2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
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*
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* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
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* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
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* license.
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*
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* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
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* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
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* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
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*
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* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
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* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
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* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
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*
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* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
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* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
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* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
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* to make use of the Contribution.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
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* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
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* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
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* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
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* OTHERWISE. */
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2015-09-15 06:48:04 +01:00
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#include <openssl/ssl.h>
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2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
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#include <assert.h>
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2016-09-01 06:10:07 +01:00
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#include <stdlib.h>
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2015-04-08 04:05:04 +01:00
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#include <string.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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2015-04-08 03:38:30 +01:00
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#include "internal.h"
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2015-04-15 21:46:09 +01:00
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#include "../crypto/internal.h"
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* The address of this is a magic value, a pointer to which is returned by
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* SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(). It allows a session callback to indicate
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* that it needs to asynchronously fetch session information. */
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2015-01-29 00:20:02 +00:00
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static const char g_pending_session_magic = 0;
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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Reserve ex_data index zero for app_data.
In the ancient times, before ex_data and OpenSSL, SSLeay supported a
single app_data slot in various types. Later app_data begat ex_data, and
app_data was replaced by compatibility macros to ex_data index zero.
Today, app_data is still in use, but ex_data never reserved index zero
for app_data. This causes some danger where, if the first ex_data
registration did not use NULL callbacks, the registration's callbacks
would collide with app_data.
Instead, add an option to the types with app_data to reserve index zero.
Also switch SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx to always return zero
rather than allocate a new one. It used to be that you used
X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data. I only found one consumer that we probably
don't care about, but, to be safe and since it's easy, go with the
conservative option. (Although SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx wasn't
guaranteed to alias app_data, in practice it always did. No consumer
ever calls X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index.)
Change-Id: Ie75b279d60aefd003ffef103f99021c5d696a5e9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5313
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-06-30 04:36:17 +01:00
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static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class =
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CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT_WITH_APP_DATA;
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2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
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2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session);
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static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session);
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static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session, int lock);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) {
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2016-02-07 19:36:04 +00:00
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SSL_SESSION *session = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
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2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
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if (session == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memset(session, 0, sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
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2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
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2016-07-18 18:17:16 +01:00
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session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
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2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
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session->references = 1;
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session->timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
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2017-01-28 19:00:32 +00:00
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session->auth_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
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2016-08-03 18:13:17 +01:00
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session->time = (long)time(NULL);
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2015-12-05 04:14:35 +00:00
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CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&session->ex_data);
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2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
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return session;
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}
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2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
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SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_dup(SSL_SESSION *session, int dup_flags) {
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2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
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SSL_SESSION *new_session = SSL_SESSION_new();
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if (new_session == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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2016-12-12 18:51:00 +00:00
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new_session->is_server = session->is_server;
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2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
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new_session->ssl_version = session->ssl_version;
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2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
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new_session->sid_ctx_length = session->sid_ctx_length;
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->sid_ctx, session->sid_ctx, session->sid_ctx_length);
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2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
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/* Copy the key material. */
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2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
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new_session->master_key_length = session->master_key_length;
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2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
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OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->master_key, session->master_key,
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2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
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session->master_key_length);
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2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
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new_session->cipher = session->cipher;
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/* Copy authentication state. */
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2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
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if (session->psk_identity != NULL) {
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new_session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(session->psk_identity);
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if (new_session->psk_identity == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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}
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2016-12-12 19:06:16 +00:00
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if (session->certs != NULL) {
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new_session->certs = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
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if (new_session->certs == NULL) {
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goto err;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(session->certs); i++) {
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CRYPTO_BUFFER *buffer = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(session->certs, i);
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if (!sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(new_session->certs, buffer)) {
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goto err;
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}
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CRYPTO_BUFFER_up_ref(buffer);
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}
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}
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2016-11-07 20:02:35 +00:00
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if (session->x509_peer != NULL) {
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X509_up_ref(session->x509_peer);
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new_session->x509_peer = session->x509_peer;
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2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
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}
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2016-11-07 20:02:35 +00:00
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if (session->x509_chain != NULL) {
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new_session->x509_chain = X509_chain_up_ref(session->x509_chain);
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if (new_session->x509_chain == NULL) {
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2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
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goto err;
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}
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}
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new_session->verify_result = session->verify_result;
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2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
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new_session->ocsp_response_length = session->ocsp_response_length;
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if (session->ocsp_response != NULL) {
|
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new_session->ocsp_response = BUF_memdup(session->ocsp_response,
|
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session->ocsp_response_length);
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if (new_session->ocsp_response == NULL) {
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2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
|
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goto err;
|
|
|
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}
|
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}
|
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new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length =
|
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session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length;
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if (session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) {
|
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|
new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list =
|
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|
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BUF_memdup(session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
|
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|
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session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length);
|
|
|
|
if (new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->peer_sha256, session->peer_sha256,
|
|
|
|
SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
|
2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
|
|
|
new_session->peer_sha256_valid = session->peer_sha256_valid;
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-11-16 08:08:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
new_session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(session->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
|
|
if (new_session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-14 01:05:36 +00:00
|
|
|
new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = session->peer_signature_algorithm;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-09-22 05:11:43 +01:00
|
|
|
new_session->timeout = session->timeout;
|
2017-01-28 19:00:32 +00:00
|
|
|
new_session->auth_timeout = session->auth_timeout;
|
2016-09-22 05:11:43 +01:00
|
|
|
new_session->time = session->time;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Copy non-authentication connection properties. */
|
|
|
|
if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_NONAUTH) {
|
|
|
|
new_session->session_id_length = session->session_id_length;
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->session_id, session->session_id,
|
|
|
|
session->session_id_length);
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-11 07:48:12 +00:00
|
|
|
new_session->group_id = session->group_id;
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(new_session->original_handshake_hash,
|
|
|
|
session->original_handshake_hash,
|
|
|
|
session->original_handshake_hash_len);
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
new_session->original_handshake_hash_len =
|
|
|
|
session->original_handshake_hash_len;
|
|
|
|
new_session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint;
|
|
|
|
new_session->ticket_age_add = session->ticket_age_add;
|
2016-12-07 20:29:45 +00:00
|
|
|
new_session->ticket_max_early_data = session->ticket_max_early_data;
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
new_session->extended_master_secret = session->extended_master_secret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the ticket. */
|
|
|
|
if (dup_flags & SSL_SESSION_INCLUDE_TICKET) {
|
|
|
|
if (session->tlsext_tick != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
new_session->tlsext_tick =
|
|
|
|
BUF_memdup(session->tlsext_tick, session->tlsext_ticklen);
|
|
|
|
if (new_session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
new_session->tlsext_ticklen = session->tlsext_ticklen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The new_session does not get a copy of the ex_data. */
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
|
|
|
new_session->not_resumable = 1;
|
|
|
|
return new_session;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(new_session);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-28 19:00:32 +00:00
|
|
|
void ssl_session_rebase_time(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
2016-11-03 20:59:25 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timeval now;
|
|
|
|
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* To avoid overflows and underflows, if we've gone back in time or any value
|
|
|
|
* is negative, update the time, but mark the session expired. */
|
|
|
|
if (session->time > now.tv_sec ||
|
|
|
|
session->time < 0 ||
|
|
|
|
now.tv_sec < 0) {
|
|
|
|
session->time = now.tv_sec;
|
|
|
|
session->timeout = 0;
|
2017-01-28 19:00:32 +00:00
|
|
|
session->auth_timeout = 0;
|
2016-11-03 20:59:25 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-28 19:00:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Adjust the session time and timeouts. If the session has already expired,
|
|
|
|
* clamp the timeouts at zero. */
|
2016-11-03 20:59:25 +00:00
|
|
|
long delta = now.tv_sec - session->time;
|
|
|
|
session->time = now.tv_sec;
|
|
|
|
if (session->timeout < delta) {
|
|
|
|
session->timeout = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
session->timeout -= delta;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-01-28 19:00:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (session->auth_timeout < delta) {
|
|
|
|
session->auth_timeout = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
session->auth_timeout -= delta;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void ssl_session_renew_timeout(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session, long timeout) {
|
|
|
|
/* Rebase the timestamp relative to the current time so |timeout| is measured
|
|
|
|
* correctly. */
|
|
|
|
ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, session);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (session->timeout > timeout) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
session->timeout = timeout;
|
|
|
|
if (session->timeout > session->auth_timeout) {
|
|
|
|
session->timeout = session->auth_timeout;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-11-03 20:59:25 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-05 15:51:43 +01:00
|
|
|
int SSL_SESSION_up_ref(SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&session->references);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
if (session == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&session->references)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, session, &session->ex_data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(session->master_key, sizeof(session->master_key));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(session->session_id, sizeof(session->session_id));
|
2016-12-12 19:06:16 +00:00
|
|
|
sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
|
2016-11-07 20:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
X509_free(session->x509_peer);
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(session->x509_chain, X509_free);
|
2016-12-12 18:51:00 +00:00
|
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(session->x509_chain_without_leaf, X509_free);
|
2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_hostname);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_tick);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(session->ocsp_response);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(session->psk_identity);
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_cleanse(session, sizeof(*session));
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(session);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *session,
|
|
|
|
unsigned *out_len) {
|
|
|
|
if (out_len != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
*out_len = session->session_id_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return session->session_id;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
return session->timeout;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
2015-10-01 21:13:22 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* NULL should crash, but silently accept it here for compatibility. */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
|
|
|
return session->time;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-13 19:48:12 +01:00
|
|
|
X509 *SSL_SESSION_get0_peer(const SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
2016-11-07 20:02:35 +00:00
|
|
|
return session->x509_peer;
|
2015-09-13 19:48:12 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-04-21 21:58:49 +01:00
|
|
|
size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, uint8_t *out,
|
|
|
|
size_t max_out) {
|
|
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): Fix master_key_length's type and remove these casts. */
|
|
|
|
if (max_out == 0) {
|
|
|
|
return (size_t)session->master_key_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (max_out > (size_t)session->master_key_length) {
|
|
|
|
max_out = (size_t)session->master_key_length;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(out, session->master_key, max_out);
|
2016-04-21 21:58:49 +01:00
|
|
|
return max_out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *session, long time) {
|
|
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
session->time = time;
|
|
|
|
return time;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *session, long timeout) {
|
|
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
session->timeout = timeout;
|
2017-01-28 19:00:32 +00:00
|
|
|
session->auth_timeout = timeout;
|
2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int SSL_SESSION_set1_id_context(SSL_SESSION *session, const uint8_t *sid_ctx,
|
2016-12-08 03:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t sid_ctx_len) {
|
|
|
|
if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof(session->sid_ctx)) {
|
2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-08 03:35:24 +00:00
|
|
|
assert(sizeof(session->sid_ctx) < 256);
|
|
|
|
session->sid_ctx_length = (uint8_t)sid_ctx_len;
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(session->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
|
2015-09-13 19:46:26 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr(void) {
|
|
|
|
return (SSL_SESSION *)&g_pending_session_magic;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-08-01 20:29:38 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) {
|
2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Once the handshake completes we return the established session. Otherwise
|
|
|
|
* we return the intermediate session, either |session| (for resumption) or
|
|
|
|
* |new_session| if doing a full handshake. */
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl->s3->established_session;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl->s3->new_session != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl->s3->new_session;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return ssl->session;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) {
|
2016-08-05 15:51:43 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *ret = SSL_get_session(ssl);
|
|
|
|
if (ret != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-12-05 04:14:35 +00:00
|
|
|
int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
|
2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
|
|
|
int index;
|
2015-12-05 04:14:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp, dup_func,
|
|
|
|
free_func)) {
|
2015-04-15 22:29:53 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return index;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-13 19:20:58 +01:00
|
|
|
int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *session, int idx, void *arg) {
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx, arg);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-13 19:20:58 +01:00
|
|
|
void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *session, int idx) {
|
|
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-17 08:20:47 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl_get_new_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int is_server) {
|
|
|
|
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
|
2015-10-18 17:50:32 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-18 17:50:32 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_SESSION_new();
|
|
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-12 18:51:00 +00:00
|
|
|
session->is_server = is_server;
|
|
|
|
session->ssl_version = ssl->version;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-03 18:13:17 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Fill in the time from the |SSL_CTX|'s clock. */
|
|
|
|
struct timeval now;
|
|
|
|
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
|
|
|
|
session->time = now.tv_sec;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-28 19:00:32 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t version = ssl3_protocol_version(ssl);
|
|
|
|
if (version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
|
|
|
/* TLS 1.3 uses tickets as authenticators, so we are willing to use them for
|
|
|
|
* longer. */
|
|
|
|
session->timeout = ssl->session_psk_dhe_timeout;
|
|
|
|
session->auth_timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* TLS 1.2 resumption does not incorporate new key material, so we use a
|
|
|
|
* much shorter timeout. */
|
|
|
|
session->timeout = ssl->session_timeout;
|
|
|
|
session->auth_timeout = ssl->session_timeout;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-18 17:50:32 +01:00
|
|
|
if (is_server) {
|
2017-01-28 19:00:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (hs->ticket_expected || version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
|
2015-10-18 17:50:32 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Don't set session IDs for sessions resumed with tickets. This will keep
|
|
|
|
* them out of the session cache. */
|
|
|
|
session->session_id_length = 0;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-10-18 17:50:32 +01:00
|
|
|
session->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
if (!RAND_bytes(session->session_id, session->session_id_length)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-10-18 17:50:32 +01:00
|
|
|
session->session_id_length = 0;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-18 17:50:32 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ssl->sid_ctx_length > sizeof(session->sid_ctx)) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
2015-10-18 17:50:32 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(session->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length);
|
2015-10-18 17:50:32 +01:00
|
|
|
session->sid_ctx_length = ssl->sid_ctx_length;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
|
|
|
/* The session is marked not resumable until it is completely filled in. */
|
|
|
|
session->not_resumable = 1;
|
2016-07-18 18:17:16 +01:00
|
|
|
session->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-06-27 21:34:59 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->s3->new_session);
|
|
|
|
ssl->s3->new_session = session;
|
2016-09-01 06:10:07 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2015-10-18 17:50:32 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-12 19:06:16 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl_session_x509_cache_objects(SSL_SESSION *sess) {
|
|
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
|
|
|
|
const size_t num_certs = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(sess->certs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (num_certs > 0) {
|
|
|
|
chain = sk_X509_new_null();
|
|
|
|
if (chain == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
X509 *leaf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_certs; i++) {
|
|
|
|
X509 *x509 = X509_parse_from_buffer(sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(sess->certs, i));
|
|
|
|
if (x509 == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!sk_X509_push(chain, x509)) {
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
X509_free(x509);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
|
|
leaf = x509;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(sess->x509_chain, X509_free);
|
|
|
|
sess->x509_chain = chain;
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(sess->x509_chain_without_leaf, X509_free);
|
|
|
|
sess->x509_chain_without_leaf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
X509_free(sess->x509_peer);
|
|
|
|
if (leaf != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
X509_up_ref(leaf);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sess->x509_peer = leaf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-27 16:10:52 +01:00
|
|
|
int ssl_encrypt_ticket(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, const SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Serialize the SSL_SESSION to be encoded into the ticket. */
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *session_buf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t session_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(session, &session_buf, &session_len)) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
HMAC_CTX hctx;
|
|
|
|
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the session is too long, emit a dummy value rather than abort the
|
|
|
|
* connection. */
|
|
|
|
static const size_t kMaxTicketOverhead =
|
|
|
|
16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
if (session_len > 0xffff - kMaxTicketOverhead) {
|
|
|
|
static const char kTicketPlaceholder[] = "TICKET TOO LARGE";
|
|
|
|
if (CBB_add_bytes(out, (const uint8_t *)kTicketPlaceholder,
|
|
|
|
strlen(kTicketPlaceholder))) {
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does all the
|
|
|
|
* work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *tctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
|
|
|
uint8_t key_name[16];
|
|
|
|
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx,
|
|
|
|
1 /* encrypt */) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (!RAND_bytes(iv, 16) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
|
|
|
|
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv) ||
|
|
|
|
!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(),
|
|
|
|
NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
|
2016-07-27 16:10:52 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *ptr;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_add_bytes(out, key_name, 16) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBB_add_bytes(out, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, session_len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
size_t total = 0;
|
2016-09-22 06:21:24 +01:00
|
|
|
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(ptr, session_buf, session_len);
|
2016-09-22 06:21:24 +01:00
|
|
|
total = session_len;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
2016-07-27 16:10:52 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, ptr + total, &len, session_buf, session_len)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
total += len;
|
|
|
|
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ctx, ptr + total, &len)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
total += len;
|
2016-09-22 06:21:24 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2016-07-27 16:10:52 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!CBB_did_write(out, total)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned hlen;
|
|
|
|
if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, CBB_data(out), CBB_len(out)) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBB_reserve(out, &ptr, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) ||
|
|
|
|
!HMAC_Final(&hctx, ptr, &hlen) ||
|
|
|
|
!CBB_did_write(out, hlen)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(session_buf);
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
|
|
|
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
int ssl_session_is_context_valid(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return session->sid_ctx_length == ssl->sid_ctx_length &&
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcmp(session->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) ==
|
|
|
|
0;
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int ssl_session_is_time_valid(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct timeval now;
|
|
|
|
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
|
2016-10-27 21:36:32 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Reject tickets from the future to avoid underflow. */
|
|
|
|
if ((long)now.tv_sec < session->time) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-03 03:24:29 +00:00
|
|
|
return session->timeout > (long)now.tv_sec - session->time;
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-12 03:36:06 +00:00
|
|
|
int ssl_session_is_resumable(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_is_context_valid(ssl, session) &&
|
2016-12-12 18:51:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The session must have been created by the same type of end point as
|
|
|
|
* we're now using it with. */
|
|
|
|
session->is_server == ssl->server &&
|
2016-11-12 03:36:06 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The session must not be expired. */
|
|
|
|
ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session) &&
|
|
|
|
/* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
|
|
|
|
* version. */
|
|
|
|
ssl->version == session->ssl_version &&
|
Negotiate ciphers before resumption.
This changes our resumption strategy. Before, we would negotiate ciphers
only on fresh handshakes. On resumption, we would blindly use whatever
was in the session.
Instead, evaluate cipher suite preferences on every handshake.
Resumption requires that the saved cipher suite match the one that would
have been negotiated anyway. If client or server preferences changed
sufficiently, we decline the session.
This is much easier to reason about (we always pick the best cipher
suite), simpler, and avoids getting stuck under old preferences if
tickets are continuously renewed. Notably, although TLS 1.2 ticket
renewal does not work in practice, TLS 1.3 will renew tickets like
there's no tomorrow.
It also means we don't need dedicated code to avoid resuming a cipher
which has since been disabled. (That dedicated code was a little odd
anyway since the mask_k, etc., checks didn't occur. When cert_cb was
skipped on resumption, one could resume without ever configuring a
certificate! So we couldn't know whether to mask off RSA or ECDSA cipher
suites.)
Add tests which assert on this new arrangement.
BUG=116
Change-Id: Id40d851ccd87e06c46c6ec272527fd8ece8abfc6
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/11847
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
2016-11-16 10:05:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Only resume if the session's cipher matches the negotiated one. */
|
2016-11-17 01:53:09 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher == session->cipher &&
|
|
|
|
/* If the session contains a client certificate (either the full
|
|
|
|
* certificate or just the hash) then require that the form of the
|
|
|
|
* certificate matches the current configuration. */
|
|
|
|
((session->x509_peer == NULL && !session->peer_sha256_valid) ||
|
|
|
|
session->peer_sha256_valid ==
|
|
|
|
ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs);
|
2016-11-12 03:36:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/* ssl_lookup_session looks up |session_id| in the session cache and sets
|
|
|
|
* |*out_session| to an |SSL_SESSION| object if found. The caller takes
|
|
|
|
* ownership of the result. */
|
|
|
|
static enum ssl_session_result_t ssl_lookup_session(
|
|
|
|
SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session, const uint8_t *session_id,
|
|
|
|
size_t session_id_len) {
|
|
|
|
*out_session = NULL;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session_id_len == 0 || session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_success;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Try the internal cache, if it exists. */
|
|
|
|
if (!(ssl->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode &
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION data;
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
data.ssl_version = ssl->version;
|
|
|
|
data.session_id_length = session_id_len;
|
2016-12-13 06:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, session_id_len);
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&ssl->initial_ctx->lock);
|
|
|
|
session = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->initial_ctx->sessions, &data);
|
|
|
|
if (session != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-10-18 19:28:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/* TODO(davidben): This should probably move it to the front of the list. */
|
2016-05-24 16:28:36 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&ssl->initial_ctx->lock);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Fall back to the external cache, if it exists. */
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session == NULL &&
|
|
|
|
ssl->initial_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
int copy = 1;
|
|
|
|
session = ssl->initial_ctx->get_session_cb(ssl, (uint8_t *)session_id,
|
|
|
|
session_id_len, ©);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-08-26 17:22:56 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_success;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session == SSL_magic_pending_session_ptr()) {
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_retry;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us to do so
|
|
|
|
* (note that if the session structures returned by the callback are shared
|
|
|
|
* between threads, it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy ==
|
|
|
|
* 0], or things won't be thread-safe). */
|
|
|
|
if (copy) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add the externally cached session to the internal cache if necessary. */
|
2016-08-26 17:22:56 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!(ssl->initial_ctx->session_cache_mode &
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_add_session(ssl->initial_ctx, session);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2016-11-12 03:36:06 +00:00
|
|
|
if (session != NULL &&
|
|
|
|
!ssl_session_is_time_valid(ssl, session)) {
|
2016-07-29 19:32:55 +01:00
|
|
|
/* The session was from the cache, so remove it. */
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssl->initial_ctx, session);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
|
|
|
|
session = NULL;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_session = session;
|
|
|
|
return ssl_session_success;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
enum ssl_session_result_t ssl_get_prev_session(
|
2016-11-12 03:36:06 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION **out_session, int *out_tickets_supported,
|
2016-12-04 04:15:13 +00:00
|
|
|
int *out_renew_ticket, const SSL_CLIENT_HELLO *client_hello) {
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/* This is used only by servers. */
|
|
|
|
assert(ssl->server);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
|
2015-11-21 19:05:44 +00:00
|
|
|
int renew_ticket = 0;
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If tickets are disabled, always behave as if no tickets are present. */
|
2015-07-01 23:45:03 +01:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t *ticket = NULL;
|
|
|
|
size_t ticket_len = 0;
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
const int tickets_supported =
|
|
|
|
!(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) &&
|
2015-10-10 00:32:41 +01:00
|
|
|
ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
|
2016-12-04 04:15:13 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
|
|
|
|
client_hello, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, &ticket, &ticket_len);
|
2015-11-21 19:05:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tickets_supported && ticket_len > 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (!tls_process_ticket(ssl, &session, &renew_ticket, ticket, ticket_len,
|
2016-12-04 04:15:13 +00:00
|
|
|
client_hello->session_id,
|
|
|
|
client_hello->session_id_len)) {
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
return ssl_session_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-11-21 19:05:44 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The client didn't send a ticket, so the session ID is a real ID. */
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
enum ssl_session_result_t lookup_ret = ssl_lookup_session(
|
2016-12-04 04:15:13 +00:00
|
|
|
ssl, &session, client_hello->session_id, client_hello->session_id_len);
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
if (lookup_ret != ssl_session_success) {
|
|
|
|
return lookup_ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
*out_session = session;
|
2016-11-12 03:36:06 +00:00
|
|
|
*out_tickets_supported = tickets_supported;
|
|
|
|
*out_renew_ticket = renew_ticket;
|
2015-06-16 20:34:50 +01:00
|
|
|
return ssl_session_success;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
2015-10-18 20:08:57 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Although |session| is inserted into two structures (a doubly-linked list
|
|
|
|
* and the hash table), |ctx| only takes one reference. */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-18 20:08:57 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *old_session;
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, &old_session, session)) {
|
2016-05-24 16:28:36 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-18 20:08:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (old_session != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if (old_session == session) {
|
|
|
|
/* |session| was already in the cache. */
|
2016-05-24 16:28:36 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
2015-10-18 20:08:57 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(old_session);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* There was a session ID collision. |old_session| must be removed from
|
|
|
|
* the linked list and released. */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, old_session);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(old_session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-18 20:08:57 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-18 20:08:57 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Enforce any cache size limits. */
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
|
|
|
|
if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-24 16:28:36 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
2015-10-18 20:08:57 +01:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
return remove_session_lock(ctx, session, 1);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session, int lock) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session != NULL && session->session_id_length != 0) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (lock) {
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions,
|
|
|
|
session);
|
|
|
|
if (found_session == session) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
found_session = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, session);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (lock) {
|
2016-05-24 16:28:36 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
found_session->not_resumable = 1;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, found_session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(found_session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int SSL_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
2016-09-01 06:10:07 +01:00
|
|
|
/* SSL_set_session may only be called before the handshake has started. */
|
2016-12-12 22:00:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (SSL_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_INIT || ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) {
|
2016-09-01 06:10:07 +01:00
|
|
|
abort();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssl_set_session(ssl, session);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void ssl_set_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ssl->session == session) {
|
2016-09-01 06:10:07 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session);
|
|
|
|
ssl->session = session;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (session != NULL) {
|
2015-02-09 08:34:47 +00:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_up_ref(session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long timeout) {
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-28 19:32:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Historically, zero was treated as |SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT|. */
|
|
|
|
if (timeout == 0) {
|
|
|
|
timeout = SSL_DEFAULT_SESSION_TIMEOUT;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
long old_timeout = ctx->session_timeout;
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_timeout = timeout;
|
|
|
|
return old_timeout;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
return ctx->session_timeout;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-28 19:00:32 +00:00
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_session_psk_dhe_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx, long timeout) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout = timeout;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-11-22 18:56:46 +00:00
|
|
|
long SSL_set_session_timeout(SSL *ssl, long timeout) {
|
|
|
|
long old_timeout = ssl->session_timeout;
|
|
|
|
ssl->session_timeout = timeout;
|
|
|
|
return old_timeout;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-28 19:00:32 +00:00
|
|
|
void SSL_set_session_psk_dhe_timeout(SSL *ssl, long timeout) {
|
|
|
|
ssl->session_psk_dhe_timeout = timeout;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef struct timeout_param_st {
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx;
|
|
|
|
long time;
|
2015-05-03 20:21:28 +01:00
|
|
|
LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *cache;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
} TIMEOUT_PARAM;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static void timeout_doall_arg(SSL_SESSION *session, void *void_param) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
TIMEOUT_PARAM *param = void_param;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (param->time == 0 ||
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
param->time > (session->time + session->timeout)) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* timeout */
|
|
|
|
/* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to
|
|
|
|
* save on locking overhead */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
(void) lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(param->cache, session);
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(param->ctx, session);
|
|
|
|
session->not_resumable = 1;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (param->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
param->ctx->remove_session_cb(param->ctx, session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx, long time) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
TIMEOUT_PARAM tp;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
tp.ctx = ctx;
|
|
|
|
tp.cache = ctx->sessions;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tp.cache == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
tp.time = time;
|
2015-05-15 23:29:21 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
lh_SSL_SESSION_doall_arg(tp.cache, timeout_doall_arg, &tp);
|
2016-05-24 16:28:36 +01:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&ctx->lock);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
/* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
if (session->next == NULL || session->prev == NULL) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_tail) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* last element in list */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* only one element in list */
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = NULL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = session->prev;
|
|
|
|
session->prev->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
if (session->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&ctx->session_cache_head) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/* first element in list */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = session->next;
|
|
|
|
session->next->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
} else { /* middle of list */
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
session->next->prev = session->prev;
|
|
|
|
session->prev->next = session->next;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
session->prev = session->next = NULL;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
|
|
|
if (session->next != NULL && session->prev != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, session);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = session;
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_tail = session;
|
|
|
|
session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
|
|
session->next = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail);
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
session->next = ctx->session_cache_head;
|
|
|
|
session->next->prev = session;
|
|
|
|
session->prev = (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head);
|
|
|
|
ctx->session_cache_head = session;
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ctx->new_session_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return ctx->new_session_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session)) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ctx->remove_session_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *session) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return ctx->remove_session_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *id, int id_len,
|
|
|
|
int *out_copy)) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ctx->get_session_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-14 06:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(
|
|
|
|
SSL *ssl, uint8_t *id, int id_len, int *out_copy) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return ctx->get_session_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-18 03:51:17 +01:00
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value)) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ctx->info_callback = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl, int type,
|
2015-10-18 03:51:17 +01:00
|
|
|
int value) {
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return ctx->info_callback;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
void SSL_CTX_set_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
2014-12-19 01:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
void (*cb)(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey)) {
|
|
|
|
ctx->channel_id_cb = cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void (*SSL_CTX_get_channel_id_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY **pkey) {
|
|
|
|
return ctx->channel_id_cb;
|
|
|
|
}
|