This function was missed when the OPENSSL_EXPORT tags were first added.
Change-Id: Ia73555b8e7ca87f228a8ff9b281d7c401f1655a7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1553
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Just use the normal API for them.
Change-Id: Ibb5988611a86e8d39abda1e02087523d98defb51
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1555
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
RFC 6347 changed the meaning of server_version in HelloVerifyRequest. It should
now always be 1.0 with version negotiation not happening until ServerHello. Fix
runner.go logic and remove #if-0'd code in dtls1_get_hello_verify.
Enforce this in the runner for when we get DTLS 1.2 tests.
Change-Id: Ice83628798a231df6bf268f66b4c47b14a519386
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1552
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than switching the order of the ServerHello and HelloVerifyRequest
states and processing each twice, have the states follow the protocol order.
HelloVerifyRequest reading is optional and ServerHello is strict. Use the
send_cookie bit to determine whether we're expecting a cookie or not.
Fix the dtls1_stop_timer call in these states to consistently hit the end of a
server flight; the previous flight should not be cleared from the retransmit
buffer until the entire next flight is received. That said, OpenSSL doesn't
appear to implement the part where, on receipt of the previous peer flight, the
buffered flight is retransmitted. (With the exception of a SSL3_MT_FINISHED
special-case in dtls1_read_bytes.) So if the peer is also OpenSSL, this doesn't
do anything.
Also fix the DTLS test which wasn't actually asserting that the ClientHello
matched.
Change-Id: Ia542190972dbffabb837d32c9d453a243caa90b2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1551
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I see no internal users and the existence of a THIRD version encoding
complicates all version-checking logic. Also convert another version check to
SSL_IS_DTLS that was missed earlier.
Change-Id: I60d215f57d44880f6e6877889307dc39dbf838f7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1550
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This lets us put the SSL_CIPHER table in the data section. For type-checking,
make STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) cast everything to const SSL_CIPHER*.
Note that this will require some changes in consumers which weren't using a
const SSL_CIPHER *.
Change-Id: Iff734ac0e36f9e5c4a0f3c8411c7f727b820469c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1541
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Of the remaining implementations left, ssl3_, dtls1_, and ssl23_, dtls1_ is
redundant and can be folded into ssl3_. ssl23_ actually isn't; it sets 5
minutes rather than 2 hours. Two hours seems to be what everything else uses
and seems a saner default. Most consumers seem to override it anyway
(SSL_CTX_set_timeout). But it is a behavior change.
The method is called at two points:
- SSL_get_default_timeout
- SSL_CTX_new
Incidentally, the latter call actually makes the former never called internally
and the value it returns a lie. SSL_get_default_timeout returns the default
timeout of the /current/ method, but in ssl_get_new_session, the timeout is
shadowed by session_timeout on the context. That is initialized when
SSL_CTX_new is called. So, unless you go out of your way to
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(0), it always overrides. (And it actually used to a
difference because, for SSL23, the SSL_CTX's method is SSL23, but, when session
creation happens, the SSL's method is the version-specific one.)
Change-Id: I331d3fd69b726242b36492402717b6d0b521c6ee
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1521
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
OBJECT library types are supported only in CMake 2.8.8 or higher, and
attempting to build BoringSSL on Ubuntu 12.04 results in CMake
displaying unhelpful error messages.
Change-Id: I2bc77a2c95d4f6ee41f8489ff679a2a0ba48c508
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1530
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Those ciphers go through EVP_AEAD now.
Change-Id: Ia97af9960223724f041dc2c249def9e626fd03f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1520
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also remove SSL_eNULL ciphers. They were broken anyway in the initial import
because of a lost 'else', but just remove them altogether.
Change-Id: Ie71cf1b45f8fc6883e209801443eddf7f2d058ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1518
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2, so nothing can be depending on it yet. If we
really want a Suite B profile, it seems better to generate a configuration for
the rest of the system rather than pepper the codebase with checks.
Change-Id: I1be3ebed0e87cbfe236ade4174dcf5bbc7e10dd5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1517
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The missing SSL 3.0 client support in runner.go was fairly minor.
Change-Id: Ibbd440c9b6be99be08a214dec6b93ca358d8cf0a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1516
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This was done for the server when parsing a session ticket, but it
wasn't done in the parsing function itself. That caused problems when
high level code used the parsing function directly to set a session for
the client code.
See comments in internal bug 7091840.
Change-Id: Iaa048c3df62cd9fe7a003af33805819e2556960a
Android uses these for some conversions from Java formats. The code is
sufficiently bespoke that putting the conversion functions into
BoringSSL doesn't make a lot of sense, but the alternative is to expose
these ones.
Change-Id: If1362bc4a5c44cba4023c909e2ba6488ae019ddb
Several callers of EVP_EncodeBlock are doing ad-hoc versions of this
function without any overflow checks.
Change-Id: I4d0cad2347ea8c44b42465e8b14b2783db69ee8f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1511
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Android needs it. These functions were removed in the move to BoringSSL.
Change-Id: Ice24a0a1c390930cf07dbd00f72a3e12e6c241f9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1510
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The protocols are pretty similar; they were all basically redundant. The free
of s->tlsext_session_ticket (more fallout from the EAP-FAST patch) was moved to
SSL_free because that object's attached to s, not s->s3. This is relevant if
SSL_set_ssl_method gets called.
Change-Id: I14a896ba8a6a2c34ab1cb5f65311b117051228da
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1509
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This removes some duplicate code in parsing command-line flags and, more
importantly, makes configuration available when constructing the SSL_CTX and
avoids a number of globals.
Change-Id: I26e2d2285b732f855a2c82752bc8e0db480c3b30
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1502
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Run against openssl s_client and openssl s_server. This seems to work for a
start, although it may need to become cleverer to stress more of BoringSSL's
implementation for test purposes.
In particular, it assumes a reliable, in-order channel. And it requires that
the peer send handshake fragments in order. Retransmit and whatnot are not
implemented. The peer under test will be expected to handle a lossy channel,
but all loss in the channel will be controlled. MAC errors, etc., are fatal.
Change-Id: I329233cfb0994938fd012667ddf7c6a791ac7164
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1390
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Gives bounds checks and asserts that there's nothing after the cookie.
Change-Id: I8f9753e0c72670e9960f73a5722cefd9c02696a9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1507
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Mirror the changes in s3_clnt.c.
Change-Id: I7af7080c6eea2a67cc994befa11e45d32eaa9615
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1506
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Analogous fix for DTLS as upstream's c519e89f5c359b8c0f747519773284d9b6382791.
Change-Id: I8a56070ce2a1edf4e9ceb2fd8ce08552e25a1cf3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1504
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
They weren't updated to account for DTLS 1.2.
Change-Id: I81b3bfcb84a46d7b233bb567976a7de37bc46b92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1503
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
https://crbug.com/353579
Align behavior with NSS and report SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH error
when size of the server's dh group is less than 512 bits.
Change-Id: I09f1828482f40b2283f7c6a69425819379399815
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1480
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Even if OPENSSL_free() now simply is defined to free(), it is
still nice to consistently use OPENSSL_free, so that they can
easily be replaced. Many embedded platforms still have slow
allocation and free functions.
Change-Id: Ie8781591311f12c7f69206dbad6fc4a0c89d88b7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1490
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is needed by Android because it passes this string to a handshake
callback. It's implemented in Android's OpenSSL in this patch:
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/openssl.git/+/master/patches/0003-jsse.patch
(Note that it's called |SSL_authentication_method| there.)
I didn't format this function in OpenSSL style because it's crazy and
because we'll probably clang-format ssl/ soon.
Change-Id: I865540511b50859c339da5d76ce37810449aa444
Android needs this and it was patched into their OpenSSL in
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/openssl.git/+/master/patches/0003-jsse.patch
It appears that this is needed because javax.net.ssl.SSLEngine has it as
part of its interface and thus it's part of the Android API. No idea why
anything would ever want to disable that though.
Change-Id: I9c6279a961637f44936889edbe269b9d5c19746d
ssl23_get_client_hello has lots of remnants of SSLv2 support and remnants of an
even older SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST option (see upstream's
d92f0bb6e9ed94ac0c3aa0c939f2565f2ed95935) which complicates the logic.
Split it into three states and move V2ClientHello parsing into its own
function. Port it to CBS and CBB to give bounds checks on the V2ClientHello
parse.
This fixes a minor bug where, if the SSL_accept call in ssl23_get_client_hello
failed, cb would not be NULL'd and SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP would get reported an
extra time.
It also unbreaks the invariant between s->packet, s->packet_length,
s->s3->rbuf.buf, and s->s3->rbuf.offset at the point the switch, although this
was of no consequence because the first ssl3_read_n call passes extend = 0
which resets s->packet and s->packet_length.
It also makes us tolerant to major version bumps in the ClientHello. Add tests
for TLS tolerance of both minor and major version bumps as well as the HTTP
request error codes.
Change-Id: I948337f4dc483f4ebe1742d3eba53b045b260257
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1455
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I908d207ccd3d529ec09c687effc2aeb4631127d9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1470
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Windows doesn't have ssize_t, sadly. There's SSIZE_T, but defining an
OPENSSL_SSIZE_T seems worse than just using an int.
Change-Id: I09bb5aa03f96da78b619e551f92ed52ce24d9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1352
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Building under Ubuntu x86 fails with "Unknown processor:i686".
This adds i686 to CMakeLists.txt, fixing the build.
Change-Id: Ic1c7ce452c019b8a2a875d64a707f640d86c7e31
ssl3_send_client_key_exchange were wrongly reported
by ssl3_send_client_certificate() and
ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm()
Change-Id: I244d3d871b6b4f75a188fd386d52ffc4335d1f9b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1460
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Clang's integrated as accepts unified ARM syntax only. This change
updates the GHASH ARM asm to use that syntax and thus be compatible.
Patch from Nico Weber.
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=124610
Change-Id: Ie6f3de4e37286f0af39196fad33905f7dee7402e
It's a different handshake flow with more state machine coverage. We should
make sure to test the asynchronous version.
Change-Id: I0bb79ca7e6a86bd3cac66bac1f795a885d474909
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1454
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Didn't have coverage for abbreviated handshakes with NewSessionTicket. Also add
some missing resumeSession flags so the tests match the comments.
Change-Id: Ie4d76e8764561f3f1f31e1aa9595324affce0db8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1453
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also change MaxHandshakeRecordLength to 1 in the handshake coverage tests to
better stress the state machine.
Change-Id: I27fce2c000b3d4818fd2e9a47fb09d3f646dd1bd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1452
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Test all pairs of client and server version, except for the ones that require
SSLv3 client support in runner.go. That is, as yet, still missing.
Change-Id: I601ab49c5526cd2eb4f85d5d535570e32f218d5b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1450
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's not part of SSL_OP_ALL and is unused, so remove it. Add a test that
asserts the version check works.
Change-Id: I917516594ec5a4998a8316782f035697c33d99b0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1418
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
(This change originally applied to 1.0.1. In the switch to 1.0.2, the
DTLS specific client processing was removed and now the s3_clnt.c
functions are used. This caused most of the patch to be moot. What
remains is still useful however. For the original patch, see the change
against 1.0.1: 88ae012c8092852f03c50f6461175271104b4c8a)
CVE-2014-3510
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(Imported from upstream's 1d7d0ed9c21403d79d602b6c7d76fdecf5e737da)
Change-Id: I666f9c48d603f2366cab821ae446a57360c3026b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1439
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CVE-2014-3509
(Imported from upstream's 92aa73bcbfad44f9dd7997ae51537ac5d7dc201e)
Change-Id: Ibc681897251081ae5ebfea0ff6ca9defd73fe0f5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1441
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing
function.
CVE-2014-3508
(Imported from upstream's c01618dd822cc724c05eeb52455874ad068ec6a5)
Change-Id: I12bdeeaa700183195e4c2f474f964f8ae7a04549
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1440
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.
Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(Imported from upstream's d345a24569edf0a966b3d6eaae525f0ca4c5e570)
Change-Id: I038f9f01a1d9379f1ee058b231d80e8b9ce6c2d7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1438
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
