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d1_pkt.c 14 KiB

Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
Factor out the buffering and low-level record code. This begins decoupling the transport from the SSL state machine. The buffering logic is hidden behind an opaque API. Fields like ssl->packet and ssl->packet_length are gone. ssl3_get_record and dtls1_get_record now call low-level tls_open_record and dtls_open_record functions that unpack a single record independent of who owns the buffer. Both may be called in-place. This removes ssl->rstate which was redundant with the buffer length. Future work will push the buffer up the stack until it is above the handshake. Then we can expose SSL_open and SSL_seal APIs which act like *_open_record but return a slightly larger enum due to other events being possible. Likewise the handshake state machine will be detached from its buffer. The existing SSL_read, SSL_write, etc., APIs will be implemented on top of SSL_open, etc., combined with ssl_read_buffer_* and ssl_write_buffer_*. (Which is why ssl_read_buffer_extend still tries to abstract between TLS's and DTLS's fairly different needs.) The new buffering logic does not support read-ahead (removed previously) since it lacks a memmove on ssl_read_buffer_discard for TLS, but this could be added if desired. The old buffering logic wasn't quite right anyway; it tried to avoid the memmove in some cases and could get stuck too far into the buffer and not accept records. (The only time the memmove is optional is in DTLS or if enough of the record header is available to know that the entire next record would fit in the buffer.) The new logic also now actually decrypts the ciphertext in-place again, rather than almost in-place when there's an explicit nonce/IV. (That accidentally switched in https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/4792/; see 3d59e04bce96474099ba76786a2337e99ae14505.) BUG=468889 Change-Id: I403c1626253c46897f47c7ae93aeab1064b767b2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5715 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
9 years ago
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  1. /* DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
  2. * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */
  3. /* ====================================================================
  4. * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
  5. *
  6. * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  7. * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  8. * are met:
  9. *
  10. * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
  11. * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  12. *
  13. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  14. * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
  15. * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
  16. * distribution.
  17. *
  18. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
  19. * software must display the following acknowledgment:
  20. * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
  21. * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  22. *
  23. * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
  24. * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
  25. * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
  26. * openssl-core@openssl.org.
  27. *
  28. * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
  29. * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
  30. * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
  31. *
  32. * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
  33. * acknowledgment:
  34. * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
  35. * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  36. *
  37. * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
  38. * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  39. * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
  40. * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
  41. * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
  42. * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
  43. * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
  44. * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  45. * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
  46. * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
  47. * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
  48. * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  49. * ====================================================================
  50. *
  51. * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
  52. * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
  53. * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  54. *
  55. */
  56. /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  57. * All rights reserved.
  58. *
  59. * This package is an SSL implementation written
  60. * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
  61. * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
  62. *
  63. * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  64. * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
  65. * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  66. * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
  67. * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  68. * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  69. *
  70. * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  71. * the code are not to be removed.
  72. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  73. * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  74. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  75. * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
  76. *
  77. * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  78. * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  79. * are met:
  80. * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
  81. * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  82. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  83. * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  84. * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  85. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
  86. * must display the following acknowledgement:
  87. * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
  88. * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  89. * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  90. * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  91. * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  92. * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  93. * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  94. *
  95. * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  96. * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  97. * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  98. * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  99. * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  100. * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  101. * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  102. * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  103. * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  104. * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  105. * SUCH DAMAGE.
  106. *
  107. * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  108. * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
  109. * copied and put under another distribution licence
  110. * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */
  111. #include <openssl/ssl.h>
  112. #include <assert.h>
  113. #include <string.h>
  114. #include <openssl/bio.h>
  115. #include <openssl/buf.h>
  116. #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
  117. #include <openssl/mem.h>
  118. #include <openssl/evp.h>
  119. #include <openssl/err.h>
  120. #include <openssl/rand.h>
  121. #include "../crypto/internal.h"
  122. #include "internal.h"
  123. int dtls1_get_record(SSL *ssl) {
  124. again:
  125. switch (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown) {
  126. case ssl_shutdown_none:
  127. break;
  128. case ssl_shutdown_fatal_alert:
  129. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
  130. return -1;
  131. case ssl_shutdown_close_notify:
  132. return 0;
  133. }
  134. /* Read a new packet if there is no unconsumed one. */
  135. if (ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) == 0) {
  136. int read_ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, 0 /* unused */);
  137. if (read_ret < 0 && dtls1_is_timer_expired(ssl)) {
  138. /* For blocking BIOs, retransmits must be handled internally. */
  139. int timeout_ret = DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl);
  140. if (timeout_ret <= 0) {
  141. return timeout_ret;
  142. }
  143. goto again;
  144. }
  145. if (read_ret <= 0) {
  146. return read_ret;
  147. }
  148. }
  149. assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) > 0);
  150. CBS body;
  151. uint8_t type, alert;
  152. size_t consumed;
  153. enum ssl_open_record_t open_ret =
  154. dtls_open_record(ssl, &type, &body, &consumed, &alert,
  155. ssl_read_buffer(ssl), ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl));
  156. ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed);
  157. switch (open_ret) {
  158. case ssl_open_record_partial:
  159. /* Impossible in DTLS. */
  160. break;
  161. case ssl_open_record_success:
  162. if (CBS_len(&body) > 0xffff) {
  163. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW);
  164. return -1;
  165. }
  166. SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
  167. rr->type = type;
  168. rr->length = (uint16_t)CBS_len(&body);
  169. rr->data = (uint8_t *)CBS_data(&body);
  170. return 1;
  171. case ssl_open_record_discard:
  172. goto again;
  173. case ssl_open_record_close_notify:
  174. return 0;
  175. case ssl_open_record_fatal_alert:
  176. return -1;
  177. case ssl_open_record_error:
  178. ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
  179. return -1;
  180. }
  181. assert(0);
  182. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  183. return -1;
  184. }
  185. int dtls1_read_app_data(SSL *ssl, int *out_got_handshake, uint8_t *buf, int len,
  186. int peek) {
  187. assert(!SSL_in_init(ssl));
  188. *out_got_handshake = 0;
  189. SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
  190. again:
  191. if (rr->length == 0) {
  192. int ret = dtls1_get_record(ssl);
  193. if (ret <= 0) {
  194. return ret;
  195. }
  196. }
  197. if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
  198. /* Parse the first fragment header to determine if this is a pre-CCS or
  199. * post-CCS handshake record. DTLS resets handshake message numbers on each
  200. * handshake, so renegotiations and retransmissions are ambiguous. */
  201. CBS cbs, body;
  202. struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
  203. CBS_init(&cbs, rr->data, rr->length);
  204. if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &msg_hdr, &body)) {
  205. ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
  206. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD);
  207. return -1;
  208. }
  209. if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED &&
  210. msg_hdr.seq == ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq - 1) {
  211. if (msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) {
  212. /* Retransmit our last flight of messages. If the peer sends the second
  213. * Finished, they may not have received ours. Only do this for the
  214. * first fragment, in case the Finished was fragmented. */
  215. if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(ssl) < 0) {
  216. return -1;
  217. }
  218. dtls1_retransmit_outgoing_messages(ssl);
  219. }
  220. rr->length = 0;
  221. goto again;
  222. }
  223. /* Otherwise, this is a pre-CCS handshake message from an unsupported
  224. * renegotiation attempt. Fall through to the error path. */
  225. }
  226. if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
  227. ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
  228. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
  229. return -1;
  230. }
  231. /* Discard empty records. */
  232. if (rr->length == 0) {
  233. goto again;
  234. }
  235. if (len <= 0) {
  236. return len;
  237. }
  238. if ((unsigned)len > rr->length) {
  239. len = rr->length;
  240. }
  241. OPENSSL_memcpy(buf, rr->data, len);
  242. if (!peek) {
  243. /* TODO(davidben): Should the record be truncated instead? This is a
  244. * datagram transport. See https://crbug.com/boringssl/65. */
  245. rr->length -= len;
  246. rr->data += len;
  247. if (rr->length == 0) {
  248. /* The record has been consumed, so we may now clear the buffer. */
  249. ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
  250. }
  251. }
  252. return len;
  253. }
  254. int dtls1_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
  255. SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
  256. again:
  257. if (rr->length == 0) {
  258. int ret = dtls1_get_record(ssl);
  259. if (ret <= 0) {
  260. return ret;
  261. }
  262. }
  263. /* Drop handshake records silently. The epochs match, so this must be a
  264. * retransmit of a message we already received. */
  265. if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
  266. rr->length = 0;
  267. goto again;
  268. }
  269. /* Other record types are illegal in this epoch. Note all application data
  270. * records come in the encrypted epoch. */
  271. if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
  272. ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
  273. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
  274. return -1;
  275. }
  276. if (rr->length != 1 || rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
  277. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
  278. ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
  279. return -1;
  280. }
  281. ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data,
  282. rr->length);
  283. rr->length = 0;
  284. ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
  285. return 1;
  286. }
  287. void dtls1_read_close_notify(SSL *ssl) {
  288. /* Bidirectional shutdown doesn't make sense for an unordered transport. DTLS
  289. * alerts also aren't delivered reliably, so we may even time out because the
  290. * peer never received our close_notify. Report to the caller that the channel
  291. * has fully shut down. */
  292. if (ssl->s3->recv_shutdown == ssl_shutdown_none) {
  293. ssl->s3->recv_shutdown = ssl_shutdown_close_notify;
  294. }
  295. }
  296. int dtls1_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *buf, int len) {
  297. assert(!SSL_in_init(ssl));
  298. if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
  299. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
  300. return -1;
  301. }
  302. if (len < 0) {
  303. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
  304. return -1;
  305. }
  306. if (len == 0) {
  307. return 0;
  308. }
  309. int ret = dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, (size_t)len,
  310. dtls1_use_current_epoch);
  311. if (ret <= 0) {
  312. return ret;
  313. }
  314. return len;
  315. }
  316. int dtls1_write_record(SSL *ssl, int type, const uint8_t *buf, size_t len,
  317. enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch) {
  318. assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
  319. /* There should never be a pending write buffer in DTLS. One can't write half
  320. * a datagram, so the write buffer is always dropped in
  321. * |ssl_write_buffer_flush|. */
  322. assert(!ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(ssl));
  323. if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
  324. OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  325. return -1;
  326. }
  327. size_t max_out = len + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl);
  328. uint8_t *out;
  329. size_t ciphertext_len;
  330. if (!ssl_write_buffer_init(ssl, &out, max_out) ||
  331. !dtls_seal_record(ssl, out, &ciphertext_len, max_out, type, buf, len,
  332. use_epoch)) {
  333. ssl_write_buffer_clear(ssl);
  334. return -1;
  335. }
  336. ssl_write_buffer_set_len(ssl, ciphertext_len);
  337. int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl);
  338. if (ret <= 0) {
  339. return ret;
  340. }
  341. return 1;
  342. }
  343. int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl) {
  344. int ret = dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &ssl->s3->send_alert[0], 2,
  345. dtls1_use_current_epoch);
  346. if (ret <= 0) {
  347. return ret;
  348. }
  349. ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
  350. /* If the alert is fatal, flush the BIO now. */
  351. if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
  352. BIO_flush(ssl->wbio);
  353. }
  354. ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert,
  355. 2);
  356. int alert = (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | ssl->s3->send_alert[1];
  357. ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, alert);
  358. return 1;
  359. }