This is a really dumb API wart. Now that we have a limited set of curves that
are all reasonable, the automatic logic should just always kick in. This makes
set_ecdh_auto a no-op and, instead of making it the first choice, uses it as
the fallback behavior should none of the older curve selection APIs be used.
Currently, by default, server sockets can only use the plain RSA key exchange.
BUG=481139
Change-Id: Iaabc82de766cd00968844a71aaac29bd59841cd4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4531
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See upstream's bd891f098b. It honestly seems
kinda dumb for a client to do this, but apparently the spec allows this.
Judging by code inspection, OpenSSL 1.0.1 also allowed this, so this avoids a
behavior change when switching from 1.0.1 to BoringSSL.
Add a test for this, which revealed that, unlike upstream's version, this
actually works with ecdh_auto since tls1_get_shared_curve also needs updating.
(To be mentioned in newsletter.)
Change-Id: Ie622700f17835965457034393b90f346740cfca8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4464
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Because RFC 6066 is obnoxious like that and IIS servers actually do this
when OCSP-stapling is configured, but the OCSP server cannot be reached.
BUG=478947
Change-Id: I3d34c1497e0b6b02d706278dcea5ceb684ff60ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4461
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
See upstream's 3ae91cfb32.
I misread that code and thought it was allowing empty cipher suites when there
*is* a session ID, but it was allowing them when there isn't. Which doesn't
make much sense because it'll get rejected later anyway. (Verified by toying
with handshake_client.go.)
Change-Id: Ia870a1518bca36fce6f3018892254f53ab49f460
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4401
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I489d00bc4ee22a5ecad75dc1eb84776f044566e5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4391
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Instead, each module defines a static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS to hold the values.
This makes CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data a no-op as spreading the
CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASSes across modules (and across crypto and ssl) makes cleanup
slightly trickier. We can make it do something if needbe, but it's probably not
worth the trouble.
Change-Id: Ib6f6fd39a51d8ba88649f0fa29c66db540610c76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4375
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Callers are required to use the wrappers now. They still need OPENSSL_EXPORT
since crypto and ssl get built separately in the standalone shared library
build.
Change-Id: I61186964e6099b9b589c4cd45b8314dcb2210c89
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4372
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This causes any unexpected handshake records to be met with a fatal
no_renegotiation alert.
In addition, restore the redundant version sanity-checks in the handshake state
machines. Some code would zero the version field as a hacky way to break the
handshake on renego. Those will be removed when switching to this API.
The spec allows for a non-fatal no_renegotiation alert, but ssl3_read_bytes
makes it difficult to find the end of a ClientHello and skip it entirely. Given
that OpenSSL goes out of its way to map non-fatal no_renegotiation alerts to
fatal ones, this seems probably fine. This avoids needing to account for
another source of the library consuming an unbounded number of bytes without
returning data up.
Change-Id: Ie5050d9c9350c29cfe32d03a3c991bdc1da9e0e4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4300
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Just about everything depends on SSL_CIPHER. Move it to the top as the first
section in ssl.h. Match the header order and the source file order and document
everything. Also make a couple of minor style guide tweaks.
Change-Id: I6a810dbe79238278ac480e5ced1447055715a79f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4290
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
That block is slightly unreachable.
Change-Id: I1b4b2d8b1cd4bb7137ce0aac4b65079545cd9264
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4286
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's no longer needed to distinguish ciphers from fake ciphers.
Change-Id: I1ad4990ba936b1059eb48f3d2f309eb832dd1cb5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4285
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Rather than shoehorn real ciphers and cipher aliases into the same type (that's
what cipher->valid is used for), treat them separately. Make
ssl_cipher_apply_rule match ciphers by cipher_id (the parameter was ignored and
we assumed that masks uniquely identify a cipher) and remove the special cases
around zero for all the masks. This requires us to remember which fields
default to 0 and which default to ~0u, but the logic is much clearer.
Finally, now that ciphers and cipher aliases are different, don't process rules
which sum together an actual cipher with cipher aliases. This would AND
together the masks for the alias with the values in the cipher and do something
weird around alg_ssl. (alg_ssl is just weird in general, as everyone trying to
disable SSLv3 in OpenSSL recently discovered.)
With all that, we can finally remove cipher->valid which was always one.
Change-Id: Iefcfe159bd6c22dbaea3a5f1517bd82f756dcfe1
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4284
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Beyond generally eliminating unnecessary includes, eliminate as many
includes of headers that declare/define particularly error-prone
functionality like strlen, malloc, and free. crypto/err/internal.h was
added to remove the dependency on openssl/thread.h from the public
openssl/err.h header. The include of <stdlib.h> in openssl/mem.h was
retained since it defines OPENSSL_malloc and friends as macros around
the stdlib.h functions. The public x509.h, x509v3.h, and ssl.h headers
were not changed in order to minimize breakage of source compatibility
with external code.
Change-Id: I0d264b73ad0a720587774430b2ab8f8275960329
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4220
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
A previous change in BoringSSL renamed ERR_print_errors_fp to
BIO_print_errors_fp as part of refactoring the code to improve the
layering of modules within BoringSSL. Rename it back for better
compatibility with code that was using the function under the original
name. Move its definition back to crypto/err using an implementation
that avoids depending on crypto/bio.
Change-Id: Iee7703bb1eb4a3d640aff6485712bea71d7c1052
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4310
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are all masks of some sort (except id which is a combined version and
cipher), so they should use fixed-size unsigned integers.
Change-Id: I058dd8ad231ee747df4b4fb17d9c1e2cbee21918
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4283
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The rest of ssl/ still includes things everywhere, but this at least fixes the
includes that were implicit from ssl/internal.h.
Change-Id: I7ed22590aca0fe78af84fd99a3e557f4b05f6782
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4281
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Match the other internal headers.
Change-Id: Iff7e2dd06a1a7bf993053d0464cc15638ace3aaa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4280
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are the remaining untested cipher suites. Rather than add support in
runner.go, just remove them altogether. Grepping for this is a little tricky,
but nothing enables aNULL (all occurrences disable it), and all occurrences of
["ALL:] seem to be either unused or explicitly disable anonymous ciphers.
Change-Id: I4fd4b8dc6a273d6c04a26e93839641ddf738343f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4258
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This drops in a copy of a subset of golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305 to implement
Poly1305. Hopefully this will keep them from regression as we rework the record
layer.
Change-Id: Ic1e0d941a0a9e5ec260151ced8acdf9215c4b887
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4257
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
MSVC doesn't like unary - on unsigned numbers. Also switch ssl3_read_n's
version to uintptr_t to match the write half. This gets us closer to clearing
through C4311 violations. (The remaining one is in asn1_add_error which can go
after verifying that most of asn1_mac.h is safe to drop.)
Change-Id: Idb33dda8863bf1a3408b14d5513a667338311b6b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4255
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
After sharding the session cache for fallbacks, the numbers have been pretty
good; 0.03% on dev and 0.02% on canary. Stable is at 0.06% but does not have
the sharded session cache. Before sharding, stable, beta, and dev had been
fairly closely aligned. Between 0.03% being low and the fallback saving us in
all but extremely contrived cases, I think this should be fairly safe.
Add tests for both the cipher suite and protocol version mismatch checks.
BUG=441456
Change-Id: I2374bf64d0aee0119f293d207d45319c274d89ab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/3972
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This conceivably has a use, but NSS doesn't do this buffer either and it still
suffers from the same problems as the other uses of record_pqueue. This removes
the last use of record_pqueue. It also opens the door to removing pqueue
altogether as it isn't the right data structure for either of the remaining
uses either. (It's not clear it was right for record_pqueue either, but I don't
feel like digging into this code.)
Change-Id: If8a43e7332b3cd11a78a516f3e8ebf828052316f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4239
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It was only ever enabled for handshake and alert messages. The comments cite
renego as a use case though even then I'm not clear on why. The only use I see
is if, say, the Finished message and ClientKeyExchange came in out-of-order.
DTLS is unreliable so leaning on retransmit seems fine, and usually flights
will be packed into one packet where possible. NSS doesn't have any such
buffer and doesn't seem to have problems.
The buffering mechanism is also rather dubious. It stows away the entire packet
and read buffer---all 16K of it---and there may have been other records in that
packet.
Change-Id: Ic3b7bf817be380dc73102eec62c690ed093e6667
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4238
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
At this point, has_version has been set and we may even have a non-null cipher.
Trying to assign meaning to the record-layer version number is not worth making
s->version's semantics even more complicated.
Change-Id: Ia1cf341cf7306eb48d2d11241316dc2116306968
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4237
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Compression is gone, so don't allow for compression overhead. With that fixed,
the second rr->length check in ssl3_get_record matches the length computation
which sizes the read buffer. The first is wrong and doesn't account for the
alignment padding. Move the second to the first.
Change-Id: I3f4f05de9fdf5c645ff24493bbfdf303dcc1aa90
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4236
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also check for overflow, although it really shouldn't happen.
Change-Id: I34dfe8eaf635aeaa8bef2656fda3cd0bad7e1268
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4235
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
These are redundant with the lower level ones in s3_pkt.c just before BIO_read.
Only the operation which actually failed an operation on the BIO should set
the wait state.
Not all failure paths in ssl3_read_bytes and dtls1_read_bytes set SSL_READING,
but those that don't leave the BIO in a retry state, so SSL_READING doesn't
matter.
Change-Id: I2ae064ecc8b2946cc8ae8f724be09dfe49e077b5
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4230
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Fix up the variable names. Also avoid the messy logic of checking whether the
label and context collide with the normal key expansion ones in the face of
adverserial inputs. Make that the caller's responsibility, just as it's already
the caller's responsibility to ensure that different calls don't overlap. (The
label should be a constant string in an IANA registry anyway.)
Change-Id: I062fadb7b6a18fa946b883be660ea9b3f0f6277c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4216
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Separate actually writing the fragment to the network from assembling it so
there is no need for is_fragment. record_split_done also needn't be a global;
as of 7fdeaf11017b82368e0a97547fc491b90ad40f67, it is always reset to 0 whether
or not SSL3_WANT_WRITE occurred, despite the comment.
I believe this is sound, but the pre-7fdeaf1 logic wasn't quiiite right;
ssl3_write_pending allows a retry to supply *additional* data, so not all
plaintext had been commited to before the IV was randomized. We could fix this
by tracking how many bytes were committed to the last time we fragmented, but
this is purely an optimization and doesn't seem worth the complexity.
This also fixes the alignment computation in the record-splitting case. The
extra byte was wrong, as demonstrated by the assert.
Change-Id: Ia087a45a6622f4faad32e501942cc910eca1237b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4234
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
It's still rather a mess, but this is at least somewhat clearer. The old one
had a lot of remnants of compression, etc.
Change-Id: Iffcb4dd4e8c4ab14f60abf917d22b7af960c93ba
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4233
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
If the key is missing, it seems the failure is assumed to be expected.
BUG=473924
Change-Id: I62edd9110fa74bee5e6425fd6786badf5398728c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4231
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Move the state to TestState rather than passing pointers to them everywhere.
Also move SSL_read and SSL_write retry loops into helper functions so they
aren't repeated everywhere. This also makes the SSL_write calls all
consistently account for partial writes.
Change-Id: I9bc083a03da6a77ab2fc03c29d4028435fc02620
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4214
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Extend the False Start tests to optionally send an alert (thus avoiding
deadlock) before waiting for the out-of-order app data. Based on whether the
peer shuts off the connection before or after sending app data, we can
determine whether the peer False Started by observing purely external effects.
Change-Id: I8b9fecc29668e0b0c34b5fd19d0f239545011bae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4213
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Based on whether -false-start is passed, we expect SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to or
not to fire. Also add a flag that asserts SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE does *not* fire
in any False Start test where the handshake fails after SSL_connect returns.
Change-Id: I6c5b960fff15e297531e15b16abe0b98be95bec8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4212
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
That's a pretty obvious thing to test. I'm not sure how we forgot that one.
Change-Id: I7e1a7df6c6abbdd587e0f7723117f50d09faa5c4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4211
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
David Benjamin
Adam Langley
Matt Braithwaite
Brian Smith