This reverts commit 98831738f2.
Let's try this again. tandrii@ says this should be resolved as of
https://crbug.com/840505. (That was a while ago. I'd forgotten about
it.)
Change-Id: Ib49a629198a33d44ff1c3aa13af5825def1a5c4d
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This is so they're exposed out of cryptography.io.
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(This upstreams a change that was landed internally.)
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The last libssl struct is now opaque! (Promote the SSL_MAX_* constants
as folks use them pretty frequently.)
Update-Note: SSL_SESSION is now opaque. I believe everything handles
this now.
Bug: 6
Change-Id: I8cd29d16173e4370f3341c0e6f0a56e00ea188e9
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And since there are now 3 different points in the state machine where
a handback can occur, introduce an enum to describe them.
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Update-Note: This tweaks the SSL_shutdown behavior. OpenSSL's original
SSL_shutdown behavior was an incoherent mix of discarding the record and
rejecting it (it would return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL but retrying the
operation would discard it). SSLeay appears to have intended to discard
it, so we previously "fixed" it actually discard.
However, this behavior is somewhat bizarre and means we skip over
unbounded data, which we typically try to avoid. If you are trying to
cleanly shutdown the TLS portion of your protocol, surely it is at a
point where additional data is a syntax error. I suspect I originally
did not realize that, because the discarded record did not properly
continue the loop, SSL_shutdown would appear as if it rejected the data,
and so it's unlikely anyone was relying on that behavior.
Discussion in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6340 suggests
(some of) upstream also prefers rejecting.
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This change adds server-side support for compressed certificates.
(Although some definitions for client-side support are included in the
headers, there's no code behind them yet.)
Change-Id: I0f98abf0b782b7337ddd014c58e19e6b8cc5a3c2
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The STL already came up with a threading abstraction for us. If this
sticks, that also means we can more easily write tests elsewhere that
use threads. (A test that makes a bunch of TLS connections on a shared
SSL_CTX run under TSan would be nice. Likewise with some of the messy
RSA locking.)
Update-Note: This adds a dependency from crypto_test to C++11 threads.
Hopefully it doesn't cause issues.
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When building files separately, omitting this causes some #defines to be
missing.
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Change-Id: I07040cabcef191f0ab4a7b0e9bd4d46b37b09169
std::condition_variable has its own header to include.
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This matches the OpenSSL 1.1.0 spelling. I'd thought we could hide
SSL_SESSION this pass, but I missed one test that messed with session
IDs!
Bug: 6
Change-Id: I84ea113353eb0eaa2b06b68dec71cb9061c047ca
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GN does not like multiple files in the same target that share a name, so
add a script to check for this. A follow-up changes will hook that up to
the builders, so we'll flag this in try jobs rather than when the change
trickles downstream.
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In neither OpenSSL nor BoringSSL can this function actually fail, but
OpenSSL makes it return one anyway. Match them for compatibility.
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We have a successful TLS 1.3 deployment, in spite of non-compliant
middleboxes everywhere, so now let's get this optimization in. It would
have been nice to test with this from the beginning, but sadly we forgot
about it. Ah well. This shaves 63 bytes off the server's first flight,
and then another 21 bytes off the pair of NewSessionTickets.
So we'll more easily notice in case of anything catastrophic, tie this
behavior to draft 28.
Update-Note: This slightly tweaks our draft-28 behavior.
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It would be nice to restrict these, limiting the incorrect sizes to a
separate EVP_AEAD, but start by documenting this.
Bug: 34
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It appears Chromium still gets upset when two files in a target share a
base name.
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This allows consumers not to use crypto_test_data.cc (which embeds all
the test files), although they'll have to provide their own
implementation of that functionality.
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This file is not part of the Wycheproof project and consumers of
BoringSSL who wish to provide Wycheproof themselves (and not have
third_party/wycheproof_testvectors) need it in another location.
Change-Id: I730fe294f46a9aac77b858a91a03ee64fb8ea579
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VS2017 has added a new warning that indicates where Spectre mitigation
code would be inserted if /Qspectre were specified.
Change-Id: If80cd6a7d0c5a45313f4c3644b304cadecf465b0
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Between CBC being only parallelizable in one direction, bsaes vs vpaes,
and the Lucky 13 fix, seal and open look very different here. Benchmark
both directions.
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|alloca| is dangerous and poorly specified, according to any
description of |alloca|. It's also hard for some analysis tools to
reason about.
The code here assumed |alloca| is a macro, which isn't a valid
assumption. Depending on what which headers are included and what
toolchain is being used, |alloca| may or may not be defined as a macro,
and this might change over time if/when toolchains are updated. Or, we
might be doing static analysis and/or dynamic analysis with a different
configuration w.r.t. the availability of |alloca| than production
builds use.
Regardless, the |alloca| code path only kicked in when the inputs are
840 bits or smaller. Since the multi-prime RSA support was removed, for
interesting RSA key sizes the input will be at least 1024 bits and this
code path won't be triggered since powerbufLen will be larger than 3072
bytes in those cases. ECC inversion via Fermat's Little Theorem has its
own constant-time exponentiation so there are no cases where smaller
inputs need to be fast.
The RSAZ code avoids the |OPENSSL_malloc| for 2048-bit RSA keys.
Increasingly the RSAZ code won't be used though, since it will be
skipped over on Broadwell+ CPUs. Generalize the RSAZ stack allocation
to work for non-RSAZ code paths. In order to ensure this doesn't cause
too much stack usage on platforms where RSAZ wasn't already being used,
only do so on x86-64, which already has this large stack size
requirement due to RSAZ.
This change will make it easier to refactor |BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime|
to do that more safely and in a way that's more compatible with various
analysis tools.
This is also a step towards eliminating the |uintptr_t|-based alignment
hack.
Since this change increases the number of times |OPENSSL_free| is
skipped, I've added an explicit |OPENSSL_cleanse| to ensure the
zeroization is done. This should be done regardless of the other changes
here.
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Thanks to Brian Smith for pointing this out.
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cryptography.io wants things exposed out of EVP_get_cipherby* including,
sadly, ECB mode.
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OpenSSL staples each certificate's friendly name to the X509 with
X509_alias_set1. Mimic this. pyOpenSSL expects to find it there.
Update-Note: We actually parse some attributes now. PKCS#12 files with
malformed ones may not parse.
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PKCS#12 encodes passwords as NUL-terminated UCS-2, so the empty password
is encoded as {0, 0}. Some implementations use the empty byte array for
"no password". OpenSSL considers a non-NULL password as {0, 0} and a
NULL password as {}. It then, in high-level PKCS#12 parsing code, tries
both options.
Match this behavior to appease pyOpenSSL's tests.
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These are tied to OPENSSL_NO_OCSP in upstream but do not actually depend
on most of the OCSP machinery. The CRL invdate extension, in particular,
isn't associated with OCSP at all. cryptography.io gets upset if these
two extensions aren't parseable, and they're tiny.
I do not believe this actually affects anything beyond functions like
X509_get_ext_d2i. In particular, the list of NIDs for the criticality
check is elsewhere.
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Change-Id: Ia24aae31296772e2ddccf78f10a6640da459adf7
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Rather than have plain-C functions, asm functions, and accelerated
functions, just have accelerated and non-accelerated, where the latter
are either provided by assembly or by C code.
Pertinently, this allows Aarch64 to use hardware accel for the basic
|AES_*| functions.
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cryptography.io wants RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02, only used by the
ancient RSA_padding_check_SSLv23 function. Define it but never emit it.
Additionally, it's rather finicky about RSA_R_TOO_LARGE* errors. We
merged them in BoringSSL because having RSA_R_TOO_LARGE,
RSA_R_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS, and RSA_R_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE is a
little silly. But since we don't expect well-behaved code to condition
on error codes anyway, perhaps that wasn't worth it. Split them back
up.
Looking through OpenSSL, there is a vague semantic difference:
RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY - Specifically emitted if a digest is
too big for PKCS#1 signing with this key.
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE - You asked me to sign or encrypt a
digest/plaintext, but it's too big for this key.
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS - You gave me an RSA ciphertext or
signature and it is not fully reduced modulo N.
-OR-
The padding functions produced something that isn't reduced, but I
believe this is unreachable outside of RSA_NO_PADDING.
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE - Some low-level padding function was told to copy
a digest/plaintext into some buffer, but the buffer was too small. I
think this is basically unreachable.
-OR-
You asked me to verify a PSS signature, but I didn't need to bother
because the digest/salt parameters you picked were too big.
Update-Note: This depends on cl/196566462.
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If the callback returns an empty ALPN, we forget we negotiated ALPN at
all (bssl::Array does not distinguish null and empty). Empty ALPN
protocols are forbidden anyway, so reject these ahead of time.
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gcc-8 complains that struct Test shadows class Test from googletest.
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It's conditioned in OpenSSL on client offer, not server accept.
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PyOpenSSL's tests expect all of the outputs to be distinct. OpenSSL also
tends to prefix the return values with strings like "compiler:", so do
something similar.
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cryptography.io depends on this. Specifically, it assumes that any time
a CBC-mode cipher is defined, CMAC is also defined. This is incorrect;
CMAC also requires an irreducible polynomial to represent GF(2^b).
However, one is indeed defined for 64-bit block ciphers such as 3DES.
Import tests from CAVP to test it. I've omitted the 65536-byte inputs
because they're huge and FileTest doesn't like lines that long.
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This was reverted a second time because it ended up always setting the
final argument to CRYPTO_gcm128_init to zero, which disabled some
acceleration of GCM on ≥Haswell. With this update, that argument will be
set to 1 if |aes_hw_*| functions are being used.
Probably this will need to be reverted too for some reason. I'm hoping
to fill the entire git short description with “Revert”.
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This is so Chromium can verify the session before offering it, rather
than doing it after the handshake (at which point it's too late to punt
the session) as we do today. This should, in turn, allow us to finally
verify certificates off a callback and order it correctly relative to
CertificateRequest in TLS 1.3.
(It will also order "correctly" in TLS 1.2, but this is useless. TLS 1.2
does not bind the CertificateRequest to the certificate at the point the
client needs to act on it.)
Bug: chromium:347402
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Previously, we'd omitted OpenSSL's OCSP APIs because they depend on a
complex OCSP mechanism and encourage the the unreliable server behavior
that hampers using OCSP stapling to fix revocation today. (OCSP
responses should not be fetched on-demand on a callback. They should be
managed like other server credentials and refreshed eagerly, so
temporary CA outage does not translate to loss of OCSP.)
But most of the APIs are byte-oriented anyway, so they're easy to
support. Intentionally omit the one that takes a bunch of OCSP_RESPIDs.
The callback is benign on the client (an artifact of OpenSSL reading
OCSP and verifying certificates in the wrong order). On the server, it
encourages unreliability, but pyOpenSSL/cryptography.io depends on this.
Dcument that this is only for compatibility with legacy software.
Also tweak a few things for compatilibility. cryptography.io expects
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead to return something, SSL_get_server_tmp_key's
signature was wrong, and cryptography.io tries to redefine
SSL_get_server_tmp_key if SSL_CTRL_GET_SERVER_TMP_KEY is missing.
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These were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
