2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
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* project 2006.
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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2015-09-15 21:47:35 +01:00
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#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/obj.h>
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#include <openssl/rsa.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include "../rsa/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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Implement new SPKI parsers.
Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each
with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can
get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints
in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library
representation of an SPKI.
This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and
EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and
implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been
intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with
full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this.
This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose
EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies
acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and
the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check
key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX
implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would
later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems
unlikely.
Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may
have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or
not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate
EVP_PKEY type.)
DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for
now. This isn't any worse than before.
Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task.
BUG=522228
Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
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static int rsa_pub_encode(CBB *out, const EVP_PKEY *key) {
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/* See RFC 3279, section 2.3.1. */
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CBB spki, algorithm, null, key_bitstring;
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(out, &spki, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&spki, &algorithm, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
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!OBJ_nid2cbb(&algorithm, NID_rsaEncryption) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, &null, CBS_ASN1_NULL) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&spki, &key_bitstring, CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING) ||
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!CBB_add_u8(&key_bitstring, 0 /* padding */) ||
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!RSA_marshal_public_key(&key_bitstring, key->pkey.rsa) ||
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!CBB_flush(out)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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Implement new SPKI parsers.
Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each
with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can
get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints
in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library
representation of an SPKI.
This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and
EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and
implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been
intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with
full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this.
This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose
EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies
acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and
the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check
key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX
implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would
later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems
unlikely.
Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may
have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or
not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate
EVP_PKEY type.)
DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for
now. This isn't any worse than before.
Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task.
BUG=522228
Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
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static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *out, CBS *params, CBS *key) {
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/* See RFC 3279, section 2.3.1. */
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/* The parameters must be NULL. */
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CBS null;
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if (!CBS_get_asn1(params, &null, CBS_ASN1_NULL) ||
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CBS_len(&null) != 0 ||
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CBS_len(params) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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2015-09-15 21:47:35 +01:00
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2015-09-23 17:23:01 +01:00
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/* Estonian IDs issued between September 2014 to September 2015 are
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* broken. See https://crbug.com/532048 and https://crbug.com/534766.
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2015-09-15 21:47:35 +01:00
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*
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2015-09-17 17:02:24 +01:00
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* TODO(davidben): Switch this to the strict version in March 2016 or when
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2015-09-15 21:47:35 +01:00
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* Chromium can force client certificates down a different codepath, whichever
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* comes first. */
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Implement new SPKI parsers.
Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each
with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can
get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints
in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library
representation of an SPKI.
This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and
EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and
implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been
intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with
full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this.
This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose
EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies
acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and
the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check
key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX
implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would
later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems
unlikely.
Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may
have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or
not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate
EVP_PKEY type.)
DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for
now. This isn't any worse than before.
Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task.
BUG=522228
Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
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RSA *rsa = RSA_parse_public_key_buggy(key);
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if (rsa == NULL || CBS_len(key) != 0) {
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2015-09-15 21:47:35 +01:00
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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RSA_free(rsa);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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2015-09-15 21:47:35 +01:00
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Implement new SPKI parsers.
Many consumers need SPKI support (X.509, TLS, QUIC, WebCrypto), each
with different ways to set signature parameters. SPKIs themselves can
get complex with id-RSASSA-PSS keys which come with various constraints
in the key parameters. This suggests we want a common in-library
representation of an SPKI.
This adds two new functions EVP_parse_public_key and
EVP_marshal_public_key which converts EVP_PKEY to and from SPKI and
implements X509_PUBKEY functions with them. EVP_PKEY seems to have been
intended to be able to express the supported SPKI types with
full-fidelity, so these APIs will continue this.
This means future support for id-RSASSA-PSS would *not* repurpose
EVP_PKEY_RSA. I'm worried about code assuming EVP_PKEY_RSA implies
acting on the RSA* is legal. Instead, it'd add an EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS and
the data pointer would be some (exposed, so the caller may still check
key size, etc.) RSA_PSS_KEY struct. Internally, the EVP_PKEY_CTX
implementation would enforce the key constraints. If RSA_PSS_KEY would
later need its own API, that code would move there, but that seems
unlikely.
Ideally we'd have a 1:1 correspondence with key OID, although we may
have to fudge things if mistakes happen in standardization. (Whether or
not X.509 reuses id-ecPublicKey for Ed25519, we'll give it a separate
EVP_PKEY type.)
DSA parsing hooks are still implemented, missing parameters and all for
now. This isn't any worse than before.
Decoupling from the giant crypto/obj OID table will be a later task.
BUG=522228
Change-Id: I0e3964edf20cb795a18b0991d17e5ca8bce3e28c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6861
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
2015-12-31 02:40:40 +00:00
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EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(out, rsa);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 1;
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}
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static int rsa_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) {
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return BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->n, a->pkey.rsa->n) == 0 &&
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BN_cmp(b->pkey.rsa->e, a->pkey.rsa->e) == 0;
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}
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2016-01-01 06:17:30 +00:00
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static int rsa_priv_encode(CBB *out, const EVP_PKEY *key) {
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CBB pkcs8, algorithm, null, private_key;
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if (!CBB_add_asn1(out, &pkcs8, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1_uint64(&pkcs8, 0 /* version */) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&pkcs8, &algorithm, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
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!OBJ_nid2cbb(&algorithm, NID_rsaEncryption) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&algorithm, &null, CBS_ASN1_NULL) ||
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!CBB_add_asn1(&pkcs8, &private_key, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
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!RSA_marshal_private_key(&private_key, key->pkey.rsa) ||
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!CBB_flush(out)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_ENCODE_ERROR);
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2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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|
2016-01-01 06:17:30 +00:00
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static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *out, CBS *params, CBS *key) {
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/* Per RFC 3447, A.1, the parameters have type NULL. */
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CBS null;
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if (!CBS_get_asn1(params, &null, CBS_ASN1_NULL) ||
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CBS_len(&null) != 0 ||
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CBS_len(params) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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|
2016-01-01 06:17:30 +00:00
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|
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RSA *rsa = RSA_parse_private_key(key);
|
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if (rsa == NULL || CBS_len(key) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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|
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RSA_free(rsa);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 0;
|
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|
|
}
|
|
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|
|
2016-01-01 06:17:30 +00:00
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|
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EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(out, rsa);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
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return 1;
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|
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}
|
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|
2014-07-18 23:39:42 +01:00
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|
|
static int rsa_opaque(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
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return RSA_is_opaque(pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
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|
|
}
|
|
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|
|
2014-11-12 04:47:50 +00:00
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|
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static int rsa_supports_digest(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) {
|
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|
|
return RSA_supports_digest(pkey->pkey.rsa, md);
|
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|
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}
|
|
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|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
|
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|
|
return RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
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|
|
}
|
|
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|
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static int rsa_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
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|
|
return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.rsa->n);
|
|
|
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}
|
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|
|
static void int_rsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa); }
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void update_buflen(const BIGNUM *b, size_t *pbuflen) {
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
if (!b) {
|
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|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
i = BN_num_bytes(b);
|
|
|
|
if (*pbuflen < i) {
|
|
|
|
*pbuflen = i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int do_rsa_print(BIO *out, const RSA *rsa, int off,
|
|
|
|
int include_private) {
|
|
|
|
char *str;
|
|
|
|
const char *s;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *m = NULL;
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0, mod_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
size_t buf_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
update_buflen(rsa->n, &buf_len);
|
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|
|
update_buflen(rsa->e, &buf_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (include_private) {
|
|
|
|
update_buflen(rsa->d, &buf_len);
|
|
|
|
update_buflen(rsa->p, &buf_len);
|
|
|
|
update_buflen(rsa->q, &buf_len);
|
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|
|
update_buflen(rsa->dmp1, &buf_len);
|
|
|
|
update_buflen(rsa->dmq1, &buf_len);
|
|
|
|
update_buflen(rsa->iqmp, &buf_len);
|
2015-05-26 19:36:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes);
|
|
|
|
i++) {
|
|
|
|
const RSA_additional_prime *ap =
|
|
|
|
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(rsa->additional_primes, i);
|
|
|
|
update_buflen(ap->prime, &buf_len);
|
|
|
|
update_buflen(ap->exp, &buf_len);
|
|
|
|
update_buflen(ap->coeff, &buf_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-07 19:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
m = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len + 10);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
if (m == NULL) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rsa->n != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
mod_len = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BIO_indent(out, off, 128)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (include_private && rsa->d) {
|
2015-06-27 19:56:25 +01:00
|
|
|
if (BIO_printf(out, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
str = "modulus:";
|
|
|
|
s = "publicExponent:";
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_printf(out, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
str = "Modulus:";
|
|
|
|
s = "Exponent:";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ASN1_bn_print(out, str, rsa->n, m, off) ||
|
|
|
|
!ASN1_bn_print(out, s, rsa->e, m, off)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (include_private) {
|
|
|
|
if (!ASN1_bn_print(out, "privateExponent:", rsa->d, m, off) ||
|
|
|
|
!ASN1_bn_print(out, "prime1:", rsa->p, m, off) ||
|
|
|
|
!ASN1_bn_print(out, "prime2:", rsa->q, m, off) ||
|
|
|
|
!ASN1_bn_print(out, "exponent1:", rsa->dmp1, m, off) ||
|
|
|
|
!ASN1_bn_print(out, "exponent2:", rsa->dmq1, m, off) ||
|
|
|
|
!ASN1_bn_print(out, "coefficient:", rsa->iqmp, m, off)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-05-26 19:36:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rsa->additional_primes != NULL &&
|
|
|
|
sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_printf(out, "otherPrimeInfos:\n") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_additional_prime_num(rsa->additional_primes);
|
|
|
|
i++) {
|
|
|
|
const RSA_additional_prime *ap =
|
|
|
|
sk_RSA_additional_prime_value(rsa->additional_primes, i);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_printf(out, "otherPrimeInfo (prime %u):\n",
|
|
|
|
(unsigned)(i + 3)) <= 0 ||
|
|
|
|
!ASN1_bn_print(out, "prime:", ap->prime, m, off) ||
|
|
|
|
!ASN1_bn_print(out, "exponent:", ap->exp, m, off) ||
|
|
|
|
!ASN1_bn_print(out, "coeff:", ap->coeff, m, off)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2015-04-22 20:49:27 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_free(m);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
|
|
|
|
ASN1_PCTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
|
|
|
|
ASN1_PCTX *ctx) {
|
|
|
|
return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Given an MGF1 Algorithm ID decode to an Algorithm Identifier */
|
|
|
|
static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg) {
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *p;
|
|
|
|
int plen;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-03 16:06:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (alg == NULL || alg->parameter == NULL ||
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1 ||
|
|
|
|
alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
|
|
|
|
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
|
|
|
|
return d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash) {
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *p;
|
|
|
|
int plen;
|
|
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*pmaskHash = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!alg->parameter || alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data;
|
|
|
|
plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length;
|
|
|
|
pss = d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS(NULL, &p, plen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!pss) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return pss;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent) {
|
|
|
|
int rv = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!pss) {
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0 ||
|
|
|
|
!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128) ||
|
|
|
|
BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
|
|
|
|
if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0 ||
|
|
|
|
!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128) ||
|
|
|
|
BIO_puts(bp, "Mask Algorithm: ") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
|
|
|
|
if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0 ||
|
|
|
|
BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (maskHash) {
|
|
|
|
if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128) ||
|
|
|
|
BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pss->saltLength) {
|
|
|
|
if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128) ||
|
|
|
|
BIO_puts(bp, "Trailer Field: 0x") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pss->trailerField) {
|
|
|
|
if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
|
|
|
|
const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) {
|
|
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss) {
|
|
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
|
|
|
|
rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent);
|
2015-04-22 20:49:27 +01:00
|
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!rv) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (sig) {
|
|
|
|
return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-27 19:56:25 +01:00
|
|
|
static int old_rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const uint8_t **pder,
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
int derlen) {
|
|
|
|
RSA *rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, pder, derlen);
|
|
|
|
if (rsa == NULL) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* allocate and set algorithm ID from EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_md_to_algor(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *md) {
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_sha1) {
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*palg = X509_ALGOR_new();
|
|
|
|
if (!*palg) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set_md(*palg, md);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate and set MGF1 algorithm ID from EVP_MD */
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_md_to_mgf1(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *mgf1md) {
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR *algtmp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
*palg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) == NID_sha1) {
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */
|
|
|
|
if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&algtmp, mgf1md) ||
|
|
|
|
!ASN1_item_pack(algtmp, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &stmp)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*palg = X509_ALGOR_new();
|
|
|
|
if (!*palg) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set0(*palg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_mgf1), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, stmp);
|
|
|
|
stmp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2015-04-22 20:49:27 +01:00
|
|
|
ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR_free(algtmp);
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*palg) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* convert algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
|
|
|
|
static const EVP_MD *rsa_algor_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg) {
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
|
|
if (!alg) {
|
|
|
|
return EVP_sha1();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(alg->algorithm);
|
|
|
|
if (md == NULL) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return md;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* convert MGF1 algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
|
|
|
|
static const EVP_MD *rsa_mgf1_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR *maskHash) {
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *md;
|
|
|
|
if (!alg) {
|
|
|
|
return EVP_sha1();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */
|
|
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!maskHash) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm);
|
|
|
|
if (md == NULL) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return md;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* rsa_ctx_to_pss converts EVP_PKEY_CTX in PSS mode into corresponding
|
|
|
|
* algorithm parameter, suitable for setting as an AlgorithmIdentifier. */
|
|
|
|
static ASN1_STRING *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx) {
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
|
|
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
|
|
|
|
int saltlen, rv = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-10 21:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) ||
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (saltlen == -1) {
|
|
|
|
saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
|
|
|
|
} else if (saltlen == -2) {
|
|
|
|
saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
|
|
|
|
if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
saltlen--;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
|
|
|
|
if (!pss) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (saltlen != 20) {
|
|
|
|
pss->saltLength = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
|
|
|
|
if (!pss->saltLength ||
|
|
|
|
!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pss->saltLength, saltlen)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd) ||
|
|
|
|
!rsa_md_to_mgf1(&pss->maskGenAlgorithm, mgf1md)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */
|
|
|
|
if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pss) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rv) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return os;
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (os) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
ASN1_STRING_free(os);
|
2015-02-11 06:17:41 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-09 18:04:29 +01:00
|
|
|
/* From PSS AlgorithmIdentifier set public key parameters. */
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *sigalg, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
|
2014-10-09 18:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
int saltlen;
|
|
|
|
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
|
|
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
|
2014-10-09 18:04:29 +01:00
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
|
|
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
2014-10-09 18:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Decode PSS parameters */
|
|
|
|
pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
|
|
|
|
if (pss == NULL) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mgf1md = rsa_mgf1_to_md(pss->maskGenAlgorithm, maskHash);
|
|
|
|
if (!mgf1md) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
md = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->hashAlgorithm);
|
|
|
|
if (!md) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
saltlen = 20;
|
|
|
|
if (pss->saltLength) {
|
|
|
|
saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main
|
|
|
|
* RSA routines will trap other invalid values anyway. */
|
|
|
|
if (saltlen < 0) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1)
|
|
|
|
* and PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway. */
|
|
|
|
if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-09 18:04:29 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey) ||
|
2015-03-10 21:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, saltlen) ||
|
|
|
|
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md)) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
|
|
|
if (maskHash) {
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Customised RSA AlgorithmIdentifier handling. This is called when a signature
|
|
|
|
* is encountered requiring special handling. We currently only handle PSS. */
|
|
|
|
static int rsa_digest_verify_init_from_algorithm(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
|
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
|
|
|
|
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
|
2015-06-29 05:28:17 +01:00
|
|
|
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EVP, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
|
|
|
return rsa_pss_to_ctx(ctx, sigalg, pkey);
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
|
|
|
static evp_digest_sign_algorithm_result_t rsa_digest_sign_algorithm(
|
|
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, X509_ALGOR *sigalg) {
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
int pad_mode;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = ctx->pctx;
|
2015-03-10 21:16:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode)) {
|
2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
|
|
|
return EVP_DIGEST_SIGN_ALGORITHM_ERROR;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
|
|
|
ASN1_STRING *os1 = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx);
|
|
|
|
if (!os1) {
|
2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
|
|
|
return EVP_DIGEST_SIGN_ALGORITHM_ERROR;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
|
|
|
X509_ALGOR_set0(sigalg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
|
|
|
|
return EVP_DIGEST_SIGN_ALGORITHM_SUCCESS;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Other padding schemes use the default behavior. */
|
|
|
|
return EVP_DIGEST_SIGN_ALGORITHM_DEFAULT;
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meth = {
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
|
|
|
ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
"RSA",
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rsa_pub_decode,
|
|
|
|
rsa_pub_encode,
|
|
|
|
rsa_pub_cmp,
|
|
|
|
rsa_pub_print,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rsa_priv_decode,
|
|
|
|
rsa_priv_encode,
|
|
|
|
rsa_priv_print,
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-18 23:39:42 +01:00
|
|
|
rsa_opaque,
|
2014-11-12 04:47:50 +00:00
|
|
|
rsa_supports_digest,
|
2014-07-18 23:39:42 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
int_rsa_size,
|
|
|
|
rsa_bits,
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-31 08:10:27 +00:00
|
|
|
0,0,0,0,
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rsa_sig_print,
|
|
|
|
int_rsa_free,
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
old_rsa_priv_decode,
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-09 19:50:20 +01:00
|
|
|
rsa_digest_verify_init_from_algorithm,
|
|
|
|
rsa_digest_sign_algorithm,
|
2014-06-20 20:00:00 +01:00
|
|
|
};
|