This often causes confusion since, for various silly reasons (intrinsic
ref-counting, FOO_METHOD, and RSA's cached Montgomery bits), the thread
safety of some functions don't match the usual const/non-const
distinction. Fix const-ness where easy and document it otherwise.
Change-Id: If2037a4874d7580cc79b18ee21f12ae0f47db7fd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31344
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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make_errors.go didn't seem to get run.
Change-Id: I12739fbab75b9f4898f73f206e404d101642b9c0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31184
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I5ce176538a53136aff3eea4af04b762ac9a5a994
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31044
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Change-Id: I2d1671a4f21a602191fd0c9b932244a376ac5713
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31104
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
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Imported from upstream's 0971432f6f6d8b40d797133621809bd31eb7bf4e and
7d4c97add12cfa5d4589880b09d6139c3203e2f4, but with missing tests added. Along
the way, make Bytes work with any Span<const uint8_t>-convertable type.
Change-Id: If365f981fe8a8274e12000309ffd99b1bb719842
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31086
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Historically, OpenSSL's modular exponentiation functions tolerated negative
moduli by ignoring the sign bit. The special case for a modulus of 1 should do
the same. That said, this is ridiculous and the only reason I'm importing this
is BN_abs_is_word(1) is marginally more efficient than BN_is_one() and we
haven't gotten around to enforcing positive moduli yet.
Thanks to Guido Vranken and OSSFuzz for finding this issue and reporting to
OpenSSL.
(Imported from upstream's 235119f015e46a74040b78b10fd6e954f7f07774.)
Change-Id: I526889dfbe2356753aa1e6ecfd3aa3dc3a8cd2b8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31085
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This fixes uninitialized memory read reported by Nick Mathewson in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6347.
It imports the memset from upstream's 2c739f72e5236a8e0c351c00047c77083dcdb77f,
but I believe that fix is incorrect and instead RC4 shouldn't be allowed in
this context. See
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6603#issuecomment-413066462 for
details.
Update-Note: Decoding a password-protected PEM block with RC4 will, rather than
derive garbage from uninitialized memory, simply fail. Trying to encode a
password-protect PEM block with an unsupported cipher will also fail, rather
than output garbage (e.g. tag-less AES-GCM).
Change-Id: Ib7e23dbf5514f0a523730926daad3c0bdb989417
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31084
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This imports upstream's be4e1f79f631e49c76d02fe4644b52f907c374b2.
Change-Id: If0c4f066ba0ce540beaddd6a3e2540165d949dd2
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/31024
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The fuzzer found another place where it could cause a timeout by
providing a huge PBKDF2 iteration count. This change bounds another two
places where we parse out iteration counts and that's hopefully all of
them.
BUG=oss-fuzz:9853
Change-Id: I037fa09d2bee79e7435a9d40cbd89c07b4a9d443
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30944
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Along the way, split up the EVPTest Wycheproof tests into separate tests (they
shard better when running in parallel).
Change-Id: I5ee919f7ec7c35a7f2e0cc2af4142991a808a9db
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30846
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Also remove some transition step for a recent format change. Together, this
removes the curve hacks in the converter, which can now be purely syntactic.
The RSA ones are still a bit all over the place in terms of sharded vs
combined, so leaving that alone for now.
Change-Id: I721d6b0de388a53a39543725e366dc5b52e83561
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30845
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
We currently write a mix of "if (FOO)" and "if(FOO)". While the former looks
more like a usual language, CMake believes everything, even "if" and "else", is
just a really really funny function call (a "command").
We should pick something for consistency. Upstream CMake writes "if(FOO)", so
go with that one.
Change-Id: I67e0eb650a52670110b417312a362c9f161c8721
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30807
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
MSan and TSan both require instrumenting everything. Add some machinery so we
can do this on the bots.
Change-Id: I7d2106bc852ee976455d18787d3a20a35373a9e7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30644
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This is a version of ChaCha20-Poly1305 that takes a 24-byte nonce,
making the nonce suitable for random generation. It's compatible with
the AEAD of the same name in libsodium.
Change-Id: Ie8b20ba551e5a290b390d362e487f06377166f4c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30384
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Upstream generalized most of the EVP_CTRL_GCM_* constants to be their general
AEAD API in 1.1.0. Define them for better compatibility with code that targets
OpenSSL 1.1.0.
Change-Id: Ieaed8379eebde3718e3048f6290c21cdeac01efd
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30604
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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These functions can be used to configure the signature algorithms. One
of them is a string mini-languaging parsing function, which we generally
dislike because it defeats static analysis. However, some dependent
projects (in this case TensorFlow) need it and we also dislike making
people patch.
Change-Id: I13f990c896a7f7332d78b1c351357d418ade8d11
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30304
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Our test data uses values to up 2048 so the 1024 limit was causing tests
to fail in fuzzing mode.
Change-Id: I71b97be26376a04c13d1f438e5e36a5ffff1c1a4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30484
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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The previous limit was |UINT_MAX|. Windows limits to 600K, but that's
already causing issues. This seems like a balance between being
completely crazy and still large enough not to have to worry for a long
time. It's still probably too large for backend systems wanting to
process arbitrary PKCS#12, but I don't think any fixed value will
satisfy all desires.
Change-Id: I01a3f78d5f2df086f8dbc0e8bacfb95153738f55
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30424
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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(Otherwise the fuzzer will discover that it can trigger extremely large
amounts of computation and start timing out.)
BUG=oss-fuzz:9767
Change-Id: Ibc1da5a90da169c7caf522f792530d1020f8cb54
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30404
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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This change syncs several assembly files from upstream. The only meanful
additions are more CFI directives.
Change-Id: I6aec50b6fddbea297b79bae22cfd68d5c115220f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30364
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
I believe that case was the only way that X509_check_purpose could
return anything other than zero or one. Thus eliminate the last use of
X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT.
Change-Id: If2f071dfa934b924491db2b615ec17390564e7de
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30344
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
OpenSSL 1.0.2 (and thus BoringSSL) accepts keyUsage certSign or a
Netscape CA certificate-type in lieu of basicConstraints in an
intermediate certificate (unless X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) is set.
Update-Note: This change tightens the code so that basicConstraints is required for intermediate certificates when verifying chains. This was previously only enabled if X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT was set, but that flag also has other effects.
Change-Id: I9e41f4c567084cf30ed08f015a744959982940af
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30185
Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
This change adds a new flag, X509_V_FLAG_REQUIRE_CA_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
which causes basicConstraints with isCA to be required for intermediate
CA certificates. Without this, intermediates are also acceptable if
they're missing basicConstraints, but include either a certSign
keyUsage, or a CA Netscape certificate type.
This is a short-term change for patching. I'll undo a lot of it and make
this the default in the next change.
Change-Id: I7f42ffd76c57de3037f054108951e230c1b4e415
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30184
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com>
Setting OPENSSL_NO_ASM skips enabling the “ASM” language in CMake.
However, the FIPS module fundamentally needs to build asm because
delocate works via textual assembly. Thus this combination is currently
broken with CMake.
This change ensures that support for building asm is enabled in CMake
for this combination.
Change-Id: I4516cf3a6f579ee7c72f04ac25d15785926cf125
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29884
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change adds a function so that an ECDH and the hashing of the
resulting 'x' coordinate can occur inside the FIPS boundary.
Change-Id: If93c20a70dc9dcbca49056f10915d3ce064f641f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/30104
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Change-Id: I33c5259f066693c912ba751dff0205ae240f4a92
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29964
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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MSan works by instrumenting memory accesses in the compiler. Accesses from
uninstrumented code, such as assembly, are invisible to it. MSan will
incorrectly report reads from assembly-initialized memory as uninitialized.
To avoid confusing downstream consumers with false positives, catch this at
compile-time with a more useful error.
Update-Note: BoringSSL with MSan and assembly doesn't work, but now rather than
crashing at runtime, it will fail to build altogether. It's possible someone
was building BoringSSL with MSan and either not running it at all or just not
exercising the codepaths that break.
Bug: 252
Change-Id: I0c8b0fa3c2d1e584b3f40d532a668a8c9be06cb7
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29928
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
There were some subtleties in this one. I'm not sure if TSan covers it all, but
it's better than nothing.
Change-Id: I239e3aee2fea84caa2e48f555d08c6d89f430402
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29927
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
The business with cached Montgomery contexts is not trivial.
Change-Id: I60d34ed5f55509372c82534d1c2233a4ad67ab34
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29925
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Confirmed that, if the locks are commented out, TSan catches the threading
error.
Change-Id: I3e4ef9a7ca85fdbacf8c8b13694a5a54c6d5f99b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29924
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Otherwise, if the output BIGNUM was previously negative, we'd incorrectly give
a negative result. Thanks to Guide Vranken for reporting this issue!
Fortunately, this does not appear to come up in any existing caller. This isn't
all that surprising as negative numbers never really come up in cryptography.
Were it not for OpenSSL historically designing a calculator API, we'd just
delete the bit altogether. :-(
Bug: chromium:865924
Change-Id: I28fdc986dfaba3e38435b14ebf07453d537cc60a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29944
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Mostly in comments, but there is one special-case around renegotiation_info
that can now be removed.
Change-Id: I2a9114cbff05e0cfff95fe93270fe42379728012
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29824
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Previously we used thread-local state objects in rand.c. However, for
applications with large numbers of threads, this can lead to excessive
memory usage.
This change causes us to maintain a mutex-protected pool of state
objects where the size of the pool equals the maximum concurrency of
|RAND_bytes|. This might lead to state objects bouncing between CPUs
more often, but should help the memory usage problem.
Change-Id: Ie83763d3bc139e64ac17bf7e015ad082b2f8a81a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29565
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
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Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
lh_FOO_retrieve is often called with a dummy instance of FOO that has
only a few fields filled in. This works fine for C, but a C++
SSL_SESSION with destructors is a bit more of a nuisance here.
Instead, teach LHASH to allow queries by some external key type. This
avoids stack-allocating SSL_SESSION. Along the way, fix the
make_macros.sh script.
Change-Id: Ie0b482d4ffe1027049d49db63274c7c17f9398fa
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29586
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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bssl::UniquePtr and FOO_up_ref do not play well together. Add a helper
to simplify this. This allows us to write things like:
foo->cert = UpRef(bar->cert);
instead of:
if (bar->cert) {
X509_up_ref(bar->cert.get());
}
foo->cert.reset(bar->cert.get());
This also plays well with PushToStack. To append something to a stack
while taking a reference, it's just:
PushToStack(certs, UpRef(cert))
Change-Id: I99ae8de22b837588a2d8ffb58f86edc1d03ed46a
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Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
alignas in C++11 is a bit more flexible than
__attribute__((aligned(x))), and we already require C++11 in tests.
Change-Id: If61c35daa5fcaaca5119dcc6808a3e746befc170
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29544
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
This change moves to the final version of zx_cprng_draw, which cannot
fail. If the syscall would fail, either the operating system terminates
or the kernel kills the userspace process (depending on where the error
comes from).
Change-Id: Iea9563c9f63ea5802e2cde741879fa58c19028f4
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29424
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Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Update-Note: SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(SSL3_VERSION) now fails.
SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 is now zero. Internal SSL3-specific "AEAD"s are gone.
Change-Id: I34edb160be40a5eea3e2e0fdea562c6e2adda229
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29444
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The full library is a bit much, but this is enough to appease most of
cryptography.io.
Change-Id: I1bb0d83744c4550d5fe23c5c98cfd7e36b17fcc9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29365
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Right now we're inconsistent about it. If the OPTIONAL container is
missing, we report an error, but if the container is empty, we happily
return nothing. The latter behavior is more convenient for emulating
OpenSSL's PKCS#7 functions.
These are our own functions, so we have some leeway here. Looking
through callers, they appear to handle this fine.
Update-Note: This is a behavior change.
Change-Id: I1321025a64df3054d380003c90e57d9eb95e610f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29364
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CBS_asn1_ber_to_der was a little cumbersome to use. While it, in theory,
allowed callers to consistently advance past the element, no caller
actually did so consistently. Instead they would advance if conversion
happened, and not if it was already DER. For the PKCS7_* functions, this
was even caller-exposed.
Change-Id: I658d265df899bace9ba6616cb465f19c9e6c3534
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29304
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Copy of OpenSSL change
80770da39e.
This additionally fixes some bugs which causes time validation to
fail when the current time and certificate timestamp are near the
2050 UTCTime/GeneralizedTime cut-off.
Update-Note: Some invalid X.509 timestamps will be newly rejected.
Change-Id: Ie131c61b6840c85bed974101f0a3188e7649059b
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29125
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
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Previously, delocate.go couldn't handle GOT references and so |stderr|
was a problematic symbol. We can cope with them now, so write FIPS
power-on test and urandom errors to stderr rather than stdout.
Change-Id: If6d7c19ee5f22dcbd74fb01c231500c2e130e6f7
Update-note: resolves internal bug 110102292.
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29244
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This change adds an AES-GCM AEAD that enforces nonce uniqueness inside
the FIPS module, like we have for TLS 1.2. While TLS 1.3 has not yet
been mentioned in the FIPS 140 IG, we expect it to be in the next ~12
months and so are preparing for that.
Change-Id: I65a7d8196b08dc0033bdde5c844a73059da13d9e
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29224
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I forgot about this file.
Change-Id: Icb98ffe3ed682a80d7a809a4585a5537fed0ba1c
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/29284
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