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2015-04-13 19:04:14 +01:00
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#include <openssl/thread.h>
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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#if defined(__cplusplus)
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// rsa.h contains functions for handling encryption and signature using RSA.
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// Allocation and destruction.
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_new returns a new, empty RSA object or NULL on error.
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2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT RSA *RSA_new(void);
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_new_method acts the same as |RSA_new| but takes an explicit |ENGINE|.
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2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT RSA *RSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine);
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_free decrements the reference count of |rsa| and frees it if the
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// reference count drops to zero.
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2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT void RSA_free(RSA *rsa);
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_up_ref increments the reference count of |rsa| and returns one.
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2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_up_ref(RSA *rsa);
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// Properties.
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2016-08-09 16:04:24 +01:00
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2017-11-22 01:33:36 +00:00
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// RSA_bits returns the size of |rsa|, in bits.
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OPENSSL_EXPORT unsigned RSA_bits(const RSA *rsa);
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_get0_key sets |*out_n|, |*out_e|, and |*out_d|, if non-NULL, to |rsa|'s
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// modulus, public exponent, and private exponent, respectively. If |rsa| is a
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// public key, the private exponent will be set to NULL.
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2016-08-09 16:04:24 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_n,
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const BIGNUM **out_e, const BIGNUM **out_d);
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_get0_factors sets |*out_p| and |*out_q|, if non-NULL, to |rsa|'s prime
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// factors. If |rsa| is a public key, they will be set to NULL.
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2016-08-09 16:04:24 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_p,
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const BIGNUM **out_q);
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_get0_crt_params sets |*out_dmp1|, |*out_dmq1|, and |*out_iqmp|, if
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// non-NULL, to |rsa|'s CRT parameters. These are d (mod p-1), d (mod q-1) and
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// q^-1 (mod p), respectively. If |rsa| is a public key, each parameter will be
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// set to NULL.
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2016-08-09 16:04:24 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_dmp1,
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const BIGNUM **out_dmq1,
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const BIGNUM **out_iqmp);
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2016-08-12 19:48:19 +01:00
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// RSA_set0_key sets |rsa|'s modulus, public exponent, and private exponent to
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// |n|, |e|, and |d| respectively, if non-NULL. On success, it takes ownership
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// of each argument and returns one. Otherwise, it returns zero.
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//
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// |d| may be NULL, but |n| and |e| must either be non-NULL or already
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// configured on |rsa|.
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2018-01-23 21:48:53 +00:00
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//
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// It is an error to call this function after |rsa| has been used for a
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// cryptographic operation. Construct a new |RSA| object instead.
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2016-08-12 19:48:19 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_set0_key(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
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// RSA_set0_factors sets |rsa|'s prime factors to |p| and |q|, if non-NULL, and
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// takes ownership of them. On success, it takes ownership of each argument and
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// returns one. Otherwise, it returns zero.
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//
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// Each argument must either be non-NULL or already configured on |rsa|.
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2018-01-23 21:48:53 +00:00
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//
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// It is an error to call this function after |rsa| has been used for a
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// cryptographic operation. Construct a new |RSA| object instead.
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2016-08-12 19:48:19 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
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// RSA_set0_crt_params sets |rsa|'s CRT parameters to |dmp1|, |dmq1|, and
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// |iqmp|, if non-NULL, and takes ownership of them. On success, it takes
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// ownership of its parameters and returns one. Otherwise, it returns zero.
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//
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// Each argument must either be non-NULL or already configured on |rsa|.
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2018-01-23 21:48:53 +00:00
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//
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// It is an error to call this function after |rsa| has been used for a
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// cryptographic operation. Construct a new |RSA| object instead.
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2016-08-12 19:48:19 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1,
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BIGNUM *iqmp);
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2016-08-09 16:04:24 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// Key generation.
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_generate_key_ex generates a new RSA key where the modulus has size
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// |bits| and the public exponent is |e|. If unsure, |RSA_F4| is a good value
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// for |e|. If |cb| is not NULL then it is called during the key generation
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// process. In addition to the calls documented for |BN_generate_prime_ex|, it
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// is called with event=2 when the n'th prime is rejected as unsuitable and
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// with event=3 when a suitable value for |p| is found.
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//
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// It returns one on success or zero on error.
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2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
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BN_GENCB *cb);
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_generate_key_fips behaves like |RSA_generate_key_ex| but performs
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// additional checks for FIPS compliance. The public exponent is always 65537
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// and |bits| must be either 2048 or 3072.
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2017-05-16 19:35:22 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_generate_key_fips(RSA *rsa, int bits, BN_GENCB *cb);
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// Encryption / Decryption
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// Padding types for encryption.
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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#define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
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#define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
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#define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 4
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING can only be used via the EVP interface.
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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#define RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING 6
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_encrypt encrypts |in_len| bytes from |in| to the public key from |rsa|
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// and writes, at most, |max_out| bytes of encrypted data to |out|. The
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// |max_out| argument must be, at least, |RSA_size| in order to ensure success.
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//
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// It returns 1 on success or zero on error.
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//
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// The |padding| argument must be one of the |RSA_*_PADDING| values. If in
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// doubt, use |RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING| for new protocols but
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// |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| is most common.
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2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_encrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
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size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
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int padding);
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_decrypt decrypts |in_len| bytes from |in| with the private key from
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// |rsa| and writes, at most, |max_out| bytes of plaintext to |out|. The
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// |max_out| argument must be, at least, |RSA_size| in order to ensure success.
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//
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// It returns 1 on success or zero on error.
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//
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// The |padding| argument must be one of the |RSA_*_PADDING| values. If in
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// doubt, use |RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING| for new protocols.
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//
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// Passing |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| into this function is deprecated and insecure. If
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// implementing a protocol using RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5, use |RSA_NO_PADDING| and then
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// check padding in constant-time combined with a swap to a random session key
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// or other mitigation. See "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based
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// on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1", Daniel Bleichenbacher, Advances in
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// Cryptology (Crypto '98).
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2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_decrypt(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
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size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
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int padding);
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_public_encrypt encrypts |flen| bytes from |from| to the public key in
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// |rsa| and writes the encrypted data to |to|. The |to| buffer must have at
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// least |RSA_size| bytes of space. It returns the number of bytes written, or
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// -1 on error. The |padding| argument must be one of the |RSA_*_PADDING|
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// values. If in doubt, use |RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING| for new protocols but
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// |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| is most common.
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//
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// WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value
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// convention. Use |RSA_encrypt| instead.
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2015-10-19 21:38:36 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_public_encrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from,
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2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
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uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_private_decrypt decrypts |flen| bytes from |from| with the public key in
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// |rsa| and writes the plaintext to |to|. The |to| buffer must have at least
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// |RSA_size| bytes of space. It returns the number of bytes written, or -1 on
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// error. The |padding| argument must be one of the |RSA_*_PADDING| values. If
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// in doubt, use |RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING| for new protocols. Passing
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// |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| into this function is deprecated and insecure. See
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// |RSA_decrypt|.
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//
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// WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value
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// convention. Use |RSA_decrypt| instead.
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2015-09-19 18:35:39 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_private_decrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from,
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2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
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uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// Signing / Verification
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_sign signs |in_len| bytes of digest from |in| with |rsa| using
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// RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. It writes, at most, |RSA_size(rsa)| bytes to |out|. On
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// successful return, the actual number of bytes written is written to
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// |*out_len|.
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//
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// The |hash_nid| argument identifies the hash function used to calculate |in|
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// and is embedded in the resulting signature. For example, it might be
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// |NID_sha256|.
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//
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// It returns 1 on success and zero on error.
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2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_sign(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *in,
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unsigned int in_len, uint8_t *out,
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unsigned int *out_len, RSA *rsa);
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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// RSA_sign_pss_mgf1 signs |in_len| bytes from |in| with the public key from
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// |rsa| using RSASSA-PSS with MGF1 as the mask generation function. It writes,
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// at most, |max_out| bytes of signature data to |out|. The |max_out| argument
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// must be, at least, |RSA_size| in order to ensure success. It returns 1 on
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// success or zero on error.
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//
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// The |md| and |mgf1_md| arguments identify the hash used to calculate |msg|
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// and the MGF1 hash, respectively. If |mgf1_md| is NULL, |md| is
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// used.
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//
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// |salt_len| specifies the expected salt length in bytes. If |salt_len| is -1,
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// then the salt length is the same as the hash length. If -2, then the salt
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// length is maximal given the size of |rsa|. If unsure, use -1.
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2017-05-02 19:34:09 +01:00
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OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
|
|
|
|
size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
|
|
size_t in_len, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1_md, int salt_len);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_sign_raw signs |in_len| bytes from |in| with the public key from |rsa|
|
|
|
|
// and writes, at most, |max_out| bytes of signature data to |out|. The
|
|
|
|
// |max_out| argument must be, at least, |RSA_size| in order to ensure success.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// It returns 1 on success or zero on error.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// The |padding| argument must be one of the |RSA_*_PADDING| values. If in
|
|
|
|
// doubt, |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| is the most common but |RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING|
|
|
|
|
// (via the |EVP_PKEY| interface) is preferred for new protocols.
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
|
|
|
|
size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
|
|
size_t in_len, int padding);
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_verify verifies that |sig_len| bytes from |sig| are a valid,
|
|
|
|
// RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature of |msg_len| bytes at |msg| by |rsa|.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// The |hash_nid| argument identifies the hash function used to calculate |msg|
|
|
|
|
// and is embedded in the resulting signature in order to prevent hash
|
|
|
|
// confusion attacks. For example, it might be |NID_sha256|.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// It returns one if the signature is valid and zero otherwise.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// WARNING: this differs from the original, OpenSSL function which additionally
|
|
|
|
// returned -1 on error.
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_verify(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa);
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_verify_pss_mgf1 verifies that |sig_len| bytes from |sig| are a valid,
|
|
|
|
// RSASSA-PSS signature of |msg_len| bytes at |msg| by |rsa|. It returns one if
|
|
|
|
// the signature is valid and zero otherwise. MGF1 is used as the mask
|
|
|
|
// generation function.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// The |md| and |mgf1_md| arguments identify the hash used to calculate |msg|
|
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|
|
// and the MGF1 hash, respectively. If |mgf1_md| is NULL, |md| is
|
|
|
|
// used. |salt_len| specifies the expected salt length in bytes.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// If |salt_len| is -1, then the salt length is the same as the hash length. If
|
|
|
|
// -2, then the salt length is recovered and all values accepted. If unsure, use
|
|
|
|
// -1.
|
2017-05-02 19:34:09 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_verify_pss_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const uint8_t *msg,
|
|
|
|
size_t msg_len, const EVP_MD *md,
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1_md, int salt_len,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_verify_raw verifies |in_len| bytes of signature from |in| using the
|
|
|
|
// public key from |rsa| and writes, at most, |max_out| bytes of plaintext to
|
|
|
|
// |out|. The |max_out| argument must be, at least, |RSA_size| in order to
|
|
|
|
// ensure success.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// It returns 1 on success or zero on error.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// The |padding| argument must be one of the |RSA_*_PADDING| values. If in
|
|
|
|
// doubt, |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| is the most common but |RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING|
|
|
|
|
// (via the |EVP_PKEY| interface) is preferred for new protocols.
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_verify_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
|
|
|
|
size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
|
|
size_t in_len, int padding);
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_private_encrypt encrypts |flen| bytes from |from| with the private key in
|
|
|
|
// |rsa| and writes the encrypted data to |to|. The |to| buffer must have at
|
|
|
|
// least |RSA_size| bytes of space. It returns the number of bytes written, or
|
|
|
|
// -1 on error. The |padding| argument must be one of the |RSA_*_PADDING|
|
|
|
|
// values. If in doubt, |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| is the most common but
|
|
|
|
// |RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING| (via the |EVP_PKEY| interface) is preferred for new
|
|
|
|
// protocols.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value
|
|
|
|
// convention. Use |RSA_sign_raw| instead.
|
2015-10-19 21:38:36 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_private_encrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from,
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_public_decrypt verifies |flen| bytes of signature from |from| using the
|
|
|
|
// public key in |rsa| and writes the plaintext to |to|. The |to| buffer must
|
|
|
|
// have at least |RSA_size| bytes of space. It returns the number of bytes
|
|
|
|
// written, or -1 on error. The |padding| argument must be one of the
|
|
|
|
// |RSA_*_PADDING| values. If in doubt, |RSA_PKCS1_PADDING| is the most common
|
|
|
|
// but |RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING| (via the |EVP_PKEY| interface) is preferred for
|
|
|
|
// new protocols.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// WARNING: this function is dangerous because it breaks the usual return value
|
|
|
|
// convention. Use |RSA_verify_raw| instead.
|
2015-10-19 21:38:36 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_public_decrypt(size_t flen, const uint8_t *from,
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// Utility functions.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_size returns the number of bytes in the modulus, which is also the size
|
|
|
|
// of a signature or encrypted value using |rsa|.
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT unsigned RSA_size(const RSA *rsa);
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_is_opaque returns one if |rsa| is opaque and doesn't expose its key
|
|
|
|
// material. Otherwise it returns zero.
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_is_opaque(const RSA *rsa);
|
2014-07-18 23:39:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSAPublicKey_dup allocates a fresh |RSA| and copies the public key from
|
|
|
|
// |rsa| into it. It returns the fresh |RSA| object, or NULL on error.
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT RSA *RSAPublicKey_dup(const RSA *rsa);
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSAPrivateKey_dup allocates a fresh |RSA| and copies the private key from
|
|
|
|
// |rsa| into it. It returns the fresh |RSA| object, or NULL on error.
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT RSA *RSAPrivateKey_dup(const RSA *rsa);
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_check_key performs basic validity tests on |rsa|. It returns one if
|
|
|
|
// they pass and zero otherwise. Opaque keys and public keys always pass. If it
|
|
|
|
// returns zero then a more detailed error is available on the error queue.
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_check_key(const RSA *rsa);
|
2014-07-25 20:03:51 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_check_fips performs public key validity tests on |key|. It returns one
|
|
|
|
// if they pass and zero otherwise. Opaque keys always fail.
|
2017-04-06 19:55:18 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_check_fips(RSA *key);
|
2017-04-11 17:46:03 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1 verifies that |EM| is a correct PSS padding of
|
|
|
|
// |mHash|, where |mHash| is a digest produced by |Hash|. |EM| must point to
|
|
|
|
// exactly |RSA_size(rsa)| bytes of data. The |mgf1Hash| argument specifies the
|
|
|
|
// hash function for generating the mask. If NULL, |Hash| is used. The |sLen|
|
|
|
|
// argument specifies the expected salt length in bytes. If |sLen| is -1 then
|
|
|
|
// the salt length is the same as the hash length. If -2, then the salt length
|
|
|
|
// is recovered and all values accepted.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// If unsure, use -1.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// It returns one on success or zero on error.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// This function implements only the low-level padding logic. Use
|
|
|
|
// |RSA_verify_pss_mgf1| instead.
|
2015-03-20 23:39:54 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const uint8_t *mHash,
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *Hash,
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *EM, int sLen);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1 writes a PSS padding of |mHash| to |EM|,
|
|
|
|
// where |mHash| is a digest produced by |Hash|. |RSA_size(rsa)| bytes of
|
|
|
|
// output will be written to |EM|. The |mgf1Hash| argument specifies the hash
|
|
|
|
// function for generating the mask. If NULL, |Hash| is used. The |sLen|
|
|
|
|
// argument specifies the expected salt length in bytes. If |sLen| is -1 then
|
|
|
|
// the salt length is the same as the hash length. If -2, then the salt length
|
|
|
|
// is maximal given the space in |EM|.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// It returns one on success or zero on error.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// This function implements only the low-level padding logic. Use
|
|
|
|
// |RSA_sign_pss_mgf1| instead.
|
2015-03-20 23:39:54 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *EM,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *mHash,
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *Hash,
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1Hash,
|
|
|
|
int sLen);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1 writes an OAEP padding of |from| to |to|
|
|
|
|
// with the given parameters and hash functions. If |md| is NULL then SHA-1 is
|
|
|
|
// used. If |mgf1md| is NULL then the value of |md| is used (which means SHA-1
|
|
|
|
// if that, in turn, is NULL).
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// It returns one on success or zero on error.
|
2016-04-13 16:19:03 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(
|
2017-03-14 19:35:27 +00:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *to, size_t to_len, const uint8_t *from, size_t from_len,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *param, size_t param_len, const EVP_MD *md,
|
2016-04-13 16:19:03 +01:00
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix builds a version of |msg| prefixed with the DigestInfo
|
|
|
|
// header for the given hash function and sets |out_msg| to point to it. On
|
2017-09-08 02:46:41 +01:00
|
|
|
// successful return, if |*is_alloced| is one, the caller must release
|
|
|
|
// |*out_msg| with |OPENSSL_free|.
|
2015-05-28 21:53:31 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(uint8_t **out_msg, size_t *out_msg_len,
|
|
|
|
int *is_alloced, int hash_nid,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-20 23:39:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// ASN.1 functions.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_parse_public_key parses a DER-encoded RSAPublicKey structure (RFC 3447)
|
|
|
|
// from |cbs| and advances |cbs|. It returns a newly-allocated |RSA| or NULL on
|
|
|
|
// error.
|
2015-06-17 05:02:59 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT RSA *RSA_parse_public_key(CBS *cbs);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_public_key_from_bytes parses |in| as a DER-encoded RSAPublicKey structure
|
|
|
|
// (RFC 3447). It returns a newly-allocated |RSA| or NULL on error.
|
2015-06-17 05:02:59 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT RSA *RSA_public_key_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_marshal_public_key marshals |rsa| as a DER-encoded RSAPublicKey structure
|
|
|
|
// (RFC 3447) and appends the result to |cbb|. It returns one on success and
|
|
|
|
// zero on failure.
|
2015-06-17 05:02:59 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_marshal_public_key(CBB *cbb, const RSA *rsa);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_public_key_to_bytes marshals |rsa| as a DER-encoded RSAPublicKey
|
|
|
|
// structure (RFC 3447) and, on success, sets |*out_bytes| to a newly allocated
|
|
|
|
// buffer containing the result and returns one. Otherwise, it returns zero. The
|
|
|
|
// result should be freed with |OPENSSL_free|.
|
2015-06-17 05:02:59 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_public_key_to_bytes(uint8_t **out_bytes, size_t *out_len,
|
|
|
|
const RSA *rsa);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_parse_private_key parses a DER-encoded RSAPrivateKey structure (RFC 3447)
|
|
|
|
// from |cbs| and advances |cbs|. It returns a newly-allocated |RSA| or NULL on
|
|
|
|
// error.
|
2015-06-27 19:56:25 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT RSA *RSA_parse_private_key(CBS *cbs);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_private_key_from_bytes parses |in| as a DER-encoded RSAPrivateKey
|
|
|
|
// structure (RFC 3447). It returns a newly-allocated |RSA| or NULL on error.
|
2015-06-27 19:56:25 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT RSA *RSA_private_key_from_bytes(const uint8_t *in,
|
|
|
|
size_t in_len);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_marshal_private_key marshals |rsa| as a DER-encoded RSAPrivateKey
|
|
|
|
// structure (RFC 3447) and appends the result to |cbb|. It returns one on
|
|
|
|
// success and zero on failure.
|
2015-06-27 19:56:25 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_marshal_private_key(CBB *cbb, const RSA *rsa);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_private_key_to_bytes marshals |rsa| as a DER-encoded RSAPrivateKey
|
|
|
|
// structure (RFC 3447) and, on success, sets |*out_bytes| to a newly allocated
|
|
|
|
// buffer containing the result and returns one. Otherwise, it returns zero. The
|
|
|
|
// result should be freed with |OPENSSL_free|.
|
2015-06-27 19:56:25 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_private_key_to_bytes(uint8_t **out_bytes,
|
|
|
|
size_t *out_len, const RSA *rsa);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// ex_data functions.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// See |ex_data.h| for details.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
|
2015-12-05 04:14:35 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
|
2017-05-14 22:10:18 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
|
2014-07-31 00:02:14 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func);
|
2017-08-01 00:09:42 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *rsa, int idx, void *arg);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *rsa, int idx);
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-07 18:12:05 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// Flags.
|
2015-09-07 18:12:05 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE specifies that this RSA_METHOD does not expose its key
|
|
|
|
// material. This may be set if, for instance, it is wrapping some other crypto
|
|
|
|
// API, like a platform key store.
|
2014-07-18 23:39:42 +01:00
|
|
|
#define RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE 1
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING disables blinding of private operations, which is a
|
|
|
|
// dangerous thing to do. It is deprecated and should not be used. It will
|
|
|
|
// be ignored whenever possible.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// This flag must be used if a key without the public exponent |e| is used for
|
|
|
|
// private key operations; avoid using such keys whenever possible.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
#define RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING 8
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY is deprecated and ignored.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
#define RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY 0x20
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA public exponent values.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_3 0x3
|
|
|
|
#define RSA_F4 0x10001
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// Deprecated functions.
|
2015-04-13 22:34:17 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-12-18 21:34:49 +00:00
|
|
|
#define RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// RSA_flags returns the flags for |rsa|. These are a bitwise OR of |RSA_FLAG_*|
|
|
|
|
// constants.
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_flags(const RSA *rsa);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_blinding_on returns one.
|
2015-04-13 22:34:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_generate_key behaves like |RSA_generate_key_ex|, which is what you
|
|
|
|
// should use instead. It returns NULL on error, or a newly-allocated |RSA| on
|
|
|
|
// success. This function is provided for compatibility only. The |callback|
|
|
|
|
// and |cb_arg| parameters must be NULL.
|
2015-06-18 01:16:02 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT RSA *RSA_generate_key(int bits, unsigned long e, void *callback,
|
|
|
|
void *cb_arg);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// d2i_RSAPublicKey parses an ASN.1, DER-encoded, RSA public key from |len|
|
|
|
|
// bytes at |*inp|. If |out| is not NULL then, on exit, a pointer to the result
|
|
|
|
// is in |*out|. Note that, even if |*out| is already non-NULL on entry, it
|
|
|
|
// will not be written to. Rather, a fresh |RSA| is allocated and the previous
|
|
|
|
// one is freed. On successful exit, |*inp| is advanced past the DER structure.
|
|
|
|
// It returns the result or NULL on error.
|
2015-09-07 18:12:05 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey(RSA **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// i2d_RSAPublicKey marshals |in| to an ASN.1, DER structure. If |outp| is not
|
|
|
|
// NULL then the result is written to |*outp| and |*outp| is advanced just past
|
|
|
|
// the output. It returns the number of bytes in the result, whether written or
|
|
|
|
// not, or a negative value on error.
|
2015-09-07 18:12:05 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int i2d_RSAPublicKey(const RSA *in, uint8_t **outp);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// d2i_RSAPrivateKey parses an ASN.1, DER-encoded, RSA private key from |len|
|
|
|
|
// bytes at |*inp|. If |out| is not NULL then, on exit, a pointer to the result
|
|
|
|
// is in |*out|. Note that, even if |*out| is already non-NULL on entry, it
|
|
|
|
// will not be written to. Rather, a fresh |RSA| is allocated and the previous
|
|
|
|
// one is freed. On successful exit, |*inp| is advanced past the DER structure.
|
|
|
|
// It returns the result or NULL on error.
|
2015-09-07 18:12:05 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey(RSA **out, const uint8_t **inp, long len);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// i2d_RSAPrivateKey marshals |in| to an ASN.1, DER structure. If |outp| is not
|
|
|
|
// NULL then the result is written to |*outp| and |*outp| is advanced just past
|
|
|
|
// the output. It returns the number of bytes in the result, whether written or
|
|
|
|
// not, or a negative value on error.
|
2015-09-07 18:12:05 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int i2d_RSAPrivateKey(const RSA *in, uint8_t **outp);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS acts like |RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1| but the
|
|
|
|
// |mgf1Hash| parameter of the latter is implicitly set to |Hash|.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// This function implements only the low-level padding logic. Use
|
|
|
|
// |RSA_sign_pss_mgf1| instead.
|
2016-03-08 00:35:18 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *EM,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *mHash,
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *Hash, int sLen);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS acts like |RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1| but the
|
|
|
|
// |mgf1Hash| parameter of the latter is implicitly set to |Hash|.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// This function implements only the low-level padding logic. Use
|
|
|
|
// |RSA_verify_pss_mgf1| instead.
|
2016-03-08 00:35:18 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS(RSA *rsa, const uint8_t *mHash,
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *Hash, const uint8_t *EM,
|
|
|
|
int sLen);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP acts like |RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1| but
|
|
|
|
// the |md| and |mgf1md| parameters of the latter are implicitly set to NULL,
|
|
|
|
// which means SHA-1.
|
2017-03-14 19:35:27 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_EXPORT int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(uint8_t *to, size_t to_len,
|
2016-04-13 16:19:03 +01:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t *from,
|
2017-03-14 19:35:27 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t from_len,
|
2016-04-13 16:19:03 +01:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t *param,
|
2017-03-14 19:35:27 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t param_len);
|
2016-04-13 16:19:03 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-13 22:34:17 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
struct rsa_meth_st {
|
|
|
|
struct openssl_method_common_st common;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void *app_data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int (*init)(RSA *rsa);
|
|
|
|
int (*finish)(RSA *rsa);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// size returns the size of the RSA modulus in bytes.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t (*size)(const RSA *rsa);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int (*sign)(int type, const uint8_t *m, unsigned int m_length,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// These functions mirror the |RSA_*| functions of the same name.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
int (*sign_raw)(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding);
|
|
|
|
int (*decrypt)(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// private_transform takes a big-endian integer from |in|, calculates the
|
|
|
|
// d'th power of it, modulo the RSA modulus and writes the result as a
|
|
|
|
// big-endian integer to |out|. Both |in| and |out| are |len| bytes long and
|
|
|
|
// |len| is always equal to |RSA_size(rsa)|. If the result of the transform
|
|
|
|
// can be represented in fewer than |len| bytes, then |out| must be zero
|
|
|
|
// padded on the left.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// It returns one on success and zero otherwise.
|
|
|
|
//
|
|
|
|
// RSA decrypt and sign operations will call this, thus an ENGINE might wish
|
|
|
|
// to override it in order to avoid having to implement the padding
|
|
|
|
// functionality demanded by those, higher level, operations.
|
2014-08-18 21:29:45 +01:00
|
|
|
int (*private_transform)(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
|
|
|
|
size_t len);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
int flags;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// Private functions.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef struct bn_blinding_st BN_BLINDING;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct rsa_st {
|
|
|
|
RSA_METHOD *meth;
|
|
|
|
|
Fix threading issues with RSA freeze_private_key.
OpenSSL's RSA API is poorly designed and does not have a single place to
properly initialize the key. See
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5158.
To workaround this flaw, we must lazily instantiate pre-computed
Montgomery bits with locking. This is a ton of complexity. More
importantly, it makes it very difficult to implement RSA without side
channels. The correct in-memory representation of d, dmp1, and dmq1
depend on n, p, and q, respectively. (Those values have private
magnitudes and must be sized relative to the respective moduli.)
08805fe27910e09d05e87d61bc5411a4e3b2d999 attempted to fix up the various
widths under lock, when we set up BN_MONT_CTX. However, this introduces
threading issues because other threads may access those exposed
components (RSA_get0_* also count as exposed for these purposes because
they are get0 functions), while a private key operation is in progress.
Instead, we do the following:
- There is no actual need to minimize n, p, and q, but we have minimized
copies in the BN_MONT_CTXs, so use those.
- Store additional copies of d, dmp1, and dmq1, at the cost of more
memory used. These copies have the correct width and are private,
unlike d, dmp1, and dmq1 which are sadly exposed. Fix private key
operations to use them.
- Move the frozen bit out of rsa->flags, as that too was historically
accessible without locking.
(Serialization still uses the original BIGNUMs, but the RSAPrivateKey
serialization format already inherently leaks the magnitude, so this
doesn't matter.)
Change-Id: Ia3a9b0629f8efef23abb30bfed110d247d1db42f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25824
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-02-09 20:52:58 +00:00
|
|
|
// Access to the following fields was historically allowed, but
|
|
|
|
// deprecated. Use |RSA_get0_*| and |RSA_set0_*| instead. Access to all other
|
|
|
|
// fields is forbidden and will cause threading errors.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
BIGNUM *n;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *e;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *d;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *p;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *q;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *dmp1;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *dmq1;
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *iqmp;
|
2015-05-26 19:36:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// be careful using this if the RSA structure is shared
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
|
2015-05-15 20:49:30 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_refcount_t references;
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
int flags;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-13 19:04:14 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX lock;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// Used to cache montgomery values. The creation of these values is protected
|
|
|
|
// by |lock|.
|
2015-11-03 23:24:07 +00:00
|
|
|
BN_MONT_CTX *mont_n;
|
|
|
|
BN_MONT_CTX *mont_p;
|
|
|
|
BN_MONT_CTX *mont_q;
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
Fix threading issues with RSA freeze_private_key.
OpenSSL's RSA API is poorly designed and does not have a single place to
properly initialize the key. See
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5158.
To workaround this flaw, we must lazily instantiate pre-computed
Montgomery bits with locking. This is a ton of complexity. More
importantly, it makes it very difficult to implement RSA without side
channels. The correct in-memory representation of d, dmp1, and dmq1
depend on n, p, and q, respectively. (Those values have private
magnitudes and must be sized relative to the respective moduli.)
08805fe27910e09d05e87d61bc5411a4e3b2d999 attempted to fix up the various
widths under lock, when we set up BN_MONT_CTX. However, this introduces
threading issues because other threads may access those exposed
components (RSA_get0_* also count as exposed for these purposes because
they are get0 functions), while a private key operation is in progress.
Instead, we do the following:
- There is no actual need to minimize n, p, and q, but we have minimized
copies in the BN_MONT_CTXs, so use those.
- Store additional copies of d, dmp1, and dmq1, at the cost of more
memory used. These copies have the correct width and are private,
unlike d, dmp1, and dmq1 which are sadly exposed. Fix private key
operations to use them.
- Move the frozen bit out of rsa->flags, as that too was historically
accessible without locking.
(Serialization still uses the original BIGNUMs, but the RSAPrivateKey
serialization format already inherently leaks the magnitude, so this
doesn't matter.)
Change-Id: Ia3a9b0629f8efef23abb30bfed110d247d1db42f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25824
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-02-09 20:52:58 +00:00
|
|
|
// The following fields are copies of |d|, |dmp1|, and |dmq1|, respectively,
|
|
|
|
// but with the correct widths to prevent side channels. These must use
|
|
|
|
// separate copies due to threading concerns caused by OpenSSL's API
|
|
|
|
// mistakes. See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5158 and
|
|
|
|
// the |freeze_private_key| implementation.
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *d_fixed, *dmp1_fixed, *dmq1_fixed;
|
|
|
|
|
Make the rest of RSA CRT constant-time.
Alas, the existence of RSA keys with q > p is obnoxious, but we can
canonicalize it away. To my knowledge, the remaining leaks in RSA are:
- Key generation. This is kind of hopelessly non-constant-time but
perhaps deserves a more careful ponder. Though hopefully it does not
come in at a measurable point for practical purposes.
- Private key serialization. RSAPrivateKey inherently leaks the
magnitudes of d, dmp1, dmq1, and iqmp. This is unavoidable but
hopefully does not come in at a measurable point for practical
purposes.
- If p and q have different word widths, we currently fall back to the
variable-time BN_mod rather than Montgomery reduction at the start of
CRT. I can think of ways to apply Montgomery reduction, but it's
probably better to deny CRT to such keys, if not reject them outright.
- bn_mul_fixed and bn_sqr_fixed which affect the Montgomery
multiplication bn_mul_mont-less configurations, as well as the final
CRT multiplication. We should fix this.
Bug: 233
Change-Id: I8c2ecf8f8ec104e9f26299b66ac8cbb0cad04616
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25263
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-01-24 22:22:17 +00:00
|
|
|
// inv_small_mod_large_mont is q^-1 mod p in Montgomery form, using |mont_p|,
|
|
|
|
// if |p| >= |q|. Otherwise, it is p^-1 mod q in Montgomery form, using
|
|
|
|
// |mont_q|.
|
|
|
|
BIGNUM *inv_small_mod_large_mont;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// num_blindings contains the size of the |blindings| and |blindings_inuse|
|
|
|
|
// arrays. This member and the |blindings_inuse| array are protected by
|
|
|
|
// |lock|.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
unsigned num_blindings;
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
// blindings is an array of BN_BLINDING structures that can be reserved by a
|
|
|
|
// thread by locking |lock| and changing the corresponding element in
|
|
|
|
// |blindings_inuse| from 0 to 1.
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
BN_BLINDING **blindings;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *blindings_inuse;
|
Fix threading issues with RSA freeze_private_key.
OpenSSL's RSA API is poorly designed and does not have a single place to
properly initialize the key. See
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5158.
To workaround this flaw, we must lazily instantiate pre-computed
Montgomery bits with locking. This is a ton of complexity. More
importantly, it makes it very difficult to implement RSA without side
channels. The correct in-memory representation of d, dmp1, and dmq1
depend on n, p, and q, respectively. (Those values have private
magnitudes and must be sized relative to the respective moduli.)
08805fe27910e09d05e87d61bc5411a4e3b2d999 attempted to fix up the various
widths under lock, when we set up BN_MONT_CTX. However, this introduces
threading issues because other threads may access those exposed
components (RSA_get0_* also count as exposed for these purposes because
they are get0 functions), while a private key operation is in progress.
Instead, we do the following:
- There is no actual need to minimize n, p, and q, but we have minimized
copies in the BN_MONT_CTXs, so use those.
- Store additional copies of d, dmp1, and dmq1, at the cost of more
memory used. These copies have the correct width and are private,
unlike d, dmp1, and dmq1 which are sadly exposed. Fix private key
operations to use them.
- Move the frozen bit out of rsa->flags, as that too was historically
accessible without locking.
(Serialization still uses the original BIGNUMs, but the RSAPrivateKey
serialization format already inherently leaks the magnitude, so this
doesn't matter.)
Change-Id: Ia3a9b0629f8efef23abb30bfed110d247d1db42f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25824
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2018-02-09 20:52:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// private_key_frozen is one if the key has been used for a private key
|
|
|
|
// operation and may no longer be mutated.
|
|
|
|
unsigned private_key_frozen:1;
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined(__cplusplus)
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
} // extern C
|
2016-08-18 04:10:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
extern "C++" {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
namespace bssl {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BORINGSSL_MAKE_DELETER(RSA, RSA_free)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} // namespace bssl
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
|
|
|
} // extern C++
|
2016-08-18 04:10:28 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
Align with upstream's error strings, take two.
I messed up a few of these.
ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM doesn't exist. X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM does
exist as part of X509_PUBKEY_set, but the SPKI parser doesn't emit this. (I
don't mind the legacy code having really weird errors, but since EVP is now
limited to things we like, let's try to keep that clean.) To avoid churn in
Conscrypt, we'll keep defining X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, but not actually
do anything with it anymore. Conscrypt was already aware of
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM, so this should be fine. (I don't expect
EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM to go away. The SPKI parsers we like live in EVP
now.)
A few other ASN1_R_* values didn't quite match upstream, so make those match
again. Finally, I got some of the rsa_pss.c values wrong. Each of those
corresponds to an (overly specific) RSA_R_* value in upstream. However, those
were gone in BoringSSL since even the initial commit. We placed the RSA <-> EVP
glue in crypto/evp (so crypto/rsa wouldn't depend on crypto/evp) while upstream
placed them in crypto/rsa.
Since no one seemed to notice the loss of RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH, let's undo
all the cross-module errors inserted in crypto/rsa. Instead, since that kind of
specificity is not useful, funnel it all into X509_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS
(formerly EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS, formerly RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS).
Reset the error codes for all affected modules.
(That our error code story means error codes are not stable across this kind of
refactoring is kind of a problem. Hopefully this will be the last of it.)
Change-Id: Ibfb3a0ac340bfc777bc7de6980ef3ddf0a8c84bc
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/7458
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark (Dunn) <estark@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2016-03-14 21:13:54 +00:00
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#define RSA_R_BAD_ENCODING 100
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#define RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE 101
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#define RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT 102
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#define RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT 103
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#define RSA_R_BAD_RSA_PARAMETERS 104
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#define RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 105
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#define RSA_R_BAD_VERSION 106
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#define RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01 107
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#define RSA_R_BN_NOT_INITIALIZED 108
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#define RSA_R_CANNOT_RECOVER_MULTI_PRIME_KEY 109
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#define RSA_R_CRT_PARAMS_ALREADY_GIVEN 110
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#define RSA_R_CRT_VALUES_INCORRECT 111
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#define RSA_R_DATA_LEN_NOT_EQUAL_TO_MOD_LEN 112
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#define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE 113
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#define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE 114
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#define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 115
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#define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL 116
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#define RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE 117
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#define RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY 118
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#define RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1 119
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#define RSA_R_EMPTY_PUBLIC_KEY 120
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#define RSA_R_ENCODE_ERROR 121
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#define RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID 122
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#define RSA_R_INCONSISTENT_SET_OF_CRT_VALUES 123
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#define RSA_R_INTERNAL_ERROR 124
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#define RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 125
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#define RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL 126
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#define RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID 127
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#define RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE 128
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#define RSA_R_MUST_HAVE_AT_LEAST_TWO_PRIMES 129
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#define RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 130
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#define RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING 131
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#define RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 132
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#define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 133
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#define RSA_R_ONLY_ONE_OF_P_Q_GIVEN 134
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#define RSA_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 135
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#define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 136
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#define RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR 137
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#define RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED 138
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#define RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED 139
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#define RSA_R_TOO_LONG 140
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#define RSA_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS 141
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#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 142
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#define RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 143
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#define RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING 144
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#define RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 145
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2017-04-11 17:46:03 +01:00
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#define RSA_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED 146
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2018-03-04 07:42:44 +00:00
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#define RSA_R_D_OUT_OF_RANGE 147
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2014-07-14 23:28:14 +01:00
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2017-08-19 00:21:50 +01:00
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#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_RSA_H
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